CHAPTER LX.

THE DONGOLA EXPEDITION.

In a previous chapter, the history of events on the Nile frontier was brought down to the month of August, 1889, when Wad-en-Nejumi's forces, after the crushing defeat they encountered in the engagement at Toski, were retreating southwards, and the projected invasion of Egypt was suspended. The incidents which marked the next few years may be related in a few words.

The years 1890 and 1891 pa.s.sed almost undisturbed on the frontier. The chief military command in the province of Dongola was vested in one of the Khalifa's emirs, called Mohammed Khalil Zogal, with a force and detachments at Sunnah, and at Suarda, fifty miles south of Akasheh. From this last point patrols occasionally went north to Akasheh itself, but the Nile frontier generally remained quite undisturbed.

From Korosko, Saba Bey, in the autumn of 1890, made a reconnaissance towards Abu Hamid, with some irregulars, and captured one of the Dervish outpost forts, which he, a few hours afterwards, was compelled to relinquish. The matter is only worth mentioning by reason of the fact that in the fight which accompanied Saba's retreat the notorious Suleiman Wad Gamr, Colonel Stewart's murderer, was killed.

[Ill.u.s.tration]

In April, 1892, Colonel Kitchener succeeded Sir Francis Grenfell as Sirdar of the Egyptian army. In the same year there were signs of increased activity in the Nile Valley, and between Dongola and Suarda some 5,000 fighting men were kept under arms.

In January, 1893, the Dervishes again became aggressive, and 600 of them advanced to cut the railway connecting Sarras and Wady Halfa. The raid failed, owing to the precautions taken by Colonel Wodehouse. The Dervishes, however, managed to surprise and outnumber 120 of the Egyptian Camel Corps, who had been sent to follow up the retreat. The Egyptians fought courageously, but, having lost their two senior officers, Captain Pyne and Major Fuad Effendi, were defeated, and had to retire with a loss of no less than thirty-four men killed and fifteen wounded. The Dervish loss was estimated at more than double that number.

In July of the same year, the Dervishes made a sudden descent on Beris, the southernmost village of the El Khargeh Oasis, to the north-west of a.s.souan.

In November, the enemy made an attack upon the desert outpost of Murad Wells, but were repulsed.

From this date, with the exception of a raid on a village in the Wady Halfa district in 1895, the Dervishes in the neighbourhood of the Egyptian advanced posts observed a strictly defensive att.i.tude.

The year 1896 brought with it great changes in the entire situation. The reoccupation of the province of Dongola had for some time been in contemplation by the Egyptian Government and its advisers. It was felt that a blow must sooner or later be struck at the power of the Khalifa, which, though it had succeeded in laying waste some of the most fertile provinces abandoned by Egypt, was known to be waning, if not dying, of its own unpopularity; but no one thought that the blow would be struck so soon. In choosing the moment for action, the British Government was influenced to a very large extent by a desire to a.s.sist a friendly Power in a position of extreme difficulty. Only a short time before (29th February, 1896) a terrible disaster had happened to the Italian army in Africa, which had been defeated at Adowa with heavy loss by the Abyssinians under Menelik. Driven back in the direction of Ma.s.sowah, the remains of the Italian forces found it impossible to lend a helping hand to their comrades garrisoned at Ka.s.sala, who were threatened by the Dervishes, and in a situation of imminent peril. One object of the British and Egyptian advance which in March, 1896, was determined on, was, by making a diversion in the region of Dongola, to save Ka.s.sala, or at all events its garrison. It was not from purely disinterested motives that this step was decided upon. It was obvious that the moment when a large body of the Khalifa's forces was occupied with the Italians would be a favourable one for a movement on Dongola, whereas if Ka.s.sala was to fall into the hands of the Dervishes, the latter would be let loose to overrun the Nile Valley. Everything in fact was ripe for the expedition.

There were, moreover, political reasons for not delaying it. In the valley of the Upper Nile, the race between the Powers for possession of that part of Africa was beginning to attract attention. The French were extending their influence from the south-west, and the Belgians were sending out expeditions from the south, and there was a general feeling that some corresponding action on the part of Great Britain was desirable, as soon as a favourable opportunity should occur.

