On Friday, December 27, a German gentleman from the Free State also informed the Field-cornet that Dr. Jameson and his troopers might be expected at any time. 'On hearing this confirmation of the letter,' said Mr. Bodenstein, 'I went at once to Pretoria. I arrived there at eleven o'clock at night, and early the next morning I saw the President and informed him about the letter and what I had been told. He remarked quietly: "Yes, I have heard all about it" The General (Joubert) then said: "All right; I will send you the ammunition you require."'

In the report of the Select Committee of the Cape House of a.s.sembly (Blue Book A 6 of 1896, page 76) there is the evidence of the Hon. J.A. Faure, M.L.C., which shows that he and Sir Thomas Upington, the Attorney-General of Cape Colony, were on a visit to Johannesburg on December 27, and heard it publicly stated that Dr. Jameson with 800 men was on the border for the purpose of invading the Transvaal. Mr. Faure testifies that he learned this from a very prominent Free State Dutchman. Among others, one would suppose that the Transvaal Government must also have heard something of it.

Dr. Veale, a well-known Pretoria doctor, states that at daybreak on Thursday, January 2, Commandant Hendrik Schoeman called on him to secure his professional attendance for a member of his family who was very ill. The Commandant said that he had been sent out on Monday to watch the invading force and to ascertain their numbers, and also stated that he had been following the troop with others for a considerable time and that he was sure Jameson had not 800 but between 450 and 500, as he had repeatedly counted them; that the force was being delayed by small parties drawing it into useless fighting and so losing time; that he himself had been obliged to come on ahead, having been recalled on account of his wife's serious illness, but that it made little difference as there were others to take his place, and they had arranged not to tackle Jameson until they had drawn him among the kopjes at Doornkop, where it would be quite impossible for him ever to get through. This statement it should be noted was made in Pretoria some hours before the Jameson force surrendered at Doornkop.

So certain do the Boers appear to have been, and so confident of their ability to carry out their plans, that they stated to a reporter of the Government newspaper that they intended to stop Jameson at Rietspruit (Doornkop), and this statement was published in a Johannesburg paper on the morning of January 1, but was of course regarded as mere gossip of a piece with that which flooded the newspapers at the time. It is only right to add that there were numbers of other announcements at the same time which by no means agreed with this one, and it is stated that the editor was as much surprised as the public to find that he had been right.

In reviewing the whole of the circ.u.mstances of the raid, not the most biased and most interested of persons can withhold a tribute of admiration to the President's presence of mind, skill, and courage in dealing with circ.u.mstances wholly without precedent; and in quiet moments, when recalling all that has happened, if human at all, his Honour must indulge in a chuckle now and then to think how completely he jockeyed everybody.{32} Not the least amusing recollection must be that of the 'great trek' (Banjailand Trek), which his burghers threatened to make into Mashonaland via Rhodes' Drift when Sir John Willoughby gained his first experience of Oom Paul. The military commander of Dr. Jameson's force had called on the President to add weight to the remonstrances which were being made against the action of the burghers in invading the Chartered territory, and the President, playing his cards for a favourable settlement of Swaziland, had replied that he had done all that he could, and events must take their course. 'Tell him,' said Sir John to Dr. Leyds who was interpreting, 'that if the trek is not stopped of course the result will be war!' 'If it must be, let it be,' the old gentleman answered quietly. 'Then tell him,' Sir John replied, 'that in that case he will have to reckon with the British Army.' 'And tell him', said the President, pointing placidly at his interviewer with his big pipe, 'that I have reckoned with the British Army once before.' If the recollection occurred to both men on January 2, it must have been with different emotions.

In dealing with President Kruger's personal att.i.tude it is not perhaps pertinent but, it is interesting, to recall an incident of his earlier career-a parallel between the prisoner and the President. Oddly enough President Kruger was a rebel and a filibuster himself in the days of his hot youth, and one of his earliest diplomatic successes was in securing the release and pardon of men who, in 1857, stood in exactly the same position as the Uitlanders whom he imprisoned.

