Within hours, the lack of command and control from Luxembourg became manifestly evident. At the very moment that Moltke and Tap-pen were drafting their General Directive calling on Third Army to drive on Troyes-Vendeuvre, Hausen at 5 PM PM on 4 September informed the OHL that he had ordered a day of rest for his forces. He repeated the message an hour later. "Troops desperately need a day of rest." He did not budge from his decision when the two flanking armies, Second and Fourth, informed him that they were resuming the offensive early the next morning. He stood firm even after he belatedly received Moltke's instruction to advance on Troyes-Vendeuvre at eight o'clock that night. Just before midnight, he informed the OHL for a third time in less than seven hours that Third Army would rest on 5 September. on 4 September informed the OHL that he had ordered a day of rest for his forces. He repeated the message an hour later. "Troops desperately need a day of rest." He did not budge from his decision when the two flanking armies, Second and Fourth, informed him that they were resuming the offensive early the next morning. He stood firm even after he belatedly received Moltke's instruction to advance on Troyes-Vendeuvre at eight o'clock that night. Just before midnight, he informed the OHL for a third time in less than seven hours that Third Army would rest on 5 September.36 Moltke raised no objections. Moltke raised no objections.

Hausen took pains, both at the time and in his memoirs, to justify his decision.37 The men had reached the limits of their "psychological elasticity" as well as their "physical capability." Between 18 and 23 August, they had marched 190 kilometers to the Meuse, and thereafter 140 kilometers to the Aisne-much of it under a broiling sun and the last thirteen days during constant combat. Ammunition, food, and uniforms desperately needed to be hauled up to the front. The horses were short on oats and needed to be reshod. Hausen chose not to inform Moltke that there was also a personal reason: He had come down with what was diagnosed as a severe case of "b.l.o.o.d.y dysentery." The men had reached the limits of their "psychological elasticity" as well as their "physical capability." Between 18 and 23 August, they had marched 190 kilometers to the Meuse, and thereafter 140 kilometers to the Aisne-much of it under a broiling sun and the last thirteen days during constant combat. Ammunition, food, and uniforms desperately needed to be hauled up to the front. The horses were short on oats and needed to be reshod. Hausen chose not to inform Moltke that there was also a personal reason: He had come down with what was diagnosed as a severe case of "b.l.o.o.d.y dysentery."

The German official history of the war later took Hausen to task.38 By his action, he had exposed the flanks of his two neighboring armies-most precipitously, his halt had created a thirty-kilometer gap between his Third Army and Bulow's Second Army-and he had disrupted the planned seamless German advance on 5 September. But it failed to mention that with his action, Hausen had lost a splendid opportunity to exploit a twenty-five-kilometer gap that had developed between Foch's Ninth Army and Langle de Cary's Fourth Army. Especially Foch's Army Detachment had taken a terrible pounding from Hausen's two corps over the last two days: There had been heavy losses among infantry officers, the men were in a state of "serious fatigue" after "exhausting marches" and "the severity of the fighting," and many of the reserve formations were in what Foch termed "an extremely pitiable state." The entire region of SommesousSompuisVitry-le-Francois was devoid of major French formations. From his headquarters at Sillery, Foch had informed Joffre that the Army Detachment, about to be reconst.i.tuted as Ninth Army, could at best survive two or three days of further attacks by German Third Army. It now gained twenty-four valuable hours in which to prepare its defensive line at the Saint-Gond Marshes and the heights south of Sezanne. By his action, he had exposed the flanks of his two neighboring armies-most precipitously, his halt had created a thirty-kilometer gap between his Third Army and Bulow's Second Army-and he had disrupted the planned seamless German advance on 5 September. But it failed to mention that with his action, Hausen had lost a splendid opportunity to exploit a twenty-five-kilometer gap that had developed between Foch's Ninth Army and Langle de Cary's Fourth Army. Especially Foch's Army Detachment had taken a terrible pounding from Hausen's two corps over the last two days: There had been heavy losses among infantry officers, the men were in a state of "serious fatigue" after "exhausting marches" and "the severity of the fighting," and many of the reserve formations were in what Foch termed "an extremely pitiable state." The entire region of SommesousSompuisVitry-le-Francois was devoid of major French formations. From his headquarters at Sillery, Foch had informed Joffre that the Army Detachment, about to be reconst.i.tuted as Ninth Army, could at best survive two or three days of further attacks by German Third Army. It now gained twenty-four valuable hours in which to prepare its defensive line at the Saint-Gond Marshes and the heights south of Sezanne.39 It is difficult to disagree with the critique of Hausen. Every other German army had marched relentlessly under a searing sun during the last month. Every other army had suffered heavy casualties. Every other army needed rest and resupply. Some had in fact marched much greater distances than Third Army: First Army 500 kilometers and Second Army 440. Some, such as Second Army, had fought numerous more brutal engagements. It is hard to escape the verdict that Hausen simply was not made of the right stuff. For a second time since his failure to strike the flank of French Fifth Army south of Dinant, he failed to press a golden opportunity to break through the French line.

Above all, Moltke's General Directive was a rude shock for First Army, which received the relayed radiogram at 6 AM AM on 5 September. It entailed a painful retreat from advanced positions seized after long marches and heavy fighting between the Marne and Oise. Without direct radio communications either to the OHL or to Bulow's Second Army on his left flank, Kluck had advanced almost in a vacuum. He was thus without insight into the overall situation of the campaign in the west and about to collide with the left wing of Bulow's Second Army around Montmirail. He sent out no cavalry or aerial reconnaissance to the west, where French Sixth Army had been stood up, and was intent only on pursuing the British and French columns fleeing southward before him. on 5 September. It entailed a painful retreat from advanced positions seized after long marches and heavy fighting between the Marne and Oise. Without direct radio communications either to the OHL or to Bulow's Second Army on his left flank, Kluck had advanced almost in a vacuum. He was thus without insight into the overall situation of the campaign in the west and about to collide with the left wing of Bulow's Second Army around Montmirail. He sent out no cavalry or aerial reconnaissance to the west, where French Sixth Army had been stood up, and was intent only on pursuing the British and French columns fleeing southward before him.

In the late afternoon, Kluck at Rebais had a visitor from Luxembourg: Lieutenant Colonel Richard Hentsch, chief of the OHL's Intelligence Section. It was Hentsch's first visit to the front, designed to establish better lines of communication among the field armies. Hentsch was not a bearer of good news. He informed Chief of Staff Hermann von Kuhl that Crown Prince Rupprecht's armies were tied down at Nancy and epinal, unable to break through the Charmes Gap and drive north, and that Crown Prince Wilhelm's Fifth Army and Duke Albrecht's Fourth Army had made little progress around Verdun. Most likely, Joffre had used this stagnation of the fronts on the left and in the center of the German line to shuttle troops to the area around Paris, on Kluck's right.40 First Army could expect an attack from the west any day. First Army could expect an attack from the west any day.

