times, and which extended itself so amazingly and dreadfully afterwards.

I mean the Oriental philosophy of the 'preexistence of souls,' which drew after it the belief of the preexistence and divinity of Christ, the worship of Christ and of dead men, and the doctrine of Purgatory, with all the Popish doctrines and practices that are connected with them, and supported by them."--"This doctrine (of the preexistence of Christ) is the point to which all that I have written tends, it being the capital inference that I make from the doctrine of Materialism." There is also abundant reason to believe that both Atheists and Pantheists have had recourse to the theory of Materialism with the view of excluding the doctrine of a living, personal G.o.d, and explaining all the phenomena of Nature by the eternal laws of matter and motion. Now, if the question stands related in any way to such themes as these,--the immortality of man, the preexistence and divinity of Christ, and the personality and spirituality of G.o.d,--it must be confessed to have at least a very high _relative_ importance, as it bears on some of the most momentous articles of our _religious faith_; and the question naturally arises, What relation it bears to the fundamental principles of Theism, and how far it comports with right views of G.o.d, as the Creator and Governor of the world?

We cannot, in the face of direct evidence to the contrary, bring an indiscriminate charge of Atheism, or even of irreligion, against all the advocates of Materialism. It is true that it has often, perhaps most generally, been a.s.sociated with infidel opinions, and that in the hands of D'Holbach, Comte, and Atkinson, it has been applied in support of Atheism; but it is equally true, that in the hands of Dr. Priestley and Dr. Good, it is combined with the professed, and, as we believe, the sincere recognition of a personal G.o.d and of a future state. In point of fact, then, all Materialists have not been Atheists; and even were we convinced that Materialists professing religion were illogical or inconsequent reasoners, we should not be justified in ascribing to them those consequences of their system which they explicitly disclaim and disavow. Still it is competent, and it may be highly useful, to entertain the question, What are the grounds on which the theory of Materialism rests? And whether, if these grounds be valid, they would not lead, in strict logic, to conclusions at variance with some of the most vital and fundamental articles of the Christian faith?

In attempting to discuss the merits of that theory, we propose to state, confirm, and ill.u.s.trate a few propositions which are sufficient, in our opinion, to show that the grounds on which it rests, and the reasons to which it appeals, are not such as to warrant or justify any prejudice against the articles of Natural or Revealed Religion.

SECTION II.

PROPOSITIONS ON MATERIALISM.

I. Our _first_ proposition is, that the recent progress of Natural Science, great and rapid as it has been, has not materially altered "the state of the question" respecting the distinction between Mind and Matter, however much it may have extended our knowledge respecting the properties of both, and of the relation subsisting between the two.

We place this proposition on the foreground, because we have reason to believe that a very different impression prevails in certain quarters, a.s.sociated in some cases with the hope, in others with the apprehension, that the advances which have been made in physical science may ultimately lead to the obliteration of the old distinction between Mind and Matter. This impression has been deepened by every successive addition to the doctrines of Physiology; and especially by the recent speculations on Phrenology, Animal Magnetism, and Clairvoyance. Now, we think that these speculations, even if they were admitted into the rank of true sciences, would not materially alter the "state of the question"

respecting the distinction between Mind and Matter, as that question was discussed in former times.

Take the case of Phrenology. It had always been admitted that the mind has certain _external organs_, through which it receives various impressions from without, and holds communication with the sensible universe. The existence and use of these organs were held to be perfectly compatible with the doctrine that the soul itself is immaterial. Phrenology appears, and professes to have discovered _certain other organs_, certain cerebral developments, which stand connected with the various functions of thought and feeling; in other words, to the _five senses_ which are universally recognized, it adds _thirty_ or _forty_ organs in the brain, not hitherto known to exist.

But how does this discovery, even supposing it to be fully established, affect the state of the question respecting the radical distinction betwixt Mind and Matter? A material organization, in the case of man, was always admitted; and the only difference which that discovery could be supposed to make, must arise from the addition of certain organs to those which were previously established. But why should the spirituality of the soul be more affected by the one set of organs than it was by the other? The ablest advocates of Phrenology have repudiated Materialism.

Dr. Spurzheim expressly disclaims it. "I incessantly repeat," says he, "that the aim of Phrenology is never to attempt pointing out _what the mind is in itself_. I do not say that the organization produces the affective and intellectual faculties of man's mind, as a tree brings forth fruit or an animal procreates its kind; I only say that organic conditions are necessary to every manifestation of mind."--"If the manifestation of the faculties of the mind depend on organization, Materialism, it is said, will be established.... When our antagonists, however, maintain that we are Materialists, they ought to show where we teach _that there is nothing but matter._ The entire falsehood of the accusation is made obvious by a review of the following considerations.

The expression 'organ' designates an instrument by means of which some faculty proclaims itself. The muscles, for example, are the organs of voluntary motion, but they are not the moving power; the eyes are the organ of sight, but they are not the faculty of seeing. We separate the faculties of the soul, or of the mind, from the organs; and consider the cerebral parts as the instruments by means of which they manifest themselves. Now, even the adversaries of Phrenology must, to a certain extent, admit the dependence of the soul on the body.... We are, therefore, no more Materialists than our predecessors, whether anatomists, physiologists, or physicians, or the great number of philosophers and moralists, who have admitted the dependence of the soul on the body. For the Materialism is essentially the same, whether the faculties of the mind be said to depend on the whole body, on the whole brain, or individual powers on particular parts of the brain; the faculties still depend on organization for their exhibition."[157] We conclude, therefore, that Phrenology, even supposing it to be fully established, could not materially affect the state of the question respecting the radical distinction between Mind and Matter.

