2. He speaks as if the "physical and organic" laws of Nature possessed the same authority and imposed the same obligation as the "moral" laws of Conscience and Revelation; and as if the breach or neglect of the former were _punishable_ in the same sense, and for the same reason, as the transgression of the latter.

Next to the omission of all reference to a future state, and the total exclusion of the connection which subsists between the temporal and the eternal under the Divine government, we hold these _two_ to be the capital defects of his treatise; and it may be useful, in the present state of public opinion, to offer a few remarks upon each of them.

In regard to the _first_, we need not repeat what we have already explicitly declared, that G.o.d does govern the world _in part_ by means of "natural laws" and "second causes;" but, not content with this concession, Mr. Combe speaks as if He governed the world _only_ by these means, to the exclusion of everything like a "special Providence," or "Divine influences." It is not so much in his dogmatic statements as in his ill.u.s.trative examples that the real tendency of his theory becomes apparent. Thus he speaks of "the most pious and benevolent missionaries sailing to civilize and Christianize the heathen, but, embarking in an unsound ship, they are drowned by their disobeying a physical law, without their destruction being averted by their morality;" and, on the other hand, of "the greatest monsters of iniquity" embarking in a staunch and strong ship, and escaping drowning "in circ.u.mstances exactly similar to those which would send the missionaries to the bottom." Thus, again, he speaks of plague, fever, and ague, as resulting from the neglect of "organic laws," and as resulting from it so necessarily that they could be averted neither by Providence nor by Prayer; and he ill.u.s.trates his views by the mental distress of the wife of Ebenezer Erskine, and the recorded experience of Mrs. Hannah More.[197] It cannot be doubted, we think, that in all these cases he speaks as if G.o.d governed the world _only_ by natural laws; and that he does not recognize any special Providence or any answer to Prayer, but resolves all events into the operation of these "laws."

Now, there are evidently _two_ suppositions that may be entertained on this subject: either, that G.o.d orders _all_ events to fall out according to "natural laws" and by means of "second causes;" or, that while He _generally_ makes use of means in the ordinary course of His Providence, He reserves the liberty and the power of interposing directly and immediately, when He sees cause, for the accomplishment of His sovereign will. These two suppositions seem to exhaust the only possible alternatives in a question of this kind; and, strange as it may at first sight appear to be, it is nevertheless true that neither the one nor the other is necessarily adverse to the doctrine for which we now contend.

Even on the first supposition,--that G.o.d orders _all_ events to fall out according to "natural laws" and by means of "second causes,"--there might still be room, not, indeed, for miraculous interposition, but for the exercise of a special Providence and even for an answer to prayer; for it should never be forgotten that, among the "second causes" created and governed by the Supreme Will, there are other agencies besides those that are purely physical,--there are intelligent beings, belonging both to the visible and invisible worlds, who may be employed, for ought we know to the contrary, as "ministers in fulfilling His will," and whose agency may, without any miraculous interference with the established order of Nature, bring about important practical results, just as man's own agency is admitted to have the power of arranging, modifying, and directing the elements of Nature, while it has no power to suspend or reverse any "natural law." And if G.o.d is ordinarily pleased to make use of means, why should it be thought incredible that He may make use of the ministry of intelligent beings, whether they be men or angels, for the accomplishment of His designs? But on the second supposition,--that while He generally makes use of means in the ordinary course of His Providence, He reserves the liberty and the power of interposing directly and immediately when He sees cause,--the doctrine of a special Providence, including every interposition, natural or supernatural, is at once established; and we cannot see how Mr. Combe, as a professed believer in Revelation, which must of course be regarded as a supernatural effect of "Divine influence," can consistently deny G.o.d's direct and immediate agency in Providence, since he is compelled to admit it at least on _two_ great occasions, namely, the Creation of the world, and the promulgation of His revealed will.

In regard, again, to the second capital defect or error of his system, it may be conclusively shown that he confounds, or fails at least duly to discriminate, two things which are radically different, when he speaks as if the "physical and organic laws" of Nature had the same _authority_, and imposed the same obligations, as the "moral laws" of Conscience and Revelation, and as if the breach or neglect of the former were _punishable_, in the same sense, and for the same reason, as the transgression of the latter.

The declared object of his treatise is twofold: first, to ill.u.s.trate the relation subsisting between the "natural laws" and the "const.i.tution of man;" and, secondly, to prove the _independent operation_ of these laws, as _a key to the explanation of the Divine government_. In ill.u.s.trating the relation between the "natural laws" and the "const.i.tution of man,"

he attempts to show that the natural laws require obedience not less than the moral, and that they inflict punishment on disobedience: "The peculiarity of the new doctrine is that these (the physical, organic, and moral laws) operate independently of each other; that each requires obedience to itself; that each, in its own specific way, rewards obedience and punishes disobedience; and that human beings are happy in proportion to the extent to which they place themselves in accordance with _all_ of these Divine inst.i.tutions." In regard to these "natural laws,"--including the physical, the organic, the intellectual, and the moral,--_four_ positions are laid down: first, that they are independent of each other; secondly, that obedience or disobedience to each of them is followed by reward or punishment; thirdly, that they are universal and invariable; and, fourthly, that they are in harmony with the "const.i.tution of man."[198]

Now, in this theory of "natural laws," especially as it is applied to the doctrines of Providence and Prayer, there seem to be _three_ radical defects:

1. Mr. Combe speaks of _obedience_ and _disobedience_ to the "physical and organic" laws, as if they _could_ be obeyed or disobeyed in the same sense and in the same way as the "moral" laws, and as if they imposed an obligation on man which it would be sinful to disregard. He has not duly considered that the moral law differs from the physical and organic laws of Nature in two important respects: first, that while the former _may_, the latter _cannot_, be broken or violated by man; and secondly, that while the former does impose an imperative obligation which is felt by every conscience, the latter have either no relation to the conscience at all, or, if they have, it is collateral and indirect only, and arises not from the mere existence of such laws, but from the felt obligation of a _moral law belonging to our own nature_, which prescribes _prudence_ as a duty with reference to our personal conduct in the circ.u.mstances in which we are placed.

