Yu Song-chol said he pa.s.sed the invasion plan up to Kim Il-sung. Kim then signed off on the plan, writing "Concur."1 On June 25 at 4 A.M., the North Korean forces opened fire. The official propaganda over the years that followed repeated ceaselessly the outright lie that Kim "never for a moment relaxed his struggle to prevent war and achieve national unification peacefully" while South Korea and the United States answered him by launching "a cursed, criminal, aggressive war, for which they had long been preparing." On June 25 at 4 A.M., the North Korean forces opened fire. The official propaganda over the years that followed repeated ceaselessly the outright lie that Kim "never for a moment relaxed his struggle to prevent war and achieve national unification peacefully" while South Korea and the United States answered him by launching "a cursed, criminal, aggressive war, for which they had long been preparing."2 In Seoul, it was not as if an attack were totally unexpected. "We knew better than almost anywhere in the world that the Communists planned to invade," said Harold n.o.ble, an American diplomat based in Seoul. "But it had been coming since 1946." The pa.s.sage of time had lulled both Koreans and Americans in the city. Like people living on the edge of a volcano, "we knew it would explode some day, but as day after day, month after month, and year after year pa.s.sed and it did not blow up, we could hardly believe that tomorrow would be any different."3 Thus, when the shooting started on that Sunday morning of June 25, the Southern forces had their guard down just as the invasion planners had hoped. Many soldiers were away on weekend pa.s.ses, Thus, when the shooting started on that Sunday morning of June 25, the Southern forces had their guard down just as the invasion planners had hoped. Many soldiers were away on weekend pa.s.ses,4 and others were sleeping when the all-out Northern artillery and tank attack hit them. and others were sleeping when the all-out Northern artillery and tank attack hit them.

Receiving situation reports in a natural cave near Pyongyang that they had turned into their command post, Maj. Gen. Yu Song-chol and other North Korean military bra.s.s were astonished at how easily the Southern forces collapsed. The Korean People's Army's 150 Soviet-made T-34 tanks frightened Southern soldiers, who fell back in helpless confusion as seven Northern divisions surged down to Seoul.

Yu recalled just a couple of lapses at that stage in the otherwise highly successful invasion plan. One tank unit was delayed traversing mountain terrain more rugged than the planners had counted on. (The planners after all were not locals but hailed, one and all, from the Soviet Union.) The KPA First Division's communications system broke down and a weapons storage facility blew up, like-wise causing delays. A furious Kim Il-sung ordered the First replaced by the Fourth Division and decreed death by firing squad for the First Division commander, Maj. Gen. Choe Gw.a.n.g, an old comrade from Manchuria guerrilla days. The army's frontline commander persuaded Kim to rescind the order.5 (After at least one more run-in-with Kim, in 1968, (After at least one more run-in-with Kim, in 1968,6 Choe nearly four decades later, in 1988, was named chief of the general staff of the KPA. In 1995, with the death of Marshal O Jin-u, the defense minister, Vice-Marshal Choe became the top-ranking North Korean military man.) Choe nearly four decades later, in 1988, was named chief of the general staff of the KPA. In 1995, with the death of Marshal O Jin-u, the defense minister, Vice-Marshal Choe became the top-ranking North Korean military man.) ***

When the North Koreans marched into Seoul in triumph just three days after the initial attack, Rhee's Southern forces retreated south-ward. The Northerners hoped the war was all but won. In Korea, all roads led to Seoul. Pyongyang expected that losing the city that had been the capital for more than five centuries would put pressure on the Rhee regime to throw in the towel.

Based on a rosy prognosis from Pak Hon-yong, the invasion plan had antic.i.p.ated that Southerners would help the invaders by rising ma.s.sively against their rulers. Having been the leader of South Korea's communists before fleeing to the North, Pak was eager to restore his power base through an invasion. He had a.s.sured Kim-and Stalin-that two hundred thousand hidden communists in the South were "ready to rebel at the first signal from the North."7 In Seoul nothing of the sort happened. To be sure, there were happy people among the Seoul populace, wearing red armbands and running about to cheer their liberators. Happiest of all may have been prisoners who shouted, as the North Koreans threw open the prison gates, "Long live the fatherland!" Soon the streets were bedecked with posters depicting Kim Il-sung and Stalin.8 The invasion went over well with pro-communists such as an ice cream peddler who led some neighbors in chanting against the Rhee "clique" and confiscated for use as his family living quarters a mansion belonging to a former mayor. The invasion went over well with pro-communists such as an ice cream peddler who led some neighbors in chanting against the Rhee "clique" and confiscated for use as his family living quarters a mansion belonging to a former mayor.9 But after the initially well-behaved occupiers began rounding up and killing Southern "reactionaries," even the shouts of support started to die down. But after the initially well-behaved occupiers began rounding up and killing Southern "reactionaries," even the shouts of support started to die down.10 Yu traveled to Seoul and was surprised to see that "the people on the streets were expressionless to us. When we waved our hands to them, there were few who cheered for us." Yu traveled to Seoul and was surprised to see that "the people on the streets were expressionless to us. When we waved our hands to them, there were few who cheered for us."11 The operations plan called for North Korean troops to advance nine to twelve miles a day and take over the whole peninsula in twenty-two to twenty-seven days.12 The Northerners made the huge mistake of halting their advance in Seoul for two days of rest and celebration-giving the South's forces time to regroup. And with further communications breakdowns, the post-Seoul plans proved unworkable in some aspects. Guerrillas did help the Northern troops in some battles. But the ma.s.sive uprising Kim had counted on did not occur in the hinterland, any more than it had in Seoul and vicinity The Northerners made the huge mistake of halting their advance in Seoul for two days of rest and celebration-giving the South's forces time to regroup. And with further communications breakdowns, the post-Seoul plans proved unworkable in some aspects. Guerrillas did help the Northern troops in some battles. But the ma.s.sive uprising Kim had counted on did not occur in the hinterland, any more than it had in Seoul and vicinity13 Still, the eager Northern forces rolled down the peninsula. Still, the eager Northern forces rolled down the peninsula.

Mean-while, Kim's propaganda machine swung into action to try to make believers out of the South Koreans. Schoolchildren in North Koreanoccupied Seoul learned the catchy "Song of General Kim Il-sung":14 Tell, blizzards that rage in the wild Manchurian plains, Tell, you nights in forests deep where the silence reigns, Who is the partisan whose deeds are unsurpa.s.sed?

Who is the patriot whose fame shall ever last?

So dear to all our hearts is our General's glorious name, Our own beloved Kim Il-sung of undying fame.15 On the home front, morale was high. Only a handful of North Koreans knew that their army had invaded the South. Most believed the North had been the target of a Southern and U.S. invasion, an invasion that the North Korean People's Army had turned back heroically. Pyongyang's phony unification appeal just before the attack had fooled Kim's own people.

