Sound Military Decision - Part 17
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Part 17

The application of power, actually or by threat, is dependent on the ability of the human and material components of fighting strength to develop energy and to exert effort for purposes of combat (page 8).

These components, as ranged on one side or the other, const.i.tute the means available and opposed. (See page 31). a.n.a.lysis of these means requires a cla.s.sification of the various factors which influence the situation.

For a broad strategical estimate made by the State, economic and political factors require intensive study; physical objectives, relative position, apportionment of fighting strength, and freedom of action are all involved in such a survey.

For a strategical estimate made by a high military commander, these factors frequently enter to a lesser extent. Such a commander is concerned only with the effect which these factors will have on the operations projected for the particular theater involved in his problem. From his point of view, the economic and political factors often have little bearing on the elements of a favorable military situation. In such a case, the commander concentrates in this section on the factors more directly relating to the armed forces; his important considerations deal with such matters as numerical strength, types of weapons, disposition, and factors as to freedom of action.

For strategical estimates of lesser scope, the commander further restricts his study accordingly.

In detailed tactical estimates the commander requires an exhaustive comprehension of the fighting capabilities of his own and the enemy armed forces, because his selection of physical objectives and his use of relative position are affected by such considerations. This is manifestly true for studied tactical estimates made in advance to meet contingencies, but its import is not always fully understood in its bearing on the unfolding situation after the battle begins. At that time, the most precise knowledge is called for, under the then rapidly changing conditions. (Chapter IX.)

In the Form treated herein, those matters particularly applicable to broad estimates are included under "general factors". These are followed by the factors more directly applicable to the armed forces.

(a) General Factors. (i) Political Factors. The prosecution of the war is directly influenced by such internal conditions as the strength of the national government and its capacity for unified effort, the moulding and maintaining of a firm public opinion in support of war aims, the neutralization of subversive propaganda, and the degree to which the government can make available necessary resources, both domestic and foreign.

External relations modify the conduct of war, always affecting broad estimates of the employment of national forces. The wartime factors which influence these relations include the effect of the clash between foreign opinion and national policy, the national bias of interested neutrals and of unneutral non-belligerent governments, and the normal att.i.tude of such neutrals and non-belligerents toward each belligerent. The diplomatic skill of the opposing governments and the ability of propaganda to sway public opinion abroad may well determine the manner in which neutrality will be enforced.

Alliances, including those that are known and those that are secret, directly influence an estimate. When a war of any importance breaks out in any part of the world, all States are affected to some degree.

One may have an alliance which, though not requiring active partic.i.p.ation in the war, will call for collaboration with the efforts of a belligerent. Another alliance may require active partic.i.p.ation, while still another State may attempt to maintain strict neutrality.

Every State remaining at peace will thus be in a status ranging from that of a non-belligerent, with more or less close ties to one of the contestants, to a position of strict impartiality. The estimate of the international situation becomes more complex as the magnitude of the war increases. A correct appreciation of the status of each State concerned is of first importance in any broad estimate of the conduct of war.

(ii) Economic Factors. The capacity, organization, and mobilization of industry influence the rapidity and adequacy with which material is prepared for, and supplied to, the armed forces. The acceptance by the civilian population of sacrifices, caused by the diversion to war uses of the productive capacity of industry, will have a direct bearing upon the industrial capacity of that State.

The ability and willingness to finance the war effort, which includes the ability to tax, to float internal loans, and to create foreign credits, may well determine the extent and duration of the national capability for war.

The dependence of a nation upon the continuation of foreign trade, including the necessity of obtaining new markets and new sources of supply, affects its strength. No State yet has complete autarchy.

Thus, there is the necessity of obtaining from foreign sources certain of the raw materials which are indispensable to the war effort. As each belligerent may endeavor to deny sources of raw materials to the other, a portion of the fighting power may be required for trade protection.

(iii) Psychological Factors. The maintenance of a stable morale (page 72) at a high level is a primary concern. Such stability inures the nation or command against the full effects of surprise, fear, disappointment, despondency, and other weakening moral influences, while at the same time taking full advantage of those influences which strengthen the moral fiber of a people.

Training and experience influence morale, playing a part difficult to overestimate. They provide a basis for evaluating discipline. A study of the history of the State may prove valuable in estimating the present condition in this respect; a nation or command which may be cla.s.sed as a veteran has an advantage over a beginner at the art of war.