That the "physical and organic" laws cannot be broken or violated in the same sense in which the "moral law" may be transgressed, is evident from the simple consideration that the violation of a natural law, were it possible, _would be not a sin, but a miracle_! And that these laws impose no real obligation on the conscience is further manifest, because we hold it to be perfectly lawful to counteract, so far as we can, the operation of one physical or organic law by employing the agency of another, as in the appliances of Mechanics, the experiments of Chemistry, and the art of Navigation. When the aeronaut inflates his balloon with a gas specifically lighter than atmospheric air, or the ship-builder constructs vessels of wood or iron, so that when filled with air they shall be lighter than water, and float with their cargo on its surface, each is attempting to counteract the law of gravitation by the application of certain other related laws: but no one ever dreams of their _disobeying_ G.o.d in thus availing themselves of one physical agent to counterpoise another. The "moral law," however, cannot be treated in the same way, and that simply because it is generically different.

It is true, that _indirectly_ the laws of Nature, when known, may and ought to regulate our practical conduct; not, however, by virtue of any obligation imposed _by them_ on our conscience, but solely by virtue of that law of _moral prudence_ which springs from conscience itself, and which teaches us that we _ought_ so to act with reference to outward objects as to secure, so far as we can, our own safety and happiness, and the welfare of our fellow-men. But there can be no greater blunder than to confound _the laws of natural objects_ with _the law of human conduct_; and into this deplorable blunder Mr. Combe has allowed himself to fall. Throughout the whole of his statements respecting the "natural laws," there are two things included under one name, which are perfectly distinct and separate from each other. In the first place, there are the laws which belong to the const.i.tution of natural objects, and which regulate their mutual action on one another: in the second place, there are, in the words of a late sagacious layman, "_rules_ which the intellect of man is able to deduce for the regulation of his own conduct, by means of his knowledge of those laws which govern the phenomena of Nature. These last are perfectly distinct from the former; and it is a monstrous confusion of ideas to mix them up together....

The true state of the case is this,--it is for our interest to study these natural arrangements, and to accommodate our conduct to them, as far as we know them; and in doing so, we _obey_, not those laws of Nature, physical and organic, but the laws of _prudence and good sense_, arising from a due use of our moral and intellectual faculties."[199]

Another acute writer,[200] who states the substance of the argument in very few words, has shown that the theory of "natural laws," as taught by Mr. Combe, is true in one sense and false in another: "It is _true_, first, that the Creator has bestowed const.i.tutions on physical objects; in other words, the const.i.tutions which physical objects possess were _given_ them, given during His pleasure; secondly, that the const.i.tutions of physical objects are _definite_,--that is, they are distinct, individual, and incapable of trans.m.u.tation _by natural causes_; thirdly, that no power but the power of the Creator can vary their const.i.tutions. But it is _not true_, first, that any mode of action of a physical object is otherwise inherent in it, than as it is the will of G.o.d that that object should _now_ present that mode of action. Nor is it true, secondly, that it is beyond the power of G.o.d to vary, when He pleases, either temporarily or permanently, the const.i.tution of physical objects." He further shows that, on Mr. Combe's principle of "natural laws" being all equally Divine inst.i.tutions which must be _obeyed_, "human obedience is a very complicated and perplexing affair, so complicated and so perplexing as to involve positive contradictions;" that "the very same act is required by one law, and forbidden by another, both laws being equally Divine;" and that "we sometimes cannot obey both the 'organic' and the 'moral' laws." He concludes that "physical laws ought not to be confounded with laws of human conduct;" that "these we always must obey, and those we may often, without deserving blame, boldly disregard;" and that "by commingling distinct cla.s.ses of 'natural laws,' Mr. Combe introduces into his system dangerous error and gross absurdity."

2. Another radical defect in this theory of "natural laws" consists in its representing the consequences of our ignorance or neglect of them as _punishments_ in the same sense in which moral delinquencies are said to be followed by penal inflictions. There is something here which is totally at variance with the instinctive feelings and moral convictions of mankind. Mr. Combe affirms that each of the three great cla.s.ses of "natural laws" requires _obedience_ to itself, and that each, in its own specific way, rewards obedience and punishes disobedience. And he gives, as one example, the case of the most pious and benevolent missionaries sailing to civilize and Christianize the heathen, but embarking in an unsound ship, and being drowned _by disobeying a "natural law;"_ as another, the case of "a child or an aged person, stumbling into the fire, through mere lack of physical strength to keep out of it;" as another, the case of "an ignorant child, groping about for something to eat and drink, and stumbling on a phial of laudanum, drinking it and dying;" and as another, the case of "a slater slipping from the roof of a high building, in consequence of a stone of the ridge having given way as he walked upright along it."[201] In all these cases, the accident or misfortune which befalls the individual is represented as the _punishment_ connected with the neglect or transgression of a "natural law," just as remorse, shame, conviction, and condemnation may be the punishment for a moral offence. In other words, a child who ignorantly drinks laudanum is _punished with death_, in the same sense, and for the same reason, that the murderer is punished with death for shedding the blood of a fellow-creature; and the poor slater who misses his foot, and falls, most unwillingly, from a roof or parapet, is _punished with death_, just as a man would be who threw himself over _with the intention_ of committing suicide! Surely there is some grave error here,--an error opposed to the surest dictates of our moral nature, and one that cannot be glossed over by any apologue, however ingeniously constructed, to show the evil effects which would follow from a suspension of the general laws of Nature. For, in the words of Mr.

Scott, it is only where "the law is previously known"--and not only so, but where the "circ.u.mstances which determine the effect might be foreseen"--that "the pleasures or pains annexed to actions can properly be termed _rewards and punishments_;" for "these have reference to the state of mind of the party who is to be rewarded or punished; it is the intention or disposition of the mind, and not the mere act of the body, that is ever considered as obedience or disobedience, or thought worthy, in a moral sense, of either reward or punishment." And as the theory is thus subversive of all our ideas of moral retribution, so it demands of man a kind of obedience which it is _impossible_ for him to render, since _all_ the laws of Nature, and _all_ the states of particular things at a given time, cannot possibly be known by the ignorant many, nor even by the philosophic few. The philosopher, not less than the peasant, may perish through the explosion of a steam engine, or the unsoundness of a ship, or the casual ignition of his dwelling; and that, too, without blame or punishment being involved in either case. On Mr.