In the North, once the "war of national liberation" started, youngsters heeded the volunteer-recruitment slogan: "Let's all go out and give our lives!" Kang Song-ho, an ethnic Korean from the USSR-who was living in North Korea when the war broke out, appeared on South Korean television many years later and told how he and his friends had become fired up to fight the Southern forces. "At that time, there was a lot of propaganda made about North Korea appealing to South Korea, always offering peaceful unification," he said. Northern propaganda, as Kang recalled, claimed that "the U.S. had given instructions, and South Korea had already been made into their colony." Rhee was inciting his men "to go and even eat up the people of North Korea."16 Far more serious than the misguided a.s.sumption of quick victory was the plan's second major flaw: the a.s.sumption that the United States would stay out. Perhaps that might have turned out to be the case, if not for the Northern forces' fatal two-day stopover in Seoul. But Kim's a.s.sumption that the United States would not intervene to reverse a fait accompli more likely was mistaken-if he really believed that and was not simply handing Stalin a line to win Soviet support. Because of American policy makers' a.s.sumptions about the meaning of the invasion, response was close to automatic-and there certainly would have been sentiment in the United States in favor of retaking the South even if the North had overrun all of its territory.

Acheson and other American officials a.s.sumed that Stalin had a role in the June 25 invasion-a correct a.s.sumption, as has been amply proven with the opening of the archives of the former Soviet Union. But the Americans exaggerated the Soviet role, imagining that the Korean invasion was but the first step in an expansionist Soviet plan. They did not know that it was Kim- not Stalin--who had taken the initiative, and for his own purely Korean purposes. "This act was very obviously inspired by the Soviet Union," President Harry Truman said in a congressional briefing. a.s.sistant Secretary of State Edward W. Barrett compared the Moscow-Pyongyang relationship to "Walt Disney and Donald Duck."17 Complicating matters was the universal tendency to "fight the last war," a tendency that was reinforced by the currents of domestic United States politics at the time. Strong memories remained of the negative consequences that had flowed from appeasing the expansionist n.a.z.is at Munich. More immediately, Truman's Democrats and the Department of State had come under fire from Republicans for decisions and actions that allegedly permitted the "loss" of China: Mao Zedong's 1949 victory over Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists.

By 1950, conspiracy theorists in a kill-the-messenger frenzy were questioning the loyalty of a host of officials who had doubted Chiang's viability. Only four and a half months before the North Korean invasion, on February 9, Senator Joseph McCarthy had begun his Red-baiting campaign by announcing in Wheeling, West Virginia, that he held in his hand a list of 205 Communist Party members working in the State Department. For Truman to let the Korean invasion stand-and thus preside over the "loss" of yet another country--would have made him instant grist for McCarthy's mill.

Although Truman certainly-was aware of the compelling domestic political factors as he decided on a response in Korea, publicly he stuck to international, Cold War reasoning when he set out to rally Americans and allies to take a stand. "If we let Korea down," Truman told members of Congress, "the Soviets will keep on going and swallow up one piece of Asia after another." After Asia, it would move on to the Near East and, perhaps, Europe. The United States must draw the line. Here was an early enunciation of-what came to be called the Domino Theory.18 It was not long before additional evidence began appearing that suggested the Truman-Acheson a.s.sumption about Stalin's expansionism was off the mark.19 Korea bordered the Soviet Union, so Stalin naturally preferred a like-minded state there for security reasons. But Stalin's policy apparently did not call for the unlimited expansion into nonbordering states that many in the West feared-not, at least, for the time being. Korea bordered the Soviet Union, so Stalin naturally preferred a like-minded state there for security reasons. But Stalin's policy apparently did not call for the unlimited expansion into nonbordering states that many in the West feared-not, at least, for the time being.20 On the other hand, there has never been much doubt about the accuracy of another Truman a.s.sumption: Without swift American intervention, the invaders would overrun all of South Korea. The president acted quickly and decisively. A United Nations resolution, engineered by Washington just two days after the invasion, demanded that the Northern troops go back behind the 38th parallel. Wrapped in the UN mantle, Truman committed not only air and sea support but ground troops to help the beleaguered South Koreans. Lead units of the U.S. Army Twenty-fourth Division, stationed in j.a.pan, landed on July 1, just six days after the invasion, signaling a full American commitment to the war. A UN command ultimately combined the combatant troops of sixteen nations, with thirty-seven others contributing money, supplies and medical aid.

Acheson's successor as secretary of state, Dulles, later explained the decision this way: "We did not come to fight and die in Korea in order to unite it by force, or to liberate by force the North Koreans. We do not subscribe to the principle that such injustices are to be remedied by recourse to war. If indeed that were sound principle, we should be fighting all over the world and the total of misery and destruction would be incalculable. We came to Korea to demonstrate that there would be unity to throw back armed aggression."21 Kim Il-sung could point his finger at underlings for misleading him regarding the Southern response, and for letting the People's Army troops stop to rest after taking Seoul. However, miscalculating American capability and intent was a higher-level responsibility. Yu Song-chol said some ranking North Korean officials had warned that the United States might intervene- but Kim had dismissed their warnings as defeatism.22 With the North Korean attack, and Truman's decision to defend South Korea, Americans who never had thought much about far-off Korea and were not even quite sure how to p.r.o.nounce it were suddenly hearing a great deal about it. I was among them, a third-grade elementary school pupil at the time the war broke out. Comic books quickly began featuring GIs in the John Wayne mold fighting ferocious communist "gooks."23 By the third year of the fighting Ken Pitts, a fellow pupil in my Georgia Sunday school cla.s.s, had made a weekly ritual of praying: "Lord, be with our boys in Ko-rea," drawling out the first syllable for an extra beat or two. By the third year of the fighting Ken Pitts, a fellow pupil in my Georgia Sunday school cla.s.s, had made a weekly ritual of praying: "Lord, be with our boys in Ko-rea," drawling out the first syllable for an extra beat or two.

One of "our boys," the chief supplier of-war stories to the Martin family was a brother of my mother. Ed-ward O'Neal Logan had enlisted in the Alabama National Guard at sixteen, lying about his age, and had fought across a wide swath of the South-west Pacific during World War II with an infantry regiment and Sixth Army staff, as a guerrilla warfare and behind-the-lines intelligence officer. Slightly Oriental in appearance himself, he looked a little like Mao Zedong; he had inherited his distinctive looks from my grandfather, who occasionally cited a family legend that one of our ancestors was a Cherokee.

