On the 8th the Sultan's Minister of Foreign Affairs begged the English Amba.s.sador from considerations of humanity to enjoin Admiral Seymour not to do anything precipitate at Alexandria. Lord Dufferin curtly replied that "the Egyptian authorities had the matter completely in their own hands. They had only to do what was required of them, and not a shot would be fired." Lord Dufferin added the question, "Why was the Sultan not there with his troops to keep them in order?"

On the 9th the Porte was so far alarmed at what was going on at Alexandria as to send a despatch to Musurus Pasha, in London, pointing out that Admiral Seymour's statements respecting the Alexandria armaments were denied by the Egyptian authorities, and begging that the British Admiral might be directed to adopt a line of action more in conformity with the peaceful and conciliatory feelings which animated the Ottoman Government and the Court of St. James.

On the 10th Lord Dufferin intimated to the Porte that it was the intention of Admiral Seymour to open fire upon the batteries of Alexandria unless there was a temporary surrender of the forts for the purpose of disarmament. The Sultan replied that he would send a categorical answer on the following day. At the same time he requested that the bombardment might be delayed.

Said Pasha called on Lord Dufferin in the middle of the night (2 a.m. on the morning of the 11th), urging him to send a telegram to the British Government to order the bombardment to be arrested. The British Amba.s.sador transmitted the message. It arrived too late. The bombardment had already taken place. As Lord Dufferin, in a letter to Said Pasha in the course of the following day, observed, "When such grave issues were at stake, it was unwise to run things so fine."

On the 12th the Sultan's Minister informed his Lordship that the bombardment having added to the gravity of the situation, he was not in a position to make any communication, but that the Council were still deliberating as to the course to be pursued. This was the Council referred to at the beginning of the present chapter, which sat for twenty-four hours, and decided nothing.

On the 15th Said Pasha asked if an intimation to the Powers of the Sultan's intention to go to Egypt would be well received. Lord Dufferin said in reply that at one time he was certainly of that opinion, and that even then it might not be too late, provided His Majesty would authorize a Commissioner to enter the Conference.

On the same day all the Powers represented at the Conference presented the Identic Note to the Porte, inviting it to send troops to Egypt to a.s.sist the Khedive to re-establish order.

The Sultan, on receiving the Note, observed that if the Imperial Government had not up to the present decided on its own initiative to send troops, it was because it was convinced that measures of force could be dispensed with. He also announced that his Government now consented to take part in the Conference.

On the 16th July Lord Lyons was instructed to inform M. de Freycinet that, in view of the uncertainty which prevailed as to the movements of Arabi and his forces, Her Majesty's Government had telegraphed to the British Admiral at Port Sad, authorizing him to concert with the French Admiral for the protection of the Suez Ca.n.a.l, and to act in the event of sudden danger. In reply, the French Minister stated that the French Admiral would be instructed to concert measures with the English Admiral for the protection of the Ca.n.a.l, but that the French Government could not, without the sanction of the Chambers, authorize him to act.

On the 17th appearances became still more threatening. The Admiralty received a despatch from Admiral Hoskins reporting the arrival at Port Sad of Ali Pasha Fehmi,[42] whom Arabi had nominated Governor-General of the Suez Ca.n.a.l. This was followed by another, announcing that Arabi had called upon all Mussulmans to rise. Lord Granville thereupon urged the French Government to give their Admiral full discretion by telegraph in view of any emergency. In reply, M. de Freycinet informed the British Minister that he regretted very much to be unable to comply.

On the 19th the news from Egypt a.s.sumed a yet more serious character, and Lord Dufferin was instructed to inform the Sultan that after the delay which had occurred he could only hope to recover the confidence of Her Majesty's Government by the immediate issue of a Proclamation in favour of the Khedive, and denouncing Arabi as a rebel.

Whatever might have been the Sultan's views with regard to Arabi, he was not at the time disposed to comply with the Amba.s.sador's request.

Accordingly, His Majesty said that the issue of such a Proclamation as was suggested might not be a bad thing, and then turned the conversation to some other subject.

The same day news came of the blocking of the Mahmoudieh Ca.n.a.l, of the issue of proclamations against the Khedive by Arabi, and of the military preparations being made by him.