Similar remarks apply to the case of Mesmerism or Animal Magnetism. It had always been known and admitted that the soul is liable, by reason of its connection with the body in the present state, to be affected by _certain influences_,--from light, from heat, from electricity, from the atmosphere, and from other sources. Mesmerism appears, and professes to have discovered _another influence_ by which the nervous system is peculiarly affected; in other words, it merely adds a new influence to the number of those which were universally acknowledged before, it matters little whether it be the Magnetism of Mesmer, or the Odyle of Reichenbach, or the Dia-magnetism of Faraday. But how could this discovery, even supposing it to be fully established, affect the state of the question respecting the radical distinction between Mind and Matter? If we were Immaterialists before, while we acknowledged the influence of the atmosphere, of light, of heat, and of electricity, may we not be Immaterialists still, notwithstanding the addition of Odyle to the cla.s.s of _dynamides_? May we not admit the stranger, with the strange name, if suitably attested, without the slightest apprehension of thereby weakening the grounds on which we hold Mind to be essentially different from Matter, and incapable of being identified with it? It were a foolish and dangerous expedient, and one to which no enlightened advocate of Immaterialism will have recourse, to denounce the professed discoveries either of Phrenology or of Mesmerism, on the ground of their supposed tendency to obliterate the distinction between Mind and Matter. For the fact, that certain "organs" exist, by means of which the mind acquires a large portion of its knowledge, and that certain "influences" are known to affect it from without, is too well established to be called in question; and the mere extension of that fact by the discovery of _other organs and other influences_, hitherto unknown, could have no tendency to shut us up, more than before, to the adoption of the theory of Materialism. It is the part of wisdom, then, to leave ample scope and verge for the progress of Physiological research in this as in every other department, and to rest in the confident persuasion that whatever discoveries may yet be made in regard to the _connection_ between mind and body, they can have no effect in disproving a _radical distinction_ between the two. And this we deem a much safer ground than that which Professor Gregory has adopted, when he first of all denies the possibility of defining either matter or spirit, and then leaves the existence of "a thinking principle or soul distinct from the body" to rest merely on "our instinctive consciousness."[158]

We think it, in every point of view, a safer course to meet all objections by saying, that the admission of the _odylic_ or any other influence of a similar kind, would not in the least affect the grounds of our belief in the existence of an immaterial mind.

We are disposed to pursue the same line of argument a step further, and to apply it to the case of "Hypnotism" or "Clairvoyance." It had always been known that the mind, in its present state of connection with the body, is liable to be affected by _sleep_ and by _dreams_; and the phenomena of natural sleep and of ordinary dreams were never supposed to be incompatible with the distinction between mind and body. But the Hypnotist or the Clairvoyant appears, and announces a state of _magnetic sleep_, with a new set of phenomena dependent on it, resembling the dreams and visions of the night. The facts are strange and startling; but, after recovering from our first surprise, we may calmly ask, what effect these facts, if established, should have in modifying our convictions respecting the essential nature of mind and matter; and we shall find that they afford no sufficient reason for relinquishing the doctrine of an "immaterial spirit," but that, on the contrary, these very facts, were they sufficiently verified, would open up a new view of the powers and activities of "spirit," such as might well fill us with wonder and awe. "I have heard, times innumerable," says Professor Gregory, "religious persons declare, on seeing these phenomena, that nothing could more clearly demonstrate the immateriality, and consequently the immortality of the soul. 'In _clairvoyance_,' say these persons, 'we observe the mind acting separate from the body, and entirely independent of it. How beautiful a proof of the infinite difference between _spirit_ and _matter_.'" It is a proof that we would be slow to adduce, for the facts are doubtful as well as obscure; but, for our present purpose, it is not necessary either to admit or to deny the truth of these facts; it is sufficient to say that the phenomena of Mesmeric sleep and the visions of Clairvoyance are not more inconsistent with the doctrine of an immaterial soul than the more familiar, but scarcely less mysterious, phenomena of natural sleep and common dreams.

It is, indeed, not a little remarkable that the profound and sagacious Butler expressed himself in the following terms, long before the phenomena of Magnetism and Clairvoyance were spoken of as subjects of scientific study: "That we have no reason to think our _organs_ of sense _percipients_ ... is confirmed by the experience of dreams, by which we find we are at present possessed of a latent, and what would otherwise be an unimagined, unknown power of perceiving sensible objects, in as strong and lively a manner, _without our external organs of sense as with them_."[159]

On the whole, we think it clear that neither by Phrenology, which adds merely to the number of our material "organs," nor by Mesmerism, which adds _one_ to the number of the "influences" by which we are affected, nor by Clairvoyance, which adds the phenomena of _magnetic_ to those of _natural_ sleep, is the state of the question materially altered from what it was before these additions were made to Physiological speculation. And hence those who are well versed in our older writers on the doctrine of "spirit" and "matter," will be sufficiently furnished with weapons for repelling the more recent a.s.saults of Materialism. If any one has read and digested the Treatises of Dr. Samuel Clarke, in his replies to Dodwell, Collins, and Leibnitz; the "Free Discussion" between Dr. Priestley and Dr. Price; the "Examen du Materialisme" by Bergier, in reply to the "Systeme de la Nature;" and the writings of Andrew Baxter, Drew, Ditton, and others, on the same subject, he will find little difficulty in grappling with the arguments of Comte, Atkinson, and Martineau. He will see at once that the main, the fundamental question, is not materially affected by the advances which have been made in Physiological discovery. These discoveries may have extended our knowledge respecting _the relations_ which subsist between the "mind"

and the "body;" they have in no degree served to obliterate the _distinction betwixt the two_.