Logan was all fighting man, focused on his job of killing the enemy; cultural sensitivity was not, at the time, his strong suit. In one 1944 note home, accompanied by a photo showing him as a tanned and confident young island warrior, he had pa.s.sed along a survival tip he evidently was obeying: "The only good j.a.p is a dead j.a.p." Promoted to major at age twenty-two, he had signed up after the war to stay in the (much-reduced) regular army. From the Twenty-fourth Division's base in j.a.pan, Ed Logan got to Korea a few days ahead of his unit and headed for Taejon. The bulk of the undermanned, under-equipped Nineteenth Infantry Regiment, whose commander he served as operations and training officer (S-3), disembarked at the Pusan docks July 10 and headed north-west. Its a.s.signment: try to hold the enemy at the k.u.m River north of Taejon.

Kim Il-sung wanted to "put the U.S. imperialists' nose out of joint" by taking the city, according to an official biography. So Kim "mapped out a careful and meticulous operation to free Taejon, and led it in person."24 That biography lies shamelessly about some verifiable aspects of the war, and other sources do not mention Kim's alleged role in leading the Taejon battle, which suggests it is just one more prevarication. Indeed, Yu Song-chol said Kim kept his headquarters in an underground bunker near Pyongyang-and during the entire war, as far as Yu knew, the premier visited the frontline command only once, when it was headquartered in the capitol building in Seoul. That biography lies shamelessly about some verifiable aspects of the war, and other sources do not mention Kim's alleged role in leading the Taejon battle, which suggests it is just one more prevarication. Indeed, Yu Song-chol said Kim kept his headquarters in an underground bunker near Pyongyang-and during the entire war, as far as Yu knew, the premier visited the frontline command only once, when it was headquartered in the capitol building in Seoul.25 Nevertheless, if there was a time for homegrown tactics, such as those the anti-j.a.panese fighters, including Kim, had learned in Manchuria and elsewhere in China, one such time was mid-July of 1950. Yu said the Russian invasion planners were sent back home after their failure to match eastern front tank movements to the actual terrain.26 And the Chinese "volunteers" had not yet entered the war, with their own ideas of strategy and tactics. Recall further that, according to Kim's memoirs, attacking the enemy's rear while keeping the pressure on at the front had been a favorite tactic of his as early as the defense of Xiaow.a.n.gqing in Manchuria, back in 1933. That tactic played an important role in the Korean People's Army's a.s.sault on Taejon-regardless of-whether it was Kim himself or one of his old partisan colleagues who personally came up with the battle plan. And the Chinese "volunteers" had not yet entered the war, with their own ideas of strategy and tactics. Recall further that, according to Kim's memoirs, attacking the enemy's rear while keeping the pressure on at the front had been a favorite tactic of his as early as the defense of Xiaow.a.n.gqing in Manchuria, back in 1933. That tactic played an important role in the Korean People's Army's a.s.sault on Taejon-regardless of-whether it was Kim himself or one of his old partisan colleagues who personally came up with the battle plan.27 The Nineteenth Infantry Regiment had to defend forty-two miles of riverfront, a sector so large it normally would be a.s.signed to the three regiments that comprise a full infantry division. Like the South Koreans, the Americans at first were literally and figuratively blown away by the North Koreans' Soviet T-34 tanks. The behemoths destroyed all before them, were impregnable to most weapons the Americans had on hand and created "fear and frustration that is difficult to describe," Logan would recall. "I used a 2.75-inch rocket launcher fired at less than fifty feet. Five rounds. They bounced off the wheels and the tank kept moving."28 Air power helped, for a time, to bolster the thin line of Americans, in which there were wide gaps. On July 15, in an attempt to ward off an enemy night crossing of the river, American mortar and artillery fire and air strikes set ablaze a North Koreanheld village on the other side, illuminating the riverfront. After the loss of a three-man U.S. Air Force radio team handling ground control of the pilots, however, there was no more close air support.

On July 16 and 17, the Americans got a sample of-what many of them came to describe as the North Korean forces' "disregard for human life"-or, as the Northerners themselves would have put it, their fighting spirit. "We blew the bridge but they kept coming, over dead bodies," an incredulous American machine gunner told Logan. "There must be three to four hundred bodies in the river at the major crossing and we are out of ammo."

North Korean soldiers waded across the river and pa.s.sed through gaps between positions held by the overextended Americans. Then the Northerners circled around behind the Nineteenth and blocked the main high-way-the Americans' supply and exit route-three miles to the rear, where the road hugged a steep mountainside on one side, a precipice on the other. His superiors wounded, Logan took command of an operation to try to break through or bypa.s.s what proved to be a mile-and-a-half-long roadblock enforced by North Korean soldiers firing down from the highlands above. A squad of North Koreans jumped the major, and four men with him were killed. He fell into the guts of one of his dead soldiers, head in the man's b.l.o.o.d.y belly and played dead as enemy soldiers stuck bayonets in his rear to check his condition.

Rescued by some of his men, Logan got past the roadblock and found the division commander, Maj. Gen. William F. Dean. Dean sent Logan farther to the rear to establish a new position closer to Taejon, then organized an attempt to break through the blockage with two light tanks and four antiaircraft vehicles. The attempt failed. Some five hundred American infantrymen trapped between the roadblock and the river could escape only by climbing the mountains above the road. Some able-bodied men, detailed to carry the seriously wounded in litters, could not get far with them in the punishing terrain and had to abandon them on a mountaintop. North Korean troops soon came along and killed the wounded men.

The North Koreans who had jumped Logan made off-with his wallet, with pictures of my aunt Glennis and cousins Eddie and Dennis. A couple of days later, when the regiment was withdrawing south of Taejon for regrouping, war correspondent Marguerite Higgins of the New York Herald Tribune Herald Tribune saw the major. "Thought you were dead," she said. Higgins told him that "Seoul City Sue," a former missionary who was broadcasting North Korean propaganda to the American troops, had announced the previous day that Glennis, Eddie and Dennis Logan would never see their husband and father again. saw the major. "Thought you were dead," she said. Higgins told him that "Seoul City Sue," a former missionary who was broadcasting North Korean propaganda to the American troops, had announced the previous day that Glennis, Eddie and Dennis Logan would never see their husband and father again.