The story of the Potchefstroom revolt is little known in England, but it is told in Theal's 'Standard History of South Africa,' and very instructive reading it is. Dr. Hillier, of Johannesburg, one of the Reformers, called attention just before the outbreak to the extraordinary parallel between the revolt of Potchefstroom in 1857 against the dominance of Lydenburg and the condition of Johannesburg in 1895 under the despotism of Pretoria. Dr. Hillier in his pamphlet said:

In 1857 the Republic north of the Vaal attained its twentieth year. It had increased in population, and had taken on, to some extent, the habits and mode of life of a settled community. Mr. Pretorius and his followers began to feel that in the altered circ.u.mstances of the State the time had arrived for a remodelling of the Const.i.tution. Among these followers of Pretorius, these advocates of reform, it is interesting to find was Mr. Stepha.n.u.s Johannes Paulus Kruger.

Mr. Theal says:

'During the months of September and October, 1856, Commandant-General M. W. Pretorius made a tour through the districts of Rutsenburg, Pretoria and Potchefstroom, and called public meetings at all the centres of population. At these meetings there was an expression by a large majority in favour of immediate adoption of a Const.i.tution which should provide for an efficient Government and an independent Church.'

And again, later on, we have in the words of South Africa's historian the gist of the complaint against the then existing state of things:

'The community of Lydenburg was accused of attempting to domineer over the whole country, without any other right to preeminence than that of being composed of the earliest inhabitants, a right which it had forfeited by its opposition to the general weal.'

Such was the shocking state of things in this country in 1856. It was a great deal too bad for such champion reformers as Mr. Pretorius and his lieutenant, Mr. S.J.P. Kruger, as we shall see later. Shortly after these meetings were held, a Representative a.s.sembly, consisting of twenty-four members, one for each field-cornetcy, was elected for the special purpose of framing a Const.i.tution and installing the officials whom it should decide to appoint.

On January 5, 1857, the Representative a.s.sembly appointed Mr. Martinus Wessels Pretorius President, and also appointed members of an Executive Council. The oaths of office were then taken, the President and Executive installed, and the flag hoisted. When intelligence of these proceedings reached Zoutpansberg and Lydenburg, there was a violent outburst of indignation. At a public meeting at Zoutpansberg the acts and resolutions of the Representative a.s.sembly at Potchefstroom were almost unanimously repudiated, and a manifesto disowning the new Const.i.tution and everything connected with it was drawn up. Mr. Pretorius then issued a proclamation, deposing Commandant-General Schoeman from all authority, declaring Zoutpansberg in a state of blockade, and prohibiting traders from supplying 'the rebels' with ammunition or anything else. This conduct on the part of the new Government under Mr. Pretorius appears to me distinctly adroit. Having taken upon themselves to remodel the entire Const.i.tution of the country, they turn round on the adherents of the older Government, whom, by-the-by, they had not thought it worth while to consult, and promptly call them 'rebels.' And so you have this striking political phenomenon of a revolutionary party turning on the adherents of the Government of the State, and denouncing them, forsooth, as 'rebels.'

The 'Republic of Lydenburg' then declared itself into a sovereign and independent State. And thus two Republics, two Volksraads, two Governments, were formed and existed simultaneously in the Transvaal. And all this without a shot being fired, each party finding sufficient relief to its feelings by calling the other party 'rebels.' In order to strengthen its position, the party of Pretorius now determined on a bold stroke. They sent emissaries to endeavour to arrange for union with the Free State. The Free State Government rejected their overtures, but Pretorius was led to believe that so many of the Free State burghers were anxious for this union that all that was necessary for him to do, in order to effect it, was to march in with an armed force. He therefore placed himself at the head of a commando, and crossed the Vaal, where he was joined by a certain number of Free State burghers.

But Pretorius, with whom was Paul Kruger, found, like Dr. Jameson, that he had reckoned without his host. When intelligence of this invasion reached Bloemfontein, President Boshoff issued a proclamation declaring martial law in force throughout the Free State, and calling out burghers for the defence of the country. It soon appeared that the majority of the people were ready to support the President, and from all quarters men repaired to Kroonstad. At this stage the Free State President received an offer of a.s.sistance from General Schoeman, of Zoutpansberg, against Pretorius, in which object he believed Lydenburg would also join.