In perfect consistency, however, with this conviction, we may frankly avow our opinion, that some of the older opponents of Materialism adopted a method of stating their argument which appears to us to be liable to just exception, and which the progress of Physical, and especially of Chemical science, has tended greatly to discredit. They seem to have been apprehensive that by ascribing any peculiar properties or active powers to matter, they might incur the hazard of weakening the grounds on which they contended for the spirituality of man and the supremacy of G.o.d. Thus, in the "Inquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul," by Andrew Baxter, the existence of any active property or power in matter is explicitly denied, and the only property which is ascribed to it is a certain pa.s.sive power, or "vis inertiae," by which it is incapable of changing its state, whether of rest or of motion. This "vis inertiae" is not only supposed to be the sole property of matter, but is even held to be inconsistent with, and exclusive of, any active power whatever; and all the effects which are usually said to be produced by it are ascribed to the power of an immaterial Being. We are told that "vis inertiae," or "a resistance to any change of its present state, is essential to matter, and inconsistent with any active power in it;" that "all gravity, attraction, elasticity, repulsion, or whatever other tendencies to motion are observed in matter (commonly called natural powers of matter), are not powers implanted in matter or possible to be made inherent in it, but impulse or force impressed upon it _ab extra_;"

and that "the cause of its motion must be sought for in something not matter, in some _immaterial cause or being_."--"Gravity," for instance, "is not the action of matter upon matter, but the virtue or power of an immaterial cause or being, constantly impressed upon it." Nor has this doctrine been confined to such metaphysical reasoners as Andrew Baxter.

Professor Playfair tells us, that when he was introduced to Dr. Horsley, the Bishop "expressed great respect for Lord Monboddo, for his learning and his acuteness, and (what was more surprising) for the soundness of his judgment. He talked very seriously of the notion of _mind being united to all the parts of matter and being the cause of motion_. So far as I could gather, Dr. Horsley supposes that _every atom of matter has a soul_, which is the cause of its motion, its gravitation, &c. What has made him adopt this strange unphilosophical notion I cannot tell, unless it be the fear that his study of natural philosophy should make him suspected of Atheism, or at least of Materialism. For it is certain that there is at present a prejudice among the English clergy that natural philosophy has a tendency to make men Atheists or Materialists. This absurd prejudice was first introduced, I think, by that illiberal, though learned, prelate, Dr. Warburton."[160] A similar opinion has been recently reproduced by Dr. Burnett in his "Philosophy of Spirits in relation to Matter," in which he attempts to show that the forces and laws of Nature cannot be proved to be _the result of anything inherent in matter alone_, and that they ought to be ascribed to some substantive and distinct, but immaterial and dependent _spirits_, called "the spirit of life," "the spirit of electricity," "the spirit of heat."[161].

All these statements are only so many modifications of the same theory, and they agree in denying the existence of any active powers in matter, while they ascribe the phenomena of motion, life, and thought to an immaterial principle. There is, as it seems to us, a mixture of truth and error in this theory. It affirms a great truth, in so far as it declares the impossibility of accounting for the phenomena of motion, life, and thought, without ascribing them ultimately to a spiritual, intelligent, and voluntary cause; but it adopts a dangerous, and, as we conceive, a perfectly gratuitous a.s.sumption, when it denies that matter is capable of possessing any other properties or powers than those of extension, solidity, and "vis inertiae." We know little of the nature of those fluids, forces, or powers, which have been denominated "dynamides"

or "imponderables;" but, unquestionably, they possess properties and produce phenomena very different from any that can be reasonably ascribed to mere "vis inertiae." Nor is their possession of these properties incompatible with that law, when it is correctly understood.

For what is the real import of the law of "vis inertiae?" It amounts simply to this, as stated by Baxter himself, "that a resistance to any change of its present state,--whether of motion or rest,--is essential to 'matter,'" he adds, indeed, "and inconsistent with any active power in it;" but this is an a.s.sumption which is true only in a sense that would make it inconclusive with reference to the point at issue. It is true, if it means merely that matter is dest.i.tute of spontaneity and self-motion, such as belongs to living, voluntary agents; but it is not true, if it means that matter is dest.i.tute of all inherent properties and powers. Indeed, the "vis inertiae" which is ascribed to matter is itself a power, and a very formidable one; it is described by Baxter himself as "a kind of positive or stubborn inactivity," as "something receding further from action than bare inactivity," for "_matter is so powerfully inactive a thing_!" Now, if such a power as this may be ascribed to matter, why may it not be admitted with equal safety that G.o.d has bestowed on it certain other properties and powers, not inconsistent with this, but additional to it; and that He has established such relations and affinities between different substances as that they may act and react--mechanically or chemically--on one another? The phenomena of chemical affinity, the motions, and other changes, produced by the contact, or even the juxtaposition, of certain substances, and the variety of the resulting products, do certainly evince the operation of other powers besides that of "vis inertiae;" and we cannot see why these powers should be ascribed to "immaterial spirits," any more than that of "vis inertiae" itself, or why it would be a whit more dangerous to ascribe them to matter than to created _spirits_. All that is required, as it appears to us, to establish the dependence of the creature on the Creator and to vindicate the truth of Christian Theism, is to maintain these two positions: _first_, that whatever properties or powers belong either to "matter" or to "mind,"

were originally conferred on them, respectively, at the time of their creation by the will of G.o.d; and, _secondly_, that by the same will, these properties and powers are continually sustained, governed, and controlled. These two positions are held by all enlightened Theists, and are abundantly sufficient, if proved, to vindicate their doctrine against every a.s.sault; but we think it unwarrantable and dangerous to go further, and to ascribe, on the strength of mere gratuitous a.s.sumptions, all the activity, motion, and change which occur in the universe to created spirits or immaterial causes. These a.s.sumptions are extremely different from the common-sense notions of men, and they are utterly unnecessary for the support of any doctrine which we are concerned to defend.