In late July and early August additional American ground divisions as well as air force units arrived to reinforce the beaten-up Twenty-fourth Division. The North Korean troops, having occupied most of the South, finally were halted at the Nakdong River in the southeast, paralyzed by U.S. air power. "Indiscriminate bombing created a situation in which the KPA could neither fight nor move during daylight," recalled Yu Song-chol. Support from the rear became almost impossible. "As soon as the aircraft sound was heard, one could see the serious neurotic state in which the soldiers were terrified out of their wits. This carpet-bombing strategy struck a fatal blow to the KPA. However, it also inflicted tremendous damage on innocent civilians as well."29 Despite the turn the war was taking because of air power, Kim Il-sung pressed his troops to capture Pusan, the southeastern port and South Korea's second city. In an August 15 radio broadcast, he gave them a deadline, the end of August, explaining that "the longer this is delayed, the stronger UN defenses will become." The ensuing ferocious attacks resulted in horrendous casualties on both sides before the North Koreans' supplies ran short and they had to pull back. Despite the turn the war was taking because of air power, Kim Il-sung pressed his troops to capture Pusan, the southeastern port and South Korea's second city. In an August 15 radio broadcast, he gave them a deadline, the end of August, explaining that "the longer this is delayed, the stronger UN defenses will become." The ensuing ferocious attacks resulted in horrendous casualties on both sides before the North Koreans' supplies ran short and they had to pull back.30 The Nineteenth Infantry Regiment was a.s.signed to defend a western area of the Pusan perimeter. Casualties had reduced manpower of the regiment to only thirty or forty percent of what it should have been, as Logan recalled. Around the time Kim was goading his troops into renewed a.s.saults, the Nineteenth got some four hundred replacement troops. American military personnel lists in j.a.pan had been combed for anyone with any background in infantry armored or artillery units. So urgently were replacements needed, the army had not been able to divide those soldiers into the usual racially segregated units. Receiving them in a village schoolyard that was coming under sporadic artillery and mortar attacks, "we lined them up with the words, 'This group to Company so-and-so,'" Logan told me. Guides took them to their companies, and thus occurred one of the earliest recorded cases of genuine black-white racial integration in an American combat unit.31 Within days, many of the replacements were dead. As in World War II's Battle of the Bulge, "we had no records, just a name in the notebook." Within days, many of the replacements were dead. As in World War II's Battle of the Bulge, "we had no records, just a name in the notebook."

If the Lord was answering the prayers of Ken Pitts and others by watching over the Americans, the North Koreans were still "fighting for the leader,"32 Kim Il-sung, who by then had begun a.s.suming deity status himself. Kim Il-sung, who by then had begun a.s.suming deity status himself.

Mao Zedong and his Central Committee, nervously following the war from Beijing, began to fear in early August that the North Korean troops had "advanced too far in isolation, leaving their rear area vulnerable." The United States "might launch a counteroffensive." Later in August, Mao sent word to Kim through the North Korean representative in Beijing that Inchon was a likely spot for a UN amphibious landing. Kim reportedly-was unimpressed.33 Sure enough, however, with much of the North's manpower concentrated on the Pusan perimeter, U.S. forces on September 15 carried out their momentous landing at Inchon,far behind the KPA lines. They encountered little resistance. Caught between two American forces,the North Koreans retreated,the Americans chasing them. Sure enough, however, with much of the North's manpower concentrated on the Pusan perimeter, U.S. forces on September 15 carried out their momentous landing at Inchon,far behind the KPA lines. They encountered little resistance. Caught between two American forces,the North Koreans retreated,the Americans chasing them.

While acknowledging that the retreat was "a sore trial," North Korean official accounts describe it as a "temporary strategic retreat." The "iron-willed, brilliant commander" Kim Il-sung, they explain, "made up his mind to lure and scatter the enemy, throwing them into the confusion of a labyrinth, not hitting them in front as before." To ensure that the trap would succeed, the KPAs main units "retreated at exhilarating speed."34 That is not the way Kim's operations bureau commander, Yu Song-chol, would tell it. After Inchon, the North Korean high command ordered not not that its forces around the Pusan perimeter hightail it all the way back to the 38th parallel and beyond; rather, Kim's generals ordered a retreat only far enough to set up a new line of defense at South Korea's k.u.m River Basin and the Sobaek Mountain range. However, according to Yu, "the entire KPA communications network was in ruins, and we could not pa.s.s the retreat orders past the division level." that its forces around the Pusan perimeter hightail it all the way back to the 38th parallel and beyond; rather, Kim's generals ordered a retreat only far enough to set up a new line of defense at South Korea's k.u.m River Basin and the Sobaek Mountain range. However, according to Yu, "the entire KPA communications network was in ruins, and we could not pa.s.s the retreat orders past the division level."35 Breaking out of the Pusan perimeter, the Nineteenth Infantry got the a.s.signment as the lead unit to retake Taejon-this time supported by American tanks and air cover. As the Nineteenth's lead tanks pa.s.sed them, the North Korean soldiers-far from establishing a new defense line at the k.u.m, scene of their earlier triumph-rapidly changed into white civilian garb and discarded their weapons. Faced with this tactic as they chased the KPA forces day and night, the Americans shot "anything that moved," according to Logan, who by then was the regimental executive officer.36 When the Nineteenth reached the outskirts of Taejon, a South Korean policeman flagged down Logan's jeep and said, "Hurry! Hurry! Americans being killed-buried alive at police station." Lead elements of the column, including a couple of tanks, rushed to the police station and found a ditch there with arms and legs of American prisoners of war sticking out, some moving. "We got some out alive," said Logan.

The previous day, while flying over the city in a light aircraft to recon-noiter, Logan had seen on hills north and north-west of Taejon the bodies of many other people, in multicolored clothing. He a.s.sumed that those were people the Northerners had killed as they retreated. It was impossible to get an accurate count from the air, but Logan estimated that the number of bodies exceeded two thousand. Later he heard a count of some five thousand victims of this ma.s.sacre, mostly South Korean civilians.37 The UN forces retook Seoul on September 28. Fatefully but with little debate, Washington agreed to the proposal of the UN commander, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, not to stop there but to press on and take Pyongyang- a goal far beyond the original one of thwarting armed aggression. Reasons to keep going included the fear that Kim, if left to rule above the 38th parallel, would simply rebuild his army and strike again. Fatefully, the line that Beijing had decided to draw in the sand was the 38th parallel-not the Yalu River as was thought until Chinese doc.u.mentary evidence clarified the matter in the 1990s. China tried to signal that it would fight if UN troops crossed the 38th. But the push north had gathered momentum and would not be stopped. MacArthur was golden after his brilliant coup at Inchon; hardly anyone was prepared to stand in his way now. Washington, in any event, would have been hard-pressed to stop Rhee from sending his South Korean troops north. Out to avenge their humiliation at the beginning of the war, the Southerners traveled night and day up the east coast in pursuit of the fleeing North Koreans. Two of their divisions took the port of Wonsan on October 10, way ahead of an invasion force that MacArthur was sending by sea.38 The UN forces pushed the North Koreans back above the former border on October 1. MacArthur called on the North to surrender, and Kim Il-sung answered by ordering his troops to "fight to the end."39 The Americans crossed the parallel in full force from October 9. Logan joined the pursuit, taking command of the Nineteenth Regiment's Third Battalion a few days after his twenty-ninth birthday. With his battalion in the lead, the Twenty-fourth Division raced the First Cavalry Division north-ward. The first to reach a major road junction on the way to the North Korean capital, Pyongyang, would become the lead division for the push north from there. Logan "missed it by about two hours." The Americans crossed the parallel in full force from October 9. Logan joined the pursuit, taking command of the Nineteenth Regiment's Third Battalion a few days after his twenty-ninth birthday. With his battalion in the lead, the Twenty-fourth Division raced the First Cavalry Division north-ward. The first to reach a major road junction on the way to the North Korean capital, Pyongyang, would become the lead division for the push north from there. Logan "missed it by about two hours."

