[167] THOMAS CARLYLE, "Essays," I. 77, 214.

[168] C. BONNET, "Palingenesie Philosophique," 4 vols., I. 7, 47, 52.

[169] DR. PRIESTLEY, "Disquisitions," pp. 37, 38.

[170] DR. THOMAS BROWN, "Lectures," No. XCVI.

[171] ATKINSON, "Letters," p. 17.

[172] DR. SAM. CLARKE'S "Third Defence," in reply to Collins, pp. 5, 8, 17.

[173] DR. SAM. CLARKE, "First Defence," pp. 11, 16; "Second Defence,"

pp. 4, 10.

[174] DR. CLARKE'S "Letter to Mr. Dodwell," pp. 34, 69, 72. ANDREW BAXTER, "On the Soul," I. 227, 233.

[175] Matthew 10: 28.

[176] Luke 16: 22; Phil. 1: 23.

[177] DR. PRIESTLEY, "Disquisitions," p. 103; "Free Discussion," pp. 66, 237.

[178] FLAVEL, "Pneumatologia; or, Treatise of the Soul," I. 290. SIR M.

HALE, "Primitive Origination of Mankind," p. 309.

[179] _Compare_ Heb. 12: 9; Num. 16: 22; 27: 16; Zech. 12: 1; Luke 23: 43, 46; Acts 7: 59; Eccles. 12: 7; 2 Cor. 5: 8; James 2: 26; Luke 24: 39; John 10: 25; John 5: 24.

[180] DR. OLINTHUS GREGORY, "Life of Hall," Works, VI. 26.

CHAPTER V.

THEORY OF GOVERNMENT BY NATURAL LAWS.--VOLNEY.--COMBE.

The theory of "natural laws" has been applied to disprove or supersede the doctrine of Creation, by means of the principle of Development. It has been further applied to _the government_, as well as to the _creation_, of the world; and in this connection, it has been urged as a reason for disbelieving the doctrine of G.o.d's special PROVIDENCE, and employed to discredit the efficacy of PRAYER.

When thus applied, it is often a.s.sociated with the recognition of the Divine existence, and cannot, therefore, be ranked among systems avowedly Atheistic. But from the earliest times, it has been the belief of seriously reflecting men, that a system which professedly recognizes the Divine Being as the Creator of the world, but practically excludes Him from the government of its affairs, however _theoretically_ different from Atheism, is substantially the same with it.[181] It was against this Epicurean Atheism that Howe contended in his "Living Temple;" an Atheism which acknowledged G.o.ds, but "accounted that they were such as between whom and man there could be no conversation,--on _their_ part by providence, on _man's_ by religion." And it was against the same Epicurean Atheism that Cudworth contended in his "Intellectual System of the Universe," when he grappled with the objections which had been urged against the doctrine of Providence and the practice of prayer.[182]

It is not wonderful that either Atheists or Pantheists should discard the doctrine of Providence, or deny the efficacy of Prayer. On their principles, there is no room for the recognition of a supreme intelligent Power governing the world, or of a Will capable of controlling the course of human affairs.[183] But while neither Atheism nor Pantheism could be expected to recognize a presiding Providence, since they equally exclude a personal G.o.d, it may well seem strange that any system of Theism, whether natural or revealed, should omit or oppose this fundamental truth. For the doctrine of Providence may be established, _inductively_, by the very same kind of evidence to which every Theist has recourse in proving the existence and perfections of the Divine Being; and, His existence and perfections being proved, the doctrine of Providence may be inferred, _deductively_, from His character, and from the relations which He sustains towards His creatures, since it cannot be supposed that He who brought them into being, as the products of His own wisdom, goodness, and power, and endowed them with all their various properties for some great and n.o.ble end, will ever cease to care for them, or deem them unworthy of His regard. Yet, strong as is the proof arising from these and similar sources, there have occasionally appeared in all ages, and especially at a certain stage in the progress of philosophical speculation, men who admitted, and even maintained, the existence of the Supreme Being, while they denied, nevertheless, the doctrine of Providence and the efficacy of Prayer.