On the whole, we venture to conclude that the radical distinction between Mind and Matter has not been materially affected by the recent progress of Physiological research, and that the old arguments against Materialism are still available, except in so far as they were founded on a too limited view of the properties of matter, which the advancing Science of Chemistry has done so much, to unfold and to ill.u.s.trate.

II. Our _second_ proposition may be thus stated: That were we reduced to the necessity of embracing any form of the theory of "unisubstancisme,"

there could not be less,--there might even be greater,--reason for _spiritualizing matter_, than for _materializing mind_.

On the supposition that one or other of the two must be dispensed with, the question still remains, which of them can be most easily spared? or, which of them can be most conclusively proved? Mankind have generally thought that they had equally good evidence for the existence of both; that in the direct and irresistible evidence of Consciousness, they had proof sufficient of a thinking, voluntary, and active spirit, and in the less direct, but not less irresistible, evidence of Perception, proof sufficient of the existence of a material world. But each of these convictions has been in its turn a.s.sailed by the cavils of skepticism; and men have been asked to prove _by reasoning_ what needed, and, indeed, admitted of no _such_ proof,--the existence of Matter as distinct from Mind, and the existence of Mind as distinct from Matter.

The latter is denied by Materialists, the former is equally denied by Idealists; and what we affirm is, that each of these opposite theories is one-sided and partial, and that, on the supposition of our being reduced to the necessity of adopting the idea of "unisubstancisme," we should still have greater reason to reduce all to the category of "spirit," than to reduce all to the category of "matter." Many seem to think that it is more easy, or, perhaps, that it is less necessary, to prove the distinct existence of matter, than to prove the distinct existence of mind. They are so familiar with matter, and so continually surrounded by it, that they cannot conceive of its non-existence as possible, and scarcely think it necessary to inquire after any evidence in the case. But can it be justly said that they are more familiar with matter and its movements than they are with a living spirit within them, which feels, and thinks, and wills, and by means of which alone the phenomena of external nature itself can become known to them? If they receive the testimony of Perception as a sufficient proof of the existence of Matter, why should they not also receive the still more direct and immediate testimony of Consciousness as a sufficient proof of the existence of Mind? Or, if they refuse the latter, and admit the former, are they quite sure that, on their own partial principles, they could offer any conclusive answer to the "Idealism" of Berkeley? That ingenious and amiable prelate will tell them that "the objects of sense cannot exist otherwise than _in a mind perceiving them_;" that "their _esse_ is _percipi_, nor is it possible that they should have any existence out of the minds, or thinking things, which perceive them;"

and that "all the choir of heaven and the furniture of the earth,--in a word, all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind."[162] Nay, others who are not Idealists, but who believe equally in the existence of "mind" and "matter," will tell them that Berkeley's arguments are conclusive, at least to the extent of showing that the existence of "matter," as a thing external to us, cannot be proved without presupposing the existence of "mind." "For what," says Lord Brougham, "is this matter?

Whence do we derive any knowledge of it? How do we a.s.sure ourselves of its existence? What evidence have we at all respecting either its being or its qualities? We feel, or taste, or smell something; that is, we have certain sensations, which make us conclude that something exists beyond ourselves." ... "But what are our sensations? The feelings or thoughts of our own minds. Then what we do is this: from certain ideas in our minds, produced no doubt by, and connected with, our bodily senses, but independent of and separate from them, we draw certain conclusions by reasoning; and these conclusions are in favor of the existence of something other than our sensations and our reasonings, and other than that which experiences the sensations and makes the reasonings, pa.s.sive in the one case, active in the other. That something is what we call--Mind. But plainly, whatever it is, we owe to it the knowledge that matter exists; for that knowledge is gained by means of a sensation or feeling, followed by a process of reasoning; it is gained by the mind having first suffered something, and then done something.

Therefore, to say _there is no such thing as matter_ would be a much less absurd inference than to say _there is no such thing as mind_." ...

"The truth is, that we believe in the existence of 'matter,' because we cannot help it. The inferences of our reason from our sensations impel us to this conclusion, and the steps are few and short by which we reach it. But the steps are fewer, and shorter, and of the self-same nature, which lead us to believe in the existence of Mind, for of that we have the evidence within ourselves."[163]

It follows that were we reduced, as we are not, to the necessity of adopting the theory of "unisubstancisme," we might with at least as good reason dispense with the existence of "matter" as with the existence of "mind;" for, in the words of Dugald Stewart, "it would no more be proper to say of 'mind' that it is _material_, than to say of 'body' that it is _spiritual."_[164]

III. Our _third_ proposition is, That we are _not_ reduced to the necessity of adopting any theory of "unisubstancisme," since there is nothing inconceivable or self-contradictory in the supposition of two distinct substantive beings, possessing diverse properties, such as "mind" and "body," or "spirit" and "matter," are usually held to be.