Kim Il-sung ordered soldiers defending Pyongyang not to retreat even "one step farther," and a.s.signed a squad to shoot deserters. This time his effort to whip up martial spirit was insufficient. Five days later, on October 19, American and South Korean troops were in Pyongyang, where they could check out Kim's office and command bunker. Entered via four anterooms, a portrait of Stalin in each, the office contained plaster busts of Stalin and Kim. In the bunker, the former church organist had an organ.40 Losing their capital, the North Koreans continued retreating north. Logan's unit proceeded north on a "mopping up" mission, cleaning out pockets of resistance and sending many POWs to the rear for other units to care for. It was a messy job, and many civilians were victims. One news correspondent, appalled when Logan's battalion sh.e.l.led villages and burned people's homes, said it reminded him of Sherman's march to the sea. Logan defended his actions, saying it was in those villages, in those houses, that North Korean soldiers changed from their uniforms into civilian clothes and fired on his men. If he should bypa.s.s the villages, they would then attack from the rear. There was that much truth, at least, to Kim's later talk of a "labyrinth," a "trap." (Whether or not the thought had occurred to Kim, Mao as early as October 9 cabled the North Korean leader to propose trapping the advancing UN and South Korean troops by opening another front to their rear. "It will be very helpful to the operations in the north if 40,000 to 50,000 troops of the [Korean] People's Army could remain in South Korea to undertake this a.s.signment," Mao said.)41 Logan gave the critical newsman a copy of his mission statement: Attack north to rescue a surrounded unit-utmost speed-destroy anything that would jeopardize your mission. Then he asked the correspondent what he would do if he were commanding the battalion. "Before he had a chance to answer, a round landed about twenty feet from us and he bolted. The round was from a shack we had not destroyed. I didn't get an answer." Logan mused that "our wars kill more civilians, innocent or not, than battle casualties." War "is not a gentleman's game. Codes of honor and conduct are difficult to separate from the various battle situations at hand. What one would call a necessity, another, not present, would call wrong."

As the counterinvasion of North Korea proceeded, it became clear that even if Kim enjoyed substantial support from his subjects, allegiance to his regime was by no means unanimous. Residents in many areas of the North- "unsound people of some social standing," as Pyongyang described them42- cooperated with the occupying forces. Banding together in "peace preservation corps," they helped depose local communist rulers.

In Songhwa County of South Hw.a.n.ghae Province, former landowners still bore a grudge against the deputy chief of the county People's Committee for his leading role in the land reform of four years before. The man previously had been a substantial landowner himself in local terms, farming his approximately five acres with the help of relatives. Placed in charge of redistributing the county's land, he had parceled out to those previously landless relatives more than enough to make up for the acreage he had been required to give up personally. Now his aggrieved neighbors saw their chance for revenge. Cooperating with South Korean troops who occupied the county they threw the official's wife and six children down a 100-meter vertical mine shaft, killing them all.43 Kim Il-sung had already called for reinforcements, doc.u.ments in the former Soviet archives show. On September 29, three months after the invasion, Kim wrote to ask Stalin to commit the Soviet Union to the war and request China to join the fighting as well. On October 1, Kim wrote directly to Mao to plead for a rescue mission.

The Chinese had antic.i.p.ated being called upon. When the Americans intervened, Mao "quickly concluded that the real U.S. aim was to threaten China itself, and he began to act accordingly," say scholars Sergei Goncharov, John W Lewis and Xue Litai. Within a week after the American intervention, the Chinese leader had begun to worry that the North Koreans could not achieve the quick victory Kim had promised. As early as July 7, when the KPA was still pressing south and demolishing all resistance, senior Chinese military officials shifted elite army units close to the Korean border in preparation for possible entry into the war. In quick succession they deployed added reserve units and put the troops through training exercises, with the Americans as their hypothetical enemy.44 Mao and some colleagues calculated, after a review, that they need not fear escalation beyond a conventional war because the Americans would not use nuclear weapons in either China or Korea.45 Their troops battle-ready and in position, the Chinese leaders watched the war. Once the UN troops had landed at Inchon, Mao wrote to his top general in the Northeast: "Apparently it will not do for us not to intervene in the war." After Kim Il-sung requested help, saying North Korea could not put up sufficient resistance on its own, the Chinese Politburo met on October 2. Skeptics including Premier Zhou Enlai continued to argue that the new communist government should concentrate on pressing domestic matters instead of sending its poorly equipped soldiers for a showdown with the U.S. Army. Their troops battle-ready and in position, the Chinese leaders watched the war. Once the UN troops had landed at Inchon, Mao wrote to his top general in the Northeast: "Apparently it will not do for us not to intervene in the war." After Kim Il-sung requested help, saying North Korea could not put up sufficient resistance on its own, the Chinese Politburo met on October 2. Skeptics including Premier Zhou Enlai continued to argue that the new communist government should concentrate on pressing domestic matters instead of sending its poorly equipped soldiers for a showdown with the U.S. Army.46 On top of the alarming prospect that a U.S.-backed regime soon would govern the entire Korean peninsula and knock on China's door, pressure from Stalin helped to stiffen backs. "If we do not send troops," Mao said, "the reactionaries at home and abroad "would be swollen with arrogance when the enemy troops press to the Yalu River border." Secretary of State Ache-son's a.s.surances that the United States had no designs on Chinese territory inspired little trust. If a showdown with the Americans was inevitable, as Mao believed, Korea was a more advantageous place to have it out than Taiwan or Vietnam, two other possibilities. On October 8, the day after units of the U.S. First Cavalry Division crossed the 38th parallel heading north, Mao issued an official order for China's Northeast Frontier Force, under the new name of Chinese People's Volunteers, to "march speedily to Korea and join the Korean comrades in fighting the aggressors and winning a glorious victory.47 That still was not the last word, however. Second thoughts ensued when there was a snag over Soviet a.s.sistance.48 Another politburo meeting was called for the evening of October 18. Yu Song-chol had gone with Pak Hon-yong to Beijing on Kim's orders. Around midnight on October 18, the two met with the Chinese Politburo to brief them on the war and repeat the request for aid. When they had finished, "Mao Zedong began by informing us that the Politburo had already decided to send volunteer forces to Korea." Mao used body language to advise on military strategy, asking his listeners to imagine that one of his legs was the U.S. forces; the other, South Korean forces. First surround and annihilate the South Koreans, and then the Americans will be helpless, he said-and he "raised one leg of his bulky body and hopped around on one foot. Another politburo meeting was called for the evening of October 18. Yu Song-chol had gone with Pak Hon-yong to Beijing on Kim's orders. Around midnight on October 18, the two met with the Chinese Politburo to brief them on the war and repeat the request for aid. When they had finished, "Mao Zedong began by informing us that the Politburo had already decided to send volunteer forces to Korea." Mao used body language to advise on military strategy, asking his listeners to imagine that one of his legs was the U.S. forces; the other, South Korean forces. First surround and annihilate the South Koreans, and then the Americans will be helpless, he said-and he "raised one leg of his bulky body and hopped around on one foot.49 MacArthur countermanded a Pentagon order to use only South Korean forces near the Chinese border.50 On October 20, he ordered maximum effort to secure all of Korea. On October 24, Mao declared that U.S. occupation of Korea would be a serious threat to Chinese security and could not be tolerated. The first Chinese partic.i.p.ation in battle came October 25. On October 20, he ordered maximum effort to secure all of Korea. On October 24, Mao declared that U.S. occupation of Korea would be a serious threat to Chinese security and could not be tolerated. The first Chinese partic.i.p.ation in battle came October 25.51 In October and November, hundreds of thousands of Chinese troops entered the fray. In October and November, hundreds of thousands of Chinese troops entered the fray.

