THE FRENCH CENTER ALONE caused Joffre concern. Langle de Cary's Fourth Army, fronting Duke Albrecht's Fourth Army, was stretched out in a wide arc between Humbauville, southwest of Vitry-le-Francois, and Revigny-sur-Ornain. On its left wing, the Mailly Gap, some twenty kilometers wide, separated it from the right flank of Foch's Ninth Army southeast of the Saint-Gond Marshes; on its right, the smaller Revigny Gap had opened between Fourth Army and Sarrail's Third Army. Joffre rushed reinforcements up from Lorraine-Louis Espina.s.se's XV Corps and emile-Edmond Legrand-Girarde's XXI Corps-to plug the gaps. His one worry was that an enemy breakthrough there could jeopardize his left wing behind the Seine River. caused Joffre concern. Langle de Cary's Fourth Army, fronting Duke Albrecht's Fourth Army, was stretched out in a wide arc between Humbauville, southwest of Vitry-le-Francois, and Revigny-sur-Ornain. On its left wing, the Mailly Gap, some twenty kilometers wide, separated it from the right flank of Foch's Ninth Army southeast of the Saint-Gond Marshes; on its right, the smaller Revigny Gap had opened between Fourth Army and Sarrail's Third Army. Joffre rushed reinforcements up from Lorraine-Louis Espina.s.se's XV Corps and emile-Edmond Legrand-Girarde's XXI Corps-to plug the gaps. His one worry was that an enemy breakthrough there could jeopardize his left wing behind the Seine River.

Indeed, on 6 September, Duke Albrecht planned to attack southeast from Vitry-le-Francois along the Marne-Rhine Ca.n.a.l with VI, VIII, and XVIII corps as well as VIII and XVIII reserve corps to relieve the pressure on German Sixth Army before Nancy. At dawn, a violent French artillery attack preempted his plan. Although Albrecht at first believed that this was simply one last, desperate French attempt to secure their line by way of a brazen offensive, aviators' reports of the arrival of fresh formations (Joseph Masnou's 23d ID from XII Corps in the south) quickly brought the realization that the French had gone to the attack in the east as well. Erich Tulff von Tschepe und Weidenbach's exposed VIII Corps stood in danger of being enveloped; hence, as mentioned earlier, Duke Albrecht appealed to Third Army for aid. Hausen, as ever, responded positively. He divided his army, sending Maximilian von Laffert's XIX Corps and 23d ID from Karl d'Elsa's XII Corps to b.u.t.tress Fourth Army's right wing. For three days, Langle de Cary's soldiers fought a vicious battle in the land between the Ornain and Marne rivers. Neither side gained an advantage.

On 8 September, Duke Albrecht had declined to take part in Hausen's nighttime bayonet attack on French artillery positions; by the time he attempted it the next morning after a lengthy artillery barrage, he had lost the critical element of surprise. At ten-thirty that night, Langle de Cary confidently informed Joffre that "all together, the general situation at the close of day is good." The enemy had thrown everything it had at Fourth Army, Langle de Cary reported, and French fliers reported no German reserves moving up to the front. "Physical state of troops: good. Moral state: much improved, is now actually excellent." The arrival of Legrand-Girarde's XXI Corps from epinal augured well for the next day, when Langle de Cary planned to attack Albrecht's right flank, with "a good chance of bringing about a decision."79 The German retreat in the afternoon of 9 September made that "chance" more than reasonable. The German retreat in the afternoon of 9 September made that "chance" more than reasonable.

In fact, a sharp dispute had broken out between the German center armies. While Duke Albrecht called on Fifth Army to support his left wing in an attempt to envelop the left flank of Langle de Cary's Fourth Army, Crown Prince Wilhelm instead wanted Fourth Army to tie down Langle de Cary's right wing while he forced his way through the Revigny Gap. Appeals for resolution to Luxembourg brought no relief. Studiously careful not to get ground up in a spat between two royals, Moltke managed a Solomon-like decision: "Mutual support between 4. and 5. Armies desirable."80 Albrecht eventually yielded, after Wilhelm appealed the matter directly to his father, the kaiser. Albrecht eventually yielded, after Wilhelm appealed the matter directly to his father, the kaiser.

While the German royals squabbled, Joffre struck. On the morning of 6 September, Sarrail's Third Army, with its pivot on Verdun and its main body about twenty kilometers southwest of the fortress, had advanced against German Fifth Army as part of the great Allied offensive.81 Expecting the enemy to continue its advance southward from Clermont-en-Argonne and Sainte-Menehould, Joffre had ordered Sarrail to "attack the flank of the enemy forces ... west of the Argonne Forest." Expecting the enemy to continue its advance southward from Clermont-en-Argonne and Sainte-Menehould, Joffre had ordered Sarrail to "attack the flank of the enemy forces ... west of the Argonne Forest."82 But the German crown prince had shifted his advance onto a southeasterly course toward Bar-le-Duc, with the result that the two armies clashed head-on. Frederic Micheler's V Corps, entrusted with guarding the Revigny Gap, took the brunt of the German attack by Kurt von Pritzelwitz's VI Corps-the same unit that had so badly mauled the French colonials at Rossigny. And just as at Rossigny, Pritzelwitz's corps again stove in a French division-this time the 10th of Micheler's V Corps-shot its commander, General Charles Roques, and captured most of its staff. But the German crown prince had shifted his advance onto a southeasterly course toward Bar-le-Duc, with the result that the two armies clashed head-on. Frederic Micheler's V Corps, entrusted with guarding the Revigny Gap, took the brunt of the German attack by Kurt von Pritzelwitz's VI Corps-the same unit that had so badly mauled the French colonials at Rossigny. And just as at Rossigny, Pritzelwitz's corps again stove in a French division-this time the 10th of Micheler's V Corps-shot its commander, General Charles Roques, and captured most of its staff.83 Espina.s.se's XV Corps had arrived just in time to take part in Third Army's debacle. Espina.s.se's XV Corps had arrived just in time to take part in Third Army's debacle.