Speaking in the House of Commons in March, Mr. Curzon, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, stated that, "in view of the reported forward movements in various directions by the Dervishes and the threatened beleaguerment of Ka.s.sala, the Government, acting in conjunction with the Government of Egypt and their advisers, and in order to avoid danger to Italy, to Egypt, and to England, and in the interests of Europe, had ordered an advance to Akasheh." He added that the advance might be extended to Dongola, and that the future action of the Government was to be "regulated by considerations not merely military and strategical, but political and financial."

It was decided that the Dongola expedition should consist of about 9,000 Egyptian troops, under the command of the Sirdar. In addition to these, the 1st Battalion of the North Staffordshire Regiment was to be moved from Cairo to Wady Halfa to relieve the Egyptian garrison there, and also to be at hand if required. The route chosen was by rail and river to Wady Halfa, and thence by a march along the Nile bank to the front.

The decision of the British Government was arrived at so suddenly that it was not even communicated to the Khedive and his advisers. The news took Cairo by surprise. Without any previous intimation it became known at midnight on the 12th March that Colonel Hunter, who commanded the frontier force at Wady Halfa, had been ordered to advance and occupy Akasheh, that all available troops were to be pushed up the Nile with a view to an advance on Dongola, and that the 1st Battalion of the North Staffordshire Regiment (64th), then quartered in Cairo, was to leave immediately for Wady Halfa.[153]

Although the news took Cairo by surprise, it was the kind of surprise with which one hears that something long expected and long delayed has at last really come true. For years past the Egyptian army had been steadily trained and prepared for the event which the disaster to the Italian arms in Abyssinia only precipitated.

A few words may here be said concerning the state of the army at this period. Its formation, begun by Sir Evelyn Wood soon after Tel-el-Kebir, had progressed slowly but surely. The men had been gradually disciplined under British officers and accustomed by degrees to meeting the Dervishes in the numerous frontier skirmishes of the past ten years. In 1884-5, Egyptian troops were employed upon the lines of communication of Wolseley's Nile expedition, and some of the Camel Corps were under fire at Kirbekan. Backed by British troops, they fought well at Ginnis, and they crushed Wad-en-Nejumi single-handed at Argin and Toski. At the beginning of 1896 the army numbered 18,000 men. It consisted of sixteen battalions of infantry, each battalion having six companies of from 100 to 120 men each, and about eight squadrons of cavalry, with camel corps, artillery, &c. Of the infantry, ten battalions were composed of fellaheen, taken by conscription, and six of Soudanese blacks (volunteers enlisted for life). The fellaheen battalions numbered from 1 to 4 had British colonels and majors; those numbered from 5 to 8 were officered only by natives. The Soudanese Battalions numbered from 9 to 14 (this last only in course of formation) had British officers, whilst the 15th and 16th Battalions, made up of reservists called out for the campaign, were also partly officered by Englishmen. There were in all about eighty British officers, a number increased to 120 by others sent out on special service in the course of the campaign.

A glance must now be taken at the means of transport at the disposal of the Sirdar, and it will be seen that, as in Wolseley's expedition, the provisioning of the above force at a distance of nearly 1,000 miles from its base in Cairo formed one of the chief difficulties to be dealt with.

In March, 1886, the Upper Egypt Railway was open as far as Girgeh, 341 miles above Cairo, but it had been prolonged, for Government purposes only, to Belianeh, eight miles further on. Thence everything had to be carried in steamers and native boats to a.s.souan. Here men and stores had to be unloaded and conveyed overland by the eight-mile railway to Sh.e.l.lal, just above the First Cataract, where they were again shipped and taken on to Wady Halfa. From this last place to Sarras, a distance of thirty miles, a railway existed when the campaign began, and this line was continued as quickly as possible in the rear of the army as it advanced. It may here be observed that the rapid construction of this railway, under the direction of Nicour Bey and Captain Girouard, of the Royal Engineers, was not the least notable feature of the campaign. From the rail-head to the front stores had to be carried by convoys of camels and mules, aided on the less broken parts of the river by relief boats, as soon as the rising Nile had allowed them to be dragged up the cataract by steamers. The navigation of the Nile between Wady Halfa and Dongola is not easy, the broken water of the Second Cataract extending from Wady Halfa almost to Sarras, and at Hannek, 100 miles further on, the Third Cataract again obstructs the navigation.

On the 20th March, Mr. Morley moved a vote of censure of the House of Commons on the Government in connection with the Dongola expedition, but on a division the motion was negatived by 288 votes against 143.

