argument against Clarke, to prove the soul only a quality." The Society of Freethinkers, addressing Martinus, propose to send him an answer to the ill-grounded sophisms of their opponents, and likewise "an easy mechanical explanation of perception or thinking."--"One of their chief arguments," say they, "is that self-consciousness cannot inhere in any system of matter, because all matter is made up of several distinct beings which never can make up one individual thinking being. This is easily answered by a familiar instance. In every _jack_ there is a _meat-roasting_ quality, which neither resides in the fly, nor in the weight, nor in any particular wheel, of the jack, but is the result of the whole composition.... And as the general quality of meat-roasting, with its several modifications, does not inhere in any one part of the jack, so neither does consciousness, with its several modes of sensation, intellection, volition, &c., inhere in any one, but is the result from the mechanical composition of the whole animal." And then, in regard to the _second_ difficulty: "The parts," say they, "of an animal body are perpetually changed, ... from whence it will follow that the idea of individual consciousness must be constantly translated from one particle of matter to another.... We answer, this is only a fallacy of the imagination. They make a great noise about this _individuality_, how a man is conscious to himself that he is the same individual he was twenty years ago, notwithstanding the flux state of the particles of matter that compose his body. We think this is capable of a very plain answer, and may be easily ill.u.s.trated by a familiar example. Sir John Cutler had a pair of black worsted stockings, which his maid darned so often with silk, that they became at last a pair of silk stockings. Now, supposing those stockings of Sir John's endued with some degree of consciousness at every particular darning, they would have been sensible that they were the same individual pair of stockings, both before and after the darning!"

The subject is here presented in a ludicrous point of view, and some may doubt whether this is a legitimate method of treating it. But it should not be forgotten that while _ridicule is no safe test of truth, it may be the most effective exposure of nonsense and folly_.

SECTION III.

THE RELATIONS OF MATERIALISM TO THEOLOGY.

It has been generally felt and acknowledged, that the doctrine which preserves the distinction between matter and spirit, body and soul, is more in accordance with the truths of Natural and Revealed Religion, than the opposite theory which identifies them; and that, on the other hand, a profound and serious study of these truths has a tendency to raise our thoughts above the low level of Materialism, and to direct them to the contemplation of a higher and n.o.bler world,--the world of spirits.

There are many distinct points at which the theory of Materialism comes into contact and collision with the truths both of Natural and Revealed Religion. By a brief enumeration of these, the practical importance of the subject may be clearly evinced.

1. The doctrine of "the immortality of the soul" is seriously affected by the theory of Materialism. That there is _some_ connection between the two is apparent from the very anxiety with which infidels have labored to undermine the doctrine of "spirit," on purpose to get rid of the doctrine of "immortality." But in stating the connection between them, we must exercise the utmost caution, lest we should unwarily place the truth on a precarious or questionable basis. In arguing for the future life of the soul, as a doctrine of Natural Religion, some writers have spoken as if they supposed that nothing more was needful to demonstrate its "immortality" than the bare fact of its being "immaterial," and that, by its very nature as "spirit," it is indestructible by G.o.d Himself. Now, we do not hold that the mere proof of its being an immaterial substance would necessarily infer its being also immortal. For ought we know, the principle of life, sensation, memory, and volition _may_ belong to an immaterial substance even in the lower animals, who are not supposed to be immortal; and the only use which we would make of its "immateriality" in connection with its "immortality," is simply this,--that not being material, _its destruction is not necessarily implied in the dissolution of the body_.