Joffre, true to fashion, blamed the setback on Third Army's commander. He struck out furiously. He railed against "the mediocre military value" of some of Sarrail's units. He accused them of having committed "grave errors such as abandoning rifles, ammunition and rucksacks along the roads or in bivouacs." He charged that especially 173d Infantry Regiment (IR) had purposefully "broken war material." All too many infantry officers "have no authority over their men;" staff officers failed to show "sufficient activity." Joffre closed his blistering epistle with the dire admonition that "General Command of Third Army reestablish order, taking whatever measures necessary."84 By 8 September, the Germans had stormed the Meuse heights and thrown the French line back from Revigny, Laheycourt, and Laimont. Joffre, concerned that the enemy would now break through the Revigny Gap, late on the night of 8 September ordered a chastened Sarrail to withdraw his right wing and break off contact with la region fortifee de Verdun. la region fortifee de Verdun.85 Sarrail churlishly refused. He would later claim that he had heroically refused the "order to abandon Verdun" and a.s.sume the t.i.tle of "Savior of Verdun." In fact, Verdun with its mighty ring of forts, 350 heavy and 442 light guns, and 65,774 soldiers had little to fear from the German crown prince. Sarrail churlishly refused. He would later claim that he had heroically refused the "order to abandon Verdun" and a.s.sume the t.i.tle of "Savior of Verdun." In fact, Verdun with its mighty ring of forts, 350 heavy and 442 light guns, and 65,774 soldiers had little to fear from the German crown prince.86 With his stubborn refusal to obey Joffre's order, Sarrail had momentarily imperiled the entire French attack by failing to maintain contact with the right wing of Langle de Cary's Fourth Army. With his stubborn refusal to obey Joffre's order, Sarrail had momentarily imperiled the entire French attack by failing to maintain contact with the right wing of Langle de Cary's Fourth Army.87 Crown Prince Wilhelm on 10 September made a final bid for breakthrough. His Fifth Army had taken a frightful battering from the soixante-quinzes- soixante-quinzes-5,263 dead and missing and 9,556 wounded in the last ten days.88 General Frederic-Georges Herr, in charge of VI Corps' artillery brigade, expertly directed French fire from aircraft and balloons. General Frederic-Georges Herr, in charge of VI Corps' artillery brigade, expertly directed French fire from aircraft and balloons.89 In a single day, the 75s of Martial Verraux's VI Corps destroyed eleven batteries (sixty-six guns) of Bruno von Mudra's XVI Corps. To silence the "black butchers," Wilhelm, like Hausen two days before, decided on a nighttime bayonet attack by VI, XIII, and XVI army corps. Using his telephone line from Varennes to Luxembourg, he obtained Moltke's sanction. In a single day, the 75s of Martial Verraux's VI Corps destroyed eleven batteries (sixty-six guns) of Bruno von Mudra's XVI Corps. To silence the "black butchers," Wilhelm, like Hausen two days before, decided on a nighttime bayonet attack by VI, XIII, and XVI army corps. Using his telephone line from Varennes to Luxembourg, he obtained Moltke's sanction.90 But as Bavarian casualties before Nancy mounted dramatically, the chief of the General Staff rescinded his approval. Wilhelm and his chief of staff, Konstantin Schmidt von k.n.o.belsdorf, took the matter to Chief of Operations Tappen and again threatened to seek an imperial ruling. But as Bavarian casualties before Nancy mounted dramatically, the chief of the General Staff rescinded his approval. Wilhelm and his chief of staff, Konstantin Schmidt von k.n.o.belsdorf, took the matter to Chief of Operations Tappen and again threatened to seek an imperial ruling.

Moltke relented. At 2 AM AM on a cold and rainy 10 September, almost one hundred thousand on a cold and rainy 10 September, almost one hundred thousand Landser Landser, with rifles unloaded and bayonets fixed, stormed French positions around Vaux-Marie, north of Sainte-Menehould.91 The charge, like that of George Pickett at Gettysburg in July 1863, was shattered by enemy artillery. Well into daybreak, the 75s of Micheler's V Corps and Verraux's VI Corps poured their deadly fire into the packed gray ranks of German infantry. At 7:45 The charge, like that of George Pickett at Gettysburg in July 1863, was shattered by enemy artillery. Well into daybreak, the 75s of Micheler's V Corps and Verraux's VI Corps poured their deadly fire into the packed gray ranks of German infantry. At 7:45 AM AM, the French counterattacked a demoralized and decimated enemy. Some German units panicked; others ran about in the darkness leaderless and in utter confusion; few dared return the enemy's fire for fear of shooting their own men.92 A large proportion of Fifth Army's fifteen thousand casualties over the first ten days of September occurred that night. At the company and battalion levels, officer losses were as high as 40 percent. A large proportion of Fifth Army's fifteen thousand casualties over the first ten days of September occurred that night. At the company and battalion levels, officer losses were as high as 40 percent.

The war diary of Max von Fabeck's Wurttemberg XIII Corps reveals the full terror of that dreadful night.93 Hinko von Luttwitz's 12th RID "failed completely to reach its a.s.signed line," in the process blocking the advance of 38th Reserve Infantry Regiment (RIR). In the confusion, the two units fired on each other almost at point-blank range. The aforementioned French counterattack "totally demolished" 38th RIR. Elsewhere, Bernhard von Pfeil und Klein-Ellguth's 27th ID also failed to reach its a.s.signed target line. Mudra's XVI Corps blindly shot at German units advancing on its flanks. By morning, Fabeck's units were in total disarray, hopelessly intertwined with those of XVI Corps and 52d Infantry Brigade. Most were down to one-third of full strength. "Nowhere," the war diary of XIII Corps concluded, had the original goal of silencing the French batteries "been achieved." Hinko von Luttwitz's 12th RID "failed completely to reach its a.s.signed line," in the process blocking the advance of 38th Reserve Infantry Regiment (RIR). In the confusion, the two units fired on each other almost at point-blank range. The aforementioned French counterattack "totally demolished" 38th RIR. Elsewhere, Bernhard von Pfeil und Klein-Ellguth's 27th ID also failed to reach its a.s.signed target line. Mudra's XVI Corps blindly shot at German units advancing on its flanks. By morning, Fabeck's units were in total disarray, hopelessly intertwined with those of XVI Corps and 52d Infantry Brigade. Most were down to one-third of full strength. "Nowhere," the war diary of XIII Corps concluded, had the original goal of silencing the French batteries "been achieved."

Near the end of that savage butchery, at around 9 AM AM, Lieutenant Colonel Hentsch arrived at Varennes on the return leg of his tour of the front. Arguing that Second Army had been reduced to "cinders," that the enemy had driven a wedge between German First and Second armies, and that a full withdrawal was under way, he ordered Fifth Army to fall back to the line Sainte-MenehouldClermont. Crown Prince Wilhelm and Schmidt von Kobelsdorff vehemently refused to obey the order and demanded such written instruction from Wilhelm II or Moltke.94 On the French side, Sarrail tersely a.s.sured Joffre at the end of the day, "Situation satisfactory." On the French side, Sarrail tersely a.s.sured Joffre at the end of the day, "Situation satisfactory."95 At 2 At 2 PM PM on 11 September, Joffre was sufficiently confident of victory to inform War Minister Alexandre Millerand, on 11 September, Joffre was sufficiently confident of victory to inform War Minister Alexandre Millerand, "La bataille de la Marne s'acheve en victoire incontestable." "La bataille de la Marne s'acheve en victoire incontestable."96 The clarity of the statement requires no translation. The clarity of the statement requires no translation.