Kuhl at once realized that he was "confronted with an entirely new situation." Without the "breakthrough on the upper Moselle," the giant Cannae being planned for the French army could not take place. The enemy "was by no means being held [down] everywhere" by Moltke's other armies; in fact, "large displacements of troops were in progress." The danger on First Army's right flank had come out of nowhere. It was real. It had to be addressed at once. "The suggestion, which we had made that morning, of first throwing the French back across the Seine, was finished."41 Reluctantly, Kuhl agreed with Hentsch that First Army's four corps had to be withdrawn behind the Marne over the next two days "calmly and in orderly fashion" to a line MeauxLa Ferte-sous-JouarreLa Ferte-Gaucher. This would then enable Second Army to swing around on its left and face Paris, its right wing on the Marne and its left wing on the Seine. Reluctantly, Kuhl agreed with Hentsch that First Army's four corps had to be withdrawn behind the Marne over the next two days "calmly and in orderly fashion" to a line MeauxLa Ferte-sous-JouarreLa Ferte-Gaucher. This would then enable Second Army to swing around on its left and face Paris, its right wing on the Marne and its left wing on the Seine.

THE EVE OF THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE, 2 SEPTEMBER 1914.

Having reached full agreement with First Army, Hentsch the next day traveled to Second Army headquarters at Champaubert. He repeated his (and Moltke's) bleak a.s.sessment of the German campaign in the west, and bemoaned the lack of four army corps "with which we could win the campaign."42 One can only wonder whether he regretted the General Staff's earlier dispatch of Guard Reserve Corps and XI Army Corps to the Eastern Front, as well as of II Corps to besiege Antwerp, and of VII Reserve Corps to invest Maubeuge. It was now the thirty-fifth day of mobilization. Schlieffen had prescribed victory on the thirty-ninth or fortieth day. One can only wonder whether he regretted the General Staff's earlier dispatch of Guard Reserve Corps and XI Army Corps to the Eastern Front, as well as of II Corps to besiege Antwerp, and of VII Reserve Corps to invest Maubeuge. It was now the thirty-fifth day of mobilization. Schlieffen had prescribed victory on the thirty-ninth or fortieth day.

THE BRUTAL HEAT FINALLY broke on 5 September. The first engagement in what came to be called the Battle of the Marne took place forty kilometers northeast of Paris. The future battlefield was bordered to the north by Villers-Cotterets, the Bois du Roi, and Levignen; to the east by the Ourcq River, which meandered on a southwesterly course from La Ferte-Milon to Lizy-sur-Ourcq before flowing into the Marne between Congis and Varreddes; and to the south by the Ca.n.a.l de l'Ourcq and the Marne. The land bordered by these three obstacles consisted of a hilly plateau studded with numerous villages, orchards, and grain fields. It was cut by three small streams: from north to south, the Grivelle, Gergogne, and Therouanne. Each was embedded between gently rising wooded slopes of 80 to 120 meters; the chalky soil in places was dotted with bogs, broke on 5 September. The first engagement in what came to be called the Battle of the Marne took place forty kilometers northeast of Paris. The future battlefield was bordered to the north by Villers-Cotterets, the Bois du Roi, and Levignen; to the east by the Ourcq River, which meandered on a southwesterly course from La Ferte-Milon to Lizy-sur-Ourcq before flowing into the Marne between Congis and Varreddes; and to the south by the Ca.n.a.l de l'Ourcq and the Marne. The land bordered by these three obstacles consisted of a hilly plateau studded with numerous villages, orchards, and grain fields. It was cut by three small streams: from north to south, the Grivelle, Gergogne, and Therouanne. Each was embedded between gently rising wooded slopes of 80 to 120 meters; the chalky soil in places was dotted with bogs,43 difficult terrain to do battle. difficult terrain to do battle.

What Kuhl had called the "phantom Paris" became "flesh and blood" by 5 September. Early that warm and clear morning, General Maunoury, in accordance with Joffre's General Instruction No. 6, had advanced out of the Paris Entrenched Camp with Sixth Army. Once a ragtag collection of 80,000 reservists and second-line troops, Sixth Army now totaled 150,000 men: Victor Boelle's IV Corps, Frederic Vautier's VII Corps, Henri de Lamaze's Fifth Group of 55th RID and 56th RID, Antoine Drude's 45th ID, Charles Ebener 's Sixth Group of 61st RID and 62nd RID, and Jean-Francois Sordet's cavalry corps.44 Maunoury placed 55th RID and 56th RID as well as a Moroccan brigade north of Dammartin-en-Goele; etienne de Villaret's 14th ID of VII Corps and 63rd RID at Louvres; a brigade from the cavalry corps north of Claye-Souilly; and Raoul de Lartigue's 8th ID at the Marne on his right flank to maintain communications with Sir John French and the BEF. These were some of the units that German fliers had spotted on 3 and 4 September. Maunoury placed 55th RID and 56th RID as well as a Moroccan brigade north of Dammartin-en-Goele; etienne de Villaret's 14th ID of VII Corps and 63rd RID at Louvres; a brigade from the cavalry corps north of Claye-Souilly; and Raoul de Lartigue's 8th ID at the Marne on his right flank to maintain communications with Sir John French and the BEF. These were some of the units that German fliers had spotted on 3 and 4 September.

A slender, almost delicate soldier of sixty-seven, Maunoury had been wounded in the Franco-Prussian War (187071) and had served for a while as military governor of Paris. He was now all that stood between Kluck and the capital. He planned to march his ten infantry divisions to a position northeast of Meaux, and from there to strike Kluck's right flank the next day along the north bank of the Marne. Louis Gillet's reserve cavalry brigade had scouted Maunoury's route of advance toward Meaux and found no German forces.45 It thus came as a total surprise when around noon a hail of 77mm artillery sh.e.l.ls from the heights of Monthyon, northwest of Meaux, burst into the thick marching columns of 14th Infantry Division. It thus came as a total surprise when around noon a hail of 77mm artillery sh.e.l.ls from the heights of Monthyon, northwest of Meaux, burst into the thick marching columns of 14th Infantry Division.

The unsuspected adversary was Hans von Gronau. Detached to guard First Army's right flank, IV Reserve Corps stood to the north of, and at right angles to, Kluck's main force around Barcy and Chambry. Gronau, at age sixty-four, was a Prussian artillery specialist. After several rotations through the General Staff in the 1880s and 1890s, he had commanded artillery regiments and brigades. Retired in 1911 and enn.o.bled two years later, he was reactivated at the outbreak of the war.46 At the Ourcq, Gronau commanded a much-depleted force: 43d Infantry Brigade (IB) had been taken from him to invest Brussels, with the result that IV Reserve Corps consisted of a mere fifteen (rather than the normal twenty-five) battalions of infantry and twelve batteries of light artillery. At the Ourcq, Gronau commanded a much-depleted force: 43d Infantry Brigade (IB) had been taken from him to invest Brussels, with the result that IV Reserve Corps consisted of a mere fifteen (rather than the normal twenty-five) battalions of infantry and twelve batteries of light artillery.47 It had neither aircraft nor electronic communications. With just 22,800 men, it was 12,000 under full strength. Moreover, Otto von Garnier's 4th Cavalry Division (CD) had but twelve hundred sabers, having been battered by British 1st Cavalry Brigade and Royal Horse Artillery around Nery on 1 September. Still, the vigilant Garnier kept up his patrols and detected French cavalry, some scouts, and a strong column of infantry marching toward Montge-en-Goele, halfway between Paris and Meaux. Were these merely French advance guards? Or units of the Paris Garrison out on patrol? Or had Joffre somehow managed to cobble together a new army north of the capital? It had neither aircraft nor electronic communications. With just 22,800 men, it was 12,000 under full strength. Moreover, Otto von Garnier's 4th Cavalry Division (CD) had but twelve hundred sabers, having been battered by British 1st Cavalry Brigade and Royal Horse Artillery around Nery on 1 September. Still, the vigilant Garnier kept up his patrols and detected French cavalry, some scouts, and a strong column of infantry marching toward Montge-en-Goele, halfway between Paris and Meaux. Were these merely French advance guards? Or units of the Paris Garrison out on patrol? Or had Joffre somehow managed to cobble together a new army north of the capital?