According to Yu Song-chol, Kim Il-sung at that point lost overall command of the war: The Korean People's Army was reduced to a support role, in charge of the eastern front, while the Chinese ran operations independently on the central front.52 At whatever temporary cost to his self-esteem, though, China had saved Kim's bacon. The most important military result of his "strategic retreat" up to that point had been to show so much North Korean weakness the Chinese felt compelled to help. At whatever temporary cost to his self-esteem, though, China had saved Kim's bacon. The most important military result of his "strategic retreat" up to that point had been to show so much North Korean weakness the Chinese felt compelled to help.

Khrushchev recalled in his memoir of the Korean War that the Soviet amba.s.sador in North Korea had been writing "very tragic reports concerning Kim Il-sung's state of mind. Kim Il-sung was already preparing to go into the mountains to pursue guerrilla struggle again"-in other words, to leave the enemy in control of most of North Korea for the time being. He would have had little choice without Mao's intervention. Stalin was adamant in his refusal to play the rescuer's role-having become resigned, as Khrushchev wrote, "to the idea that North Korea would be annihilated, and that the Americans would reach our border."53 United Nations forces were slow to recognize that they faced a new opponent. Early in December, while freshly promoted Lt. Col. Ed Logan's unit was halted just short of the Yalu, another regiment of the Twenty-fourth Division reported having captured Chinese soldiers. "No one believed it at higher headquarters," Logan would recall. Soon enough they had to believe, though. Logan's Third Battalion got orders to head back to the Anju-Sinanju area and hold a crossroads until the retreating First Cavalry Division could pa.s.s through to the South. "The First Cav got chopped up something awful." Logan's battalion held the crossroads for two days, helping to evacuate First Cavalry Division casualties-"a b.l.o.o.d.y job." The UN retreat continued. By December 6, Pyongyang was back in the hands of the North.

The Chinese were not using tanks as the North Koreans had in June and July. Instead, "hordes" of soldiers, hardy veterans of years of battles in the Chinese civil war, attacked at night, on foot, bypa.s.sing heavy weapons. "They could go for days with a bag of rice, an army coat, ammo and rifle," Logan marveled. Americans weren't accustomed to that sort of combat. "We are road-bound. We try to live in the field as we do at home."54 South Korean divisions, made up of conscripts shipped to the front lines after only a few days of training, were even less prepared. They bore the brunt of the attacks and, like many of the U.S. units, completely disintegrated. South Korean divisions, made up of conscripts shipped to the front lines after only a few days of training, were even less prepared. They bore the brunt of the attacks and, like many of the U.S. units, completely disintegrated.

MacArthur had said it would be over by Christmas. As it happened, it was on Christmas Day that a Chinese concussion grenade blew Logan off a hilltop in the vicinity of the Imjin River, north of Seoul, where UN forces were making a stand. Both eardrums burst and his back injured, he was flown to a hospital ship for repairs. Told he would be evacuated to j.a.pan, he refused and returned to his command, believing the Chinese would attack on New Year's Eve. Indeed, the Chinese did attack that day, sending ma.s.ses of troops to attempt to cross the river. Logan's unit held until January 2, 1951. The Chinese infiltrated through the Nineteenth Regiment's flanks, which were exposed by the evacuation of units on its right. Three Chinese soldiers got to the headquarters tent area, where Logan's men fought them hand to hand. At that point he decided it was time to evacuate his unit south-ward, joining the general retreat.

On January 4, 1951, the Chinese and North Korean troops recaptured Seoul. The UN forces retreated to a line farther south. Logan traversed the roads packed as far as he could see with South Korean civilians and dejected soldiers, once again trying to flee the communist forces, old and young carrying bundles on their heads, on their backs, on handcarts. North Korean soldiers were disguising themselves as refugees and joining the crowds to infiltrate behind the UN lines-"but how could you stop them?"

The Eighth Army commander, Gen. Matthew Ridgway ordered the units defending the new line not to take a fight-to-the-death approach but to save their resources for another day. However, they had nearly lost contact with the enemy. "We did not know exactly-where he was or in what strength- a real violation of the principles of warfare," Logan said. Against orders, the battalion commanders sent patrols north-ward each day-two miles, then three, then four. Not sighting the enemy, they finally reported this to the division commander "and got chewed out a little." In a couple of days, Ridgway ordered a task force of tanks, artillery and infantry to reconnoiter north toward Suwon and beyond. They succeeded, which was a great morale booster.

Logan's role in the combat was over, however. In February of 1951, Ridgway, bringing in new blood for the next phase of the war, evacuated war-weary banged-up and sick regimental and battalion commanders who had been in Korea for the duration. Taking along two Silver Stars pinned on him for valor, Logan went to a hospital in j.a.pan for surgery on his frostbitten toes and recuperation from a variety of other ailments.

Proclaiming a state of emergency in December of 1950, Truman had called upon "our farmers, our workers in industry and our businessmen to make a mighty production effort to meet the defense requirements of the nation." His proclamation and a drastically increased defense budget signaled that the military-industrial complex was back in business, for the duration of the Cold War and beyond.