AT 4 4 AM AM ( (GMT) on a cold and damp 11 September, Moltke left Luxembourg with Colonels Tappen and von Dommes to visit his field armies. Heavy northerly winds prohibited travel by air, and even the horses had trouble finding their footing in the "bottomless" mud. At Varennes, Moltke and Crown Prince Wilhelm conducted what eyewitnesses termed "an agitated and embarra.s.sing" interview. The crown prince was in no mood for the chief of staff's pessimistic a.s.sessment of the situation. He cheerily informed the gloomy Moltke that the on a cold and damp 11 September, Moltke left Luxembourg with Colonels Tappen and von Dommes to visit his field armies. Heavy northerly winds prohibited travel by air, and even the horses had trouble finding their footing in the "bottomless" mud. At Varennes, Moltke and Crown Prince Wilhelm conducted what eyewitnesses termed "an agitated and embarra.s.sing" interview. The crown prince was in no mood for the chief of staff's pessimistic a.s.sessment of the situation. He cheerily informed the gloomy Moltke that the attaque brutal attaque brutal with the bayonet on the morning of 10 September had been a "great success" and that Fifth Army was ready to "exploit" this triumph. with the bayonet on the morning of 10 September had been a "great success" and that Fifth Army was ready to "exploit" this triumph.97 The trio motored on to Suippes and at 11 AM AM briefly conferred with Hausen. The mood at Suippes was "depressing." Hausen's 32d ID had recently been shattered by Foch's violent counterattacks, and his 24th RID had been battered by Ninth Army's advance guards the night before near Connantray-Vaurefroy. If the word briefly conferred with Hausen. The mood at Suippes was "depressing." Hausen's 32d ID had recently been shattered by Foch's violent counterattacks, and his 24th RID had been battered by Ninth Army's advance guards the night before near Connantray-Vaurefroy. If the word cinders (Schlacke) cinders (Schlacke) applied to anyone, it was to Third Army, which had lost 14,987 men in the first ten days of September. applied to anyone, it was to Third Army, which had lost 14,987 men in the first ten days of September.98 There was nothing to fall back on, as Dresden had already sent out all available reserves-111 officers, 351 noncommissioned officers, 4,050 ranks, and 330 horses. There was nothing to fall back on, as Dresden had already sent out all available reserves-111 officers, 351 noncommissioned officers, 4,050 ranks, and 330 horses.99 Incredibly, Hausen stated that Third Army, stretched across a forty-kilometer front, could hold its position until the new offensive with Seventh Army commenced. Moltke, although convinced that the French were about to mount a major a.s.sault to "pierce the right and center of Third Army" and afraid that Hausen's forces "were no longer combat effective," concurred. Incredibly, Hausen stated that Third Army, stretched across a forty-kilometer front, could hold its position until the new offensive with Seventh Army commenced. Moltke, although convinced that the French were about to mount a major a.s.sault to "pierce the right and center of Third Army" and afraid that Hausen's forces "were no longer combat effective," concurred.100 Sometime before 1 PM PM, Moltke arrived at Fourth Army headquarters at Courtisols. The mood there was "confident." Duke Albrecht a.s.sured Moltke that although he had lost 9,433 men in the last ten days, he could spare forces to sh.o.r.e up Hausen's battered Third Army. His chief of staff, General Walther von Luwitz, lectured Moltke that a major withdrawal would have a decimating "moral effect" on the troops.101 Then the proverbial bolt from the blue: Just as Tappen was drafting orders for Fifth, Fourth, and Third armies to maintain their positions, his staff overheard a relayed radio message from Bulow at Second Army headquarters to the OHL. "Enemy appears to want to direct his main offensive against the right flank and center of Third Army" in an obvious attempt to break through at Vitry-le-Francois. Then the proverbial bolt from the blue: Just as Tappen was drafting orders for Fifth, Fourth, and Third armies to maintain their positions, his staff overheard a relayed radio message from Bulow at Second Army headquarters to the OHL. "Enemy appears to want to direct his main offensive against the right flank and center of Third Army" in an obvious attempt to break through at Vitry-le-Francois.102 A "deeply shaken" Moltke saw no reason to doubt Bulow. The only countermeasure was to withdraw the entire German center to the line SuippesSainte-Menehould until the new offensive (with Seventh Army) could be launched on the right wing. Moltke and Tappen, appreciating that Second Army had sustained 10,607 casualties between 1 and 10 September, agreed. It was only fitting that Bulow, who had set the retreat in motion on 8 September, likewise initiated the final decision to undertake a general retreat all along the front. A "deeply shaken" Moltke saw no reason to doubt Bulow. The only countermeasure was to withdraw the entire German center to the line SuippesSainte-Menehould until the new offensive (with Seventh Army) could be launched on the right wing. Moltke and Tappen, appreciating that Second Army had sustained 10,607 casualties between 1 and 10 September, agreed. It was only fitting that Bulow, who had set the retreat in motion on 8 September, likewise initiated the final decision to undertake a general retreat all along the front.

Moltke was fearful that not only his right wing but now also his center stood on the point of collapse. He rushed back to Suippes. Hausen was incapacitated due to illness, now correctly diagnosed as typhus. Hoeppner, his chief of staff, was at the front. Thus, a Major Ha.s.se on Third Army's staff confirmed Bulow's dire prognosis: Foch's Ninth Army was threatening the entire front of Third Army. No sooner had Ha.s.se completed his briefing than Third Army's radio operators intercepted a call from Duke Albrecht's Fourth Army to the OHL: "Strong enemy forces marching against Vitry-le-Francois and Maisons-en-Champagne."103 There was not a moment to lose. At 1:30 There was not a moment to lose. At 1:30 PM PM, Moltke made what he later called "the hardest decision of my life, [one] which made my heart bleed,"104 the general order to retreat in echelon. He instructed Second Army to fall back to Thuizy (southeast of Reims), Third Army to the line Thuizy-Suippes, Fourth Army to SuippesSainte-Menehould, and Fifth Army to east of Sainte-Menehould. This would essentially become the stationary trench line of the Western Front. the general order to retreat in echelon. He instructed Second Army to fall back to Thuizy (southeast of Reims), Third Army to the line Thuizy-Suippes, Fourth Army to SuippesSainte-Menehould, and Fifth Army to east of Sainte-Menehould. This would essentially become the stationary trench line of the Western Front.

Moltke dispatched Dommes to bring the unwelcome news to Fourth and Fifth armies, where Dommes in horror discovered that their army corps were down to but ten thousand infantrymen each. Moltke, for his part, motored on to Bulow's headquarters. Lieutenant Colonel Matthes, who basically had taken over operational decisions from the "sick, almost pathetic" Lauenstein, never forgot the chief of staff's shaken state. "Constant nervous facial twitching betrayed his extremely strained condition to all those present."105 Moltke declined to motor on to First Army. Perhaps finally acknowledging the lack of leadership on the German right wing, he placed Heeringen's new Seventh Army at Saint-Quentin under his most senior army commander-Karl von Bulow. Moltke declined to motor on to First Army. Perhaps finally acknowledging the lack of leadership on the German right wing, he placed Heeringen's new Seventh Army at Saint-Quentin under his most senior army commander-Karl von Bulow.106 Moltke returned to his headquarters in the Hotel de Cologne at Luxembourg in a driving downpour around 2 AM AM on 12 September. His first order was to relieve the severely ill Max von Hausen of command of Third Army. He next briefed Wilhelm II on his tour of the front. According to Hans von Plessen, chief of Imperial Headquarters, the kaiser became enraged, "slammed his fist on the table and forbade any further retreat." on 12 September. His first order was to relieve the severely ill Max von Hausen of command of Third Army. He next briefed Wilhelm II on his tour of the front. According to Hans von Plessen, chief of Imperial Headquarters, the kaiser became enraged, "slammed his fist on the table and forbade any further retreat."107 Moltke then went to bed, where he was comforted by several of his staff officers-and by his wife, Eliza. Moltke then went to bed, where he was comforted by several of his staff officers-and by his wife, Eliza.