Combe's theory, it would seem to be necessary that every one should be a man of science, if he would avoid _sin_ and _punishment_; and yet, unfortunately, the ablest man of science is not exempt, in the present state of his knowledge, from the same calamities which befall his less enlightened, but not less virtuous, neighbors.

These views are strikingly confirmed by the remarks of a writer in "The Reasoner," who blames Mr. Combe for complicating his argument unnecessarily and uselessly with some of the truths of Theism, and who thinks that the doctrine of "natural laws" can only be consistently maintained on the ground of Atheism. "If the system of Nature," he says, "be viewed by itself, without any reference to a Divine Author or all-perfect Creator,--merely as an isolated system of facts,--no comparison could be made, no reconciliation would be necessary, and the system of Nature would be regarded as the result of some unknown cause, a combination of good and evil, and no more to be censured or wondered at for being what it is, than any single substance or fact in Nature excites censure or surprise on account of its peculiar const.i.tution....

The a.s.sumption of a Supernatural Being as the author and director of the laws of Nature appears to me to be attended with several mischievous results. First, you make every infringement of the laws of Nature an offence against the supposed Divine Legislator, which, to a pious and conscientious mind, must give rise to distressing remorse.... Again, under this view, the penalties incurred will often be very unjust, oppressive, and cruel; as where persons are placed in circ.u.mstances that compel them to violate the laws of Nature, as when they are obliged to pursue some unwholesome employment which injures their health and shortens their lives; or where the penalty is incurred by an accident, as when a person breaks a leg or an arm, or is killed by a fall; or where a person is materially or fatally injured in endeavoring to save another person from injury or death. In such cases as these, to represent the unavoidable pain or death incurred or undergone for an act of beneficence, as a punishment inflicted for a transgression of the laws of G.o.d the Divine Legislator, is to violate all our notions of justice and right, to say nothing of goodness or mercy, and to represent the Divine Being as grossly unjust and cruelly vindictive.... Again, if all suffering, however unavoidably incurred, is to be regarded as a punishment from the Divine Legislator, to attempt to alleviate or remove the suffering thus incurred would be to fly in the face of the Divine authority, by endeavoring to set aside the punishment it had inflicted; just as it would be an opposition to the authority of human laws to rescue a prisoner from custody, or deliver a culprit from punishment."[202]

3. We deem it another radical defect in Mr. Combe's theory of "natural laws," that he represents the _distinct existence and independent action of these laws_ as "the key to the Divine government," as the one principle which explains all apparent irregularities, and accounts satisfactorily for the casualties and calamities of human life. We cannot doubt, indeed, either the wisdom or the benevolence of that const.i.tution of things under which we live, nor dispute the value and importance of those laws according to which the world is ordinarily governed. We admit that the suspension of any one of these laws, except perhaps on some signal occasion of miraculous interposition, would go far to unsettle and derange the existing economy. But "natural laws"--whether viewed individually or collectively, and whether considered as acting independently of each other, or as mutually related and interdependent--cannot afford of themselves any key to the Divine government, or any solution of the difficulties of Providence. We must rise to a far higher platform if we would survey the whole scheme of the Divine administration: we must consider, not merely _the independent operation_ of the several cla.s.ses of "natural laws," but also their _mutual relations_, as distinct but connected parts of one vast system, in which the "physical and organic" laws are made subordinate and subservient to the "moral," under the superintendence of that Supreme Intelligence which makes the things that are "seen and temporal" to minister to those things which are "unseen and eternal;" we must carefully discriminate, as Bishop Butler has done, between the mere "natural government" which is common to man with the inferior and irresponsible creation, and the higher "moral government" which is peculiar to intelligent and accountable agents; and we must seek to know how far--the reality of both being admitted--the former is auxiliary or subservient to the latter, and whether, on the whole, the system is fitted to generate that frame of mind, and to inculcate those lessons of truth, which are appropriate to the condition of man, as a subject of moral discipline in a state of probation and trial. Nothing short of this will suffice for the explanation of the Divine government, or for the satisfaction of the human mind. It is felt to be a mere insult to the understandings, and a bitter mockery to the feelings, of men, to talk only of "natural laws," or even of their "independent action" in such a case, to tell a weeping mother that her child died, and died too as the transgressor of a wise and salutary "natural law" which establishes a certain relation between opium and the nervous system: for, grant that the law is wise and salutary, grant that evil would result from its abolition, grant even that it acts independently of any other law, physical or moral, still the profounder question remains, whether such an event as the death of a tender child, through the operation of a law of which that child was necessarily ignorant, can properly be regarded as a punishment inflicted by Divine justice? and whether a theory of this kind can afford "a key to the government of G.o.d?"

Such are some of the radical and incurable defects of Mr. Combe's theory of "natural laws." We ascribe it to him simply because he has been the most recent and the most popular expounder of it. But it is not original, nor in any sense peculiar to him alone. He acknowledges his obligations in this respect to a ma.n.u.script work of Dr. Spurzheim, ent.i.tled, "A Sketch of the Natural Laws of Man;" and he refers, somewhat incidentally, to Volney's "Law of Nature," published originally as a Catechism, and afterwards reprinted under the t.i.tle, "La Loi Naturelle; _ou, Principes Physiques de la Morale_." The same theory, in substance, had been broached in the "Systeme de la Nature," and _there_ it was applied in support of the atheistic conclusions of that remarkable treatise. But it may be said to have been _methodized_ by Volney; and in his treatise it is exhibited in a form adapted to popular instruction.[203] There is a striking resemblance between his speculations and those of Mr. Combe. He, too, acknowledges the existence of G.o.d; but virtually supersedes His Providence by the subst.i.tution of "natural laws." The "law of Nature" is defined as "the constant order by which _G.o.d_ governs the world," and is represented as the most universal "rule of action." That law is supposed to be a command or a prohibition to act in certain cases, accompanied with the natural sanction of _reward and punishment_. After giving several examples of "natural laws," which are all merely _general facts_ or the generalized results of experience, he describes man's relation to these laws almost in the words of Mr. Combe. "Since all these, and similar facts," he says, "are unchangeable, constant, and regular, there result for man as many true laws to which he must conform, with the express clause of a _penalty attached to their infraction_, or of a benefit attached to their observance; so that if a man shall pretend to see well in the dark, if he acts in opposition to the course of the seasons or the action of the elements, if he pretends to live under water without being drowned, or to touch fire without being burned, or to deprive himself of air without being suffocated, or to drink poison without being destroyed, he receives for each of these infractions of the 'natural laws' a corporeal _punishment_, and one that is proportioned to his offence; while, on the contrary, if he observes and obeys every one of these laws, in their exact and regular relations to him, he will preserve his existence, and make it as happy as it can be."