Typical of the fruits of the Truman proclamation was the reinvigoration of my hometown, whose postCivil War slumber had been broken early in World War II with the decision to build and operate there the world's largest aircraft plant under one roof. Government Aircraft Plant No. 6 closed after VJ Day and by 1950 kudzu vines threatened to engulf its echoing premises. But now the plant's new contractor, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, recalled managers, engineers and skilled machinists who had dispersed into the civilian economy55 True to Truman's summons, Lockheed put out the word to the chicken farmers and shade-tree mechanics of North Georgia that a huge and well-paid production workforce was needed to dust off the Marietta facility and resume sending bombers to the Air Force. True to Truman's summons, Lockheed put out the word to the chicken farmers and shade-tree mechanics of North Georgia that a huge and well-paid production workforce was needed to dust off the Marietta facility and resume sending bombers to the Air Force.

Air power was the key to the evolving strategy in Korea. Two months after losing Seoul for the second time, the UN forces regained the capital. But the seesawing battles continued, with the two sides arrayed against each other in the vicinity of the former border. Carrying out a scorched-earth policy of aerial and naval bombardment in North Korea, the UN forces sought to deprive the Chinese and North Korean troops of logistical support from the rear and, ultimately, of the will to fight. Killing millions of people, in what Bruce c.u.mings once predicted "would be recognized eventually as an "American holocaust,"56 the bombings helped prevent reconquest of the South but fell short of defeating the communists. the bombings helped prevent reconquest of the South but fell short of defeating the communists.

As Chinese and North Korean soldiers stubbornly defended their positions, building a net-work of military tunnels along the front, North Korean civilians like-wise dug into mountainsides to construct underground factories that could withstand bombing raids. Children, according to official accounts, kept going to school during the war "while their pencil cases rattled" from the bombing. If those official sources can be credited, the Northerners simply became more determined-and, alas, more verbose: "Hero Kang Ho-yung was seriously wounded in both arms and both legs in the Kamak Hill Battle, so he rolled into the midst of the enemy with a hand grenade in his mouth and wiped them out, shouting: 'My arms and legs were broken. But on the contrary my retaliatory spirit against you scoundrels became a thousand times stronger. I will show the unbending fighting will of a member of the Workers' Party of Korea and unflinching will firmly pledged to the Party and the Leader!'"57 The truth, of course, is that war takes its toll on the morale of even the most motivated people. According to defector testimony, North Koreans had become so war-weary that many had come to hope simply for an end to the fighting, regardless of-which side might win.58 As the fighting and killing continued, MacArthur sought to resolve the b.l.o.o.d.y impa.s.se by carrying the war to China. He wanted to unleash Chiang Kai-shek's Taiwan-based Nationalist troops for a rematch with the Chinese communists, supporting them this time with American bombing-including the atomic bomb. American generals had been considering and making preparations for the possible use of nuclear weapons since the early weeks of the war, and Truman had publicly discussed the possibility in a press conference on November 30, 1950.59 Truman, however, favored an essentially defensive posture, fearing that MacArthur's aggressive scheme would attract Soviet intervention (just as the Chinese, unbeknownst to him, had calculated). In the ensuing third world war, with American forces stretched too thin, Europe or j.a.pan or both might fall to the communist forces. When MacArthur, against orders, persisted in maneuvering publicly and privately to get his way Truman fired him for insubordination. The war would be limited to a conventional "police action."

Limited "war was an unpopular concept among Americans. Right-wing forces opposed it because they-wanted not mere "containment" of communist regimes at their current borders-the usual policy of Cold Warera governments in Washington-but an active "rollback" that would take on such regimes and remove them. Regime change was a minority position, however.

More important in shifting American opinion was the bloodshed that continued in Korea following MacArthur's march to the Yalu. The violence came to seem gratuitous, giving rise to cynicism in the field that later would be portrayed graphically in the movie and long-running television series M*A*S*H. M*A*S*H. At home, as well, more and more Americans asked a simple but compelling question: Why get our men killed capturing and relinquishing real estate by the square inch in that far-off land-especially if the United States could wipe out the enemy with a few well-placed nuclear weapons? At home, as well, more and more Americans asked a simple but compelling question: Why get our men killed capturing and relinquishing real estate by the square inch in that far-off land-especially if the United States could wipe out the enemy with a few well-placed nuclear weapons?

Ceasefire talks began in mid-1951, with American officers and one South Korean representing the UN side while the North Koreans and Chinese fielded a joint delegation. Growing American sentiment in favor of using stronger measures to halt the fighting may have been one factor influencing the other side to agree to negotiate.60 Nevertheless, the North Koreans were ready to try to portray Washington's eagerness to talk as evidence that Pyongyang had triumphed: The United States was "frantic," "completely bewildered." Nevertheless, the North Koreans were ready to try to portray Washington's eagerness to talk as evidence that Pyongyang had triumphed: The United States was "frantic," "completely bewildered."61 The talks snagged on the treatment of prisoners of war. UN negotiators insisted that each POW be permitted to decide whether to return to his country or not. Humanitarian considerations aside, Washington's propaganda goal was to show up communism by encouraging many of the North Koreans and Chinese to reject a return to communist rule. The communist side would have none of that, and insisted on the return of all prisoners according to the terms of the Geneva Convention.

American public support for Truman waned as the talks and the fighting dragged on, and he decided not to seek reelection. Dwight Eisenhower campaigned on a promise to "go to Korea"--which voters took as a pledge to try to halt the war, even if that required more serious measures. After taking office as president in January 1953, the former general let North Korea's allies in Beijing and Moscow know he was prepared to end the stalemate by expanding the war. He withdrew orders with which Truman had neutralized Taiwan; Chiang Kai-shek was now "unleashed," and conceivably might decide to invade the Chinese mainland, opening a second front. Stalin's death in March of 1953 further complicated matters for North Korea's backers. In May, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles told Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru that the United States was prepared to exercise the nuclear option. Nehru duly pa.s.sed along the threat.

Finally, on July 27, 1953, representatives of the United Nations, China and North Korea, meeting at the neutral village of Panmunjom ("Plank-Gate Tavern"), signed a ceasefire agreement. South Korea did not sign, since Rhee wanted to keep the war going and unify the peninsula. Many military commanders on the UN side privately agreed with him. The generals feared that the ceasefire, while averting further bloodshed in the immediate conflict, postponed an inevitable final reckoning with what they still viewed as the expansionist forces of worldwide communism-a reckoning that would prove even bloodier on account of the delay62 The armistice signatories fixed a border along a 155-mile-long, two-and-a-half-mile-wide "demilitarized zone." That left North and South roughly where they had been at the time of the 1950 invasion. (The North did gain the major city of Kaesong. Also the new border was even closer to Seoul than before, an advantage to the North in case hostilities should revive-and thus the cause of decades of anxiety in the South Korean capital.) In this war approximately 3.5 million Koreans had died-2.5 million of them Northerners, representing a quarter of the DPRKs pre-war population. Perhaps a million Chinese had died.63 The UN death toll including battle-related deaths of 33,629 Americans plus 3,194 others-Turks, Greeks, French, British, Canadians, Thais, Colombians and so on-pales beside the Korean and Chinese numbers. But from the point of view of the dead foreign soldiers' comrades, families and friends, there were far too many losses. The UN death toll including battle-related deaths of 33,629 Americans plus 3,194 others-Turks, Greeks, French, British, Canadians, Thais, Colombians and so on-pales beside the Korean and Chinese numbers. But from the point of view of the dead foreign soldiers' comrades, families and friends, there were far too many losses.