Another important factor relates to the existence of the skills necessary for the production and use of the material means of war. The control of skilled personnel is a psychological consideration of great importance.

Unity of effort, or the lack of it, especially between management and labor, may be one of the most important factors of the estimate.

Special attention is desirable as to national inventiveness and versatility in the production of new and surprising means of war or in development of methods that in any way contribute to a successful war effort.

Racial or national characteristics may affect the estimates of morale and training. Reactions of various races or groups to the conditions of war have been sufficiently recorded, on the basis of past performance, to prove of some value. Service traditions may furnish clues for correct evaluation of psychological factors.

While only the physical elements of fighting strength are susceptible of quant.i.tative comparison, failure to take account of mental and moral factors may involve serious error. Nevertheless, in many situations, such factors remain relatively indeterminate until subjected to test. Inferences may be drawn, and deductions made, on a basis of peace-time observation and of historical precedent. In these, racial and national characteristics may figure prominently. History, however, has taught that, in a conflict between modern industrial and military nations, it is unwise to entertain any a.s.sumption other than that of moral equality until such time as the conflict has demonstrated the existence of a difference, and the degree thereof, or unless prior experience, observation, and acquaintance unquestionably warrant otherwise.

(iv) Information and counter-information measures. Operations of war are tremendously affected by the information which each belligerent possesses of the others. It is therefore of vital importance to weigh the efficiency of the belligerents in the employment of means of obtaining, denying, and utilizing information.

There may appropriately be considered present, probable, or possible use or non-use of indirect methods such as: study of press, captured doc.u.ments, and material; reports from other friendly units; interrogation of prisoners of war, deserters, inhabitants, and escaped or exchanged prisoners; radio direction-finding; efficiency of cryptography; interception of enemy radio, telegraph, telephone, and mail communications; espionage; censorship; propaganda; efficiency of communications systems, ash.o.r.e and afloat, which include all means of interchange of thought. In this connection it will be recalled that information, however accurate and appropriate, is useless if it cannot be conveyed in time.

The direct methods of obtaining information are military operations intended for that purpose, such as observation, reconnaissance, scouting, trailing.

Counter-information measures are no less important than those pertaining to collection of information. Such measures include all provisions for secrecy, such as censorship, counter-espionage, cryptography, control of own communications, security of doc.u.ments, camouflage, and applicable tactical operations.

(b) Factors More Directly Applicable to Armed Forces, (i) Vessels, including aircraft. The numbers and characteristics, of the ships and aircraft of the various nations of the world are known with less and less accuracy from the time when war becomes a probability. The information available is given intense and comparative scrutiny, under the specific headings of the factors of the Estimate Form as later enumerated.

(ii) Land forces, including land-based aviation. Important facts concerning the land forces of the enemy, including his land-based aviation, will be known, probably, to a lesser extent than in the case of the naval forces. The value of a comparison--naval, land, or air--may depend upon whether the intelligence service has improved the accuracy of these data, maintained them up to date, and collected accurate additional information.

(iii) Personnel. The status of enemy personnel as to the sufficiency of numbers effectively to man all implements, as to training, morale, skill, stamina, and willingness to accept the supreme sacrifice, can seldom be accurately known. Unless there is positive information to the contrary, the wise commander will a.s.sume in this respect that the status of the personnel available to his opponent is at least equal to that of his own command. Full consideration will be given to all known facts concerning own personnel, to the end that its worth in any proposed situation may be properly evaluated.

The basic discussion of the psychological factors (page 125) is applicable here as to the respective armed forces. Personal characteristics of commanders, so far as known, deserve full study, since they have an important bearing on relative fighting strength.

The military value of the various units and forces is a similar consideration. The present att.i.tude and past actions of enemy commanders and of their commands, and the factor of racial, national, and service characteristics, may furnish clues for correct evaluation in this connection.

(iv) Material. The material characteristics of the commander's own implements of war are generally known to him. The characteristics of enemy material can only be estimated from such data as have become available, but are not to be underestimated.

Material characteristics embrace armament, life, and mobility.