In certain stages of philosophic inquiry, there is a natural tendency, we think, or at least a strong temptation, to subst.i.tute the laws of Nature in the place of G.o.d, or to conceive of him as somehow removed to a greater distance from us by means of these laws. Every one must be conscious, to some extent, of this tendency in his own personal experience; he must have felt that when he first began to apprehend any one of the great laws of Nature, and still more when he advanced far enough to see that every department of the physical world is subject to them, so as to exhibit a constant order, an all-pervading harmony, his views of G.o.d and Providence became less impressive in proportion as the domain of "law" was extended, and that he was in imminent danger of sinking, if not into _theoretical_, at least into _practical_ Atheism.

"It is a fact," says Dr. Channing, "that Science has not made Nature _as expressive of G.o.d_ in the first instance or, to the beginner in religion, as it was in earlier times. Science reveals a rigid, immutable _order_; and this to common minds looks much like self-subsistence, and does not manifest intelligence, which is full of life, variety, and progressive operation. Men in the days of their ignorance saw an immediate Divinity accomplishing an immediate purpose, or expressing an immediate feeling, in every sudden, striking change of Nature, ... and Nature, thus interpreted, became the sign of a present, deeply-interested Deity."[184] That the scientific study of Nature, and especially of certain departments of physical inquiry, has often had the effect of deadening our sense of a present and presiding Deity, of obscuring or perplexing our views of the connection of G.o.d with His works, and of virtually removing Him from all efficient control over the creatures of His hands, is attested, not only by the published speculations of some, but also by the inward consciousness of many more, who have never avowed infidel sentiments to others, nor even, at least articulately, to themselves. It may be useful, therefore, to inquire somewhat particularly, whether, and how far, the existence of "natural laws" and the operation of "second causes" should affect our views of the Providence which G.o.d exercises over us, or of the Prayers which we address to Him.

SECTION I.

THE DOCTRINE OF NATURAL LAWS AND SECOND CAUSES.

The existence of "natural laws," and the operation of "second causes,"

are often explicitly recognized, and always obviously implied, in Scripture. Revelation is not designed to explain the nature or the action of either; but it a.s.sumes the reality of both.[185] It is plainly implied in the very _first_ chapter of Genesis, that, at the era of creation, G.o.d gave _a definite const.i.tution_, implying peculiar properties and powers, to all the various cla.s.ses of objects which were then called into being. He created light, with its peculiar properties; He created water, with its peculiar properties. He created everything "after its kind." The distinction between one created thing and another, such as light and water, and the distinction also between "genera" and "species," especially in the case of plants, trees, fish, fowl, cattle, and reptiles, are very strongly marked in the sacred narrative: and this distinction implies the existence of certain properties peculiar to each of these objects or cla.s.ses,--properties not common to them all, but distinctive and characteristic, which made them to be, severally, what they are, and which amount to a _distinct definite const.i.tution_. These properties, account for them as we may, are essential to their existence as distinct objects in nature, and cannot be separated from them as long as the objects themselves exist. Light has certain properties, and so has water, and so has every distinct order of vegetable or animal life, which make them to be what they severally are, and which cannot be severed from them otherwise than by the destruction of their very nature. These properties are known to us by their _effects_; and hence the substances or beings to which they respectively belong are regarded by us as _causes_; and their operation as causes is regulated by certain "laws," imposed upon them by the same Omnipotent Will which called them into being and endowed them with all their peculiar properties and powers. The operation of these "natural causes,"

and the existence of certain "established laws" by which they are regulated, are explicitly recognized or obviously a.s.sumed in Scripture.[186] "Thou hast established the earth, and it abideth; they continue this day _according to thine ordinances_, for all are _thy servants_."

The established const.i.tution and settled order of Nature, as well as the "laws," "decrees," or "ordinances" by which it is regulated, are thus explicitly recognized in Scripture itself; and there are several reasons why this fact should be deliberately considered. First, because it seems to have been a.s.sumed by our opponents, that the discovery of "natural laws," and the admission of "second causes," must necessarily be adverse, and may ultimately prove fatal, to the cause of Religion; or, in other words, that Faith must recede just in proportion as Science advances; whereas the Bible speaks both of natural objects, possessing peculiar properties and powers, and also of natural laws, as G.o.d's "ordinances" both in the heavens and the earth, but speaks nevertheless of a presiding Providence or governing Will, without ever supposing that the two are incompatible or mutually exclusive. Secondly, because some of the less intelligent members of the Christian community itself seem to be influenced, to a certain extent, by the very same error which we ascribe to our opponents; and evince a very groundless jealousy of Science, as if they feared that the progress of physical research might have the effect of weakening the grounds on which they believe in the care of Providence and the efficacy of Prayer; whereas the Bible gives no countenance to any jealousies or fears of this kind, but affirms G.o.d's providential government and encourages man's believing prayer, at the very time when it founds upon and appeals to the established const.i.tution and course of Nature.[187] And thirdly, because a right apprehension of the properties and powers belonging to created beings, and of the laws to which they are severally subject, will be found to conduce largely to a clear and comprehensive view of the relation which G.o.d sustains to His works. His Providence, as it is declared and exemplified in Scripture, has _a necessary reference to the natural const.i.tution of things_; and hence the Westminster Confession, in the spirit of the highest philosophy, and with admirable discrimination and accuracy, affirms that "G.o.d, the Creator of all things, doth uphold, direct, dispose, and govern, all creatures, actions, and things, from the greatest even to the least, by His most wise and holy Providence;"