This code of "natural laws" is then described by Volney as possessing no fewer than _ten_ peculiar characteristics, which give it a decided preeminence over every other moral system, whether human or Divine,--as being _primitive, immediate, universal, invariable, evident, reasonable, just, peaceful, beneficial_, and alone _sufficient_. But it is so only when viewed in connection with the miserably low and meagre system of morals with which it is avowedly a.s.sociated. For when morals are described as a mere physical science, founded on man's organization, his interests and pa.s.sions,--when the treatise, according to its _second_ t.i.tle, is professedly an attempt to expound the _physical principles of morals_,--and when, in pursuance of this plan, all the principles of Ethics are rigorously reduced to _one_, namely, the principle of self-preservation, which is enforced, as a duty, by the only sanctions of pleasure and pain,--it is not wonderful that, _for such an end_, the "natural laws" might be held sufficient: but it is wonderful that any mind capable of a moment's reflection should not have perceived that, in such a system, the cardinal idea of _Deity_ is altogether omitted, or left unaccounted for, in the case of Man, and that no attempt is made to explain or to account for anything that is properly _moral_ in the government of G.o.d.

On a review of these speculations, it is important to bear in mind that the existence of natural laws is not necessarily exclusive of a superintending Providence. Their operation, on the contrary, may afford some of the strongest proofs of its reality. For, whether considered as a scheme of _provision_ or as a system of _government_, Divine Providence rests on a strong body of natural evidence. In the one aspect, it upholds and preserves all things; in the other, it controls and overrules all things for the accomplishment of the Divine will.

Considered as a scheme of government, it is either _natural_ or _moral_.

To the former, all created beings without exception are subject; to the latter, only some orders of being,--such, namely, as are intelligent, voluntary, and responsible agents. In the case of man, const.i.tuted as he is, the Physical, Organic, Intellectual, and Moral laws are all combined; and he is subject, therefore, both to a _natural_ government, which is common to him with all other material and organized beings, and also to a _moral_ government, which is peculiar to himself as a free and accountable agent. The _natural_ government of G.o.d extends to all his creatures, and includes man considered simply as one of them; and its reality is proved, first, by the _laws_ to which all created things are subject, and which they have no power to alter or resist; secondly, by the _final causes_ or beneficial ends which are obviously contemplated in the arrangements of Nature, and the great purposes which are actually served by them; and, thirdly, by the _necessary dependence_ of all created things on the will of Him to whom they owe alike the commencement and the continuance of their being. But the natural government of G.o.d, which extends to _all_ His creatures, does not exhaust or complete the doctrine of His Providence: it includes also a scheme of _moral_ government, adapted to the nature, and designed for the regulation, of His intelligent, voluntary, and responsible subjects.

And the reality of a moral government may be proved, _first_, by the _moral faculty_, which is a const.i.tuent part of human nature, and which makes man "a law to himself;" _secondly_, by the _essential nature_ of virtuous and vicious dispositions, as being inherently pleasant or painful; _thirdly_, by the _natural consequences_ of our actions, which indicate a sure connection between moral and physical evil; and, _fourthly_, by the _moral atmosphere_ in which we are placed, as being members of a community in which the distinction between right and wrong is universally acknowledged, and applied in the way of approbation or censure. By such proofs, the Providence of G.o.d may be shown to be a scheme both of _natural_ and _moral_ government,--two aspects of the same system which are _equally real_, yet _widely different_. But the distinction between the two, although founded on a real and radical difference, is not such as to imply that they have no relation to each other, or no mutual influence, as distinct but connected parts of the same comprehensive scheme. They are not isolated, but interpenetrating; they come into contact at many points, and _the natural is made subordinate and subservient to the moral_. For there is a beautiful gradation in the order of the established laws of Nature. The physical laws are made subordinate and subservient to the organic; both the physical and organic are subservient to the intellectual; the physical, organic, and intellectual are subservient to the moral; and the intellectual and moral are subservient to our preparation for the spiritual and eternal. In the words of Bishop Butler, "The natural and moral const.i.tution and government of the world are _so connected_ as to make up together but _one scheme_; and it is highly probable that the first is formed and carried on merely in _subserviency to the latter_, as the vegetable world is for the animal, and organized bodies for minds."[204]

Every instance of pleasure or pain arising from the voluntary actions of men, is a proof that a relation of some kind has been established between all the distinct, but independent, provinces of Nature; and the invariable connection between moral and physical evil shows how the lower are made subservient to the higher departments of the Divine government. Apart from a scheme of moral discipline, there is no reason discernible, _a priori_, why pain should be the accompaniment or consequent of one mode of action rather than another; and the relations which have been established, in the natural const.i.tution of things, between sin and misery, affords a strong proof not only of the _reality_ of a moral government, but of the _subordination_ of physical and organic agencies to its great designs.

