184 Berkeley's horror of abstract or unperceived s.p.a.ce and atoms is partly explained by dogmas in natural philosophy that are now antiquated.

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185 Ralph [?] Raphson, author of _Demonstratio de Deo_ (1710), and also of _De Spatio Reali, seu ente Infinito: conamen mathematico-metaphysic.u.m_ (1697), to which Berkeley refers in one of his letters to Johnson. See also Green's _Principles of Natural Philosophy_ (1712). The immanence of omnipotent goodness in the material world was unconsciously Berkeley's presupposition. In G.o.d we have our being.

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186 Note here Berkeley's version of the causal principle, which is really the central presupposition of his whole philosophy-viz. every event in the material world must be the issue of acting Will.

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187 So Locke on an ideally perfect memory. _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. x. -- 9.

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188 John Sergeant was the author of _Solid Philosophy a.s.serted against the Fancies of the Ideists_ (London, 1697); also of _the Method to Science_ (1696). He was a deserter from the Church of England to the Church of Rome, and wrote several pieces in defence of Roman theology-some of them in controversy with Tillotson.

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189 Spirit and Matter are mutually dependent; but Spirit is the realising factor and real agent in the universe.

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190 See Descartes, _Meditations_, III; Spinoza, _Epist._ II, ad Oldenburgium.

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191 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 2.

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192 Is "inclusion" here virtually a synonym for verbal definition?

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193 See _Principles_, sect. 2. The universe of Berkeley consists of Active Spirits that perceive and produce motion in impotent ideas or phenomena, realised in the percipient experience of persons. All supposed powers in Matter are refunded into Spirit.

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194 When self-conscious agents are included among "things." We can have no sensuous image, i.e. idea, of _spirit_, although he maintains we can use the word intelligently.

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195 Berkeley insists that we should individualise our thinking-"ipsis consuescere rebus," as Bacon says,-to escape the dangers of artificial signs. This is the drift of his a.s.sault on abstract ideas, and his repulsion from what is not concrete. He would even dispense with words in his meditations in case of being sophisticated by abstractions.

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196 Nature or the phenomenal world in short is the revelation of perfectly reasonable Will.

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197 Gerard De Vries, the Cartesian.

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