On May 25 the two commandoes were drawn up facing each other on opposite banks of the Rhenoster River, and remained in that position for three hours. Threatened from the north as well as the south Pretorius felt his chance of success was small, and he therefore sent out Commandant Paul Kruger with a flag of truce to propose that a pacific settlement should be made.

Here indeed is a very close parallel, but the climax is still to come. The treaty arrived at was practically an apology on the part of the South African Republic. Many citizens of the Free State who had joined the northern forces moved over the Vaal after this event. Those who remained and those who had been previously arrested were brought to trial for high treason. One man was sentenced to death, but the sentence was mitigated subsequently to a fine; others were fined. These fines were again still further mitigated at the solicitation of Messrs. Paul Kruger and Steyn, until it came to little more than a ten-pound note apiece.

There we have the story of President Kruger and his friends playing exactly the part Dr. Jameson and the Johannesburg Reformers tried to do. As Potchefstroom rose under Mr. Kruger against the oligarchical rule of Lydenburg, so Johannesburg was to rise against Pretoria. The Potchefstroom Republic under Pretorius and Kruger made a raid a la Jameson into the Orange Free State for political purposes, to encourage those who were believed to be anxious to effect a union. And just as Jameson failed against the Government of Pretoria, so Pretorius failed against the Government of the Orange Free State. In 1857 it was Paul Kruger not Dr. Jameson who hoisted the white flag. The Free Staters who had tried to help Kruger's raid were arrested just as the Johannesburgers were; but although one of them was condemned to death all of them were released, by the intervention of Mr. Kruger himself, on paying a slight fine.

History has repeated itself indeed; but the offence of Dr. Jameson is surely less than that of Mr. Kruger, if we are to pay heed to the records of the Free State Volksraad, wherein it is written that on a certain day the President stated in open Raad that proof had been obtained of a proposed combined attack on the Free State by the Transvaal Boers, led by Pretorius and Kruger on the one side, and the Basutos under Moshesh on the other-a horrible and unnatural alliance which was not effected only because Moshesh could not trust his professed allies. The Raad thereupon publicly gave thanks to the Almighty, Who had revealed and frustrated this 'hideous complot.'

Footnotes for Chapter VI

{24} In the Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons the following questions and answers occur, Mr. Blake questioning and Major Heany replying:

'Having got the message you went off with it and you got in, as we see by the evidence, as quickly as you could, and you just gave the message as accurately as you could to Dr. Jameson?-I read the message from my note-book absolutely accurately to Dr. Jameson.

'And he did not lose much time in making up his mind?-No; he went outside his tent. He was in a bell-tent when I arrived and he went outside and walked up and down for about twenty minutes, and then he came in and announced his determination.'

{25} In the course of the Inquiry at Westminster, Dr. Jameson himself took occasion to explain this reference, when answering a question put by Mr. Sidney Buxton.

Knowing what you do now of the position at Johannesburg, do you think it was within their power to send out 300 mounted men?-I cannot give an opinion upon that; I think all their actions were perfectly bona fide. There is one telegram here which has been brought up against me very unpleasantly, which I wish I had never sent, where 'fear' is imputed in the telegram as it stands here. My explanation is that I was irritated at the time at the trouble going on, and that I used it inadvertently, or possibly there is a mistake in deciphering the code word; as to that I cannot tell, but I am sorry that it should appear so in the telegram, because I never imputed fear or cowardice to anyone in connection with anything.

{26} July 1899. The originals have since been photographed and are here reproduced.

{27} Colonel Francis Rhodes.

{28} Lionel Phillips.

{29} (July, 1899.) Is it not probable that the deleted figures '2,000' in Colonel Rhodes' letter (see photograph) may account for some of the talk about 2,000 armed men?

{30} After the arrival in England of the officers of Dr. Jameson's force, a report dealing with the military aspect of the expedition was sent by Sir John Willoughby to the War Office. It has been printed and-to a certain extent-circulated, and cannot therefore be regarded as private. But apart from this it is a doc.u.ment so peculiar-so marked by mishandling of notorious facts-that it deserves no consideration other than it may earn on merits. It is printed in extenso with notes by a member of the Reform Committee. See Appendix H.