Let any one endeavor to a.s.sign a reason for the sole, exclusive existence either of "matter" or of "spirit," or a distinct, specific ground for the opinion that they are necessarily incompatible with each other, and he will be compelled to own that the theory of "unisubstancisme," however plausible by reason of its apparent simplicity, is really nothing more than a gratuitous a.s.sumption. It cannot be admitted with reference even to _nature_ and _man_ without confounding the simplest elements of human knowledge; and with reference to _G.o.d_ and the _universe_, it is attended with still more fatal consequences, since it must lead, if consistently followed out, to undisguised Pantheism. Why should it be supposed that there is, or can only be, _one_ substance in Nature? one substance invested with all those properties and powers which exist, in such manifold diversity, in the organic and inorganic kingdoms? The wonder might rather seem to be that any _two_ substances should be capable of accounting for such a variety of phenomena as the universe exhibits. A "dualism" is unavoidable, unless we are to materialize G.o.d as well as man; and why may there not be a "dualism" in the case of created _mind_ and _matter_, as there must be, on any supposition except that of Pantheism, in the case of the uncreated mind and the material universe? We see variety and gradation in all the works of G.o.d; we see thousands of substances, simple and compound, possessing various properties, even in the inorganic world; we see different forms of life, vegetable and animal, ascending by steps of regular gradation, from the lowest to the highest; we see, in the animal kingdom, various propensities, instincts, and powers, which const.i.tute the characteristics of distinct species; at length we rise to Man, with his rational, responsible, and immortal nature. Why may not Man be the _nexus_ between a world of "matter" and a world of "spirits,"--Man, who is equally connected with the material world by his body, and with the spiritual by his soul,--who is, as it were, "mind incarnate," spirit in flesh? And why may there not be higher spirits still, whether embodied in subtler and more refined vehicles, or existing apart from all material forms, in those other worlds which Astronomy has brought to light? No reason can be a.s.signed for a negative answer to these and similar queries, unless it be that _we cannot conceive of pure spirit without bodily form_; and this may be true, if it be meant merely to affirm that we can find no sensible image for it, nothing by which it can be represented to our sight, or pictured in our imagination, as visible things may be; but it is not true, if it be meant to imply that we have no distinct notion of "mind" or "spirit,"

for it is as clearly known by its properties, of thought, feeling, volition, and consciousness, as matter itself can be; and who will venture to define, or to depict, or to form any image of _the substance of matter_, apart from the properties which belong to it?

We are under no necessity, then, of adopting the theory of "unisubstancisme," and we cannot found upon it in argument without building on a mere gratuitous a.s.sumption.

IV. Our _fourth_ proposition is, That the same reason which warrants us in ascribing certain properties and phenomena to a distinct substance called "matter," equally warrants us in ascribing certain other properties and phenomena to a distinct substance called "mind;" and that the difference between their respective properties and phenomena is so great as to justify the belief that the _substances_ are different and ought to be denominated by distinctive names.

When Materialists affirm, as they do, the existence of one only substantive being in Nature, and represent all our mental phenomena as the mere results of physical organization, they a.s.sume that "matter," at least, is a real _ent.i.ty_; that it is a _substance_ or _substratum_ in which certain powers or qualities inhere; and that its existence, as such, is evident and undeniable. We are entirely relieved, therefore, by their own admission or a.s.sumption, from the necessity of discussing the more general problem of Ontology; the problem, whether we can prove the existence of _any_ being, properly so called, from a mere series of phenomena, a succession of appearances. They virtually admit, since they evidently a.s.sume, that the phenomena must have a substance under them, the qualities a substratum in which they inhere. Now, the very same reason which warrants, or rather obliges them to recognize "matter" as a substance and not as a shadow,--as an _ent.i.ty_ which really exists and manifests itself by its properties and effects,--must equally warrant, or rather oblige them to recognize "mind" or "spirit" also as a distinct substantive being, unless it can be shown either that its properties are the same with those of matter, or that they may be accounted for by some peculiar modification of matter, some law of physical organization. There can be no reason for admitting the existence of "matter" as a substance, which does not apply also to the existence of "mind" as a distinct substance, if it shall be found that their properties are essentially different. We know, and can know, nothing of _substance_ otherwise than by its properties or powers: we know nothing of "matter,"--it would, in fact, be to us non-existent, but for its extension, solidity, and other properties; we know nothing of "mind,"--it would equally be to us non-existent, but for its consciousness, its thoughts, feelings, and desires; and if it be right to ascribe the one set of properties to a substantive being, called "matter," it cannot be wrong to ascribe the other set of properties also to a substantive being, called "mind."

If it could be shown, indeed, that the properties of the one substance might either be identified with, or accounted for, by those of the other; if animal feeling could be identified with or derived from, mere physical impulse; if intellectual thought could be reduced to material motion; if desire and aversion, hope and fear could be explained by the natural laws of attraction and repulsion, then we might blend the two substances into one, and speak of "mind" as a mere modification of "matter." But as long as the properties or powers by which alone any substance can be known are seen to be generically different, we cannot confound the substances themselves, or reduce them to one category, without violating the plainest rules of philosophical inquiry.

And yet to these rules Dr. Priestley refers, as if they warranted the conclusions at which he had arrived. He desires his readers "to recur to the universally received rules of philosophizing, such as are laid down by Sir Isaac Newton at the beginning of his third book of "Principia."

The first of these rules, as laid down by him, is that we are to _admit no more causes than are sufficient to explain appearances_; and the second is, that to _the same effect_ we must, as far as possible, a.s.sign _the same cause_." We cheerfully accept these canons of philosophical inquiry; and it is just because no one substance is sufficient, in our estimation, to account for _all_ the appearances, that we equally reject the "spiritualism" of Berkeley, who would resolve all phenomena into "mind," and the "materialism" of Priestley, who would resolve all phenomena into "matter." Matter and Mind may, indeed, be said to resemble each other in some respects,--in their being equally existent, equally created, and equally dependent; but their essential properties are generically different, for there is no ident.i.ty, but a manifest and undeniable diversity, between thought, feeling, desire, volition, and conscience, and the various qualities or powers belonging to matter, such as extension, solidity, and _vis inertiae_, or even the powers of attraction and repulsion. On the ground of this manifest difference between the properties by which alone any substance makes itself known, we hold ourselves warranted to affirm that the "mind" is immaterial, and to ascribe mental phenomena to a _distinct substantive being_, not less than the material phenomena of Nature.