There was an incident in connection with the expedition which is of sufficient importance to deserve notice.

A few days after the expedition was decided on, the Egyptian Government, on the 19th March, applied to the Commissioners of the Public Debt to advance towards the expenses the sum of 500,000, to be taken from what is known as the "Reserve Fund." This fund was created pursuant to the Khedivial decree of 12th July, 1888, under which the financial arrangements made by "The London Convention" of 1885, already referred to in a former chapter, were once more modified. The changes made comprised the suspension of the Sinking Fund of the Debt, and the application of the money to form a reserve fund, to meet unforeseen contingencies. One of these was declared to be "extraordinary expenses incurred with the previous sanction of the Commission of the Debt."

Four out of the six Commissioners agreed in considering the Dongola expedition as coming under the above category, and advanced the money.

The French and Russian Commissioners dissented. This led to a lawsuit in the Mixed Tribunal of Cairo, which later on, viz., on the 9th June, ordered the Government to refund the money with interest. The judgment being confirmed on appeal on the 2nd December, 1896, the Khedive's advisers might have found themselves in a position of some difficulty had not Lord Cromer vigorously taken the matter in hand, and induced the British Government to lend the sum which had to be refunded. The amount due under the judgment, 515,600, was repaid to the "Caisse" on the 8th December, and the Khedive's Ministers expressed their lively grat.i.tude.

This was still further earned when later on the British Government released their claim to be repaid the sum advanced.

On 21st March the Sirdar, with Major Wingate and Slatin Pasha, and the 1st Battalion of the North Staffordshire Regiment, 917 strong, left Cairo for a.s.souan and Wady Halfa. At the same time the various Egyptian battalions were hurried up the river with all possible despatch.

As usual the enterprising firm of Messrs. Thomas Cook & Son came in for the princ.i.p.al part of the river transport work. All their steamers, except those engaged in the postal service, were requisitioned by the Egyptian Government, and, deprived of their handsome fittings and luxurious accommodation, now figured as troopships between Belianeh and a.s.souan. Between the 21st and 26th March, these steamers shipped from the former place no less than 4,500 men, besides 750 animals and an enormous quant.i.ty of stores. A detachment of the Connaught Rangers was stationed at Belianch in charge of the store depot established there.

It should be mentioned that the 9th Soudanese Battalion, forming part of the Souakim garrison, marched from Kosseir, on the Red Sea, to Keneh, on the Nile, following the route across the desert taken by General Baird and his army in 1801.

Meanwhile Colonel Hunter with his frontier force moved on to Akasheh, which for some time past had been the advanced post of the Dervishes, and occupied it without opposition.

The Egyptian troops now concentrated as rapidly as possible at the various posts between Wady Halfa and Akasheh, the Staffordshire Regiment being left to garrison the former place.

The railway was now being pushed forward, and on 24th May it was completed to a point three miles beyond Ambigol, sixty-three miles south of Wady Halfa.

To guard against raids on either flank in the proposed further advance, the west bank of the Nile was patrolled by native irregulars, and the important post of Murad Wells had its garrison of Ababdeh "friendlies"

strengthened by some two or three companies from one of the Egyptian battalions.

The post of Murad Wells, situated about half-way between Korosko and Abu Hamid, was by far the most important of the desert posts. No Dervish descent upon the east bank of the river was possible unless these wells had been first secured; consequently there had been repeated struggles for their possession. Their guardianship had at the time now referred to been intrusted to the Ababdeh Arabs in the pay of the Government. The last attack on the wells was that made by the Dervishes as lately as November, 1893, but which was repulsed with severe loss. The chief of the tribe, Saleh Bey, who was in command of the defending force, lost his life on this occasion, but was succeeded by his elder brother, Ahmed Bey, an equally capable leader.

On the news of Hunter's advance to Akasheh, a younger brother, Abd-el-Azim, on the 11th April made a bold reconnaissance to the south.

Crossing the desert with a party of his Ababdehs, he struck the Nile about forty miles south of Abu Hamid, and then continuing some eighty miles further along the river, he informed the people of the Egyptian advance. They received the news everywhere with the greatest delight, and expressed their joy at the prospect of being delivered from the Khalifa's reign of terror. Abd-el-Azim was able to obtain some useful information of the Dervish movements. At Abu Hamid there were only about 400 fighting men, but Berber was held by 6,000 of the Jehadia, Jaalin and Baggara tribes.