This relation between the _natural_ and the _moral_ government of G.o.d is admirably ill.u.s.trated by Bishop Warburton: "The application of _natural events_ to _moral government_, in the common course of Providence, connects the character of Lord and Governor of the intellectual world with that of Creator and Preserver of the material.... The doctrine of the _preestablished harmony_,--the direction of natural events to moral government,--obviates all irreligious suspicions, and not only satisfies us that there is but _one_ governor of both systems, but that both systems are conducted by _one_ scheme of Providence. To form the const.i.tution of Nature in such a manner that, without controlling or suspending its laws, it should continue, throughout a long succession of ages, to produce its physical revolutions as they best contribute to the preservation and order of its own system, just at those precise periods of time when their effects, whether salutary or hurtful to many, may serve as instruments for the government of the moral world: for example, that a foreign enemy, amidst our intestine broils, should desolate all the flourishing works of rural industry,--that warring elements, in the suited order of _natural_ government, should depopulate and tear in pieces a highly-viced city, just in those very moments when _moral_ government required a warning and example to be held out to a careless world,--is giving us the n.o.blest as well as the most astonishing idea of G.o.d's goodness and justice.... When He made the world, the free determinations of the human will, and the necessary effects of laws physical, were so fitted and accommodated to one another, that a sincere repentance in the _moral_ world should be sure to avert an impending desolation in the _natural_, not by any present alteration or suspension of its established laws, but by originally adjusting all their operations to all the foreseen circ.u.mstances of moral agency."[205]

Viewed in this light, the course of Providence is wonderfully adapted to the const.i.tution of human nature, since it affords as much _certainty_ in regard to some things as is sufficient to lay a foundation for forethought, prudence, and diligence in the use of means, and yet leaves so much remaining _uncertainty_ in regard to other things as should impress us with a sense of constant _dependence_ on Him "in whom we live, and move, and have our being." The const.i.tution of Nature and the course of Providence in the present state seem mainly intended to teach these _two_ lessons,--first, of _diligence_ in the use of means, and, secondly, of _dependence_ on a Higher Power: for there is sufficient _regularity_ in the course of events to encourage human industry in every department of labor; and yet there is as much _uncertainty_, arising from the endless complication of causes and the limited range of human knowledge, as should impress us with a sense of our utter helplessness. The wisdom of G.o.d in the government of the world may be equally manifested in the _regular order_ which He has established, and which, within certain limits, man may be able to ascertain and reckon on as a ground of hopeful activity; and in the _apparent casualty_ and _inscrutable mystery_ of many things which can neither be divined by human wisdom, nor controlled by human power. It matters not whether the remaining uncertainty is supposed to arise from some cla.s.ses of events not being subject to regular laws, or from our ignorance of these laws, and the variety of their manifold combinations. In either case, it is certain that, in our actual experience, and, so far as we can judge, in the experience of every creature not possessed of omniscient knowledge, these two elements are and must be combined,--such a measure of _certainty_ as should encourage industry in the use of means, and such a measure of remaining _uncertainty_ as should keep them mindful that they are not, and never can be, independent of G.o.d.

SECTION III.

THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER.

The doctrine of Providence lays a firm foundation for the duty of Prayer. In the case of all intelligent, moral, and responsible beings, the mere existence of a Divine government to which they are subject, would seem to imply an obligation to own and acknowledge it; and this obligation is best fulfilled by the exercise of prayer, which is a practical testimony alike to man's _dependence_ and to G.o.d's _dominion_.

Prayer, in its widest sense, includes the whole homage which man is capable of rendering to G.o.d as the sole object of religious worship; and it implies the recognition of all His supreme perfections and prerogatives as the Creator and Governor of the world. It is usually described[206] as consisting, first, in "adoration,"--in which we express our sense of His rightful supremacy and absolute perfection, and do homage to Him for what He is in himself; secondly, in "thanksgiving,"--in which we express our sense of grat.i.tude for all His kindness and care, and do homage to Him for the benefits which He has bestowed; thirdly, in "confession,"--in which we express our sense of sin in having transgressed His law, and do homage to Him as our moral Governor and Judge; and, fourthly, in "pet.i.tion,"--in which we express our sense of dependence alike on His providence and grace, and do homage to Him as the "Father of lights, from whom cometh down every good and perfect gift." Of these, the _three first_ are so evidently reasonable and becoming, so necessarily involved in the simplest idea which we can form of our relations to G.o.d and of the obligations which result from them, that few, if any, of those who admit the existence and providence of the Supreme Being, will deny that the sentiments themselves are appropriate to our condition, however they may doubt the necessity or the duty of giving formal utterance to them in the language of religious worship. But in regard to the _fourth_, which, if it be not the most sublime or elevated, is yet the most urgent motive to the exercise of devotion, many difficulties have been raised and many objections urged, which do not apply, at least in the same measure, to the other parts of Prayer, and which, in so far as they prevail with reflecting minds, would soon lead to the practical neglect of _all_ religious worship. The practice of offering up "pet.i.tions" either for ourselves or others, with the view of thereby obtaining any benefit, whether of a temporal or spiritual kind, has been denounced, and even ridiculed, as an unphilosophical attempt to alter the established course of Nature, or the preordained sequences of events. The supposition of its "efficacy"

has been represented as a flagrant instance of superst.i.tious ignorance, worthy only of the dark ages, and even as a presumptuous blasphemy, derogatory to the unchangeable character of the Supreme. Some have held, indeed, that while prayer can have no real efficacy either in averting evil or procuring good, it may nevertheless be both legitimate and useful, by reason of the wholesome _reflex influence_ which it is fitted to exert on the mind of the worshipper; and they have recommended the continuance of the practice on this ground, as if men, once convinced of its utter inefficacy, _would_ or _could_ continue, with any fervency, to offer up their requests to G.o.d, merely for the sake of impressing their own minds through the medium of a sort of conscious hypocrisy! We are told that David Hume, "after hearing a sermon preached by Dr. Leechman, in which he dwelt on the power of prayer to render the wishes it expressed more ardent and pa.s.sionate, remarked with great justice, that 'we can make use of no expression, or even thought, in prayers and entreaties, which does not imply that these prayers have an influence.'"

This intermediate ground, therefore, is plainly untenable, and we are shut up to one or other of two alternatives: either there _is_ an "efficacy" in prayer as a means of averting evil and procuring good, such as may warrant, and should encourage, us in offering up our requests unto G.o.d; or, there _is no_ such efficacy in it, and no reason why it should be observed by any of G.o.d's intelligent creatures, whether on earth or in heaven.