In a belated bid to reverse what they considered to be the rapidly escalating disaster occasioned by Moltke's order to retreat, Deputy Chief of Staff von Stein and Chief of Operations Tappen set off early in the morning of 13 September on a tour of army headquarters. At Montmedy, they came across Dommes, returning from Fourth and Fifth armies. The trio quickly agreed on a last-ditch effort to save the German campaign in the west: They would plug the still-twenty-kilometer-wide gap between First and Second armies by withdrawing one army corps each from Third, Fourth, and Fifth armies. They informed Wilhelm II of their plans by telegraph at 8 PM PM. There is no record of the kaiser's response.

General von Einem, until then commander of VII Corps and now head of Saxon Third Army, offered up XII Corps and Duke Albrecht's XVIII Corps from Fourth Army. Chief of Staff Schmidt von k.n.o.belsdorf of Fifth Army grudgingly agreed to release VI Corps-which was, in fact, fighting with Albrecht's Fourth Army. Even then, he did so only on condition that it first be given a day of rest and not be subjected to "long marches." Bulow, when informed of the plan, believed it might effect at least a "much desired moral success."108 Whether the three corps' exhausted men and horses could even have made the 100-to-150-kilometer march must remain an open question, as must their possible deployment once there, for the fronts were rapidly moving during the German retreat from the Marne. Whatever the case, by the time Stein, Tappen, and Dommes returned to Luxembourg "frozen through and through" at 5:15 Whether the three corps' exhausted men and horses could even have made the 100-to-150-kilometer march must remain an open question, as must their possible deployment once there, for the fronts were rapidly moving during the German retreat from the Marne. Whatever the case, by the time Stein, Tappen, and Dommes returned to Luxembourg "frozen through and through" at 5:15 AM AM on 15 September, events there had overtaken their plan. on 15 September, events there had overtaken their plan.

For on 14 September, Chief of the Military Cabinet von Lyncker had informed Wilhelm II that "Moltke's nerves are at an end and [he] is no longer able to conduct operations."109 The kaiser had agreed and in what has been depicted as "a terrible scene" had ordered Moltke to step down on grounds of "ill health." The kaiser had agreed and in what has been depicted as "a terrible scene" had ordered Moltke to step down on grounds of "ill health."110 Deputy Chief of Staff von Stein, in Moltke's words, was also "sacrificed." Deputy Chief of Staff von Stein, in Moltke's words, was also "sacrificed."111 The decision took Moltke completely by surprise. "I refuse to do this! I The decision took Moltke completely by surprise. "I refuse to do this! I AM AM not sick. If H[is] M[ajesty] is unhappy with the conduct of operations, then I will go!" not sick. If H[is] M[ajesty] is unhappy with the conduct of operations, then I will go!"112 But in the end he accepted what he twice called his "martyrdom" to spare both his Supreme War Lord and the nation embarra.s.sment. But in the end he accepted what he twice called his "martyrdom" to spare both his Supreme War Lord and the nation embarra.s.sment.113 Prussian war minister von Falkenhayn was to succeed Moltke, but the change in command would not be made public until 20 January 1915 to conceal the defeat at the Marne. Indeed, when Falkenhayn on 28 September requested that the Foreign Office publish a General Staff report on the debacle at the Marne, Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg forbade such disclosure. Prussian war minister von Falkenhayn was to succeed Moltke, but the change in command would not be made public until 20 January 1915 to conceal the defeat at the Marne. Indeed, when Falkenhayn on 28 September requested that the Foreign Office publish a General Staff report on the debacle at the Marne, Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg forbade such disclosure.114 On 11 September, Einem, en route to taking over Third Army, by chance had come across Moltke at Reims. "I met a totally broken and disconcerted man." Incredibly, Moltke began the conversation by asking Einem, "My G.o.d, how could this possibly have happened?" Einem lost his composure. "You yourself ought to know the answer to that best of all! How could you ever have remained at Luxembourg and allowed the reins of leadership totally to slip from your hands?" Moltke was taken aback. "But, dear Einem, I could not possibly have dragged the Kaiser through half of France during our advance!" Einem's "harsh" reply was meant to cut to the quick. "Why not? The Kaiser most likely would not have had anything against it. And if your Great Uncle could square it with his sense of responsibility to take his King right onto the battlefields of Koniggratz [1866] and Sedan [1870], you and the Kaiser could at least have come sufficiently close to the front to keep the reins in your hands."115 For Moltke, the war thus ended as it had begun-with a brutal, negative comparison to his uncle, the Elder Moltke. For Moltke, the war thus ended as it had begun-with a brutal, negative comparison to his uncle, the Elder Moltke.

To the German soldiers at the sharp end of the stick, the order to retreat seemed grotesque. They did not feel like a beaten army. Georg Wichura, whose 5th ID for days had valiantly held up the advance of the BEF and the French cavalry corps between Monbertoin and Montreuil-aux-Lions, was "decimated" by the order. The "mood swing" among his men was "terrible, everywhere confused looks." "A thousand serious thoughts went through their heads," the division's diary noted. "Legs like lead. Silent and exhausted, as if in a trance, the column plods on ahead."116 Similar reactions were noted at Third Army. The order to retreat arrived like a "bolt of thunder" at 133d RIR. Its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Schmidt, recalled, "I saw many men cry, the tears rolled down their cheeks; others simply expressed amazement." Lieutenant Colonel Wilke of 178th IR noted "understandable shrugging of shoulders, sad shaking of heads. ... Finally, it all turned into a dumbfounded silence filled with ominous antic.i.p.ation." Similar reactions were noted at Third Army. The order to retreat arrived like a "bolt of thunder" at 133d RIR. Its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Schmidt, recalled, "I saw many men cry, the tears rolled down their cheeks; others simply expressed amazement." Lieutenant Colonel Wilke of 178th IR noted "understandable shrugging of shoulders, sad shaking of heads. ... Finally, it all turned into a dumbfounded silence filled with ominous antic.i.p.ation."117 The general feeling among the Saxon troops was that "it was not our fault, we stood our ground." The general feeling among the Saxon troops was that "it was not our fault, we stood our ground."118 At Second Army, Oskar von Hutier, commanding 1st Guard Division, refused to obey the order to retreat.

I ordered my mount in order to rush up to the front. I already had my left foot in the stirrup when the Division's Deputy Adjutant ... leaped from his horse and came over to me with a deadly pale look. When I asked him what was wrong, he whispered in my ear: "We must all retreat immediately."