It is not in the metaphysical doctrine of its immaterial nature, but in the practical evidence of its moral responsibilities and religious capacities, that we find the most satisfactory natural proof of its immortality. It is perfectly possible to hold, on the one hand, that all "immaterial substances" are not necessarily indestructible; and yet to hold, on the other hand, that _such_ an immaterial substance as the soul of man is known to be,--endowed with conscience, with intelligence, with affections and aspirations, with hopes and fears such as can find no suitable object and no adequate range within the limits of the present life,--must be destined to an immortal existence. The "immortality," for which alone we ought to contend, is such as implies neither a necessity of existence in the creature, nor its independence on the will of the Creator. The _power_ of G.o.d to annihilate the soul is not called in question, but the _purpose_ of G.o.d to make the soul immortal is inferred from its nature and capacities, its aspirations and hopes and fears. And all that is necessarily implied in the doctrine of what has been called "the natural immortality of the soul" is well stated by Dr. S. Clarke, when he says that, "the soul may be such a substance as is able to continue its own duration forever, by the powers given to it at its first production, and the continuance of those general influences which are requisite for the support of created beings in general." Mr. Baxter, acute and metaphysical as he was, placed the argument substantially on the same ground. "It appears," he says, "that all substance equally, as well material as immaterial, cannot cease to exist but by an effect of infinite power.... The human soul, having no parts, must be indissoluble in its nature by anything that hath not power to destroy or annihilate it. And since it hath not a natural tendency to annihilation, nor a power to annihilate itself, nor can be annihilated by any being finitely powerful only, without an immediate act of the omnipotent Creator to annihilate it, it must endlessly abide an active perceptive substance, without either fear or hopes of dying through all eternity, which is, in other words, to be immortal as to the agency of all natural or second causes, that is, 'naturally immortal.'"[174]

When thus stated and limited, the argument is at once safe and valid. It is first proved that the Mind is a "substance," living, perceptive, and active, which is simple and indivisible, and not capable, like matter, of being separated into parts possessing the same properties or powers; and then this distinction betwixt mind and matter is applied to prove that it cannot be _destroyed by dissolution_, as the body may be, but that if it be destroyed at all, it must be by _annihilation_. But no substance, material or immaterial, can be annihilated by any _finite or second cause_; it can be annihilated only by the will of him who created it; and the question respecting the soul of man remains, What are the indications of G.o.d's will concerning it? When this question is seriously entertained, we can hardly fail to see in the structure of its powers, in the grandeur of its capacities, in the moral and responsible consciousness which belongs to it, a strong presumptive proof of its being His purpose that it should continue to live after the dissolution of the body. The Metaphysical argument is sufficient to remove preliminary objections, the Moral argument furnishes a presumptive proof.

The theory of Materialism, as it a.s.sumes different forms, so it admits of being a.s.sociated with different views respecting the future prospects of the soul. When it is held in its grossest form, it stands in a relation of direct antagonism to the doctrine of "immortality," as is apparent in the speculations of D'Holbach, Comte, and Atkinson, who insist at large on the proof of Materialism on purpose to undermine and overthrow the doctrine of Immortality. The theory of Materialism has been maintained by Dr. Priestley and others, in conjunction with a professed, and, as we believe, sincere belief in a future state of rewards and punishments. The sleep of the soul during the interval between death and the resurrection, and its ultimate awakening by an immediate and miraculous interposition of Divine power, are equally held to be true,--the one on the ground of a natural evidence, the other on that of the authority of Revelation. But the natural evidence is defective, since it depends entirely on the a.s.sumption that "thought" is produced by and dependent on a certain material organization, without which it could not exist; and the supernatural authority is still less to be relied on, since it _seems_, at least, to recognize the existence of disembodied spirits, and unequivocally declares that the soul cannot be killed as the body may. If the soul be material, as Dr. Priestley says it is, it must be, equally with the body, affected by the stroke of death; yet our Lord says,--and His authority cannot be declined when the doctrine of a future resurrection is made to depend on the mere testimony of Scripture,--"Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul; but rather fear Him which is able to destroy both soul and body in h.e.l.l."[175] And the soul is represented as existing in a state of conscious happiness or misery, even during the interval between death and the resurrection, in the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, as well as in the statement of the apostle that "he was in a strait betwixt two, having a desire to depart and to be with Christ, which is far better."[176] In its most recent and refined form, the theory of Materialism represents "mind" as a subtle product, evolved out of matter, and destined to an endless existence,--an ever-ascending progression; and in this form of it, the doctrine of a distinct, personal immortality is, no doubt, far better preserved than in its earlier and grosser forms, which spoke of the utter destruction of individual consciousness at the hour of death, and of our material particles pa.s.sing merely into other kinds of organic or inorganic being.