Without aerial reconnaissance and with the western horizon blocked by a series of wooded hillocks between Saint-Soupplets and Penchard, the safe option was to stay put and await developments. But the wily Gronau threw out the textbook and made a quick decision that most likely would have resulted in failure at most staff colleges. "Lieutenant-Colonel, there is no other way out," he informed his chief of staff, Friedrich von der Heyde, "we must attack!"48 Without delay, Gronau sent 7th RID and 22d RID to occupy the long, wooded ridge around Saint-Mard, Dammartin, and Monthyon. Their orders were simple: Attack any and all forces approaching out of the west. At 11:30 Without delay, Gronau sent 7th RID and 22d RID to occupy the long, wooded ridge around Saint-Mard, Dammartin, and Monthyon. Their orders were simple: Attack any and all forces approaching out of the west. At 11:30 AM AM, Gronau's artillery spotted a mighty host of French infantry and artillery-de Lamaze's 55th RID and 56th RID as well as Ernest Blondlat's 1st Moroccan Brigade. They advanced northwest of Iverny along cobblestone roads lined with shimmering poplars, past gray stone farmhouses with gray slate roofs, and through fields of beets, mustard, wheat, and clover. As soon as they were within range, Gronau opened fire.

The battle raged fiercely throughout the day. A German artillerist (Hoyer) with 7th Reserve Field Artillery Regiment wrote home that the gun crews "were killed like flies." Some nearby batteries lost all their officers; his own unit, 70 percent. "And the horses!" In a nearby stable Hoyer found fifty dead in a single heap.49 An anonymous noncommissioned officer with 26th Infantry Regiment (IR) remembered the horror of the battlefield. "The cadavers of animals of all kind lie everywhere and spread a horrible smell." After a brief rest and a two-hundred-liter barrel of red wine "liberated" at a "swampy farm," the men of the 26th moved on through "high gra.s.s, bushes and thickets." They found a small wood. "Sharp cracks beside us, ahead of us and above us. One shrapnel after another rains down on us. It covers the entire wood. We run from one large tree to another. ... Countless wounded and dead lie all around us." An anonymous noncommissioned officer with 26th Infantry Regiment (IR) remembered the horror of the battlefield. "The cadavers of animals of all kind lie everywhere and spread a horrible smell." After a brief rest and a two-hundred-liter barrel of red wine "liberated" at a "swampy farm," the men of the 26th moved on through "high gra.s.s, bushes and thickets." They found a small wood. "Sharp cracks beside us, ahead of us and above us. One shrapnel after another rains down on us. It covers the entire wood. We run from one large tree to another. ... Countless wounded and dead lie all around us."50 Darkness finally brought relief. German IV Reserve Corps held the ridge. Maunoury had not been able to cross the 120-meter-deep valley of the Ourcq River. Meaux remained well out of his reach. Darkness finally brought relief. German IV Reserve Corps held the ridge. Maunoury had not been able to cross the 120-meter-deep valley of the Ourcq River. Meaux remained well out of his reach.

Gronau's swift action proved critical to the course of the Battle of the Marne. It denied Joffre the all-important element of surprise.51 Instead of Maunoury striking Kluck's right flank unawares, it was now French Sixth Army that had been taken by surprise. Moreover, the action had taken place a full eighteen hours Instead of Maunoury striking Kluck's right flank unawares, it was now French Sixth Army that had been taken by surprise. Moreover, the action had taken place a full eighteen hours before before Joffre originally had planned to mount his great offensive between Verdun and Paris, thus throwing his overarching concept into question. Gronau and his band of valiant reservists, in the words of the German official history, had "with one bold stroke" finally brought clarity: "The German army's right flank was, in fact, seriously threatened." Joffre originally had planned to mount his great offensive between Verdun and Paris, thus throwing his overarching concept into question. Gronau and his band of valiant reservists, in the words of the German official history, had "with one bold stroke" finally brought clarity: "The German army's right flank was, in fact, seriously threatened."52 And "with a rare appreciation of the strategic realities," And "with a rare appreciation of the strategic realities,"53 Gronau understood that he was vastly outnumbered (about six to one) and withdrew IV Reserve Corps to relative safety ten kilometers behind the small Therouanne stream. He would receive the coveted Pour le Merite two years after he had first earned it at Monthyon. Gronau understood that he was vastly outnumbered (about six to one) and withdrew IV Reserve Corps to relative safety ten kilometers behind the small Therouanne stream. He would receive the coveted Pour le Merite two years after he had first earned it at Monthyon.

Shortly before midnight on 5 September, the telephone rang at First Army headquarters at Rebais. It was Gronau with news of the encounter with Maunoury's Sixth Army. Chief of Staff von Kuhl, who at 7 PM PM had only received spotty news from Aircraft B65 that a minor engagement had occurred near Meaux, had only received spotty news from Aircraft B65 that a minor engagement had occurred near Meaux,54 at once grasped the gravity of the situation. There were but two choices-regroup and retreat to defensive positions to protect the German outer right flank, or blunt the French attack with a counteroffensive. Kuhl chose the latter. Kluck agreed: "Wheel 1. Army to the right at once, quickly form up on the right, attack across the Ourcq." at once grasped the gravity of the situation. There were but two choices-regroup and retreat to defensive positions to protect the German outer right flank, or blunt the French attack with a counteroffensive. Kuhl chose the latter. Kluck agreed: "Wheel 1. Army to the right at once, quickly form up on the right, attack across the Ourcq."55 Just after midnight, Kluck and Kuhl ordered Alexander von Linsingen's II Corps to quick-march from south of the Marne to west of the Ourcq in the direction of Lizy-sur-Ourq and Germigny-l'eveque, there to b.u.t.tress Gronau's position behind the Therouanne. Later on the afternoon of 6 September, they also dispatched Friedrich Sixt von Arnim's IV Corps to west of the Ourcq. It was a hard undertaking, as both corps had to cross two, and in some places three, river barriers. Yet the two corps incredibly managed two days of forced marches that stood out in the annals of the Prussian army: sixty kilometers on 7 September and seventy the following day, over bloated corpses of men and beasts alike, past columns of wounded and prisoners of war, through poplar woods and pear orchards. Just after midnight, Kluck and Kuhl ordered Alexander von Linsingen's II Corps to quick-march from south of the Marne to west of the Ourcq in the direction of Lizy-sur-Ourq and Germigny-l'eveque, there to b.u.t.tress Gronau's position behind the Therouanne. Later on the afternoon of 6 September, they also dispatched Friedrich Sixt von Arnim's IV Corps to west of the Ourcq. It was a hard undertaking, as both corps had to cross two, and in some places three, river barriers. Yet the two corps incredibly managed two days of forced marches that stood out in the annals of the Prussian army: sixty kilometers on 7 September and seventy the following day, over bloated corpses of men and beasts alike, past columns of wounded and prisoners of war, through poplar woods and pear orchards.