{31} See Appendix G. It will be noted that in his declarations Commandant Cronje modifies his terms very considerably. It was impossible for any reasonable person to accept the explanation preferred by him, that the promise to spare the lives of the surrendered force was only to hold good until they could be handed over to the Commandant-General. In fact, it is well known that Commandant Cronje only took up this att.i.tude after an extremely acrimonious discussion had taken place between him and Commandant Malan-a quarrel in which they went the length of making charges against each other in the public press of treachery and neglect of duty whilst in the field. The Commandant Cronje referred to here is the same gentleman who commanded the Boer forces at Potchefstroom in the War of Independence, and his record is an extremely unpleasant one, his conduct of operations having earned for the Potchefstroom commando the worst reputation of any. Apart from the execution of several British subjects who were suspected and, on wholly insufficient grounds, summarily shot as spies, there are the unpleasant facts that he caused prisoners of war to be placed in the forefront of the besieging operations and compelled them to work in the trenches in exposed positions so that they should be-and actually were-shot by their own comrades. There was also the incident in which he refused to allow one or two of the ladies who were among the beleaguered garrison, and who were then in extremely bad health, to leave the fort to obtain such food and medical attendance as would enable them to live. One of the ladies died in consequence. But the incident which has more bearing on Jameson's surrender than any other is that connected with the armistice, when Commandant Cronje, in defiance of treaty obligations, withheld from Colonel Winslow and the besieged garrison the news that an armistice had been arranged between the Boer and British forces, and continued the siege until the garrison, in order to save the lives of the wounded and the women and children refugees, were obliged to surrender. It will be remembered that this incident was too much even for Mr. Gladstone, and that on its becoming known after the terms of peace had been settled, the Transvaal Government were required by Sir Evelyn Wood to allow a British force to march up from Natal and re-occupy Potchefstroom as a formal acknowledgment of Cronje's treachery. Mr. Kruger and his party, who were in the greatest fear that the settlement would not be effected, and that Sir Evelyn Wood's action might provoke a renewal of hostilities, agreed to the terms, but with grave apprehensions as to the results. However, no contretemps occurred.

{32} Once when out hunting on foot-a young man then-Mr. Kruger, after climbing to the top of a kopje, found that he had been seen by a number of hostile natives who were then running towards him, some to climb the hill, others branching out to surround it. He knew that those on the flat could cut him off before he could descend and that his only chance lay in 'bluff.' Stepping on to the outermost ledge in full view of the enemy he calmly laid down his rifle, drew off first one and then the other of his velschoens (home-made hide shoes, in those poorer days worn without socks) and after quietly knocking the sand out of them drew them on again. By this time the natives had stopped to observe him. He then picked up his rifle again, and turning to an imaginary force behind the kopje waved to the right and then to the left, as though directing them to charge round each end of the hill. The next instant the Kaffirs were in full retreat.

CHAPTER VII.

AFTER DOORNKOP.

The news of Dr. Jameson's surrender was received in Johannesburg towards mid-day, at first with derision, but as report after report came in, each confirming and supplementing the other, no room for doubt was left and a scene of the wildest excitement ensued. It is not too much to say that not one person in a hundred, no matter what his political leanings were, had doubted for a moment Dr. Jameson's ability to force his way into Johannesburg. There is not the slightest indication in the newspapers of the time, which without doubt reflected every varying mood and repeated every rumour which it was possible to catch from an excited people, that there was in any man's mind a suspicion that the Boers would be able to stop the invader. In the first place no one believed that they could mobilize sufficiently quickly to oppose him, and in the second place, he was understood to have a force of 800 men so admirably equipped and trained that it would not be possible for 5,000 Boers hurriedly called together to intercept him. All this, however, was forgotten when it came to accounting for the disaster; or rather, the previous convictions only added strength to the rage of disappointment. The public by that time knew of the letter of invitation; it had been taken on the battle-field and news of it was telegraphed in, and apart from this the writers had made no secret of it. But what the public did not know, and what, if they had known it, would not have appealed with similar force, was the efforts made to stop Jameson and the practical withdrawal of the letter before he had started. It was sufficient for them during the few remaining hours of that day to recall that Jameson had come in, that he had fought against great odds, and that when almost reaching his goal he had been taken prisoner for want of a.s.sistance. It is perfectly true that in their rage of grief and disappointment men were willing to march out with pick-handles to rescue him, if there were not rifles enough to arm them. While the excitement lasted this was the mood, and the Reform Committee were the scapegoats. The att.i.tude of the crowd was due to ignorance of the circ.u.mstances and natural emotion which could not be otherwise vented. The excitement had greatly abated by the following morning, and it was realized then that the position was practically but little worse than that which the Reform Committee had offered to take up when they tendered their persons as security for the evacuation of the country by the invading force, and had proposed to continue the struggle without their aid.