At a meeting of the Conference, the English and French Amba.s.sadors presented proposals relative to the measures to be adopted _for the protection_ of the _Suez Ca.n.a.l_, and asked the Conference to designate the Powers who should be charged, in case of need, to take the measures specially necessary for the purpose. The four other representatives reserved to themselves the right of referring the matter to their respective Governments.

On the 20th July Her Majesty's Government ordered the despatch of the expedition to Egypt.

On the 21st the Austrian Government declined to join in giving to other Powers the _mandat_ proposed for the defence of the Ca.n.a.l.

On the 22nd Lord Granville made the following proposal to the French Government:--

1. Unless the Porte sends an acceptance of a kind immediately available, the English and French representatives should be instructed to say to the other Amba.s.sadors that England and France can no longer rely upon Turkish intervention; and as they consider immediate action necessary to _prevent further loss of life and continuance of anarchy_, they intend, unless the Conference has any other plan, to devise with a third Power, if possible, military means for procuring a solution.

2. To ask Italy to be that third Power.

3. To consult immediately upon the division of labour.

4. The Suez Ca.n.a.l may be included in the general scheme of allied action.[43]

M. de Freycinet, in reply, cautiously stated that the French Government understood that the measures to be taken by them for the protection of the Ca.n.a.l would not extend to any expedition into the interior of the country, but would be limited to naval operations, and to the occupation of certain points on the Ca.n.a.l itself; _and that although they would not object to an expedition by England into the interior of Egypt_, they could not themselves take part in any such expedition. He added that before giving an official answer he must bring the matter before the Council of Ministers.

The German Charge d'Affaires stated to Lord Dufferin and the French Amba.s.sador, in very positive terms, that the northern Governments would never agree to a mandate, that it would be better for England to go forward at once by herself, and that every one admitted that the reserve made under the term _force majeure_ would cover anything that she might be obliged to do in Egypt.

On the 23rd July the Sultan determined to allow Said Pasha and a.s.sim Pasha to represent him at the Conference. At the meeting, the following day, the two Ottoman delegates took their seats, and the other delegates having given the Turkish representatives to understand that a formal answer was expected to the Identic Note of the 15th July, the Turkish Minister declared that "he accepted in principle the despatch of Ottoman troops to Egypt."

This statement, made at the eleventh hour, was not without its effect on the different great Powers. As a fact, with the exception of England, and possibly France, none of them desired to meddle either directly or indirectly in Egyptian matters, and they were glad of the pretext to let England settle Egypt alone.

The Austrian Government notified that, "in case the Sultan refused to send his troops to Egypt, Austria would be even less disposed to join in asking other Governments to act as European _mandataires_, for the general maintenance of order, than to do so for the protection of the Suez Ca.n.a.l."

On the 24th July Italy was invited to co-operate with England and France in the steps to be taken for the protection of the Ca.n.a.l. The Italian Minister, M. Mancini, thanked Her Majesty's Government for the proof of confidence and friendship afforded by their invitation to her, but thought that at the moment when Turkey had accepted all the conditions of a Note to which England and Italy were parties, it would be a contradiction for those two Powers to enter into engagements as to another form of intervention.

On the 25th M. de Freycinet, being pressed for a formal answer to the proposal made for the joint military intervention, answered that for the moment the French Government could not go beyond the projected co-operation for the protection of the Suez Ca.n.a.l.

On the 24th a Bill was brought into the Chamber of Deputies to enable the French Government to carry into effect arrangements with England for a joint protection of the Ca.n.a.l. The amount asked for was 9,410,000 francs. The result was a most stormy debate, which was adjourned amid much excitement.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE PORTE AND THE POWERS.

On the 26th July Said Pasha formally announced that the Sublime Porte, resolved to give effect to its incontestable Sovereign rights over Egypt, had decided to send immediately a sufficient number of troops.

This was communicated to the Conference at its sitting the same day.

Said Pasha admitted, on being pressed, that the despatch of the troops could only be the result of an understanding arrived at between the Powers. The British and French Amba.s.sadors then made the following declaration:--"France and England have communicated to the Conference their views, which have also been communicated to the different Cabinets, and their proposals having encountered no objections, the two Powers are at present agreed that in the present state of affairs they are ready, if necessity arises, to employ themselves _in the protection of the Suez Ca.n.a.l_, either alone, or with the addition of any Power which is willing to a.s.sist."