It was a daring decision with potentially deadly ramifications. For, in the process, a fifty-kilometer-wide gap developed in First Army's line between Varreddes and Sancy-les-Provins, at the southern limit of the German advance. Appreciating the danger, Kuhl rushed Manfred von Richthofen's I Cavalry Corps and Georg von der Marwitz's II Cavalry Corps into the breach. These rear guards were to defend first the trench of the Grand Morin River, then, if that fell, the trench of the Pet.i.t Morin, and finally the trench of the Marne. Gronau established a line of defense between Vincy-Manoeuvre and Varreddes. Knowing that major reinforcements were on the way, he sought out a comfortable ditch and took a nap.

AT DAWN ON 6 September, 980,000 French and 100,000 British soldiers with 3,000 guns a.s.saulted the German line of 750,000 men and 3,300 guns between Verdun and Paris. 6 September, 980,000 French and 100,000 British soldiers with 3,000 guns a.s.saulted the German line of 750,000 men and 3,300 guns between Verdun and Paris.56 Joffre, who had been able to reinforce his armies with a hundred thousand reservists, issued the troops a stirring appeal. "The salvation of the country" was in their hands. There could be "no looking back." The sacred ground of France was to be held "at whatever cost;" "be killed on the spot rather than retreat." Anything even resembling weakness would not be "tolerated." Joffre, who had been able to reinforce his armies with a hundred thousand reservists, issued the troops a stirring appeal. "The salvation of the country" was in their hands. There could be "no looking back." The sacred ground of France was to be held "at whatever cost;" "be killed on the spot rather than retreat." Anything even resembling weakness would not be "tolerated."57 President Poincare, at Bordeaux, had to get the text through unofficial channels. He understood the seriousness of the hour. "We are going to play our part for all we are worth in what will be the greatest battle humanity has ever known." President Poincare, at Bordeaux, had to get the text through unofficial channels. He understood the seriousness of the hour. "We are going to play our part for all we are worth in what will be the greatest battle humanity has ever known."58 Charles Huguet, French military plenipotentiary to the BEF, for the first time in weeks detected cheer at GHQ now that the Great Retreat was finally over. "When day dawned on the ever-memorable morning of 6th September," Field Marshal Sir John French wrote, he had regained some of his earlier "great hopes" for victory. "The promise of an immediate advance against the enemy" sent "a thrill of exultation and enthusiasm throughout the whole force." Charles Huguet, French military plenipotentiary to the BEF, for the first time in weeks detected cheer at GHQ now that the Great Retreat was finally over. "When day dawned on the ever-memorable morning of 6th September," Field Marshal Sir John French wrote, he had regained some of his earlier "great hopes" for victory. "The promise of an immediate advance against the enemy" sent "a thrill of exultation and enthusiasm throughout the whole force."59 Deputy Chief of Staff Wilson giddily a.s.sured his French counterpart, Henri Berthelot, that the Allied armies would be in Germany "in 4 weeks." Deputy Chief of Staff Wilson giddily a.s.sured his French counterpart, Henri Berthelot, that the Allied armies would be in Germany "in 4 weeks."60 The most critical sector of the front was between Paris and the Marne. There, the battle would rage for four days. Much of it would be fought in a maze of waterways that served as tributaries to the Marne: the Ourcq, which flowed north and south on both sides of Maunoury's advance; the Pet.i.t Morin and the Grand Morin, which ran east and west across the line of advance of French Fifth Army and the BEF; and finally the Saint-Gond Marshes, from which the Pet.i.t Morin arose and where Foch's Ninth Army stood.

At first, both Kluck and Bulow took the forces attacking Gronau's corps to be nothing more than French rear guards covering Joffre's withdrawal on Paris-at most a sortie designed to relieve pressure on the French armies south of the Seine. General von der Marwitz, in fact, asked the kaiser's court chaplain to prepare a suitable "entry text" for Paris, "but not too long!"61 The Germans were disabused of the notion of encountering only French rear guards during the night of 6 September. Men from Duke Albrecht of Wurttemberg's 30th IB, Fourth Army, had found Joffre's stirring appeal to his troops near Frignicourt, south of Vitry-le-Francois. The Germans were disabused of the notion of encountering only French rear guards during the night of 6 September. Men from Duke Albrecht of Wurttemberg's 30th IB, Fourth Army, had found Joffre's stirring appeal to his troops near Frignicourt, south of Vitry-le-Francois.62 Albrecht's headquarters, which had a telephone link to Luxembourg, immediately pa.s.sed the doc.u.ment on to Moltke. Sometime around 8 Albrecht's headquarters, which had a telephone link to Luxembourg, immediately pa.s.sed the doc.u.ment on to Moltke. Sometime around 8 PM PM, the chief of the General Staff sent it out to the other army commands. He did not counter it with a stirring appeal of his own. He was content simply to hand it over to the press with a quixotic message that the war needed to end with a peace that would "for all foreseeable future" see Germany "undisturbed by any foe."63 There was now no doubt that the Allies' retreat had ended and that they had gone on the attack. Specifically, Gronau's battle with vastly superior French forces the day before pointed to an attempt to envelop the German right wing. There was now no doubt that the Allies' retreat had ended and that they had gone on the attack. Specifically, Gronau's battle with vastly superior French forces the day before pointed to an attempt to envelop the German right wing.

Chief of Operations Tappen, just promoted to the rank of colonel, was delighted. The "Day of Decision" was finally at hand. He burst into a meeting of his operations and intelligence officers: "Well, we finally get hold of them. Now it will be a fierce fight. Our brave troops will know how to do their job." No more retreats, no more avoiding battle by the enemy. It was now just a matter of applying "brute force."64 Kluck and Kuhl faced another major decision. Should they break off the battle and fall back from their advanced position in the acute angle of the Marne and the Ourcq? Should they, together with Bulow's Second Army, withdraw to defensive positions between the Marne and the Ourcq and there parry Joffre's flanking maneuver? Or should they continue the battle and seek a quick, decisive victory over Maunoury's Sixth Army? Yet again, both opted to blunt the French thrust with a counteroffensive. Realizing that First Army's three (under strength) corps on the Ourcq were too weak to mount a counterattack against 150,000 French soldiers, they turned to Bulow. Shortly after 8 AM AM on 7 September, they telegraphed Second Army headquarters at Champaubert: "II, IV and IV Reserve Corps heavily engaged west of the lower Ourcq. Where III and IX Army Corps? What is your situation?" No reply. They repeated the message, adding "Urgently request answer." It crossed paths with a radiogram from Second Army wishing to know, "What is your situation?" Finally, a third request from Kuhl, "Engagement III and IX Corps at the Ourcq urgently required." on 7 September, they telegraphed Second Army headquarters at Champaubert: "II, IV and IV Reserve Corps heavily engaged west of the lower Ourcq. Where III and IX Army Corps? What is your situation?" No reply. They repeated the message, adding "Urgently request answer." It crossed paths with a radiogram from Second Army wishing to know, "What is your situation?" Finally, a third request from Kuhl, "Engagement III and IX Corps at the Ourcq urgently required."65 No reply. No reply.