Some ingenious thinkers, on both sides of the question, have not been fully satisfied with this method of stating the grounds of our opinion.

It has been said by our opponents, that if we found merely on the acknowledged difference between two sets of properties or phenomena, while we admit that the substance or substratum is in itself entirely unknown to us, or known only through the medium of the properties to which we refer,--then the dispute becomes a purely _verbal_ one, and can amount to nothing more than this, whether a _substance_ of whose essence we are entirely ignorant should be called by the name of "matter" or by the name of "spirit." But the dispute is not a purely _verbal_ one, even on the suppositions which have been stated. For it is essential to a right "philosophy of nature," that every substance possessing peculiar properties should have a distinctive name. Thus, even in the material world itself, we distinguish sulphur from soda, gold from granite, and magnesia from electricity or _odyle_. Why? Because, while they have some properties in common, in virtue of which we rank them in the same category as "material substances," they have, severally, certain distinctive or peculiar characteristics, which forbid us to call the one by the same name as the other. And for precisely the same reason, when we find another cla.s.s of properties and powers existing in certain beings, which are totally different from those belonging to mere material substances,--incapable not only of being identified with them, but also of being accounted for by means of them,--we are equally warranted in ascribing these properties to a _substance_, and in affirming that this substance, of which we know nothing except through its properties, is radically different from "matter." That there is something more than a mere _verbal_ difference between us and our opponents might seem to be admitted by themselves, when they evince so much zeal in a.s.sailing our position and defending their own; but it becomes strikingly apparent as soon as we extend our inquiry so as to embrace the grand question respecting the distinction, if any, between G.o.d and the material universe.

Some, again, who are substantially, at least in all important respects, on our side of the question, have not been satisfied with showing that the two sets of properties are generically different, and that the same reason exists for ascribing the one to a distinct substantive being called "mind," as for ascribing the other to a substantive being called "matter." They have been anxious to advance a step further; and to show that the two sets of properties are _mutually exclusive_, and that they could not possibly _coexist_ in the same subject. This is the declared object of Baxter's Work on the Soul, which professes to prove that the only power belonging to "matter," namely, its _vis inertiae_, or resistance to any change in its present state, is inconsistent with its possession of any active power. It is not held sufficient to show that the properties are generically different, and that the substances in which these properties inhere may and should be designated by distinct names, as matter and spirit, soul and body; but it must be further proved that they are so heterogeneous and inconsistent as to be mutually exclusive, and incapable of coexisting in the same substance. To a certain extent, we think this mode of reasoning may be admitted. We do not conceive that "vis inertiae" is the only property belonging to matter, or that it is necessarily exclusive of attraction and repulsion, and the other powers which may belong to its specific varieties; but we do conceive that the "vis inertiae" of mere matter is utterly inconsistent with the self-activity, the self-moving power, which belongs to "mind:" and we are confirmed in this conviction by the anxiety which our opponents have evinced to explain the phenomena of mind by purely mechanical laws, and to establish a system, not of _moral_, but of _material_ necessity, in opposition to the doctrine of man's spontaneity and freedom. We are further of opinion, that _extension_ cannot be predicated of "mind," without also being predicated of "thought;" and that to ascribe it to either would lead to ridiculous absurdities, such as have been noted, and perhaps caricatured, by Dr. Thomas Brown. We think, too, that the unity and continuity of consciousness, with the intimate sense of personal ident.i.ty, that belongs to all rational and responsible beings, are utterly irreconcilable with the continual flux and mutation that are incident to matter, and that they cannot be accounted for without the supposition of a distinct substance, existing the same throughout all the changes that occur in the material receptacle in which it dwells. To this extent we think that the argument is alike legitimate and valid; but when it goes beyond this, and attempts either to divest matter of all active properties, or to demonstrate that, in the very nature of things, sensation and thought could not possibly be annexed to a material substance, we think that it advances beyond the real exigencies of the case, and that it undertakes a task which is somewhat too arduous for our present powers,--a task which many of the ablest advocates of Immaterialism would humbly, but firmly, decline.

In this connection, it may be useful to remark that it is only with reference to this advanced and more arduous part of the general argument, that such writers as Locke and Bonnet, whose authority is often pleaded in opposition to our views, ever felt the slightest difficulty. They were both "Immaterialists," because they both discerned the radical difference between mental and material phenomena, and because they both admitted the reasonableness of ascribing them, respectively, to a _distinct substance_. But they were not convinced by the more metaphysical arguments of those who professed to show that none of the phenomena of "mind" could possibly be exhibited by matter, or, at least, they declined to take that ground. That Locke was an Immaterialist is evident from many pa.s.sages in his writings. "By putting together," he says, "the ideas of thinking, perceiving, liberty and power of moving themselves and other things, we have as clear a perception and notion of immaterial substances as we have of material.