The reports received by the Johannesburg people were to the effect that the surrender had been conditional upon the sparing of the lives of the force. Indeed the first reports agreed that Jameson upon receipt of the High Commissioner's proclamation, had laid down his arms; but upon the return of Mr. Lace (whose mission has been explained) it was realized that this was not the case. A later account showed that Jameson had surrendered to Commandant Cronje on the condition that the lives of all should be spared, and this version of the surrender was published in the Johannesburg newspapers. When further accounts were received from Pretoria and Krugersdorp, stating that the surrender had been unconditional and that there was grave doubt as to what would be done with Dr. Jameson, it was surmised as an explanation that he had declined to bargain for his own life and had merely stipulated that those of his followers should be spared.

On Friday the news that it was contemplated to shoot Dr. Jameson caused a frenzy of horror and excitement in the town. Every effort was made by the Reform Committee and its supporters to maintain strictly the position which the Government had suggested through their Commission on Wednesday, lest some untoward incident should turn the trembling balance against Dr. Jameson and his men; nor were the Committee alone in the desire to maintain that position. On Friday and on Sat.u.r.day communications were received from the local Government officials, and from Commandant-General Joubert through the British Agent, drawing the attention of the Committee to alleged breaches of the arrangement. The allegations were satisfactorily disproved; but the communications clearly indicated that the Government were most desirous of maintaining the position in relation to Johannesburg which they had laid down before the first battle with Dr. Jameson's forces.

Information was received on Thursday that the High Commissioner would leave Capetown for Pretoria at 9 p.m. that night. It had been a matter of surprise that, the arrangement having been entered into with him early on Wednesday, he had not found it convenient to start for some thirty-six hours. Considering how seriously he had interfered with the movement-first by his proclamation, and next by concerted action with the Government for a peaceful settlement-it had been naturally a.s.sumed that he would not lose a moment in leaving Capetown for the scene of trouble. Such however was not the case.

It has been alleged that the arrangement made between the Transvaal Government and the High Commissioner with a view to a peaceful settlement bore only upon Dr. Jameson's action, and that it was not contemplated that there should be any interference between the Government and its own subjects in Johannesburg. In answer to this it may be noted that the High Commissioner had in the first place offered his services, and that those services had been declined by the Transvaal Government; but that the latter, on realizing the seriousness of the position which they were called upon to face, and acting, it is stated, upon the advice of Mr. J.H. Hofmeyr, the recognized leader of the Dutch Africanders in the Cape Colony, reconsidered this refusal and urgently besought the High Commissioner to go up to Pretoria and use his influence to effect a peaceful settlement. This arrangement, together with the promise of the redress of grievances, had been made known to the deputation of the Reform Committee by the Government Commission in Pretoria, as has already been stated-the Government well knowing that Johannesburg was in arms and a party to the arrangement with Dr. Jameson.