The German army's prewar neglect of communications and control was glaringly apparent.66 During the Battle of the Marne, Luxembourg had direct telephone connections via Fourth Army with Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh armies on the relatively stagnant German left and center. But it could communicate with the fluid First and Second "strike" armies only by way of a single wireless set, which was p.r.o.ne to interruptions by weather and to jamming by French field stations and the Eiffel Tower. Messages often arrived so mutilated at Bulow's and Kluck's headquarters that they had to be re-sent three or four times. Field telegraph stations managed to get only twenty-nine of fifty-nine reports from First Army's fliers to Kluck and Kuhl between 1 and 5 September. There were no electronic ties between First and Second armies, or between them and their army corps and cavalry corps. A host of intelligence officers languished at the OHL and were not attached to the various corps commands where they might have done some good. No one thought of using airplanes to pa.s.s important orders along the line. The distance between Bulow's headquarters at Montmort and Kluck's at Vandrest (and later Mareuil), after all, was a mere fifty-five kilometers, or half an hour by air. The two commanders were thus effectively cut off from discussing the rapidly developing situation with each other-and with Moltke, who was 435 kilometers by automobile During the Battle of the Marne, Luxembourg had direct telephone connections via Fourth Army with Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh armies on the relatively stagnant German left and center. But it could communicate with the fluid First and Second "strike" armies only by way of a single wireless set, which was p.r.o.ne to interruptions by weather and to jamming by French field stations and the Eiffel Tower. Messages often arrived so mutilated at Bulow's and Kluck's headquarters that they had to be re-sent three or four times. Field telegraph stations managed to get only twenty-nine of fifty-nine reports from First Army's fliers to Kluck and Kuhl between 1 and 5 September. There were no electronic ties between First and Second armies, or between them and their army corps and cavalry corps. A host of intelligence officers languished at the OHL and were not attached to the various corps commands where they might have done some good. No one thought of using airplanes to pa.s.s important orders along the line. The distance between Bulow's headquarters at Montmort and Kluck's at Vandrest (and later Mareuil), after all, was a mere fifty-five kilometers, or half an hour by air. The two commanders were thus effectively cut off from discussing the rapidly developing situation with each other-and with Moltke, who was 435 kilometers by automobile* away from Second Army headquarters and 445 from First Army headquarters. away from Second Army headquarters and 445 from First Army headquarters.67 Interestingly, Tappen rejected all suggestions that the OHL, or at least a small operations staff, move up to the front behind the German right wing on the grounds of "technical difficulties as well as stodginess."68 One can only speculate whether Moltke, for his part, remembered that in 1866 his uncle had supervised the movements of his armies during the Battle of Koniggratz from the Ros...o...b..rg, above the Bistritz River, and that he had likewise led from the front in 1870 during the Battle of Sedan from a ridge high above the Meuse River near Frenois. One can only speculate whether Moltke, for his part, remembered that in 1866 his uncle had supervised the movements of his armies during the Battle of Koniggratz from the Ros...o...b..rg, above the Bistritz River, and that he had likewise led from the front in 1870 during the Battle of Sedan from a ridge high above the Meuse River near Frenois.

ALL THE WHILE, the fighting west of the Ourcq raged on. Blondlat's Moroccan brigade and the right wing of Louis Leguay's 55th RID first went into action on the French right flank on 6 September. Linsingen's II Corps, just arrived, furiously counterattacked with heavy artillery. Soon the entire front from Barny to Trilport erupted with murderous artillery fire and spirited infantry charges. The French initially gained the upper hand, but by nightfall both sides fell exhausted into defensive positions. In the ensuing dark, the Germans could make out the glow of Paris's ma.s.sive searchlights.

Linsingen urged greater speed on Sixt von Arnim's IV Corps; it arrived the next morning, 7 September. As senior corps commander, Linsingen took command and repositioned his forces: From right to left, Sixt von Arnim was to charge the front at etavigny; Gronau was to hold the middle at Trocy-en-Multien; Kurt von Trossel with 3d ID and 22d RID was to cover Gronau's left near Germigny-l'eveque; and Linsingen was to secure the left flank at Trilport. Maunoury in the meantime received reinforcements from Paris: Celeste Deprez's 61st RID, Drude's 45th ID, and the rest of Vautier's VII Corps, just up from Alsace. Unbeknown to the French commander, a German reserve infantry brigade under Rudolf von Lepel had been released by the surrender of Brussels and was marching south toward Nanteuil-le-Haudouin-against Sixth Army's left flank. Still, Maunoury enjoyed a numerical advantage of thirty-two infantry battalions and two cavalry divisions.

Maunoury vigorously resumed the offensive at 7 AM AM on 7 September. on 7 September.69 In the middle of the front, Gronau's fatigued IV Reserve Corps, stiffened by the arrival of Sixt von Arnim's 15th Brigade, threw Leon Lombard's 63d RID into panic with a hurricane bombardment followed by ma.s.sed infantry charges. Only a heroic counterattack by Colonel Robert Nivelle's 5th Artillery Regiment of 45th ID-firing sh.e.l.ls from its 75s into the ma.s.sed German infantry at the rate of twenty rounds per minute-prevented a complete collapse. In the middle of the front, Gronau's fatigued IV Reserve Corps, stiffened by the arrival of Sixt von Arnim's 15th Brigade, threw Leon Lombard's 63d RID into panic with a hurricane bombardment followed by ma.s.sed infantry charges. Only a heroic counterattack by Colonel Robert Nivelle's 5th Artillery Regiment of 45th ID-firing sh.e.l.ls from its 75s into the ma.s.sed German infantry at the rate of twenty rounds per minute-prevented a complete collapse.* French Fifth Group of Reserve Divisions likewise was driven back, and its commander, de Lamaze, seriously considered falling back on Paris. On the southern flank, the men of 8th RID were "in a state of extreme fatigue," and Lartigue was forced to have the division stand down around noon. In the north, Sixt von Arnim's 16th Brigade shattered Deprez's 61st RID, but a combination of exhaustion after its nightlong forced march and a counterattack by Vautier's VII Corps prevented it from enveloping the French left flank. Still, 61st RID fell back as far as Nanteuil-le-Haudouin. Maunoury sent Louis de Trentinian's 7th ID from IV Corps to take its place in the left of his line. Gallieni rushed Francois Ganeval's 62d RID out to hold the line at the Ourcq. French Fifth Group of Reserve Divisions likewise was driven back, and its commander, de Lamaze, seriously considered falling back on Paris. On the southern flank, the men of 8th RID were "in a state of extreme fatigue," and Lartigue was forced to have the division stand down around noon. In the north, Sixt von Arnim's 16th Brigade shattered Deprez's 61st RID, but a combination of exhaustion after its nightlong forced march and a counterattack by Vautier's VII Corps prevented it from enveloping the French left flank. Still, 61st RID fell back as far as Nanteuil-le-Haudouin. Maunoury sent Louis de Trentinian's 7th ID from IV Corps to take its place in the left of his line. Gallieni rushed Francois Ganeval's 62d RID out to hold the line at the Ourcq.