On the 1st of May the first fight of the season came off in the neighbourhood of Akasheh. About noon 240 of the Egyptian cavalry, under Major Burn Murdoch, when some four miles from Akasheh, suddenly came across 300 mounted Baggara, with a further force of about 1,000 men on foot, drawn up behind them. The odds being too great, the cavalry was ordered to retire. Seeing this movement, the Dervish hors.e.m.e.n, advancing amid a cloud of dust, charged down upon the rear troop just at the moment that the cavalry had entered a narrow defile. Several of the men were speared and stabbed in the back before the main body had time to wheel and in their turn charge the a.s.sailants. This they quickly did in dashing style, and then ensued a hand-to-hand fight which lasted about twenty minutes, at the end of which the Dervishes wheeled about and galloped off to the rear of the spearmen on foot. The ground not admitting of another charge, the cavalry then dismounted and opened fire on the enemy. This was kept up till at 3 p.m., just as the 11th Soudanese Battalion was arriving in support, the Dervishes retired, to the great satisfaction of the small Egyptian force, which with jaded horses, and suffering intensely from want of water, had been fighting continuously for three hours under a burning sun.

The cavalry had two killed and ten wounded, against eighteen killed and eighty wounded on the enemy's side.

On the 2nd June the arrival of the 10th Soudanese Battalion at Akasheh completed the concentration necessary for the further advance.

From information obtained by the Intelligence Department it was ascertained that the Dervish force, though inferior in number to that of the Egyptians, was composed of good fighting material, Baggara, Jaalins, and Jehadias, and was led by the well-known Emir Hamuda. Their total number was estimated at 3,000.

On the evening of the 6th the Egyptian troops commenced the advance, quitting Akasheh on the march to Ferket, on the east bank, sixteen miles distant. The Sirdar, who had shortly before reached the front, was in command. The force was divided into two parts, which may be called the River and the Desert Columns.

The River Column, under the command of Colonel Hunter, consisted of infantry and artillery. The infantry was divided into three brigades of three battalions each; the artillery was composed of two field batteries and two Maxims, the latter worked by thirty men of the Connaught Rangers.

The Desert Column, commanded by Major Burn Murdoch, consisted of seven squadrons of cavalry, the Camel Corps, one infantry battalion mounted on camels, one battery of Horse Artillery, and two Maxim guns. The total force of the two columns was not less than 9,100 men.

The Sirdar's plan for the attack was for the River Column to proceed along the Nile bank, and the Desert Column to make a detour to the east, so timed that both columns should reach Ferket at dawn, the former attacking from the north whilst the latter cut off the Dervish retreat east and south. On the west of their position was the Nile, the further bank of which was guarded by Egyptian irregulars, so as to prevent the possibility of escape on that side. Thus the Dervishes were to be completely hemmed in on every side.

The River Column bivouacked at 11 p.m. at a place distant only about four miles from the enemy, every precaution being taken to prevent news of the advance reaching the Dervish force. There were no bugle calls, no lights, and no firing.

At 12.15 on the morning of the 7th June the march was resumed, the 1st Brigade taking the ground nearest the river, the 2nd being on the left, and the 3rd in the rear.

Meanwhile the Desert Column was skilfully guided in the darkness across the desert until it reached the point south of Ferket where it had been arranged that it should take up its position.

The enemy became aware of the approach of the two columns almost simultaneously, saw that all prospect of retreat was cut off, and hurriedly prepared for action. Their formation was largely governed by the position of their camps. Their left wing, or wing next the river, occupied the huts of the Jaalin camp, and was thrown forward beyond the centre, which was opposite the Baggara camp; the right wing again was slightly in the rear of the centre.

The engagement began by the Dervishes opening fire at 5 a.m. from an outpost on the Jebel Ferkeh, a mountain on the north side of the village close down by the river under which the River Column had to pa.s.s.

The 2nd Brigade brought a heavy fire to bear upon the hill, and quickly clearing it, the march continued. As the column reached the more open ground beyond Jebel Ferkeh, the troops opened out, and the brigades on the right and left got into fighting formation, with two battalions thrown forward and one in reserve. The 1st Brigade then moved towards the river to attack the enemy's left wing, whilst the 2nd Brigade advanced on the right wing near the Jaalin camp; the 3rd Brigade coming up from the rear to fill the intervening gap.