that "by the same Providence, He ordereth all things to fall out _according to the nature of second causes_, either necessarily, freely, or contingently;" and that "G.o.d in His ordinary Providence maketh use of means, yet is free to work without, above, and against them at His pleasure."[188]

"Natural laws" and "second causes" are thus established by experience, and explicitly recognized in Scripture. It is necessary, however, especially with reference to certain modern speculations, to discriminate between the two; and to show that while they are closely related and equally legitimate objects of philosophical inquiry, they are nevertheless radically different, as well as easily distinguishable, from each other. It is the favorite doctrine of the Positive school in France that the knowledge of "causes" is utterly interdicted to man, and that the only science to which he should aspire consists exclusively in the knowledge of "phenomena," and their coordination under "general laws." M. Comte explicitly avows this doctrine, and Mr. Mill and Mr.

Lewes give it their implied sanction.[189] According to their theory, all Science is limited to "the laws of the coexistence and succession of phenomena," and "causes" are not only unknown, but incapable of being known. And to such an extent is this doctrine carried that M. Comte antic.i.p.ates the possible ultimate reduction of _all_ "phenomena" to _one_ all-comprehensive, all-pervading "law," as the highest perfection of Science and the decisive extinction of Religion; while Mr. Mill, doubtful of this being possible, thinks it conceivable, at least, that there may be worlds, different from our own, in which events occur _without causes_ of any kind, and even without any _fixed law_.

In regard to this theory it might well be asked, how it comes to pa.s.s that human language, which is the natural exponent of human thought, should contain, in every one of its multifarious dialects, so many expressions which denote or imply "causation," if it be true that all knowledge of causes is utterly inaccessible to the human faculties? Nay, why is it that the axiom of causation needs only to be announced to command the immediate a.s.sent of the whole human race?

It will be found, we believe, that even in the case of those who contend for this theory, the instinctive and spontaneous belief in "causation" is not extinguished nor even impaired; but that they seek merely _to subst.i.tute "laws" for "causes_," or rather to represent _the laws of nature_ as the only _efficient causes_ of all natural phenomena.

They thus identify or confound two things which it is of the utmost consequence to discriminate and keep distinct. There is an ambiguity, however, in the common usage of the term "law," which may seem to give a plausible appearance to their theory, or at least to vail over and conceal its radical fallacy. It denotes sometimes the mere statement of _a general fact_, or the result of a comprehensive generalization, founded on the observation and comparison of many particular facts; it denotes at other times _the force or power_, whatever that may be, which produces any given set of phenomena. The "law" of gravitation, for example, is often used to denote nothing more than the _general fact_, ascertained by experience, that all bodies near the surface of the earth tend to its centre with a velocity proportioned directly to their ma.s.s, and inversely to the square of their distance; and when it is employed in _this_ sense, it determines nothing as to the "cause" which is in operation,--it affirms merely a fact, or a fact reduced to a formula, and confirmed by universal experience. But it is often transferred, at least mentally and almost perhaps unconsciously, to denote some "power"

which is instinctively supposed to be in operation when any change is observed,--a "power" which may be conceived of, either as a _property_ inherent in mind or in matter, or as a _force_, such as the Divine volition, acting upon it _ab extra_; and it is only in the latter of these two senses, as denoting a "cause," properly so called, and not a mere fact or law, that it can be applied to account for any phenomenon.