For putting together the ideas of thinking and willing, &c., joined to _substance_, of which we have no distinct idea, we have the idea of an immaterial spirit; and by putting together the ideas of coherent solid parts and a power of being moved, joined with _substance_, of which likewise we have no positive idea, we have the idea of matter: the one is as clear and distinct an idea as the other."[165] But notwithstanding this explicit statement, he demurred to the doctrine of those who maintained that the power of thinking could not possibly be superadded to matter, and this because he deemed it presumptuous to set limits to the Divine omnipotence, or to p.r.o.nounce any judgment on a question of that kind. "We have the ideas of matter and thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know whether any mere material being thinks or no; it being impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own ideas, without Revelation, to discover whether Omnipotency has not given to some systems of matter, fitly disposed, a power to perceive and think.... I see _no contradiction_ in it that the first eternal thinking Being should, if He pleased, give to certain systems of created senseless matter, put together as He sees fit, some degrees of sense, perception, and thought."[166]

In these and similar pa.s.sages, Locke did not mean, we think, to retract or modify the doctrine which he had taught respecting the radical distinction betwixt mind and matter; he intended merely to intimate that, in adopting that doctrine, he proceeded on grounds different from those which had been a.s.sumed by some other writers; that his belief rested mainly on the essential difference between the properties belonging to the two substances, and not on the mere metaphysical arguments by which some had attempted to prove that G.o.d himself could not impart to matter the power of thinking. He shrunk from p.r.o.nouncing a positive decision on _this_ one point; and yet his words have ever since been quoted with triumph by the advocates of Materialism as affording a virtual sanction to _the possibility_ at least of that for which they contend. And on the same account, Locke has been severely blamed by some modern "spiritualists." Mr. Carlyle, speaking of "Hartley's and Darwin's, and all the possible forms of Materialism,--the grand Idolatry, as we may rightly call it, by which at all times the true worship, that of the invisible, has been polluted and withstood"--adds the following characteristic remarks: "Locke, himself a clear, humble-minded, patient, reverent, nay religious man, had paved the way for banishing religion from the world. Mind, by being modelled in men's imaginations into a Shape, a Visibility, and reasoned of as if it had been some composite, divisible, and reunitable substance, some finer chemical salt, or curious piece of logical joinery, began to lose its immaterial, mysterious, divine, though invisible character: it was tacitly figured as something that might, were our organs fine enough, be _seen_. Yet who had ever seen it? who could ever see it? Thus, by degrees, it pa.s.sed into a Doubt, a Relation, some faint Possibility, and, at last, into a highly probably Nonent.i.ty. Following Locke's footsteps, the French had discovered that 'as the stomach secretes chyle, so does the brain secrete thought.'"[167]

The sentiments of Bonnet of Geneva, as stated in his "Palingenesie," are substantially in accordance with those of Locke, and have met with similar treatment. He is not a Materialist; he admits a real distinction, as well as a close union, between the soul and the body; he speaks even of the possible existence of disembodied souls or pure spirits; he affirms the immateriality of the thinking principle; and expressly a.s.signs his reasons for _not_ being a Materialist.[168] But he appears to have thought, as Locke did, that possibly the power of thinking might be superadded to matter, by the Creator's omnipotent will, and that there is nothing in this supposition which could seriously affect either the doctrine of Theism or the "immortality" of man. And hence he affirmed, in words which Dr. Priestley selected for the motto of his "Disquisitions," that "if any one should ever demonstrate the soul to be material, far from being alarmed at this, we should only admire the power which could give to _matter_ the power of _thinking_."

We conceive that the language both of Locke and Bonnet on this particular point amounts to a dangerous and very unnecessary concession.

Were it meant merely to affirm that G.o.d could so unite a thinking spiritual being with a material organism, as to make the two mutually dependent and subservient, this is no more than is admitted by all the advocates of Immaterialism, and it is actually exhibited in the const.i.tution of human nature. But if it were meant to admit that the power of "thinking" and "willing" might be superadded as a property or quality to matter itself, _without any substantive being other than matter as a substratum_, then we conceive it to be at variance with the grounds on which Locke and Bonnet themselves had previously declared their belief in the distinct existence both of matter and spirit. We shall only add, that the prejudice against our doctrine, which is founded on the union of two _substances_ apparently so heterogeneous as mind and matter in _the same person_, is, to say the least, fully counterbalanced by the difficulty, incident to the theory, of demonstrating the coexistence of _two sets of properties_, apparently so diverse and disparate as thought and extension, "vis inertiae" and spontaneity, in _the same substance_.

On the whole, we conclude that the same reason which warrants us in ascribing certain properties or phenomena to a distinct substance called "matter," equally warrants us in ascribing certain other properties or phenomena to a distinct substance called "mind;" and that the difference between their properties and phenomena is so great as to justify the belief that the substances are different, and ought to be denominated by distinctive names.

V. Our _fifth_ proposition is, That it is impossible to account for the phenomena of thought, feeling, desire, volition, and self-consciousness, by ascribing them, as Materialists do, either to the _substance of_ "matter," or to its _form_; that is, either to the _atomic particles_ of which it consists, or to the _peculiar organization_ in which these particles are arranged.

It is too manifest to admit either of doubt or denial, that the power of thinking, feeling, and willing, does not belong to every form of matter.

It is not, therefore, one of its essential properties; and if it belong to it at all, it must be either a _quality superadded_ to the ordinary powers of matter, or a _product resulting_ from its configuration in an organized form.

If it be a quality superadded merely to the ordinary powers of matter, then it must exist equally in every part of the ma.s.s to which it is attached; every particle of the matter in which it inheres must be sentient, intelligent, voluntary, and active; and, on this supposition, it will remain a difficult, if not desperate problem, to account for the _unity_ of consciousness by such a diversity of parts, and especially for the _continuity_ of consciousness, when the material elements are confessedly in a state of constant flux and mutation. It would seem, too, that if thought be thus connected with an extended, divisible, and mutable substance, it must be itself extended, and, of course, divisible; and, accordingly, Dr. Priestley does not hesitate to affirm that our _ideas_, as well as our _minds_, possess these characters.

"Whatever ideas," he says, "are in themselves, they are evidently produced by external objects, and must therefore correspond to them; and since many of the objects or archetypes of ideas are _divisible_, it necessarily follows that _the ideas themselves are divisible also_." ...