The principles which are applicable to the decision of this important question may be best explained, after adverting briefly to some of the particular objections which have been urged against the "efficacy of prayer." Several of these objections evidently proceed on an erroneous view of the nature and object of prayer. When it is said, for example, that G.o.d, being omniscient, does not need to be informed either of the wants or the wishes of any of His creatures, the objection involves a great and important truth,--a truth which was explicitly recognized by our Lord when He said, "Your heavenly Father knoweth what things ye have need of before ye ask Him;" but that truth is grievously misapplied when it is directed to prove that prayer is either superfluous or ineffectual, since the objection virtually a.s.sumes that the object of prayer is _to inform G.o.d of what He did not know before_, and that His omniscience is of itself sufficient to show that prayer from men or angels must needs be unavailing. When it is said, _again_, that G.o.d being immutable, His will cannot be affected or altered by the "pet.i.tions" of His creatures, this objection, like the former one, involves a great and important truth,--a truth which is also explicitly recognized in Scripture when it is said that "He is without variableness or the least shadow of turning;" but this truth, too, is grievously misapplied when it is directed to prove that there can be no efficacy in prayer, since it might as well be said that the Divine dispensations must be invariably the same whatever may be the conduct of His creatures _in other respects_, as that they must be the same whether men do or do not pray; or, that His procedure as a Moral Governor has no reference whatever either to the character or conduct of his subjects. But, in the words of Dr. Price, "G.o.d's unchangeableness, when considered in relation to the exertion of His attributes in the government of the world, consists, not in always acting in the same manner however cases and circ.u.mstances alter, but in always doing what is right, and varying His conduct according to the various actions, characters and dispositions of beings. If, then, prayer makes an alteration in the case of the suppliant, as being the discharge of an indispensable duty, what would in truth infer _changeableness_ in Him would be, not His regarding and answering it, but His _not_ doing this."[207] When it is said, _again_, that there can be no "efficacy in prayer," because there is an established const.i.tution and regular course of Nature, by which all events, whether prosperous or adverse, are invariably determined, and which cannot be altered or modified without _a miracle_, this objection, like each of the two former, involves an important truth,--a truth which is also explicitly recognized in Scripture when it speaks of "the ordinances of the heavens and the earth," and of the peculiar laws and properties of all created things; but this truth is also grievously misapplied when it is directed to prove that G.o.d's will has no efficient control over natural events, or that He has no agencies at His disposal by which he can accomplish the desires of them that seek Him. In all these objections there is an apparent truth, but there is also a latent error; and the false conclusion is founded on an erroneous supposition in regard to the nature and object of prayer.

For this reason, we shall endeavor to separate the truth from the error, and to lay down a few positions which may be established both by reason and Scripture, and which will be sufficient to show that the doctrine which affirms the efficacy of prayer is not only credible, but true.

1. Prayer, in the restricted sense in which we now speak of it, as denoting "pet.i.tion" or "supplication," consists in offering up "the desires of the heart to G.o.d for things agreeable to His will." It is not a mere formal, outward homage, such as might be rendered by words, or ceremonies; it is a spiritual service, in which the mind and heart of man come into immediate converse with G.o.d Himself. It is offered to Him personally, as to the invisible but ever-present "Searcher of hearts,"

who "hears the _desire_ of the humble," and whose "ear is attentive to the voice of their supplications." This implies the recognition of His omnipresence and omniscience, but these perfections of His nature do not supersede the expression of our desires in prayer, just because prayer is designed, not to increase His knowledge, but to declare our sense of dependence on His will, and to procure His grace to help us in every time of need. Our pet.i.tions, too, are always bounded within certain limits, and subject to at least one indispensable condition; they are offered only "for things agreeable to His will;" and when our own will is thus, in the very act of prayer, expressly subordinated to that which is alone unerring and supreme, we acknowledge at once His rightful sovereignty and our dutiful subjection, and we are not justly chargeable with the presumption of dictating to G.o.d the course of procedure which He should pursue towards us. We are protected, too, against the evils which our own _errors in prayer_ might otherwise entail on us, for "we know not what things to pray for as we ought;" and we have an infallible security that, in the best and highest sense,--that which is most in accordance with our real welfare,--our prayers _must_ be answered, since our wills are resolved into His will; and His will, being omnipotent, cannot be resisted or frustrated in any of its designs. Our a.s.surance of the certain efficacy of our prayers is so much the greater, in proportion as we have reason to believe that the things for which we pray are agreeable to His will; and hence we are more confident in asking spiritual than temporal gifts; for the former we know to be always agreeable to His will and conducive to our own welfare, while the latter may, or may not, be good for us in our present circ.u.mstances, and must be left at the sovereign disposal of Him who knows what is in man, and what is best for each of His children.

2. Considering the relation in which we stand to G.o.d as His creatures and subjects, it is natural, fit, and proper that _we_ should make known our requests to Him, and supplicate the aids both of His providence and grace; and if it be _our duty_ to pray, it is reasonable to believe that G.o.d will have some respect to our prayers in His methods of dealing with us; in other words, that, as a righteous moral governor, he will make a difference between the G.o.dly and the unG.o.dly, the men who do, and the men who do not, pray.

In this position it is a.s.sumed that there are certain relations, natural or revealed, subsisting betwixt us and G.o.d, in virtue of which it is our duty to acknowledge His dominion and our dependence, by supplicating the aids of His providence and grace. That such relations do subsist between G.o.d and man, is evinced alike by the light of Nature and of Revelation; and they cannot be discerned or realized without immediately suggesting the idea of certain corresponding obligations and duties. Every one whose conscience has not been utterly seared must instinctively feel the force of that appeal, "If I be a Father, where is mine honor? and if I be a Master, where is my fear?" For, considering G.o.d in the very simplest aspect of His character as the Creator and Governor of the world, He stands related to us as the Author and Preserver of our being, as our rightful Proprietor and constant Benefactor, as our supreme Lawgiver, Governor, and Judge; and these _natural relations_, apart altogether from the _supernatural_ which are revealed in Scripture, are sufficient to lay a solid groundwork for "the duty of prayer" in the case of every intelligent being who is capable of knowing G.o.d, and acknowledging his dependence on the Divine will. In such a case, prayer is felt to be a natural, fit, and becoming expression of what is known to be true, and what _ought_, as a matter of duty, to be practically avowed. Now, this is the grand design of prayer; and in its real design, when that is rightly apprehended, it finds its n.o.blest vindication. The object of prayer is, neither to _inform_ G.o.d, as if he were not omniscient, nor to alter His eternal purposes, as if He were not unchangeable, nor to unsettle the established course of Nature, as if He were not "a G.o.d of order;" but simply to acknowledge His _dominion_ and our _dependence_, and to obtain from Him, in the way of His own appointment, the blessings of which we stand in need.