At 10 AM AM on 7 September, First Army headquarters received word that an aviator had spotted two columns of British soldiers slowly moving north out of the Forest of Crecy toward the joint of German First and Second armies. on 7 September, First Army headquarters received word that an aviator had spotted two columns of British soldiers slowly moving north out of the Forest of Crecy toward the joint of German First and Second armies.70 Kluck and Kuhl could wait no longer. Still without a reply from Bulow to their request for reinforcements, they seized the initiative and ordered Ewald von Lochow's III Corps and Quast's IX Corps, both temporarily a.s.signed to Bulow, to leave Second Army's right wing in broad daylight and quick-march to the Ourcq. Kluck and Kuhl could wait no longer. Still without a reply from Bulow to their request for reinforcements, they seized the initiative and ordered Ewald von Lochow's III Corps and Quast's IX Corps, both temporarily a.s.signed to Bulow, to leave Second Army's right wing in broad daylight and quick-march to the Ourcq.71 For Kuhl had decided to master what now threatened to be a.s.saults on both his wings by way of an all-out offensive on the right, designed to crush Maunoury's Sixth Army before the BEF could engage German First or Second army. For Kuhl had decided to master what now threatened to be a.s.saults on both his wings by way of an all-out offensive on the right, designed to crush Maunoury's Sixth Army before the BEF could engage German First or Second army.

Incredibly, neither Kluck nor Kuhl was aware that General von Bulow shortly after midnight on 7 September had already pulled back his right wing, fearing that his soldiers were too exhausted to ward off another French frontal attack. Bulow withdrew III and IX corps of First Army as well as his own X Reserve Corps fifteen to twenty kilometers behind the shelter, such as it was, of the Pet.i.t Morin River-some eight hours before before First Army's duumvirate ordered them to march to the Ourcq. Bulow radioed Moltke of his action at 2 First Army's duumvirate ordered them to march to the Ourcq. Bulow radioed Moltke of his action at 2 AM AM. He declined to inform Kluck via dispatch rider. By his action, Bulow created a gap of some thirty kilometers between the right wing of Second Army and the left wing of First Army. Kluck and Kuhl, by recalling III and IX corps, widened that gap to about fifty kilometers. Failure to communicate once again bedeviled the German army commanders on the right pivot wing.

Having pulled back his right wing, Bulow next ordered an attack by his left wing. Realizing that Second Army was down to the strength of only three full corps, he once again enlisted the help of two Saxon infantry divisions from Hausen's Third Army.72 General von Einem, commanding VII Corps on Second Army's right, thought the plan madness: At the very moment that the enemy might discover and then exploit the German gap astride the Pet.i.t Morin, "Bulow shifts the center of gravity to his left wing!" What use would victory there be, he mused, "if we are enveloped on the right and separated from First Army?" General von Einem, commanding VII Corps on Second Army's right, thought the plan madness: At the very moment that the enemy might discover and then exploit the German gap astride the Pet.i.t Morin, "Bulow shifts the center of gravity to his left wing!" What use would victory there be, he mused, "if we are enveloped on the right and separated from First Army?"73 In fact, the German position on the Marne and the Ourcq defies rational a.n.a.lysis. Without firm direction from the OHL, both commanders had developed their own operational concepts. Bulow insisted that First Army's primary function, as laid down in Moltke's General Directive of 5 September, was to protect his right flank against a possible French sortie out of le camp retranche de Paris le camp retranche de Paris. Thus, it was paramount that Kluck break off the battle with Maunoury and shift his army left to join up with Second Army's right wing. As well, it was critical that Hausen's Third Army defeat Foch's Ninth Army on Bulow's left flank before Fanchet d'Esperey's Fifth Army could exploit Second Army's exposed right flank. Kluck, on the other hand, insisted that the only way to break the French offensive was to destroy Maunoury's Sixth Army before the British, whose fighting capabilities he by and large denigrated, could take their place on the left flank of French Fifth Army south of the Grand Morin River. Bulow made no effort to coordinate the operations of the two "strike" armies or to bring Moltke fully into the calculus.74 Just after 7 Just after 7 PM PM on 7 September, Richthofen's cavalry corps reported that British advance guards had crossed the Grand Morin at La Ferte-Gaucher. They were about to enter the gap in the German line. on 7 September, Richthofen's cavalry corps reported that British advance guards had crossed the Grand Morin at La Ferte-Gaucher. They were about to enter the gap in the German line.

For the Germans, 7 September was the critical day in the Battle of the Marne. Kluck and Kuhl, as noted previously, had hastily taken II and IV corps out of the line on the Marne and rushed them north to aid Gronau's corps on the Ourcq. Bulow had then withdrawn III and IX corps as well as X Reserve Corps behind the Pet.i.t Morin-only to have had Kluck and Kuhl eight hours later order III and IX corps to leave Bulow's right wing and to march north in order to help defeat Maunoury's French Sixth Army. None of these orders was shared, much less discussed beforehand. In the process, as is well known, Bulow, Kluck, and Kuhl had created a fifty-kilometer-wide gap between First and Second armies-one into which the BEF was slowly stumbling as it headed north between Changis, on the Marne, and Rebais, south of the Pet.i.t Morin. The eighth of September would thus see two distinct battles: Kluck versus Maunoury on the Ourcq, and Bulow versus Franchet d'Esperey on the two Morins.

Kluck's bold, aggressive decision remains highly controversial. He had already "disobeyed" Moltke's General Directive to remain "echeloned" to the right and behind Second Army. Now he literally s.n.a.t.c.hed two corps from Bulow's right wing and rushed them to the Ourcq. To Kluck, time was the critical factor. Could he defeat Maunoury before the BEF drove through the gap in the German line and into the back of either First Army or Second Army? How long could Richthofen's and Marwitz's cavalry corps hold the line of the Grand Morin against the three advancing British corps? When would Lepel's brigade finally arrive on the left flank of French Sixth Army? Kluck answered those rhetorical musings by ordering "every man and every horse" west of the Ourcq to deliver the final and fatal blow to Maunoury's Sixth Army. It was a last-minute, all-out gamble. The campaign in the west hung on it.

At Luxembourg, General von Moltke yet again was on the verge of panic. "Today a great decision will come about," he wrote his wife, Eliza, on 7 September, "since yesterday our entire army is fighting from Paris to Upper Alsace. Should I have to give my life today to bring about victory, I would do it gladly a thousand times." He lamented the "streams of blood" that had already been shed and the "countless" homes and lives that had been destroyed. "I often shudder when I think of this and I feel as though I need to accept responsibility for this dreadfulness. ..."75 These were not the words of a great captain. These were not the words of a great captain.

GERMAN SECOND ARMY on the Marne was a battered force. It had marched 440 kilometers under a broiling sun along dusty roads. Food and fodder had been irregular, and the half-ripe fruit and oats it found along the way only added to the misery of man and beast alike. It had fought most of the major engagements on the right wing-Liege, Namur, Charleroi, and Guise/Saint-Quentin. From around 260,000 soldiers at the start of August, it was down to 154,000 by the end of the month. About 9,000 men had succ.u.mbed to heat sores, exhaustion, and hunger; 12,151 were listed as wounded; and 5,061 had been killed. on the Marne was a battered force. It had marched 440 kilometers under a broiling sun along dusty roads. Food and fodder had been irregular, and the half-ripe fruit and oats it found along the way only added to the misery of man and beast alike. It had fought most of the major engagements on the right wing-Liege, Namur, Charleroi, and Guise/Saint-Quentin. From around 260,000 soldiers at the start of August, it was down to 154,000 by the end of the month. About 9,000 men had succ.u.mbed to heat sores, exhaustion, and hunger; 12,151 were listed as wounded; and 5,061 had been killed.76 After three days on the Pet.i.t Morin, Bulow informed the OHL, his army had shrunk from its initial seven to less than four corps, many at least 20 percent understrength. After three days on the Pet.i.t Morin, Bulow informed the OHL, his army had shrunk from its initial seven to less than four corps, many at least 20 percent understrength.77 In the only change in a major command undertaken by the German army during the "march to the Marne," Bulow replaced Guenther von Kirchbach with Johannes von Eben as commander of X Reserve Corps. In the only change in a major command undertaken by the German army during the "march to the Marne," Bulow replaced Guenther von Kirchbach with Johannes von Eben as commander of X Reserve Corps.