At a meeting on the 27th, the representatives of the Porte communicated a declaration to the effect that having again informed the members of the Conference that the Imperial Government was on the point of sending troops to Egypt, the Government earnestly hoped that, in face of this determination, the existing foreign occupation of that country would be abandoned as soon as the Ottoman troops should arrive at Alexandria.

In reply, Lord Dufferin was instructed to say that Her Majesty's Government could neither withdraw their troops, nor relax their preparations; adding that the arrival and co-operation of Turkish forces in Egypt would be accepted by England, provided the character in which they came was satisfactorily defined beforehand.

At this period, it must be borne in mind that the British expeditionary forces had already started, and the Ministry of Mr. Gladstone had now no desire to have the Turkish troops, for which they had previously professed so much anxiety. It was, however, necessary to keep up appearances, and to find from time to time plausible pretexts to prevent the Sultan from carrying out his determination.

In effecting the desired object Lord Dufferin, as will be seen, found means to throw such difficulties in the way as to prevent the despatch of a Turkish army to Egypt.

The views of Germany were also at the same time communicated to Lord Granville, and were stated to him as being that the Sultan had the first claim to exercise the proposed protection. In the event of his being unwilling or unable to do so, the Powers interested in the Ca.n.a.l would be justified in acting themselves. If those Powers had the intention of protecting their own interests in the Ca.n.a.l, Germany could not take upon herself any responsibility for the measures to be taken for this purpose. Finally Austria, Russia, and Italy adopted the same view as Germany.

On the 28th the adjourned debate on the vote of 9,410,000 francs for the despatch of French troops to Egypt for the protection of the Ca.n.a.l took place in the French Chamber of Deputies. The force, it was explained, was to be 8,000 men and two gunboats. The Ministers pointed out that all that was intended was to occupy one or two points of the Ca.n.a.l. France would be charged with the surveillance of the Ca.n.a.l between Port Sad and Ismailia, and England of the part between Ismailia and Suez.

The vote was violently opposed, and in the end rejected by a majority of 341 against the Government. The debate was wound up by a remarkable speech from M. Clemenceau, who said,--"Messieurs, la conclusion de ce qui se pa.s.se en ce moment est celle-ci, l'Europe est couverte de soldats, tout le monde attend, toutes les Puissances se reservent leur liberte pour l'avenir; reservez la liberte d'action de la France."

Lord Granville, seeing that all hope of French co-operation was gone, intimated to M. de Freycinet that, although Her Majesty's Government accepted the co-operation of Turkey, it would nevertheless proceed with its own measures. "That then," said the French Minister, "is _intervention a deux_."

On the 1st August Lord Dufferin informed the Turkish Minister, in reply to his request that the British expedition should be countermanded, that it was useless for him to base any of his calculations on the supposition either that the troops would be countermanded, or that the British _corps d'armee_ would leave Egypt until order had been completely re-established.

The Minister said with reference to the Proclamation against Arabi, that he thought it would be advisable to defer it until after the Turkish troops were landed.

Lord Dufferin answered that if the Proclamation was not previously issued, no Turkish troops would be allowed to land in Egypt. The Amba.s.sador said, "If the Sultan desired to co-operate with England it was necessary he should first clearly define the att.i.tude he intended to a.s.sume towards Arabi and the rebellious faction."

On the same day the Ottoman plenipotentiaries delivered to the other members of the Conference the reasons for the Porte not issuing the desired Proclamation declaring Arabi a rebel. The princ.i.p.al pa.s.sage was as follows:--"It is, therefore, quite natural to suppose that a Proclamation which would accuse a subject of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, who, at a moment when he showed fidelity and devotion to his sovereign, was the object of distinctions, would derive its force from the immediate presence of the material factor, the absence of which at the time of its publication would render its provisions barren."

Orders were sent to the English Admiral that, until the Porte should have entered into an agreement with Her Majesty's Government for the issue of a Proclamation by the Sultan in support of Tewfik Pasha, and denouncing Arabi as a rebel, and should have signed a Military Convention for the co-operation of the Turkish troops, no Turkish troops could be allowed to land in Egypt.

On the 5th Lord Dufferin formally notified this to the Ottoman delegates, and Said Pasha intimated that he fully understood the grave nature of the communication.