It is not unreasonable to believe that G.o.d, as the Governor of the world, will have some regard to the dispositions and actions of His responsible creatures, as a reason for dealing differently with those who own, and those who disown, His supremacy; and that He may require the use of certain means, such as the exercise of prayer, with the view of our obtaining from Him, in a way the most beneficial to ourselves, the blessings, whether temporal or spiritual, of which we stand in need.

For if we really be the creatures of G.o.d, and, as such, dependent on His providential bounty, and subject to His righteous government, it is self-evidently natural and right that we should, as intelligent and responsible beings, acknowledge His supreme dominion and our absolute dependence by supplicating the aids both of His providence and grace.

This is _our duty_, considering the relations which He sustains towards us; and if it be fit and proper that we should pray to G.o.d, if it be, in our circ.u.mstances, a duty which we owe to Him, then it is most reasonable to believe that it is equally fit and proper in G.o.d to have some respect to our prayers, and to deal with us differently according as we either observe or neglect this religious duty.

Prayer may be regarded in one or other of two distinct aspects: either as _a duty_, the observance or neglect of which must be followed, under a system of moral government, with different results; or simply as _a means_, the use of which is productive of certain effects which are made to depend on this special instrumentality. And in either view, its "efficacy" may be affirmed on the same grounds on which we are wont to vindicate the use of _all other means_, and to enforce the observance of _all other duties_, in connection with the system of the Divine government.

3. The efficacy of prayer, so far from being inconsistent with, is founded on, the immutability of the Divine purposes and the faithfulness of the Divine promises. G.o.d's purposes are justly held, in all other cases, to include the _means_ as well as the _ends_; and they are often fulfilled through the instrumentality of "second causes." His purpose to provide for the wants of man and beast has reference not merely to the harvest which is the result, but also to the agricultural labor by which, instrumentally, the harvest is prepared. May not "prayer" be also _a means_ ordained by G.o.d in the original const.i.tution of the world, a means towards certain ends which are made dependent on its use? If it be such a means, then its "efficacy" is established, in the only sense in which we are concerned to contend for it; while it is shown to be _no more inconsistent_ with the immutability of the Divine purposes, than any other system of _means or instruments_ that may be employed as subordinate agencies in the government of the world. This important view is strikingly ill.u.s.trated in Scripture. For some of the _purposes_ of G.o.d, which might have been undiscoverable in the mere light of Nature, are there explicitly declared; nay, they are thrown into the form of express _promises_, to which the Divine faithfulness is solemnly pledged; and yet the exercise of prayer, so far from being superseded by these promises, is rather stimulated and encouraged by them; and the believer pleads with increased fervor and confidence when he simply converts _G.o.d's promises into his own pet.i.tions_. He feels that in doing so he is taking G.o.d at his word; and that his own prayer, in so far as it is warranted by His promise, cannot be ineffectual any more than G.o.d's faithfulness can fail.

Thus Daniel "understood by books the number of the years whereof the word of the Lord came to Jeremiah the prophet, that He would accomplish _seventy_ years in the desolation of Jerusalem." He knew the Lord's promise, and that the time for its fulfilment was at hand; yet so far from regarding either the immutability of the Divine _purpose_, or even the infallible certainty of the Divine _promise_, as a reason for neglecting prayer, as if that exercise were superfluous or vain, he was stimulated and encouraged to pray just because "he knew the word of the Lord."--"And I set my face," he says, "unto the Lord G.o.d, to seek by prayer and supplications, with fasting, sackcloth, and ashes;" and I prayed unto the Lord my G.o.d, and said, "O Lord! hear; O Lord! forgive; O Lord! hearken and do; defer not, for thine own sake, O my G.o.d!"[208]

Thus, _again_, when the Lord gave certain great and precious promises to His ancient people, a.s.suring them that "He would sprinkle clean water upon them, and give them a new heart and a right spirit," it is added, "I will yet for this be inquired of by the house of Israel to do it for them."[209] Thus, _again_, when the Saviour himself gave to His disciples that promise, which is emphatically called "the promise of the Father," a.s.suring them that they should be "baptized with the Holy Ghost not many days hence," and directing them to "wait at Jerusalem until they should be endued with power from above," the apostles, so far from regarding that "promise" as superseding the exercise of "prayer,"

betook themselves immediately to an upper room, and "all continued with one accord in prayer and supplication;" and, at the appointed time, G.o.d's promise was fulfilled, and their prayer answered, when "they were all filled with the Holy Ghost, and began to speak with other tongues as the Spirit gave them utterance." These examples are abundantly sufficient to show that prayer, so far from being inconsistent with, is founded on, the immutability of the Divine _purposes_, and the faithfulness of the Divine _promises_.

4. Our next position is, that _the method_ in which G.o.d answers the prayers of His people may be, in many respects, mysterious or even inscrutable; but no objection to "the efficacy of prayer," which is founded on our ignorance of His infinite resources, can have any weight, especially when there are _several hypothetical solutions_, any one of which is sufficient to neutralize its force.

An omnipresent, omniscient, and almighty Being, presiding over the affairs of His own world, as the author, upholder, and governor of all things, may well be conceived to have infinite resources at His command,--such as we can never fully estimate,--by which he can give effect to prayer in ways that may be to us inscrutable. But our ignorance of the _mode_ is no reason for doubting the _reality_ of His interposition in answer to prayer; and even if we were unable to decide on the comparative merits of the various explanations of it which have been proposed, the mere fact that there are several solutions, at once conceivable and credible, any one of which may be sufficient, as a hypothetical explanation, to neutralize every adverse presumption, should be held tantamount to a proof that no valid or conclusive objection can be urged against it. Dr. Chalmers has frequently ill.u.s.trated the legitimate and important uses of "hypothetical solutions" in Theology; and has conclusively shown that even where they leave us at a loss to determine which of various methods of solving a difficulty is the truest or the best, they yet serve a great purpose, if they merely neutralize an objection, by showing that the difficulty in question _might_ be satisfactorily accounted for, were our knowledge more extensive or more precise.[210] Now, with regard to "the efficacy of prayer," there are _four_ distinct solutions, or rather _four_ different methods of disposing of the difficulty, any one of which is sufficient to vindicate the claims of the doctrine on our faith. We shall not discuss the respective merits of these various solutions in detail, but shall merely state them, with the view of showing that there are several methods of accounting for "the efficacy of prayer" in perfect consistency with the established order of Nature.