When I asked retired colonel Ed Logan what he thought the war had accomplished, his reply-was positive if laconic: "Saved South Korea."64 But as for his view of the 19501953 policy of "limited war" against the Chinese and North Koreans, he said bluntly: "We should've nuked 'em." But as for his view of the 19501953 policy of "limited war" against the Chinese and North Koreans, he said bluntly: "We should've nuked 'em."

Kim Il-sung had won the respect of his foes for the military leadership he displayed in the early days of the war.65 As Joseph C. Goulden revealed in his excellent book on the war, someone in the CIA in Washington had thought enough of Kim's importance to his country's war effort to offer a hit man a "grand prize of a considerable amount of money" to try to a.s.sa.s.sinate the North Korean premier. As Joseph C. Goulden revealed in his excellent book on the war, someone in the CIA in Washington had thought enough of Kim's importance to his country's war effort to offer a hit man a "grand prize of a considerable amount of money" to try to a.s.sa.s.sinate the North Korean premier.66 At home, on the other hand, Kim faced a potential political problem that Truman himself could have recognized: blame for an initially successful war gone sour. North Korea lay in ruins, devastated more thoroughly than j.a.pan had been by the time of its 1945 surrender. At home, on the other hand, Kim faced a potential political problem that Truman himself could have recognized: blame for an initially successful war gone sour. North Korea lay in ruins, devastated more thoroughly than j.a.pan had been by the time of its 1945 surrender.67 Kim in his Manchurian guerrilla days never had commanded more than a few hundred men in combat-and those were hara.s.sing operations, by no means comparable to the full-scale war of conquest he waged against the South. If, in the anti-j.a.panese struggle, he had come to be viewed as a legendary hero, now he was stuck with a b.l.o.o.d.y disaster of a war. Earlier major decisions after 1945, such as land reform, had been dictated by the Russians and had succeeded, but the invasion scheme was Kim's call-a fact that some of the other top leaders knew, even though the ma.s.ses did not-and it was a failure. As Stalin told Zhou Enlai at a Black Sea meeting in October 1950, Kim had underestimated the "enemy's might."68 Unlike Truman, Kim was not about to step down voluntarily. If he did not act shrewdly, though, it was conceivable that he could lose the leadership, and its perquisites. Regarding those perquisites, he seems not to have denied himself. Despite his inspirational p.r.o.nouncement that "when the people eat boiled foxtail millet, we must have it, too," photos from the 'wartime period show Kim looking very well fed indeed-a striking contrast to his rail-thin subjects.69 Not the least of Kim's perks was the adoring gaze of that vast majority of his people who, believing the official version of events, were totally unaware it was Kim who had planned and started the full-scale war that killed and maimed so many of them. Kim evidently could not get enough adoration. An official biography relates a telling incident: Entertaining a group of military heroes during the war, Kim asked them coyly, "There is a song you sing at the front. Please sing that song." The men obligingly sang the song--which, as Kim well knew, was "The Song of General Kim Il-sung."70 Part of Kim's approach to dealing with the failures of the war was to pa.s.s the buck, while harking back to the supposed golden age of his guerrilla activities. North Korean casualties in the war, he wrote, could have been cut drastically if only "flunkeyist" subordinates had taught the people the lessons of his anti-j.a.panese struggle, instead of directing their eyes abroad to the achievements of the socialist mother country, the Soviet Union.

"If-we had educated people in our revolutionary traditions," Kim wrote in his memoirs, "they could have formed small units of five to six people or fifteen to twenty people, each carrying an axe and one or two mal mal [about half a bushel to a bushel] of rice, and moving from mountain to mountain, firing several shots now and then and posting up leaflets; in this way they could have endured one month or two in mountains." [about half a bushel to a bushel] of rice, and moving from mountain to mountain, firing several shots now and then and posting up leaflets; in this way they could have endured one month or two in mountains."71 There are some similarities here with the way Korean communist guerrillas in the South, as well as the Chinese "volunteers," actually did operate during the Korean War. And perhaps his remark is a regretful reference to Mao's proposal for establishing a second front in the South in October 1950. There are some similarities here with the way Korean communist guerrillas in the South, as well as the Chinese "volunteers," actually did operate during the Korean War. And perhaps his remark is a regretful reference to Mao's proposal for establishing a second front in the South in October 1950.72 However, Kim's hindsight a.n.a.lysis seems a bit quaint when held up against the overall military reality of that conflict-a struggle so ferociously close to total war that it can be called "limited" only thanks to its nonuse of nuclear weapons and the fact that ground fighting did not spill over into other countries. However, Kim's hindsight a.n.a.lysis seems a bit quaint when held up against the overall military reality of that conflict-a struggle so ferociously close to total war that it can be called "limited" only thanks to its nonuse of nuclear weapons and the fact that ground fighting did not spill over into other countries.

Mainly, however, Kim dealt with the war's failure by proclaiming over and over again that North Korea had won a great victory, repelling an invasion by the South and the UN forces. "At the time when we had been able to live a worthy life, built up on our own after the liberation, the U.S. imperialists ignited the war," he told the people.73 As an official biographer puts it, "all the attacks of the enemy were turned, as though they dashed their heads against the cliffs. The People's Army mercilessly hit the oncoming enemy met them and crushed their positions. The People's Army and the whole Korean people stood like a mountain towering in the sky brandishing their sharpened arms. On top of the mountain stood Comrade Kim Il-sung, the iron-willed brilliant commander who held in his hands the general outcome of the war, looking down upon the panic-stricken U.S. imperialist aggressors with calm and shining eyes."74 The North's propaganda references to "the whole Korean people"-as if the people of North and South under Kim's leadership had been struggling in partnership against the South Korean rulers-would have rung hollow to many Southerners. Their own military men were bad enough, overbearing and arrogant toward civilians. But the experience with the Northern occupiers seems to have been even worse. Northern troops in the South indulged themselves in drunkenness and looting. Many Southerners saw their young relatives forbibly conscripted into the North Korean People's Army and their older relatives-civilians with backgrounds in politics or scholarship-spirited off to the North, never to return.75 Others lost friends or relatives in ma.s.s executions of people denounced as anti-communist. Some of the executions were particularly grisly beheadings by swordsmen. Others lost friends or relatives in ma.s.s executions of people denounced as anti-communist. Some of th