Hutier's reply: "Have they all gone crazy?"119 Paul Fleck, commanding 14th ID, VII Corps, likewise was dumbfounded. "This could not be. ... Victory was ours." He obeyed the order only after having it confirmed by Second Army's chief of staff, von Lauenstein. Paul Fleck, commanding 14th ID, VII Corps, likewise was dumbfounded. "This could not be. ... Victory was ours." He obeyed the order only after having it confirmed by Second Army's chief of staff, von Lauenstein.120 Colonel Bernhard Finck von Finckenstein, commanding the prestigious 1st Kaiser Alexander Guard-Grenadier-Regiment, remonstrated that the enemy was "in wild flight" from the front. The order to retreat "hit us like the blow of a club. Our brave troops had to give up the b.l.o.o.d.y victory only so recently achieved and to surrender the battlefield to the enemy. That aroused bitter feelings." Colonel Bernhard Finck von Finckenstein, commanding the prestigious 1st Kaiser Alexander Guard-Grenadier-Regiment, remonstrated that the enemy was "in wild flight" from the front. The order to retreat "hit us like the blow of a club. Our brave troops had to give up the b.l.o.o.d.y victory only so recently achieved and to surrender the battlefield to the enemy. That aroused bitter feelings."121 Major von Rantzau of 2d Grenadier Regiment even toyed with insubordination: "Colonel, I respectfully report that we have lost confidence in our leadership [OHL]." Major von Rantzau of 2d Grenadier Regiment even toyed with insubordination: "Colonel, I respectfully report that we have lost confidence in our leadership [OHL]."122 Captain Walter Bloem of 12th Brandenburg Grenadiers with Kluck's First Army dismissed the French "Victory of the Marne" as an "utter fraud." He and the men of B Company took solace in draining ninety bottles of claret in four hours. Captain Walter Bloem of 12th Brandenburg Grenadiers with Kluck's First Army dismissed the French "Victory of the Marne" as an "utter fraud." He and the men of B Company took solace in draining ninety bottles of claret in four hours.123 Only the hope in a new offensive brought some relief. Only the hope in a new offensive brought some relief.

The first order of business for the German armies after their retreat from the Marne was to resupply the troops and salvage whatever war materials had been damaged or abandoned. By 10 September, the Prussian War Ministry issued formal orders for full-scale scavenging to begin.124 Cavalrymen were to be buried only in their "underwear and pants," with boots, tunics, and equipment gathered for reuse. Dead and wounded infantrymen were to be stripped of all ammunition and weapons "already in the front lines." Casings from artillery sh.e.l.ls, broken machine guns, shattered artillery pieces, caissons, and harnesses were to be gathered up. All parts from downed aircraft and Zeppelins likewise were to be retrieved. "War Socialism" was in full flower at the front. Cavalrymen were to be buried only in their "underwear and pants," with boots, tunics, and equipment gathered for reuse. Dead and wounded infantrymen were to be stripped of all ammunition and weapons "already in the front lines." Casings from artillery sh.e.l.ls, broken machine guns, shattered artillery pieces, caissons, and harnesses were to be gathered up. All parts from downed aircraft and Zeppelins likewise were to be retrieved. "War Socialism" was in full flower at the front.

FOR JOFFRE, the order of the Day was straightforward and urgent-"to pursue energetically and leave the enemy no respite: victory depends on the legs of our infantry."125 Abandoning his plan to envelop the German right wing, Joffre now ordered French Third to Sixth and Ninth armies and the BEF to pursue the retreating Germans in echelon on a northeasterly course. Abandoning his plan to envelop the German right wing, Joffre now ordered French Third to Sixth and Ninth armies and the BEF to pursue the retreating Germans in echelon on a northeasterly course.126 Specifically, Sixth Army was to advance on Soissons, the BEF on Fismes, Fifth Army on Reims, and Ninth Army on Sommesous and Chalons. As well, he called Joseph de Castelli's VIII Corps up from Charmes and Bayon in Lorraine to press the attack. For four days, Joffre's armies fought a b.l.o.o.d.y battle of pursuit against dogged German rear guards over fields littered with the stinking remains of men and beasts, broken war equipment, burning villages, and streams of refugees. But the legs of the French infantry were as tired as those of the German, and slowly the enemy slipped out of Joffre's grasp. Specifically, Sixth Army was to advance on Soissons, the BEF on Fismes, Fifth Army on Reims, and Ninth Army on Sommesous and Chalons. As well, he called Joseph de Castelli's VIII Corps up from Charmes and Bayon in Lorraine to press the attack. For four days, Joffre's armies fought a b.l.o.o.d.y battle of pursuit against dogged German rear guards over fields littered with the stinking remains of men and beasts, broken war equipment, burning villages, and streams of refugees. But the legs of the French infantry were as tired as those of the German, and slowly the enemy slipped out of Joffre's grasp.