But then, it is placed on a very precarious ground,--the mere supposition of a material product, which can never be established by proof, and which, if there were no other objection to it, might well seem to be sufficiently discredited by the mere fact that it ascribes to _the effect_ properties and powers, of a very high and peculiar order, which do not exist in _the cause_.

2. The doctrine of "future rewards and punishments," or of "man's responsibility" as a subject of the Divine government, is also materially affected by the theory of Materialism, in some, at least, of its forms. When it is connected, as it often has been, with the doctrine of "Mechanical Necessity," which represents every thought, opinion, emotion, desire, and habit, as the unavoidable result of mere physical influences acting on the brain, and makes no account of the spontaneity or freedom which belongs to man as an intelligent, moral, and responsible agent, it is manifestly impossible to discover any ground for the doctrine of future rewards and punishments. And accordingly, D'Holbach, Comte, and Atkinson describe man as if he were the mere creature of circ.u.mstances, and deny that his character could possibly have been different from what it is. But even when it is not a.s.sociated with fatalism, the theory, which denies the distinct existence of the soul as a substantive being, has a tendency to shake our belief in the doctrine of a "future retribution," properly so called, since that doctrine rests on the a.s.sumption of our continued personal ident.i.ty, or the unity and continuity of our consciousness, as dying yet immortal beings; whereas, if there be no "soul," or substantive spiritual being, and if the "body" be in a state of perpetual flux and mutation, it is difficult to see how _the same being that sinned can suffer_, or how the doctrine of "retribution," properly so called, can be consistently maintained.

3. The doctrine of "the spirituality" of the Divine nature must be seriously affected, in different ways, by the theory of Materialism.

It is said in Scripture that "G.o.d made man in His own image," and that He "breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul." Deny the existence of "spirit" or "soul," as G.o.d's living image on earth, and what ground of evidence, or what help of a.n.a.logy, remains for either conceiving or proving aright the existence of Him who is "a Spirit" and "the Father of the spirits of all flesh?" And if the "spirituality" of the Divine nature be called in question, many of the Divine attributes must also suffer; for it is only as "a spirit" that G.o.d can be _omnipresent_, and his omnipresence is presupposed in his _omniscience_ and _omnipotence_. For these reasons, we incur the greatest risk of entertaining limited and false conceptions of G.o.d, by obliterating the distinction between "matter" and "spirit."

It is, no doubt, competent, and it may even be highly useful, to entertain the question, how far the theory of Materialism should be held to affect the grounds on which we believe in a living, personal, spiritual G.o.d? In answer to this question, we have no hesitation in avowing our conviction that the theory of Materialism, however it may be modified, has a tendency to impair the evidence of that fundamental article of faith. G.o.d is "a Spirit," and man was made "in the image of G.o.d." Take away all spiritual essences; reduce every known object in nature to matter, gross or refined; let mental and moral phenomena be blended with the physical, and what remains to const.i.tute the groundwork of a "spiritual" system, or to conduct us to the recognition of a supreme, immaterial Mind? If the material body, with its peculiar organization, be capable of producing human thought, and sufficient to account for the intelligence of man, why may not the material universe, with its mysterious laws and manifold forces, be held sufficient to explain whatever marks of a higher intelligence may appear in Nature?