In like manner, the "laws of motion" are merely the generalized results of our experience and observation relative to the direction, velocity, and other phenomena of moving bodies; but "motion," although it is regulated, is not produced, by these laws; it depends on a "cause,"

whatever that may be, which is not only distinguishable, but different from them all. Yet when we speak of the "laws of motion," we may imperceptibly include, in our conception of them, that _force_ or _power_ which impels the body, as well as the mere _law_ or _rule_ which regulates its movements. It were a mere unprofitable dispute about words, did we entertain and discuss the question, whether the import of the term "law" might not be so extended as to include under it _powers_, _properties_, and _causes_, as well as the _rules_ and _conditions_ of their operation: for, even were this question answered in the affirmative, there would still be room for a real distinction between the two, and there could be no reason for saying that the knowledge of "causes," as distinguished from "laws," is wholly inaccessible to the human faculties. There is thus a real and important distinction between "laws" considered simply as general facts, and "causes" considered as efficient agents; and the two cannot be reduced to the same category, otherwise than by giving such an extension to the term "law" as shall make it comprehensive of _causation_; and even then, the distinction remains between the mere formulas of Science and the actual forces of Nature. "The laws of Nature," says the sagacious Dr. Reid, "are the _rules_ according to which the effects are produced, but there must be a _cause_ which operates according to these rules. The rules of navigation never navigated a ship; the rules of architecture never built a house."[190]

It might be shown, were it needful for our present purpose, that the object of Science is _threefold: first_, to ascertain particular facts; _secondly_, to reduce these facts under general laws; and, _thirdly_, to investigate the "causes" by which both _facts_ and _laws_ may be accounted for. The exclusion of any one of the three would be fatal to Philosophy as well as Religion; and it is prohibited by the "natural laws" of the human mind, which has the capacity not only of observing particular facts, but of comparing and contrasting them so as to deduce from them a knowledge of general laws, and which is also imbued with an instinctive and spontaneous tendency to ascribe every change that is observed to some "power" or "cause" capable of producing such an effect.

It might further be shown, that in every instance a "cause," properly so called, is a _substance_ or _being_ possessing certain properties or powers,--properties which may be called, if you will, the "laws" of that substance, but which necessarily include the idea of _causation_ or _efficiency_; that in the case of mere physical agency, there must be a plurality of substances so related as that the one shall act on the other in certain conditions which are indispensable to their mutual action; and that these requirements leave ample room for those manifold adjustments and adaptations on which the argument from "design," in favor of the Perfections and Providence of G.o.d, is founded. The mere recognition of "general laws," considered simply as the "coordination of facts," and especially as exclusive of the idea of causation or efficiency, can never satisfy the demands of reason, nor exhaust the legitimate functions of Science. For, in the expressive words of Sir John Hersch.e.l.l, "It is high time that philosophers, both physical and others, should come to some nearer agreement than seems to prevail, as to the meaning they intend to convey in speaking of causes and causation. On the one hand, we are told that the grand object of physical inquiry is to explain the nature of phenomena by referring them to their _causes_; on the other, that the inquiry into 'causes' is altogether vain and futile, and that Science has no concern but with the discovery of 'laws.' Which of these is the truth? Or are both views of the matter true _on a different interpretation of the terms_? Whichever view we may take, or whichever interpretation we may adopt, there is one thing certain,--the extreme inconvenience of such a state of language. This can only be reformed by a careful a.n.a.lysis of the widest of all human generalizations, disentangling from one another the innumerable shades of meaning which have got confounded together in its progress, and establishing among them a rational cla.s.sification and nomenclature.... A 'law' may be a _rule of action_, but it is not _action_. The great First Agent may lay down a rule of action for himself, and that rule may become known to man by observation of its uniformity; but, const.i.tuted as our minds are, and having that conscious knowledge of _causation_ which is forced upon us by the reality of the distinction between _intending_ a thing, and _doing_ it, we can never subst.i.tute the 'rule' for the 'act.'"[191]

But while the existence of "natural laws" and the operation of "second causes" are equally admitted, and yet duly discriminated, large room is still left for diversities of opinion or of statement in regard to _the precise relation which G.o.d sustains to His works_, and especially in regard to _the nature and method of His agency in connection with the use of "second causes_." Hence have arisen the various theories which have appeared successively in the history of Philosophy, and which have had for their avowed object the explanation of the _connection between G.o.d and Nature_, or the conciliation of Theology with Science.[192]

