198 Are the things of sense only modes in which percipient persons exist?

M335 N.

199 See Locke's _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. 9. -- 8.

M336 M. S.

M337 M.

M338 M.

M339 T.

M340 M.

M341 N.

M342 M.

M343 T.

200 Time being relative to the capacity of the percipient.

201 See Locke's _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. 9. -- 8.

M344 M.

202 To perceive what is not an idea (as Berkeley uses idea) is to perceive what is not realised, and therefore not real.

203 So things have a _potential_ objective existence in the Divine Will.

204 With Berkeley, change is time, and time, abstracted from all changes, is meaningless.

205 Could he know, by seeing only, even that he _had_ a body?

M345 M.

M346 M.

M347 M.

M348 M.

M349 M. N.

M350 N.

206 "the ideas attending these impressions," i.e. the ideas that are correlatives of the (by us unperceived) organic impressions.

M351 M.

M352 M.

M353 M.

207 The Italian physical and metaphysical philosopher Fardella (1650-1718) maintained, by reasonings akin to those of Malebranche, that the existence of the material world could not be scientifically proved, and could only be maintained by faith in authoritative revelation. See his _Universae Philosophiae Systema_ (1690), and especially his _Logica_ (1696).

M354 M.

208 Locke's _Essay_, Bk. IV. ch. 11.

209 What does he mean by "unknown substratum"?

M355 M.

M356 S.

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M358 M.

210 He gets rid of the infinite in quant.i.ty, because it is incapable of concrete manifestation to the senses. When a phenomenon given in sense reaches the _minimum sensibile_, it reaches what is for us the margin of realisable existence: it cannot be infinitely little and still a phenomenon: insensible phenomena of sense involve a contradiction. And so too of the infinitely large.

M359 T.

211 In short he would idealise the visible world but not the tangible world. In the _Principles_, Berkeley idealises both.

M360 S.

M361 M.

212 Cf. _Essay on Vision_, sect. 149-59, where he concludes that "neither abstract nor visible extension makes the object of geometry."

213 By the adult, who has learned to interpret its visual signs.

214 Inasmuch as no physical consequences _follow_ the volition; which however is still self-originated.

M362 G.

215 "A succession of ideas I take to _const.i.tute_ time, and not to be only the sensible measure thereof, as Mr. Locke and others think."

(Berkeley's letter to Johnson.)

M363 P.

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M365 T.

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216 Cf. _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. 16, sect. 8.

217 Cf. _Essay on Vision_, sect. 67-77.

218 Cf. _Essay on Vision_, sect. 88-120.

M367 T.

M368 M.

M369 M.

219 This is of the essence of Berkeley's philosophy.

M370 M.

M371 M.

M372 Mo. S.

M373 S.

M374 S.

M375 S.