The first is the theory of those who hold that there _is the same relation between prayer and the answer to prayer_ as between _cause and effect in any other sequence of Nature_. Prayer is supposed to be the cause, and the answer the effect; and this by an invariable law, established in the original const.i.tution, and manifested in the uniform course, of the world. To this solution Dr. Chalmers seems to refer when he says, that "the doctrine of the efficacy of prayer but introduces _a new sequence_ to the notice of the mind," that "it may add another law of Nature to those which have been formerly observed," and that "the general truth may be preserved, that the same result always follows in the same circ.u.mstances, although it should be discovered that prayer is one of those influential circ.u.mstances by which the result is liable to be modified."[211] Now, if it be meant merely to affirm that, in the administration of His providential government, G.o.d has respect to the prayers of men as a consideration which affects their relation to Him and His treatment of them, and that this rule is as invariable as any other law of Nature, the principle that is involved in this solution may be admitted as sound and valid; but if it be further meant, that prayer and the answer to prayer are _in all respects_ similar to any other instance of cause and effect, it must be remembered that the answer is not the effect of the prayer, at least directly and immediately, but the effect of the Divine will; and then the question suggested by Dr.

M'Cosh--whether _causality_ can properly be ascribed to our prayers with reference to the Divine will?--would claim our serious consideration.

But in the former sense, as implying nothing more than that, in the original const.i.tution and the ordinary course of Providence, the same effect is given to our prayers as to _any other moral cause or condition_, it seems to be exempt from all reasonable objection, and to afford a sufficient explanation of the difficulty.

The second "hypothetical solution" is that of those who hold that while G.o.d, in answering the prayers of men, does not ordinarily disturb the known or discoverable sequences of the natural world, yet His interference may be alike real and efficacious though it should take place at a point in the series of natural causes far removed beyond the limits of our experience and observation; and thus "the answer to prayer may be effectually given without any infringement on the known regularities of Nature." Dr. Chalmers adverts to this second solution in replying to an objection which might possibly be raised against the first, namely, that "we see no evidence of the constancy of visible nature giving way to that invisible agency, the interposition of which it is the express object of prayer to obtain;" and he suggests that, in the vast scale of natural sequences, which const.i.tute one connected chain, the responsive touch from the finger of the Almighty may be given "either at a higher or a lower place in the progression," and that if it be supposed to be "given far enough back," it might originate a new sequence, but without doing violence to any ascertained law, since it occurs beyond the reach of our experience and observation. This solution we hold to be not so much an effective argument in favor of the efficacy of prayer, as a conclusive answer to a particular objection against it. It is sufficient to show that, with our very limited knowledge, we act presumptuously in deciding against the possibility of an answer to prayer such as _may_ leave the established course of Nature unaltered; but there is no necessity, and no reason, for supposing that the responsive touch _can only_ be given at a point to which our knowledge does not extend, or that, were our knowledge extended, we would have less difficulty in admitting it _there_, than in holding it to be possible at any lower term in the scale of sequences.

The third "hypothetical solution" is that of those who hold that a Divine answer to prayer may be conveyed through _the ministry of angels_, or the agency of intelligent, voluntary, and active beings, employed by G.o.d, in subordination to His Providence, for the accomplishment of His great designs. The existence of such an order, or rather hierarchy, of created intelligences is clearly revealed in Scripture; and it is rendered credible, or even probable, by _the a.n.a.logy of Nature_, since we observe on earth a regular gradation of animal life from the insect up to man, and we have no reason to suppose that the gradation is suddenly arrested just at the point where the animal and the spiritual are combined. But not only their existence, their _active agency_ also, as "ministers fulfilling His will," as "ministering spirits sent forth to minister to them who shall be heirs of salvation," is explicitly and frequently declared as well as exemplified in Scripture; and this, too, would be, on the supposition of their existence, in strict accordance with _the a.n.a.logy of Nature_, which shows that the lower orders of being are placed under the care and control of the higher. Mr. Boyle, accordingly, makes frequent reference, in his Theological treatises, to _the ministry of angels_, as subordinate agents, through whose instrumentality many of the designs of Providence may be carried into effect; and President Edwards enlarges on the same theme.[212]

The fourth "hypothetical solution" is that of those who hold that G.o.d has so arranged His Providence from the beginning as to provide for particular events as well as for general results, and especially to provide an answer to the prayers of His intelligent creatures. This solution is more general than any of the _three_ former, and may even be comprehensive of them all. It regards prayer as an element which was taken into account at the original const.i.tution of the world, and for which an answer was provided, as the result of natural laws or of angelic agency, employed for this express end by the omniscient foreknowledge and wisdom of G.o.d. It is the solution that has obtained the sanction of some of the highest names in Science and Theology.

"I begin," says Euler, "with considering an objection which almost all the Philosophical Systems have started against prayer. Religion prescribes this as our duty, with an a.s.surance that G.o.d will hear and answer our vows and prayers, provided they are conformable to the precepts which He hath given us. Philosophy, on the other hand, instructs us that all events take place in strict conformity to the course of Nature, established from the beginning, and that our prayers can effect no change whatever, unless we pretend to expect that G.o.d should be continually working miracles in compliance with our prayers.

This objection has the greater weight, that Religion itself teaches the doctrine of G.o.d's having established the course of all events, and that nothing can come to pa.s.s but what G.o.d foresaw from all eternity. Is it credible, say the objectors, that G.o.d should think of altering this settled course, in compliance with any prayers which men might address to Him? But I remark, _first_, that when G.o.d established the course of the universe, and arranged all the events that must come to pa.s.s in it, He paid attention to _all the circ.u.mstances_ which should accompany each event, and, particularly, to _the dispositions, desires, and prayers_ of every intelligent being; and that the arrangement of all events was disposed _in perfect harmony_ with all these circ.u.mstances. When, therefore, a man addresses to G.o.d a prayer worthy to be heard, that prayer was already heard from all eternity, and the Father of mercies arranged the world expressly in favor of that prayer, so that the accomplishment should be a consequence of the natural course of events.