"If the archetypes of ideas have _extension_, the ideas which are expressive of them, and are actually produced by them according to certain mechanical laws, must have extension likewise; and, therefore, the mind in which they exist, whether it be material or immaterial, must have extension also.... I am, therefore, obliged to conclude that the sentient principle in man, containing ideas which certainly have parts, and are divisible, and consequently must have extension, cannot be that simple, indivisible, and immaterial substance that some have imagined it to be, but something that has real extension, and therefore may have the other properties of matter."[169] He argues that _ideas_ must be extended and divisible because their objects or archetypes are so; and, further, that the _mind_ itself must be material, because these properties belong to the ideas which inhere in it as their subject or seat. Now, _this_ argument is fairly met by the reasoning, or the ridicule, call it which you will, of Dr. Thomas Brown: "In saying of mind that it is matter, we must mean, if we mean anything, that the principle which thinks is hard and divisible; and that it will be not more absurd to talk of the _twentieth_ part of an affirmation, or the _quarter_ of a hope, of the _top_ of a remembrance, and the north and east corners of a comparison, than of the twentieth part of a pound, or of the different points of the compa.s.s, in reference to any part of the globe. The true answer to the statement of the Materialist,--the answer which we feel in our hearts, on the very expression of the plurality and divisibility of feeling,--is that it a.s.sumes what, far from admitting, we cannot even understand, and that, with every effort of attention which we can give to our mental a.n.a.lysis, we are as incapable of forming any conception of what is meant by the quarter of a doubt, or the half of a belief, as of forming to ourselves an image of a circle without a central point, or of a square without a single angle."[170]

But the theory which supposes the soul to be extended and divisible, and its ideas, feelings, and volitions to be extended and divisible also, has given place to another, which does not represent the mental qualities as inhering in every particle of the matter with which they are a.s.sociated, but rather as _the products of organization_, the results, not of the atomic elements, but of the form, or figure, into which they are cast. It seems to have been felt that it would be unsafe to ascribe the power of thinking to every particle of the brain, and it is now represented as the result or product of "the brain in action, as light and heat are of fire, and fragrance of the flower."[171] This idea is ill.u.s.trated by a great variety of natural examples, in which certain effects are produced by the _arrangement of matter,_ which could not be produced by its individual particles, existing separate and apart, or combined in other forms. Nor is this a new phase of the theory, or an original discovery of the present age; it was familiarly known and fully discussed[172] in the days of Clarke and Collins, and every similitude which is now employed to ill.u.s.trate it may be found dissected in their writings. Collins had undertaken to prove that "an individual power may reside in a material system which consists of separate and distinct parts,"--"an individual power which is _not_ in every one, nor in any one, of the particles that compose it, when taken apart and considered singly:" and he had adduced as an example the very similitude which Atkinson employs, namely, "fragrance from the flower;" for he adds, "a rose, for example, consists of several particles, which, separately and singly, want a power to produce that agreeable sensation we experience in them when united." Other instances are given; such as "the power of the eye to contribute to the act of seeing, the power of a clock to show the hour of the day, the power of a musical instrument to produce in us harmonious sounds;" these, he says, "are powers not at all resulting from any powers of _the same kind_ inhering in the parts of the system;"

and he infers that "in the same manner the power of thinking, without being an aggregate of powers of the same kind, may yet inhere in a system of matter." But these examples, so far from confirming, serve rather to confute, the theory in whose support they are adduced. Could it be shown, indeed, that the eye possesses _in itself_ the power of vision, and that sight results solely from its peculiar texture; or, that a clock is really an "intellectual machine," and produces an "intellectual effect;" or, that a musical instrument possesses in itself the soul of melody, and is conscious of its own sweet sounds,--then it might be possible to entertain the supposition that, _in like manner_, an organized brain may have the power of producing thought, and feeling, and will. But what is the matter of fact? Let Dr. Clarke's answer with reference to the case of a timepiece suffice for all: "That which you call the power of a clock to show the time of the day is evidently _nothing in the clock itself_, but the figure and motion of its parts, and, consequently, not anything of a different sort or kind from the powers inherent in the parts. Whereas 'thinking,' if it was the result of the powers of the different parts of the machine of the body, or of the brain in particular, would be something really inhering in the machine itself, specifically different from all and every one of the powers of the several parts out of which it resulted; which is an express contradiction, a supposing the effect to have more in it than the cause." ... "That particular and determinate _degree of velocity_ in a wheel, whereby it turns once round precisely in twelve hours, is that which you call _the power of a clock_ to show the time of the day; and because such a determinate velocity of motion is _made use of by us_ for the measure of time, is it therefore really a new quality or power distinct from the motion itself?" The same answer is equally applicable to all the other examples, and it may be stated generally as amounting to this, that "it is absolutely false in fact, and impossible in the nature of things, that any power whatsoever should inhere or reside in any system or composition of matter, different from the powers residing in the single parts."[173]

The two great difficulties which adhere to the theory of Materialism, and which must ever prove insurmountable, are these: first, to account for the power of thinking by means of material atoms, which are individually dest.i.tute of it; and secondly, to account for the unity and continuity of human consciousness by means of material atoms which are constantly undergoing flux and mutation. For the first end, recourse has been had to the theory which ascribes the power of thinking, not to the particles of matter, but to their order, arrangement, or organization; and for the second, the continuous sense of personal ident.i.ty is supposed to be sufficiently accounted for by supposing that, as the particles which compose the brain are changed, the retiring atoms leave their share of the general consciousness as a legacy to their successors. And both these expedients for surmounting the difficulty are exquisitely caricatured in the "Memoirs of Martinus Scriblerus," in a chapter which is justly described as "an inimitable ridicule on Collins'