Dr. Jameson surrendered at 9.30 a.m. on Thursday. The High Commissioner did not leave Capetown until 9 p.m. the same day. There had therefore been ample time for the Government to intimate to him their opinion that matters had been satisfactorily settled and that they did not need his services any longer, had they held such an opinion. As a matter of fact, that was by no means their opinion. They considered that they had yet to deal with 20,000 armed men in Johannesburg, and that they had to do that, if possible, without provoking a civil war, which would inevitably result in the long-run to their disadvantage, however great their success might be over the Johannesburg people in the meantime. They not only allowed the High Commissioner to proceed to Pretoria on the understanding originally effected, but they took steps to remind the Reform Committee on several occasions that they were expected to adhere to the arrangement entered into. And such was the position when the High Commissioner arrived on the night of Sat.u.r.day, the 4th.

Sir Hercules Robinson proceeded direct to Pretoria, but did not transact any business until Monday, abstaining, in deference to the feelings of the Boers, from any discussion of business matters on the Sabbath. On Sunday, however, he received information from the Reform Committee as to the arrangements entered into with the Government. He was also informed that threats had been made by persons who without doubt were speaking the mind of the Government, that if any trouble should take place with Johannesburg Dr. Jameson and probably many of his comrades would be shot. It was not stated that the Transvaal Government or authorities would officially countenance any such act or would authorize it even as the result of a trial; but the statement which was made by everyone from the President downward was that, in the event of any fighting in Johannesburg, the burghers would be so much enraged and so beyond control that the prisoners who had caused all the trouble would inevitably be shot. It is a part of Boer diplomacy to make as much use as possible of every weapon that comes to hand without too great a regard for the decencies of government as they occur to the minds of every civilized people, and it is not at all unusual to find the President proclaiming at one moment that some course must be taken to prevent disaster, for the reason that he cannot be answerable for his burghers in their excited state, and at another moment indignantly repudiating the suggestion that they would be guilty of any step that could be considered unworthy of the most civilized of peoples. In fact such exhibitions were repeatedly given by him at a later stage when dealing with the Reform prisoners.

Before any communication was received from the High Commissioner on Monday messages had been received by the members of the Reform Committee to the effect that the laying down of arms would be absolutely necessary to ensure the safety of Jameson and his men. The Reform Committee had then learnt that the two messengers sent to stop Dr. Jameson-Major Heany and Captain Holden-had reached him, and had come in with him, and were at that moment prisoners with him in Pretoria. They had also heard of the reception accorded to Sir Jacobus de Wet's despatch and the High Commissioner's proclamation, so that it was abundantly clear that the incursion had been made in defiance of the wishes of the leaders, whatever other reasons there might have been to prompt it. But the public who const.i.tuted the movement were still under the impression that Dr. Jameson was a very fine fellow who had come in in a chivalrous manner to help those whom he had believed to be in distress. There was however no division of opinion as to what should be done; even those who felt most sore about the position in which they had been placed did not hesitate for a moment. The first and for the time being the only consideration was the safety of Dr. Jameson and his comrades.

The events and negotiations of the days preceding the arrest of the Reformers have been the subject of so much discussion and so much misunderstanding that it will be better as far as possible to compile the history from original doc.u.ments or the published and properly authenticated copies. In Blue Book [C. 7,933] the following is published:

SIR HERCULES ROBINSON (Pretoria) to MR. CHAMBERLAIN.

(Telegraphic. Received 1.8 a.m., 6th January, 1896.)

5th January. No. 3.-Arrived here last night. Position of affairs very critical. On side of Government of South African Republic and of Orange Free State there is a desire to show moderation, but Boers show tendency to get out of hand and to demand execution of Jameson. I am told that Government of South African Republic will demand disarmament of Johannesburg as a condition precedent to negotiations. Their military preparations are now practically complete, and Johannesburg, if besieged, could not hold out, as they are short of water and coal. On side of Johannesburg leaders desire to be moderate, but men make safety of Jameson and concession of items in manifesto issued conditions precedent to disarmament. If these are refused, they a.s.sert they will elect their own leaders and fight it out in their own way. As the matter now stands, I see great difficulty in avoiding civil war; but I will do my best, and telegraph result of my official interview to-morrow. It is said that President of South African Republic intends to make some demands with respect to Article No. 4 of the London Convention of 1884.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN to SIR HERCULES ROBINSON.

(Telegraphic. January 6, 1896.)