and why may we not at once embrace Pantheism, and conceive of G.o.d only as "the soul of the world?" Dr. Priestley's reply to this question appears to us to be a mere evasion of the difficulty. In treating of "the objection to the system of Materialism derived from the consideration of the Divine essence," he first of all premises that "in fact we have no proper idea of any essence whatever; that our ideas concerning 'matter' do not go beyond the powers of which it is possessed, and much less can our ideas go beyond powers, properties, or attributes with respect to the Divine Being;" and then adds, "Now, the powers and properties of the Divine mind, as clearly deduced from the works of G.o.d, are not only so infinitely superior to those of the human mind, when there is some a.n.a.logy between them, but so essentially different from them in other respects, that whatever term we make use of to denote the one, it must be improperly applied to the other." He specifies several points of "essential difference" between the human and the Divine mind: the _first_ is, the limited intelligence of the one as contrasted with the all-comprehensive omniscience of the other; the _second_ is, the omnipotence which belongs to G.o.d, and in virtue of which He can produce, or annihilate, anything at His pleasure: the _third_ is, that "the Divine essence cannot be the object of any of our senses, as everything else that we call 'matter' is." And on these grounds he concludes that "as the Divine powers, so the Divine nature, must be essentially different from ours, and, consequently, no common term, except such comprehensive terms as _being, nature_, &c., can be properly used to express both." He further argues that "no proof of the materiality of man can be extended, by any just a.n.a.logy, to a proof or evidence of a similar materiality of the Divine nature; for the properties or powers being different, the 'substance' or 'essence' (if it be any convenience to us to use such terms at all) must be different also."[177]

Now, we conceive this to be a mere evasion of the real difficulty: _first_, because the same mode of reasoning, if applied to the case of the human mind, would equally serve to prove that _it_ should be distinguished from matter: and, _secondly_, because the alleged _differences_ between the human and the Divine mind, great and real as we admit them to be, afford no better reason for calling G.o.d a "spirit,"

than that which may be found in the _resemblance or a.n.a.logy_ between created and uncreated intelligence. It is as true of the human as it is of the Divine mind, that we know nothing of its essence, except what we learn through its properties and powers, that "it cannot be the object of any of our senses, as everything that we call 'matter' is," and that if it be right to give different and distinctive names to substances, expressive of their properties in so far as these are known to us, we are warranted in calling the human soul a "spirit" and distinguishing it from "matter," until it can be shown that the properties of both are identical. If this be denied, we cannot see on what ground the distinction between "matter" and "spirit" can be maintained with reference to G.o.d Himself. Dr. Priestley founds, not on the _resemblance or a.n.a.logy,_ but on the _essential difference_, between created and uncreated intelligence; but, in point of fact, the _difference_, great and real as it is, has no bearing on the only question at issue; it is the _resemblance or a.n.a.logy_ between all thinking beings and the Supreme Mind that suggests the reason for cla.s.sing them under the same category as "spirits," and that enables us to rise from the spiritual nature of man to the spiritual nature of G.o.d.

The personality of G.o.d, as a living, self-conscious, and active Being, distinct from the created universe and superior to it, is dependent on the "spirituality" of His nature; and in so far as the latter is affected by the theory of Materialism, the evidence of the former must also be proportionally weakened. We find, accordingly, that many Materialists have exhibited a tendency towards a Pantheistic theory of nature, in which the material universe is conceived of as the "body," of which G.o.d is the "soul." Some Materialists, indeed, have stopped short of Pantheism; but this may have arisen from their being less consequent reasoners, or more timid thinkers, than others who were prepared to follow out their principles fearlessly to all their logical results; for, a.s.suredly, if there be no evidence sufficient to show that the "mind" is distinct from the "body," it will require a very high kind of evidence to make it certain that "G.o.d" is distinct from "Nature."

4. The theory of Materialism comes into direct collision, at several points, with the doctrines of Revealed Religion.

The doctrine of Scripture in regard to the "human soul" is manifestly at variance with that theory. In the earliest pages of Genesis, we have an account of its creation, which, when compared with other statements and forms of expression occurring elsewhere, seems very clearly to imply that the "soul" is a distinct substantive being, possessing properties and powers peculiar to itself, and, although now united to the "body,"

yet capable of existing apart from it, and destined to an immortal existence hereafter.[178] That it is a distinct substantive being, connected with the body, but not dependent on it, at least in the sense of being incapable of existing apart from it, appears from various testimonies of the inspired Word. G.o.d is there pleased to call Himself "the Father of our spirits," and that, too, in contradistinction to "the fathers of our flesh." "We have had fathers of our 'flesh' which corrected us, and we gave them reverence; shall we not much rather be in subjection unto the Father of 'spirits' and live?" He is called "the G.o.d of the 'spirits' of all flesh," and "the Lord who formeth the 'spirit'