The Battle of the Marne ended in anticlimax. On 11 September, torrents of rain and a sudden cold snap further dogged the already exhausted troops. Heavy clouds and dense mist grounded Joffre's aircraft. Deep mud slowed the horse-drawn artillery. In the confusion, Douglas Haig's gunners mistakenly sh.e.l.led their own infantry. All along the line, the Allied armies advanced barely fifteen kilometers a day against a retreating enemy. By 1314 September, the erstwhile German pivot wing, reinforced by the new Seventh Army from Saint-Quentin, had dug in on the commanding heights along the northern bank of the Aisne River. On 13 September, Maunoury informed Joffre that Sixth Army, "which has not had a day of rest in about fifteen days, very much needs 24 hours rest."127 Franchet d'Esperey the next day refused to obey Joffre's order to mount a major offensive northward toward Berry-au-Bac, Gernicourt, and Neufchatel. "It is not rear guards that are in front of us," he testily lectured the generalissimo, "but an organized [defensive] position." Franchet d'Esperey the next day refused to obey Joffre's order to mount a major offensive northward toward Berry-au-Bac, Gernicourt, and Neufchatel. "It is not rear guards that are in front of us," he testily lectured the generalissimo, "but an organized [defensive] position."128 Even the feisty Foch informed GQG the next day that Ninth Army was meeting "great resistance" along its "entire front." Even the feisty Foch informed GQG the next day that Ninth Army was meeting "great resistance" along its "entire front."129 And at the lowest stratum of command, Sub-Lieutenant J. Caillou of 147th IR matter-of-factly noted that while his unit had received 2,300 reinforcements since August, by the time it reached the Aisne it had suffered 2,800 casualties "out of a complement of 3,000." And at the lowest stratum of command, Sub-Lieutenant J. Caillou of 147th IR matter-of-factly noted that while his unit had received 2,300 reinforcements since August, by the time it reached the Aisne it had suffered 2,800 casualties "out of a complement of 3,000."130 The Valley of the Aisne const.i.tutes a deep depression with the river running east to west and in many places too deep to ford. Its slopes consist of rough woods and thickets. A ridge, 150 meters above the river and traversed by a forty-kilometer road, the Chemin des Dames, built by Louis XV for his daughters, provided German artillery with superb observation posts. For four soggy and b.l.o.o.d.y days, Franchet d'Esperey's Fifth Army, Maunoury's Sixth Army, and Sir John French's BEF a.s.saulted the German defensive line, moving over battle-scarred terrain littered with abandoned wounded, munitions, supplies, stragglers, and thousands of drained wine bottles-to no avail. By 18 September, a "surprised" Joffre scaled back the Battle of the Aisne as it became clear that frontal a.s.saults on well-dug-in German artillery, machine-gun, and infantry positions ("very serious fortifications") had dashed all "hope for a decision in open terrain."131 In the center of the French line, neither Third Army nor Fourth Army made any appreciable progress. Once more, Joffre took out his frustration on Sarrail. "I do not understand how the enemy was able to get away 48 hours ago without your being informed of it," he acidly lectured the general by telephone. "Kindly inst.i.tute an inquiry immediately on this matter and let me know the results at once."132 Sarrail evaded a formal inquiry by having his staff telephone GQG with a routine progress report. Sarrail evaded a formal inquiry by having his staff telephone GQG with a routine progress report.133 Foch, freshly invigorated, drove Ninth Army in pursuit north-northeast with the aim of "destroying" the German army. Foch, freshly invigorated, drove Ninth Army in pursuit north-northeast with the aim of "destroying" the German army.134 Pounding rain rendered the chalky roads of the Champagne virtually impa.s.sable. At Fere-Champenoise, Foch's soldiers found ransacked wine cellars and the streets strewn with empty wine bottles. At 8 Pounding rain rendered the chalky roads of the Champagne virtually impa.s.sable. At Fere-Champenoise, Foch's soldiers found ransacked wine cellars and the streets strewn with empty wine bottles. At 8 PM PM on 11 September, Justinien Lefevre's 18th ID entered Chalons-sur-Marne; at 7:45 on 11 September, Justinien Lefevre's 18th ID entered Chalons-sur-Marne; at 7:45 AM AM the next day it began to cross the Marne. the next day it began to cross the Marne.135 The Germans' retreat had been so hasty that they had not had time to activate the demolition charges attached to the bridges. That night Foch dined at the Hotel Haute-Mere-Dieu, where the night before the chefs had prepared a "sumptuous meal" for Saxon crown prince Friedrich August Georg and his staff. The Germans' retreat had been so hasty that they had not had time to activate the demolition charges attached to the bridges. That night Foch dined at the Hotel Haute-Mere-Dieu, where the night before the chefs had prepared a "sumptuous meal" for Saxon crown prince Friedrich August Georg and his staff.136 In truth, men, horses, and supplies had been exhausted. On 20 September, Franchet d'Esperey dejectedly instructed his corps commanders simply to "stand and hold."137 The next day Joffre in a "lapidary manner" instructed Foch by telephone, "Postpone the attack. Inform [commanders] to economize ammunition." The next day Joffre in a "lapidary manner" instructed Foch by telephone, "Postpone the attack. Inform [commanders] to economize ammunition."138 What the French official history of the war calls a "threatening ammunition crisis" had developed for the artillery. What the French official history of the war calls a "threatening ammunition crisis" had developed for the artillery. Les 75s Les 75s had started the war with 1,244 sh.e.l.ls per gun, but those stocks had been fired off and the daily production of at best 20,000 sh.e.l.ls did not begin to meet the requirements for the three thousand had started the war with 1,244 sh.e.l.ls per gun, but those stocks had been fired off and the daily production of at best 20,000 sh.e.l.ls did not begin to meet the requirements for the three thousand soixante-quinzes soixante-quinzes in service. in service.139 An obvious "sh.e.l.l crisis" was at hand well before the end of September 1914. To the great relief of British and French commanders, the Germans were equally fatigued. The III Corps of Kluck's First Army, to give but one example, between 17 August and 12 September had marched 653 kilometers with full combat packs, had fought the enemy for nine full days, and had had zero days of rest. An obvious "sh.e.l.l crisis" was at hand well before the end of September 1914. To the great relief of British and French commanders, the Germans were equally fatigued. The III Corps of Kluck's First Army, to give but one example, between 17 August and 12 September had marched 653 kilometers with full combat packs, had fought the enemy for nine full days, and had had zero days of rest.140 In a final bid for victory, Joffre used his superb railroad system to shift forces (IV, VIII, XIV, and XX corps) from his right to his left. In a feat of logistical brilliance, the Directorate of Railways moved the corps in about four to six days on roughly 105 to 118 trains each.141 Yet again, the sought-after final victory eluded Joffre. He blamed it on "the slowness and the lack of skilled maneuvering displayed by the two flank armies and Fifth Army." Yet again, the sought-after final victory eluded Joffre. He blamed it on "the slowness and the lack of skilled maneuvering displayed by the two flank armies and Fifth Army."142 His staff calculated that the French army in September had suffered 18,073 men killed, 111,963 wounded, and 83,409 missing. His staff calculated that the French army in September had suffered 18,073 men killed, 111,963 wounded, and 83,409 missing.143 Several belated attempts by each side between 17 September and 17 October to turn the flank of the other-the so-called race to the sea-ended in deadly deadlock. Several belated attempts by each side between 17 September and 17 October to turn the flank of the other-the so-called race to the sea-ended in deadly deadlock.* The great war of maneuver turned into siege-style warfare in the blood-soaked fields and trenches of Artois, Picardy, and Flanders. The great war of maneuver turned into siege-style warfare in the blood-soaked fields and trenches of Artois, Picardy, and Flanders.

* Moltke had been forced out of office the day before, and the rest of the senior staff was occupied with the withdrawal to the Aisne; none initialed Hentsch's report. Moltke had been forced out of office the day before, and the rest of the senior staff was occupied with the withdrawal to the Aisne; none initialed Hentsch's report. Interestingly, Dommes was the "patriotic censor" who in May 1919 on behalf of the army and the Foreign Office convinced Moltke's widow, Eliza, not to publish the general's memoirs, t.i.tled Interestingly, Dommes was the "patriotic censor" who in May 1919 on behalf of the army and the Foreign Office convinced Moltke's widow, Eliza, not to publish the general's memoirs, t.i.tled Responsibility for the War Responsibility for the War, as their contents could bring about a "national catastrophe" at a time when the Allies were hammering out peace terms in Paris. Dommes (and Tappen) denied that Hentsch in September had been given "full power of authority" by Moltke. Both Dommes and Tappen after the war denied that Hentsch and Moltke had met privately shortly before Hentsch departed on his tour of the front. And both Dommes and Tappen were highly active in selecting materials for the Reichsarchiv to use in writing the volume dealing with the Battle of the Marne.* Greenwich Mean Time. German accounts give German General Time (one hour later). Greenwich Mean Time. German accounts give German General Time (one hour later).* A junior staff officer had accidentally ordered this configuration of the baggage wagons. A junior staff officer had accidentally ordered this configuration of the baggage wagons.* Exophthalmic goiter, also known as Graves', Parry's, or Basedow's disease. Exophthalmic goiter, also known as Graves', Parry's, or Basedow's disease.* Grand Duke Nikolai Ivanov's Russian army took 130,000 prisoners and inflicted 300,000 casualties on Franz Conrad von Hotzendorf's forces between 26 August and 11 September 1914. Grand Duke Nikolai Ivanov's Russian army took 130,000 prisoners and inflicted 300,000 casualties on Franz Conrad von Hotzendorf's forces between 26 August and 11 September 1914.* In 181315, Field Marshal Gebhard von Blucher had fought with the Duke of Wellington against Napoleon I. In 181315, Field Marshal Gebhard von Blucher had fought with the Duke of Wellington against Napoleon I.* The French official history gives the dates 20 September15 October for The French official history gives the dates 20 September15 October for la course a la mer la course a la mer. AFGG, 4:127.

EPILOGUE.

Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.-CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE WAS A CLOSE-RUN THING. IT CONFIRMED yet again the Elder Helmuth von Moltke's famous counsel that no plan of operations "survives with certainty beyond the first encounter with the enemy's major forces." yet again the Elder Helmuth von Moltke's famous counsel that no plan of operations "survives with certainty beyond the first encounter with the enemy's major forces."1 And it reified yet again Carl von Clausewitz's dictum that "war is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty." And it reified yet again Carl von Clausewitz's dictum that "war is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty."2 Nothing about the Marne was preordained. Choice, chance, and contingency lurked at every corner. Nothing about the Marne was preordained. Choice, chance, and contingency lurked at every corner.