Hence, first of all, the theory of "occasional causes," as taught by Father Malebranche, with the laudable, but, as we think, mistaken, design of vindicating the Divine agency in Providence by virtually superseding every other power in Nature;--a theory which represents physical agencies as the mere _occasions_, and G.o.d as the sole _cause_ of all changes, which teaches that a healthy eye, with the presence of light, is not the cause of vision, but the occasion only of that Divine interposition by which alone we are enabled to see, and that a man's desire or volition to walk is not the cause of his walking, but the occasion merely of that Divine interposition which alone puts the proper muscles in motion. Hence, secondly, the theory of "preestablished harmony" as taught by Leibnitz;--a theory which was mainly designed to explain the relation subsisting between the soul and the body, but which involves principles bearing on the general doctrine of cause and effect, and applicable to the relation subsisting between G.o.d and His works.

This theory teaches that mind and body, although closely united, have no real influence on each other, that each of them acts by its own properties and powers, and that their respective operations exactly correspond to each other by virtue of a "preestablished harmony" between the two, just as one clock may be so adjusted as to keep time with another, although each has its own moving power, and neither receives any part of its motions from the other. This theory, therefore, denies everything like causal action between mind and matter; and when it is extended, as it may legitimately be, to the relation between G.o.d and the world, it would seem to imply the coequal existence and independence of both, and the impossibility of any causal relation between the two. The manifest defects of these theories have given rise to a _third_, which, in one of its forms, has been generally adopted by Divines,--the theory of "instrumental causes."

This theory has a.s.sumed two distinct and very different forms. In the first, all natural effects are ascribed to powers _imparted_ to created beings, and _inherent_ in them; that is, to powers which are supposed to have been conferred at the era of Creation, and to be still sustained by G.o.d's will in Providence, subject, however, to be suspended or revoked according to His pleasure. In the second, which resembles in some respects the doctrine of "occasional causes," all natural effects are ascribed to powers not _imparted_, but _impressed_, not belonging to the natural agent, but communicated by impulse _ab extra_; and G.o.d's will is represented as the only efficient cause in Nature. In both forms of the theory, the agency of G.o.d and the instrumentality of natural means are, in a certain sense, acknowledged; but in the _former_, second causes are apt to be regarded as if they were self-existent and independent of G.o.d; in the _latter_, second causes are apt to be virtually annulled, and all events to be regarded as the immediate effects of Divine volition. Both extremes are dangerous. For, on the one hand, the operation of second causes cannot be regarded as necessary and independent, without severing the tie which connects the created universe with the will of the Supreme; and, on the other hand, the operation of second causes cannot be excluded or denied, without virtually making G.o.d's will _the only efficient cause_, and thereby charging directly and immediately on Him, not only all the physical changes which occur in Nature, but also all the volitions and actions of His creatures. In order to guard against these opposite and equally dangerous extremes, we must hold the real existence and actual operation of "second causes;" while we are careful, at the same time, to show both that whatever powers belong to any created being were originally conferred by G.o.d, and also that they are still preserved and perpetuated by Him, subject to his control, and liable to be suspended or revoked, according to the pleasure of His will. We would thus have _one First_, and MANY SECOND CAUSES; the former _supreme_, the latter _subordinate_; really distinct, but not equally independent, since "second causes" are, from their very nature, subject to the dominion and control of that Omniscient Mind which called them into being, and which knows how to overrule them all for the accomplishment of His great designs.

We are aware that some are unwilling to acknowledge the _efficiency_ of any "second causes," and seek to resolve all events, even such as are brought about by the volitions of men, into the will of G.o.d, as the only Agent in Nature. Others, again, admitting the existence of created spirits, and their operation as real causes, are unwilling to acknowledge any active powers in _matter_, and are anxious to show that _mind_, and _mind only_, can be an efficient cause. We see no reason for this extreme jealousy of "second causes" either in the mental or the material world. In the mental world, they cannot be denied, as distinct, although subordinate and dependent, agencies, without virtually making G.o.d's will _the only cause_ in Nature, and thereby representing Him as the _cause of sin_, if sin, indeed, could exist on that supposition, or without destroying the distinct individuality and personal responsibility of man. Man must be regarded as a distinct, though dependent, _agent_, and, as such, a real, though subordinate, _cause_; otherwise every action, whether good or evil, must be ascribed directly and immediately to the efficiency of the Divine will, and _to that alone_. And in the material world, "second causes" can as little be dispensed with; for every theory, even the most meagre, must acknowledge the existence of _some_ power or property in matter, were it only the pa.s.sive power or _vis inertiae_ on which all the laws of motion depend.