Armament relates to the caliber and number of guns, and to other weapons such as torpedoes, mines, depth-charges and aircraft (with their own weapons). It also includes chemical agents and other instrumentalities, together with the types, potentialities as to range, and the number or amount of each available, both for immediate use and as replacements. Ammunition supply is a factor here. In the evaluation of foreign armaments, sufficient data are often available to make a reasonable estimate, but care is desirable not to underestimate.

Life is the ability to withstand punishment; it is expressed in terms of standards which can be clearly visualized. For a vessel, life is the ability to absorb damage while carrying out its a.s.signed task. In the absence of definite factual data, evaluation of the life of foreign vessels will sometimes prove difficult. Here, again, an underestimate is dangerous.

Mobility is capability of movement. It is compounded of the elements of speed, radius, and the ability to operate under imposed conditions of weather, visibility, hydrography, and other possible obstacles to certain and free movement. Mobility is one of the most important factors pertaining directly to relative position, to apportionment of fighting strength, and to freedom of action. Closely related factors are the organization, disposition, and methods of operation of the enemy, and of own forces. Accurate knowledge of these factors, before an operation, greatly enhances the possibilities of dealing effectively with the enemy.

The condition of the implements of war embraces such factors as the efficiency of motive machinery, the integrity of underwater compartments and other material construction, and physical endurance.

The last applies not only to material, but also to living beings, and involves the ability to withstand the wasting effects of operations, whether due to fatigue, hardship, disease, worry, wounds, or other causes. Here again, it is obvious that the commander will often have only an imperfect idea of the condition of the enemy in this respect.

His experience will lead him to form an accurate estimate of his own condition. Definitely, unless he has positive information to the contrary, he a.s.sumes that the condition of the enemy is no worse or better than his own. (See also the psychological factors, page 125 and the personnel factor, page 127).

(v) Logistics support is of primary concern to the commander. In the naval service, this is particularly true of the strategical estimate.

While the factor may also have some bearing on a tactical estimate, logistics support will rarely change sufficiently, during a naval battle, to affect the outcome. This support exercises a dominant influence upon the fighting power of armed forces. It is concerned with the availability, adequacy, and supply of the following:

Material: items such as fuel, ammunition, weapons, aircraft, food, clothing, spare parts, repair materials, animals, and general supplies.

Personnel: military and civilian; number and quality of replacements.

Facilities: factors such as bases; manufacture and repair facilities, afloat and ash.o.r.e; shelter; sanitation; hospitalization; recreation; transportation; education; counter-espionage; counter-propaganda.

The limitation imposed upon operations by logistics represents the final limit of a commander's plan of action.

(2) Survey of the Characteristics of the Theater of Operations.

The characteristics of the theater of operations exert an influence, always important, sometimes paramount, upon the possibility of attaining the objective, and upon the strategical and tactical operations that may be employed.

At this point in his estimate the commander utilizes his charts, intelligence reports, and hydrographic publications to make a factual study of the theater. This study is not for the purpose, at this time, of drawing any conclusions as to possible courses of action, but to furnish data which will a.s.sist in consideration of later sections of the estimate. The study may be made under several important headings, as follows:

(a) Hydrography. A study of the hydrography will determine the depth of water, the existence of shoals, the presence of unusual currents, the rise and fall of the tides, the availability of channels, and other pertinent features. These are recorded for later use.

Shallow water may permit mining or may prevent the operation of submarines. On the other hand, the ability to mine in shallow water may be curtailed by strong currents or by the rise and fall of the tide. Again, the depth of water, the strength of currents, and the range of the tide may determine the feasibility of netting the entrance to a port or base. In a tactical action, advantage may be taken of shoals to limit the freedom of action of the enemy, without, however, interfering with that of one's own forces.

(b) Topography. The topography of the area is also frequently of interest to the naval commander. In actions close to the sh.o.r.e, the character of the coast may play an important role. A high bluff, combined with considerations as to light, may create a very definite advantage or disadvantage in a naval tactical situation.

Topography may be a most important consideration in determining what bases are to be used. The commander makes note of the topography of the various possible bases; later in his estimate, the natural features lending a.s.sistance to the defense of the various sites may play an important part in the selection of bases.

The use of channels may depend upon the topography of the bordering land. Questions arise as to whether such land can be seized and held, or, if in friendly hands, whether it can afford adequate protection to the channel.