Senior commanders on both sides did not at first understand the magnitude of the decision at the Marne. It seemed simply a temporary blip on the way to victory. The armies would be rested, reinforced, re-supplied, and soon again be on their way either to Berlin or to Paris. Below headquarters and army as well as corps commands, a million men on either side likewise had no inkling of what "the Marne" meant-except more endless marches, more baffling confusion, and more b.l.o.o.d.y slaughter. Future historian Marc Bloch, a sergeant with French 272d Infantry Regiment, on 9 September recalled marching down a "tortuously winding road" near Larzicourt on the Marne at night, oblivious to the fact that the great German a.s.sault had been blunted. "With anger in my heart, feeling the weight of the rifle I had never fired, and hearing the faltering footsteps of our half-sleeping men echo on the ground," he drearily noted, "I could only consider myself one more among the inglorious vanquished who had never shed their blood in combat."3 THE FRONT STABILIZES AT THE AISNE RIVER.

The Battle of the Marne did not end the war. But if it was "tactically indecisive," in the words of historian Hew Strachan, "strategically and operationally" it was a "truly decisive battle in the Napoleonic sense."4 Germany had failed to achieve the victory promised in the Schlieffen-Moltke deployment plan; it now faced a two-front war of incalculable duration against overwhelming odds. A new school of German military historians Germany had failed to achieve the victory promised in the Schlieffen-Moltke deployment plan; it now faced a two-front war of incalculable duration against overwhelming odds. A new school of German military historians5 goes so far as to suggest that Germany had lost the Great War by September 1914. goes so far as to suggest that Germany had lost the Great War by September 1914.

Still, "what if?" scenarios abound. What if Germany had not violated Belgium's neutrality; would Britain still have entered the war? What if Helmuth von Moltke had not sought a double envelopment of the enemy in Alsace-Lorraine and and in northern France; could at least half of the 331,000 soldiers on the left wing have helped the right wing to victory? What if he had not sent III and IX army corps to the east; could one of those have filled the famous gap between Second and First armies on the Marne, and the other helped Third Army break French Ninth Army's fragile front at the Saint-Gond Marshes? What if the commanders of German First and Second armies had simply refused to follow Lieutenant Colonel Richard Hentsch's "recommendation" to retreat from the Marne; could German First and Second armies have held on the Ourcq and Marne rivers, with possibly war-ending results? in northern France; could at least half of the 331,000 soldiers on the left wing have helped the right wing to victory? What if he had not sent III and IX army corps to the east; could one of those have filled the famous gap between Second and First armies on the Marne, and the other helped Third Army break French Ninth Army's fragile front at the Saint-Gond Marshes? What if the commanders of German First and Second armies had simply refused to follow Lieutenant Colonel Richard Hentsch's "recommendation" to retreat from the Marne; could German First and Second armies have held on the Ourcq and Marne rivers, with possibly war-ending results?

What if Joseph Joffre had not been the French commander in chief? What if he had been cashiered in late August after he had been soundly defeated in the Battle of the Frontiers and after his deployment Plan XVII had totally collapsed? What historian Sewell Tyng called Joffre's "inscrutable, inarticulate calm," his "placid, unsophisticated character," and his "far-sighted, unsentimental, determined" leadership were among the major reasons why the French did not repeat their collapse of 187071.6 After the war, Marshal Ferdinand Foch paid due tribute. Immediately after the loss of the Battle of the Frontiers, Joffre had recognized that "the game had been poorly played." He had broken off the campaign with every intention of resuming it as soon as he had "repaired the weaknesses discovered." Once clear on "the enemy's ultimate intentions" by marching across Belgium, Joffre had shifted forces from his right wing to his left, had cashiered general officers whom he found to be "not up to standard," had orchestrated an orderly withdrawal behind the Marne and Seine rivers, had created Michel-Joseph Maunoury's new "army of maneuver" in the west, and had launched his great attack between "the horns of Paris and Verdun" when he deemed the moment favorable. "When this moment arrived, he judiciously combined the offensive with the defensive after ordering an energetic about-face," Foch opined. "By a magnificently planned stroke he dealt the invasion a mortal blow." After the war, Marshal Ferdinand Foch paid due tribute. Immediately after the loss of the Battle of the Frontiers, Joffre had recognized that "the game had been poorly played." He had broken off the campaign with every intention of resuming it as soon as he had "repaired the weaknesses discovered." Once clear on "the enemy's ultimate intentions" by marching across Belgium, Joffre had shifted forces from his right wing to his left, had cashiered general officers whom he found to be "not up to standard," had orchestrated an orderly withdrawal behind the Marne and Seine rivers, had created Michel-Joseph Maunoury's new "army of maneuver" in the west, and had launched his great attack between "the horns of Paris and Verdun" when he deemed the moment favorable. "When this moment arrived, he judiciously combined the offensive with the defensive after ordering an energetic about-face," Foch opined. "By a magnificently planned stroke he dealt the invasion a mortal blow."7 The contrast with the lethargic, doubting, distant, "physically and mentally broken" Younger Moltke need not be belabored. The contrast with the lethargic, doubting, distant, "physically and mentally broken" Younger Moltke need not be belabored.

What if French morale had cracked after the Battle of the Frontiers? Campaigns are not fought against lifeless bodies. The enemy reacts, innovates, surprises, and strikes back. Were it not for the "emotions" and the "pa.s.sions" of the troops, Carl von Clausewitz reminds us, wars would not escalate and might not even have to be fought. "Comparative figures" of opposing strengths would suffice to decide the issue without having to resort to "the physical impact of the fighting forces." Put differently, "a kind of war by algebra."8 But in 1914, the French But in 1914, the French poilu poilu surprised the Germans with what Moltke called his surprised the Germans with what Moltke called his elan elan. "Just when it is on the point of being extinguished," he wrote his wife at the height of the Battle of the Marne, it "flames up mightily."9 Karl von Wenninger, the Bavarian military plenipotentiary at Imperial Headquarters, likewise expressed his surprise at the enemy's tenacity. "Who would have expected of the French," he wrote his father on 9 September, "that after 10 days of luckless battles a[nd] bolting in open flight they would attack for 3 days so desperately." Karl von Wenninger, the Bavarian military plenipotentiary at Imperial Headquarters, likewise expressed his surprise at the enemy's tenacity. "Who would have expected of the French," he wrote his father on 9 September, "that after 10 days of luckless battles a[nd] bolting in open flight they would attack for 3 days so desperately."10 General Alexander von Kluck gave the adversary his full respect in 1918. "The reason that transcends all others" in explaining the German failure at the Marne, he informed a journalist, was "the extraordinary and peculiar apt.i.tude of the French soldier to recover quickly." Most soldiers "will let themselves be killed where they stand;" that, after all, was a "given" in all battle plans. General Alexander von Kluck gave the adversary his full respect in 1918. "The reason that transcends all others" in explaining the German failure at the Marne, he informed a journalist, was "the extraordinary and peculiar apt.i.tude of the French soldier to recover quickly." Most soldiers "will let themselves be killed where they stand;" that, after all, was a "given" in all battle plans.