On 6 September, Eben's corps ran hard up against Gilbert Defforges's X Corps between Montmirail and Le Thoult as it came to the aid of Otto von Emmich's X Corps on his left. A violent battle ensued. Franchet d'Esperey had admonished his troops not to surrender an inch of sacred soil. Fifth Army managed to advance five kilometers along its entire front, but at Le Thoult French X Corps was thrown five kilometers back across the Pet.i.t Morin. Both sides were at the limit of their physical capabilities. Richard von Susskind, commanding 2d Reserve Guard Division with Eben's X Reserve Corps, reported, "The division is very exhausted. Though still able to attack, it is no longer in condition to continue the offense."78 He spoke as well for many other division commanders. He spoke as well for many other division commanders.

When Bulow ordered First Army's III and IX corps as well as his own X Reserve Corps fifteen kilometers behind the Pet.i.t Morin early in the morning of 7 September, one of Eben's battalions of 74th Reserve Infantry Regiment (RIR) did not receive the order to withdraw. Quickly surrounded on all sides and with its back against the Pet.i.t Morin, it was mercilessly gunned down in what is called "the ma.s.sacre of Guebarre Farm": 93 men surrendered and 450 lay dead. The French had ignored the white handkerchiefs that German soldiers had tied to their rifles and raised above the trenches as a sign of surrender.79 The situation on Bulow's left flank became critical. After an intensive night bombardment-unusual at this stage in the war-a brigade of Theophile Jouannic's 36th ID from Louis de Maud'huy's XVIII Corps around noon on 8 September surprised and threw terror into several companies of German VII Corps at Marchais-en-Brie, just northwest of Montmirail.80 Although minor in itself, the brilliant French tactical action at Marchais-en-Brie const.i.tuted what historian Sewell Tyng has labeled one of those "there the battle was won" defining moments of the large Battle of the Marne. Although minor in itself, the brilliant French tactical action at Marchais-en-Brie const.i.tuted what historian Sewell Tyng has labeled one of those "there the battle was won" defining moments of the large Battle of the Marne.81 For the French a.s.sault had tremendous operational and even strategic ramifications. With German X Reserve Corps completely flanked from the west, Montmirail was indefensible. Moreover, Eben's IX Reserve Corps was outflanked on both sides. Of much greater concern to Bulow and his chief of staff, Otto von Lauenstein, was that Second Army's right wing, recently denuded of two corps bound for the Ourcq, was further jeopardized. They ordered VII Corps and X Reserve Corps to fall back ten kilometers east to the line MargnyLe Thoult. It was a major mistake. The two corps on Second Army's right flank now stood from north to south, facing west, and were thus utterly unable to shift right and close the gap with Kluck's First Army. In fact, that gap as a result had widened by fifteen kilometers. For the French a.s.sault had tremendous operational and even strategic ramifications. With German X Reserve Corps completely flanked from the west, Montmirail was indefensible. Moreover, Eben's IX Reserve Corps was outflanked on both sides. Of much greater concern to Bulow and his chief of staff, Otto von Lauenstein, was that Second Army's right wing, recently denuded of two corps bound for the Ourcq, was further jeopardized. They ordered VII Corps and X Reserve Corps to fall back ten kilometers east to the line MargnyLe Thoult. It was a major mistake. The two corps on Second Army's right flank now stood from north to south, facing west, and were thus utterly unable to shift right and close the gap with Kluck's First Army. In fact, that gap as a result had widened by fifteen kilometers.82 Bulow's right wing "was no longer threatened, it was turned." The "path to the Marne" lay open for the left-wing corps of French Fifth Army-and the BEF. Bulow's right wing "was no longer threatened, it was turned." The "path to the Marne" lay open for the left-wing corps of French Fifth Army-and the BEF.

Ever so slowly, Sir John French's forces, enhanced by William Pulteney's III Corps, on the morning of 6 September had begun its march to the front. It was headed for the open s.p.a.ces of the Brie Plateau, a rich agricultural area best known for its cheeses. The plateau was cut east to west by the ravines of the Grand Morin, Pet.i.t Morin, Marne, Upper Ourcq, Vesle, Aisne, and Ailette rivers, pa.s.sable only on bridges. To the north lay the three great forests of Crecy, d'Armainvilliers, and Malvoisine.83 The BEF deployed in an easterly direction from Tournan-en-Brie, Fontenay-Tresigny, and Rozay-en-Brie (which the British called Rozoy), almost twenty kilometers behind the line where Joffre had wanted it to start. "Desperate Frankie," as the British jokingly called Franchet d'Esperey, was furious and repeatedly demanded a more rapid advance. But at Rozoy, Sir Douglas Haig, feeling "uneasy about his left," where he suspected units of Marwitz's cavalry corps, halted the advance of I Corps, allowing Sixt von Arnim's IV Corps to make good its escape to the Ourcq. The BEF deployed in an easterly direction from Tournan-en-Brie, Fontenay-Tresigny, and Rozay-en-Brie (which the British called Rozoy), almost twenty kilometers behind the line where Joffre had wanted it to start. "Desperate Frankie," as the British jokingly called Franchet d'Esperey, was furious and repeatedly demanded a more rapid advance. But at Rozoy, Sir Douglas Haig, feeling "uneasy about his left," where he suspected units of Marwitz's cavalry corps, halted the advance of I Corps, allowing Sixt von Arnim's IV Corps to make good its escape to the Ourcq.84 Six pilots of the Royal Flying Corps found only open roads ahead of Haig. Thus, when Sir John French ordered Haig to resume his advance at 3:30 Six pilots of the Royal Flying Corps found only open roads ahead of Haig. Thus, when Sir John French ordered Haig to resume his advance at 3:30 PM PM, I Corps unsurprisingly encountered only abandoned positions. This notwithstanding, by nightfall Haig was roughly twelve kilometers behind the day's objective. He had lost a mere seven men killed and forty-four wounded.