And if _this_ can be admitted as a power inherent in matter and inseparable from it, we cannot see why the existence of _other_ powers, not incompatible with this, should be deemed a whit more derogatory to the dominion and providence of G.o.d. In a certain sense, indeed, G.o.d's will may be said to be the First, the Supreme Cause of all, since nothing can happen without His permission or appointment: but, in this sense, the existence of "natural laws" and the operation of "second causes" are by no means excluded; they are only held to have been originated at first, and ever afterwards sustained by the Divine Will, the latter being _supreme_, the former _subordinate_. It may also be said, in a certain sense, that Mind only is active:[193] for all the properties and powers of matter are the results of the Divine volition, and their mode of action is regulated and determined by "laws" which G.o.d has imposed; but it were unphilosophical, as well as unscriptural, to infer from this that He is the only Agent in the Universe; it is enough to say that He created the system of Nature, and that He still upholds and governs it by His Providence.

It must be evident that the speculations to which we have referred have a close connection with the argument, founded on natural evidence, for the being, perfections, and providence of G.o.d. That argument, in so far as it depends on the mutual adaptations between natural objects and the nice adjustments of natural laws, might be seriously impaired by supposing that there is really only one cause in Nature; whereas the ascription of certain properties and powers to created beings, whether mental or material, can have no effect in diminishing its force, since the evidence depends not so much on the phenomena of _physical_, as on those of _moral_ causation.

On the whole, we conclude that the existence of "natural laws" and the operation of "second causes" are recognized alike by the sacred writers and by sound philosophy; and that neither the one nor the other ought to be regarded as adverse to any doctrine which, as Christian Theists, we are concerned to defend.

SECTION II.

THE CONSt.i.tUTION OF MAN CONSIDERED IN ITS RELATION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF G.o.d.

"The Const.i.tution of Man considered in Relation to External Objects,"[194]--such is the t.i.tle of a popular, and, in some respects, instructive work, which has obtained, partly through the aid of an endowment, extensive circulation among the reading cla.s.s of artisans and tradesmen. Written in a lucid style, and ill.u.s.trated by numerous facts in Natural History and Philosophy, it is skilfully adapted to the capacities and tastes of common readers, and it is not wonderful that it should have exerted considerable influence on the public mind. The character of that influence, and its tendency to induce a religious or irreligious frame of spirit, has been made a matter of controversial discussion. On the one hand, Mr. Combe tells us that "'The Const.i.tution of Man' not only admits the existence of G.o.d, but is throughout devoted to the object of expounding and proving that He exercises a real, practical, and intelligible government of this world, rewarding virtue with physical and moral well-being, and punishing vice with want and suffering." On the other hand, it is manifest, beyond the possibility of doubt or denial, that if his professed Theism has subjected him to the charge of being an inconsequent thinker in some of the organs of avowed Atheism,[195] his favorite arguments in support of "government by natural law" have been applied by himself, and eagerly welcomed by others, as conclusive objections to the doctrine of a special Providence and the efficacy of Prayer.

We do not object to the limitation of his inquiry to the one point of the relation subsisting between "the Const.i.tution of Man and External Objects,"--that is a perfectly legitimate, and might be a highly instructive field of investigation; but we do object to his utter forgetfulness of that limitation in the progress of his work, and to his attempt to introduce a variety of other topics which are manifestly alien from his professed design. If he meant to discuss merely the relation between the const.i.tution of man and external objects, he had nothing whatever to do with the far higher and more comprehensive doctrine respecting the relation between the const.i.tution of man and the government of G.o.d, and, least of all, with the _revealed_ doctrines of a special Providence, of a fall into a state of sin, of death as its wages, and of "spiritual influences" by which the ruin occasioned by the fall may be redressed; and yet these topics, foreign as they are to the professed design of his work, are all introduced, and treated, too, in a way that is fitted, if not designed, to shake the confidence of his readers in what have hitherto been regarded as important articles of the Christian faith. It has received this significant testimony, "'Combe's Const.i.tution of Man' would be worth a hundred New Testaments on the banks of the Ganges."[196]

There are _two points_, especially, on which he comes more directly into collision with our present argument:

1. He speaks as if G.o.d governed the universe _only_ by "natural laws,"

so as to exclude any other dispensation of Providence.