But that men who have retreated for ten days ... that men who slept on the ground half dead with fatigue, should have the strength to take up their rifles and attack when the bugle sounds, that is a thing upon which we never counted; that is a possibility that we never spoke about in our war academies.11 Perhaps the greatest "what if?" scenario: What if Kluck's First Army had indeed turned the left flank of Maunoury's Sixth Army northeast of Paris? For most German military writers and the German official history of the war, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918 Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, this was a "certainty." Victory a.s.sured. End game. War over. But Moltke's chief of operations, Gerhard Tappen, stated after the war that he was not so sure. He, the Gabriel ever trumpeting victory throughout August and early September 1914, conceded that even Kluck's triumph at the Ourcq River would not have been "decisive" to the overall war effort. Given the dogged "tenacity" of the British and their "well known war aims," the war would have dragged on.12 Even if thereafter First Army had pivoted on its left and squared off with the three army corps of the BEF and Louis Conneau's cavalry corps, the end result likely would have been utter exhaustion for the armies on both sides. Stalemate. An honest appraisal from one not known for candor. And yet, did Kluck not owe it to both his troops and the nation to have fought the battle through to conclusion? Even if thereafter First Army had pivoted on its left and squared off with the three army corps of the BEF and Louis Conneau's cavalry corps, the end result likely would have been utter exhaustion for the armies on both sides. Stalemate. An honest appraisal from one not known for candor. And yet, did Kluck not owe it to both his troops and the nation to have fought the battle through to conclusion?

The campaign in the west in 1914 revealed two distinct command styles. Moltke was content to remain at Army Supreme Command headquarters far removed from the front-first in Koblenz and then in Luxembourg-and to give his field commanders great lat.i.tude in interpreting his General Directives. He chose not to exercise close control over them by way of telephones, automobiles, aircraft, or General Staff officers. After all, they had conducted the great annual prewar maneuvers and war games and as such could be counted on to execute his "thoughts." Already, in peacetime, Moltke had let it be known that it sufficed for "Commanding Generals" simply to be "informed about the intentions of the High Command," and that this could easily be accomplished "orally through the sending of an officer from the Headquarters."13 The reality of war proved otherwise. Some commanders failed the ultimate test, war, mainly because of a lack of competence (Max von Hausen); some partly because of advanced age (Karl von Bulow); and others partly because of ill health (Helmuth von Moltke, Otto von Lauenstein). The reality of war proved otherwise. Some commanders failed the ultimate test, war, mainly because of a lack of competence (Max von Hausen); some partly because of advanced age (Karl von Bulow); and others partly because of ill health (Helmuth von Moltke, Otto von Lauenstein).

General Moriz von Lyncker, chief of the Military Cabinet, struck at the heart of the matter on 13 September. "It is clear that during the advance into France the necessary tight leadership on the part of the Chief of the General Staff had been totally lacking."14 The next day he convinced Wilhelm II to place Moltke on "sick leave." But while more than thirty German generals were relieved of command of troops in 1914, there was no general "housecleaning" at the very top. Three army commanders were beyond reach, of course, because they were in line for future crowns: Wilhelm of Prussia led Fifth Army until August 1916, when he took command of Army Group Deutscher Kronprinz for the rest of the war; Rupprecht of Bavaria headed Sixth Army until August 1916, when he was given charge of Army Group Kronprinz Rupprecht until November 1918; and Albrecht of Wurttemberg stayed with Fourth Army until February 1917, when he a.s.sumed command of Army Group Herzog Albrecht for the duration. The next day he convinced Wilhelm II to place Moltke on "sick leave." But while more than thirty German generals were relieved of command of troops in 1914, there was no general "housecleaning" at the very top. Three army commanders were beyond reach, of course, because they were in line for future crowns: Wilhelm of Prussia led Fifth Army until August 1916, when he took command of Army Group Deutscher Kronprinz for the rest of the war; Rupprecht of Bavaria headed Sixth Army until August 1916, when he was given charge of Army Group Kronprinz Rupprecht until November 1918; and Albrecht of Wurttemberg stayed with Fourth Army until February 1917, when he a.s.sumed command of Army Group Herzog Albrecht for the duration.

Not even the two most controversial army commanders were sacked after the Battle of the Marne. Karl von Bulow, who had shown less than boldness first at the Sambre and then at the Marne, not only was promoted to the rank of field marshal in January 1915 and awarded the order Pour le Merite, but was rewarded for his mediocre performance by (again) being given command of First Army and then of Seventh Army as well. He led Second Army until April 1915, when he was temporarily relieved of command due to a stroke. He was forced to retire two months later; his pleas to be reinstated fell on deaf ears. Alexander von Kluck, who had disobeyed Moltke's orders and turned in southeast of Paris, commanded First Army until March 1915, when near Vailly-sur-Aisne he was severely injured in the leg by shrapnel. He turned seventy while recuperating and in October 1916 was retired. Max von Hausen was the only army commander relieved of duty, and that came about mainly due to a severe case of typhus. His desperate appeals to be reinstated also went unanswered.

After the Battle of the Marne, the German army of 1914 was gone forever. Its tidy division into federalist Baden, Bavarian, Prussian, Saxon, and Wurttemberg contingents ended, never to be revived. In the words of former Prussian war minister Karl von Einem, the new commander of Third Army, "The army totally loses its wartime separateness. Everything is moved about, divisions and brigades are thrown together. It is living from hand to mouth."15 In short, a true "German" army fought the Great War for the next four years. In short, a true "German" army fought the Great War for the next four years.

Joseph Joffre, on the other hand, played a highly active, indeed intense, role in French decision making. Apart from issuing a host of General Instructions, Special Instructions, and Special Orders, he showered his army commanders with hundreds of "personal and secret" memoranda, telephone calls, and individual orders. He used his driver and automobile to great advantage, constantly on the road to inspect, to order, to encourage, and, where necessary, to relieve. In fact, Joffre filled a park with so-called limoges. limoges.* These included, by his reckoning, two army, ten corps, and thirty-eight division commanders. These included, by his reckoning, two army, ten corps, and thirty-eight division commanders.16 Some (Charles Lanrezac) he fired because he considered them to be overly pessimistic or willing to challenge his orders; others (Pierre Ruffey) because he found them to be unnecessarily "nervous" and "imprudent" in their dealings with subordinates. He maintained in command a core of loyal and aggressive army commanders (Fernand de Langle de Cary, Yvon Dubail, edouard de Castelnau), and he promoted several corps commanders (Louis Franchet d'Esperey, Ferdinand Foch, Maurice Sarrail) who had "faith in their success" and who by "mastery of themselves" knew how to "impose their will on their subordinates and dominate events." Some (Charles Lanrezac) he fired because he considered them to be overly pessimistic or willing to challenge his orders; others (Pierre Ruffey) because he found them to be unnecessarily "nervous" and "imprudent" in their dealings with subordinates. He maintained in command a core of loyal and aggressive army commanders (Fernand de Langle de Cary, Yvon Dubail, edouard de Castelnau), and he promoted several corps commanders (Louis Franchet d'Esperey, Ferdinand Foch, Maurice Sarrail) who had "faith in their success" and who by "mastery of themselves" knew how to "impose their will on their subordinates and dominate events."17 He never regretted his sometimes unjustified firings. He declined after the war to engage the "victims" in a war of memoirs. He never regretted his sometimes unjustified firings. He declined after the war to engage the "victims" in a war of memoirs.

Ironically, given the Elder Moltke's strategic use of r