The next day, 7 September, aerial reconnaissance, in the stilted language of the British official history, again "confirmed the general impression that the enemy was withdrawing northward."85 The day brought little action, just a continued hesitant advance by the BEF into the gap between German First and Second armies. Sir John had long ceased to be the dashing cavalry officer who had ridden to glory fourteen years earlier during the relief of Kimberley in the Boer War. "Old Archie" Murray, his chief of staff, continued to urge caution. The men tramped happily north singing "It's a Long Way to Tipperary" and certain of their guardian, the "Angel of Mons." Marwitz's thin cavalry screen could undertake only brief sorties to block the BEF crossing the Grand Morin. The day brought little action, just a continued hesitant advance by the BEF into the gap between German First and Second armies. Sir John had long ceased to be the dashing cavalry officer who had ridden to glory fourteen years earlier during the relief of Kimberley in the Boer War. "Old Archie" Murray, his chief of staff, continued to urge caution. The men tramped happily north singing "It's a Long Way to Tipperary" and certain of their guardian, the "Angel of Mons." Marwitz's thin cavalry screen could undertake only brief sorties to block the BEF crossing the Grand Morin.

Not only the French had become exasperated at the slow pace of the British advance. Lord Ernest Hamilton of Eleventh Hussars noted, "In the strict sense there was no battle during the British advance. The fighting ... was desultory. ... The advance at first was slow and cautious."86 John Charteris, Haig's chief of intelligence, observed that although "keen," the men "moved absurdly slowly." The cavalry, Haig's true love, "were the worst of all, for they were right behind [!] the infantry." John Charteris, Haig's chief of intelligence, observed that although "keen," the men "moved absurdly slowly." The cavalry, Haig's true love, "were the worst of all, for they were right behind [!] the infantry."87 Exasperated, Gallieni at Paris dispatched Lartigue's 8th ID south of Meaux to establish contact between the BEF and Franchet d'Esperey's Fifth Army. Exasperated, Gallieni at Paris dispatched Lartigue's 8th ID south of Meaux to establish contact between the BEF and Franchet d'Esperey's Fifth Army.88 It was a murderous advance. The Germans held the seventy-to one-hundred-meter-high ridges above Meaux, their machine guns well concealed on the wooded crests of the Marne, and poured lethal fire into the French ranks crossing the valley floor below them. It was a murderous advance. The Germans held the seventy-to one-hundred-meter-high ridges above Meaux, their machine guns well concealed on the wooded crests of the Marne, and poured lethal fire into the French ranks crossing the valley floor below them.

On the diplomatic front, Joffre moved quickly to intervene when it seemed to him that Gallieni was driving the British too hard and thereby arousing "the touchiness of Field Marshal French." On 7 September, he cabled Horatio Herbert Lord Kitchener in London to extend his "warmest thanks" for Sir John's "constant," "precious," and "energetic" support of the Allied attack.89 Alliance cohesion was secured. Alliance cohesion was secured.

At 10:10 AM AM on 8 September, German Aircraft B75 reported that the BEF was advancing "more rapidly" from La Ferte-Gaucher and Rebais in the general direction of Saint-Cyr-sur-Morin. Horace Smith-Dorrien's II Corps was in the center of the line, flanked by Haig's I Corps on its right and "Putty" Pulteney's III Corps on its left. on 8 September, German Aircraft B75 reported that the BEF was advancing "more rapidly" from La Ferte-Gaucher and Rebais in the general direction of Saint-Cyr-sur-Morin. Horace Smith-Dorrien's II Corps was in the center of the line, flanked by Haig's I Corps on its right and "Putty" Pulteney's III Corps on its left.90 It was another sunny day. By noon, the BEF had reached the Pet.i.t Morin, a shallow stream barely six meters wide. The Royal Flying Corps reported only small enemy columns ahead. Marwitz's cavalry corps fought a brief but gallant rear action-and headed north. Then a "violent thunderstorm" with "torrents of rain" It was another sunny day. By noon, the BEF had reached the Pet.i.t Morin, a shallow stream barely six meters wide. The Royal Flying Corps reported only small enemy columns ahead. Marwitz's cavalry corps fought a brief but gallant rear action-and headed north. Then a "violent thunderstorm" with "torrents of rain"91 slowed the BEF's further advance. An impatient Joffre at 8 slowed the BEF's further advance. An impatient Joffre at 8 PM PM dashed off a communique to Sir John French confirming the gap between the two enemy armies and deeming it "essential" that the BEF exploit this by marching northeast before the Germans reinforced their cavalry with infantry and artillery. The BEF, in his opinion, should cross the Marne between Nogent-l'Artaud and La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, where the winding river was roughly sixty meters wide. dashed off a communique to Sir John French confirming the gap between the two enemy armies and deeming it "essential" that the BEF exploit this by marching northeast before the Germans reinforced their cavalry with infantry and artillery. The BEF, in his opinion, should cross the Marne between Nogent-l'Artaud and La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, where the winding river was roughly sixty meters wide.92 In three days and while outnumbering the enemy at least ten to one, "Johnnie" French's army had advanced just forty kilometers. The BEF's importance lay in its role as an "army in being," to borrow a naval term. In three days and while outnumbering the enemy at least ten to one, "Johnnie" French's army had advanced just forty kilometers. The BEF's importance lay in its role as an "army in being," to borrow a naval term.

Joffre's problems were not, however, confined to the Germans. On 8 September, the generalissimo discovered to his chagrin that Gallieni, in his capacity as military governor of Paris, the previous day had cabled the government at Bordeaux for instructions on how to "evacuate the civilian population" of the capital's outlying suburbs and instructed prefects and the police to find "emergency locations" for the evacuees.93 The usually aggressive governor, having pulled all units out of Paris to a.s.sist Maunoury on the Ourcq, for a brief moment was overcome by pessimism. If Maunoury were defeated, how could he hold the capital against Kluck's expected a.s.sault? Joffre, barely able to control his anger, cabled War Minister Millerand to "rescind" Gallieni's "dangerous" communication. "I remain the only judge of what is worth saying about the operations. ... The Military Governor of Paris is under my orders, and therefore does not have the right to correspond directly with the Government." The usually aggressive governor, having pulled all units out of Paris to a.s.sist Maunoury on the Ourcq, for a brief moment was overcome by pessimism. If Maunoury were defeated, how could he hold the capital against Kluck's expected a.s.sault? Joffre, barely able to control his anger, cabled War Minister Millerand to "rescind" Gallieni's "dangerous" communication. "I remain the only judge of what is worth saying about the operations. ... The Military Governor of Paris is under my orders, and therefore does not have the right to correspond directly with the Government."94 It was vintage Joffre. It was vintage Joffre.

The Allied advance into the fifty-kilometer-wide s.p.a.ce between First and Second armies drove Moltke ever deeper into despair. He issued no orders to either Bulow or Kluck on 6 or 7 September. Instead, he withdrew into a world of self-pity and grief. The "burden of responsibility of the last several days," he wrote his wife, was impossible even to name. "For the great battle of our army along its entire front has not yet been decided." The "horrible tension" of the last few days, the "absence of news from the far distant armies," and "knowing all that was at stake" was "almost beyond human power" to comprehend. "The terrible difficulty of our situation stands like an almost impenetrable black wall in front of me."95 The only bright spot on the horizon was that on 6 September Hans von Zwehl had forced Fortress Maubeuge to surrender: 412 officers and 32,280 ranks were taken prisoner and 450 guns added to the German a.r.s.enal. The only bright spot on the horizon was that on 6 September Hans von Zwehl had forced Fortress Maubeuge to surrender: 412 officers and 32,280 ranks were taken prisoner and 450 guns added to the German a.r.s.enal.96 Zwehl's three brigades of VII Corps were now freed up, perhaps to plug the gap between the Marne and the Ourcq. Wilhelm II, returning from a to