of man within him." The historical narrative, too, of man's creation, which declares that he was "made in the image of G.o.d," and that his "soul" was infused by an immediate Divine afflatus, seems to imply that there is another and a higher relation subsisting between G.o.d and the "soul" than any that subsists between G.o.d and "matter." In other pa.s.sages, the soul is expressly represented as distinct and different from the body:--"Fear not them which can kill the 'body,' but are not able to kill the 'soul.'" "Into thy hands I commit my 'spirit,'" said our Lord, just as his proto-martyr Stephen said, "Lord Jesus, receive my 'spirit.'" There are other pa.s.sages still which affirm the separate existence of disembodied spirits: "Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was, and 'the spirit,' shall return unto G.o.d who gave it."

"A spirit hath not flesh and bones as ye see me have." Nay, _spiritual life_, such as clearly presupposes the continuance of conscious existence, without interruption and without end, is said to be imparted by Christ to his people:--"I am the resurrection and the life: he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live again, and whosoever liveth and believeth in me _shall never die_."--"Whoso believeth in me ... is pa.s.sed from death unto life."[179] Life is said to be already imparted, such a life as shall survive death, and continue without interruption and without end; and surely this is utterly inconsistent with that theory of Materialism which affirms, either the annihilation of the "soul" at death, or even the cessation of its conscious existence during the interval between death and the resurrection.

The revealed doctrine of "angels," or spiritual intelligences existing in other parts of the universe, is also opposed to the theory of Materialism. According to the common belief, the "soul" of man is the _nexus_ between two worlds or states of being,--the world of "matter"

and the world of "mind." In man the elements of both worlds are united; by his body he is connected with the world of matter, by his soul with the world of mind. Death, which dissolves the union between the two, consigns the one to the dust, and introduces the other into the world of spirits. On this view, there is no difficulty in rising to the conception of higher spiritual intelligences; and the variety and gradation that are observable in all the works of G.o.d on earth may impart to that sublime conception such a measure of verisimilitude as to make it easily credible on the authority of Revelation. But the theory of Materialism, especially as advocated by Dr. Priestley, plainly excludes the existence of any order of "spiritual beings" other than the uncreated Mind; for if that only is to be termed "spirit" which possesses omniscience and the power of producing anything at pleasure, it is clear that the highest angels and seraphims are no more "spirits"

than the souls of men.

Such being the relation which subsists between the theory of Materialism, and some of the most important doctrines of Natural and Revealed Religion, it is not wonderful that a serious consideration of the latter should lead reflective men to abjure the former, or that their aversion to it should increase in proportion as their views of Divine truth are extended and enlarged. Not a few have yielded, in early youth, to the charm of speculative inquiry, and fondly embraced the idea of "unisubstancisme," who have lived to exchange it for a more Scriptural faith. For just in proportion as men are brought under the influence of serious views of G.o.d, of the soul, and of an eternal world, in the same proportion will they become alienated, and even averse, from a theory which confounds "spirit" with "matter," obscures their conceptions of G.o.d and of the world of spirits, and degrades men to the level of the beasts that perish. This effect of new, or, at least, more vivid views of "things unseen and eternal" was instructively exemplified in the case of the late Robert Hall. Like many an ardent speculatist, he had embraced in early life the system of Materialism; and even after he had entered on the work of the ministry, he could write to a professedly Christian congregation in the following terms: "I am, and have been for a long time, a Materialist, though I have never drawn your attention to this subject in my preaching, because I have always considered it myself, and wished you to consider it, as a _mere metaphysical speculation_. My opinion, however, on this head, is, that the nature of man is simple and uniform, that the thinking powers and faculties are the result of a certain organization of matter,--and that after death he ceases to be conscious until the resurrection."[180] But speculative inquiry was soon to give place to spiritual faith. The death of his revered and pious father brought his mind into realizing contact with an unseen and eternal world; and, in the words of his biographer, distinguished alike for profound science and deep practical piety, "The death of Mr. Hall's father tended greatly to bring his mind to the state of serious thought with which he entered on the pastoral office.

Meditating with the deepest veneration upon the unusual excellences of a parent now forever lost to him, he was led to investigate, with renewed earnestness, the truth as well as the value of those high and sacred principles from which his eminent piety and admirable consistency so evidently flowed. He called to mind, too, several occasions on which his father, partly by the force of reason, partly by that of tender expostulation, had exhorted him to abandon the vague and dangerous speculations to which he was p.r.o.ne. Some important changes in Mr. Hall's sentiments resulted from an inquiry conducted under such solemn impressions, and among these may be mentioned his renunciation of Materialism, which, he often declared, he _buried in his father's grave_."

FOOTNOTES:

[145] M. AD. FRANCK, "Rapport a l'Academie," Preface, p. XXI.

[146] M. COMTE, "Cours," I. 44, 89, 141; IV. 675; V. 45, 303. M.

CROUSSE, "Des Principes," pp. 16, 20, 84, 88. M. CABANIS, "Rapports du Phisique et du Moral de l'Homme," 3 vols. M. BROUSSAIS, "Traite de Physiologie appliquee a la Pathologie," 1828.

[147] "Systeme de la Nature," I. 2, 10, 86, 101, and _pa.s.sim_. This eloquent text-book of the Atheism of the last century is dissected and refuted by M. BERGIER in his "Examen du Materialisme," 2 vols. Paris, 1771.

[148] M. COMTE, "Cours," I. 44, 141. M. CROUSSE, "Des Principes," pp.

84, 86. ATKITSON AND MARTINEAU, "Letters on the Laws of Man's Nature and Development."

[149] DR. PRIESTLEY, "Discoveries relating to Vision, Light, and Colors." MR. DUGALD STEWART, "Philosoph. Essays," p. 187.

[150] DR. PRIESTLEY, "Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit;"

"Free Discussion of the Doctrine of Materialism;" "Correspondence between Dr. Priestley and Dr. Price."

[151] DR. JOHN MASON GOOD, "Life of Lucretius," prefixed to his poetical version of "The Nature of Things," I. x.x.xVIII.

[152] The "fictions of Clairvoyance" may be studied at large in "The Principles of Nature and her Divine Revelations," by AND. J. DAVIS, the Poughkeepsie Seer, 2 vols.; and in "The Celestial Telegraph," by M.

CAHAGNET. An attempt has been made to popularize the doctrine by introducing it into the light literature of the Continent. See "Memoirs of a Physician, Joseph Balsamo," by ALEXANDER DUMAS, I. 15, 21, 82; II.

50, 62, 70. Whether the cases reported by Dr. Gregory deserve to be ranked as facts or fictions is a question which we need not wait to solve, before we reject the "Revelations" of Davis.

[153] DR. PRIESTLEY, "Disquisitions," p. 2.

[154] "Systeme de la Nature," I. 97, 108.

[155] DR. PRIESTLEY, "Disquisitions," pp. 27, 38, 60.

[156] MR. ATKINSON, "Laws of Man's Nature," p. 17.

[157] DR. SPURZHEIM, "Philosophical Principles of Phrenology," pp. VI., 86, 100. PROFESSOR DOD, "Princeton Theological Essays," II. 376.

[158] DR. GREGORY, "Letters on Animal Magnetism," p. 57.

[159] BISHOP BUTLER, "a.n.a.logy," p. I. c. 1, p. 170.

[160] DR. JOHN PLAYFAIR, "Works," I., Preface, XXIX.

[161] C. M. BURNETT, M. D., "Philosophy," &c. London, 1850.

[162] BISHOP BERKELEY, "Words," I. 80.

[163] LORD BROUGHAM, "Discourse of Natural Theology," p. 238.

[164] STEWART, "Elements of Philosophy," I. 5.

[165] LOCKE'S "Essay," b. II. c. 23, -- 15. Ibid., b. IV. c. 3, -- 6.

[166] LOCKE, "Letter to Bishop of Worcester," Works, IV. 31.