Sound Military Decision - Part 20
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Part 20

Such a study enables the commander to envisage the enemy operations which presumably can materially affect his own plans. He may now list the presumed capabilities of the enemy, in the form of courses of action, for purposes of further a.n.a.lysis. Naturally, he lists courses which appear to be suitable, feasible, and acceptable as to consequences, but formal tests are deferred until the next phase of the estimate.

C. Application of Tests for Suitability, Feasibility, and Acceptability.

Having listed pertinent enemy courses of action as described above, the commander next tests them for suitability, for feasibility, and for acceptability as to their consequences.

The procedure is the same as for his own courses of action (Section II). However, since the enemy's appropriate effect desired, if deducible at all, is often only an approximation, the test for suitability is usually less rigid or absolute than for the commander's own courses of action. By the same token, since the enemy's fighting strength will usually include elements of conjecture and hypothesis, the test for feasibility may be less reliable than when applied to the commander's own courses. In fact, if there are any reasonable doubts as to feasibility of an enemy course of action, it is properly retained for further consideration. The same considerations and the same safeguard apply with respect to acceptability of the consequences.

D. Listing Retained Enemy Courses of Action.

All enemy courses of action which, after test, are retained for further study are now listed by the commander.

While it is manifestly of advantage to the commander if the number of enemy courses can reasonably be reduced to only a few or even to one, it is important that no material enemy capability be neglected because of undue restriction of the field.

The previous a.n.a.lysis will have indicated, at least, in some cases, the degree of suitability and feasibility, and will have enabled the commander to form a considered opinion as to any preference, from the enemy viewpoint, on the basis of consequences as to costs.

In many instances, therefore, it will be possible to arrange retained enemy courses in order of priority, i.e., the more likely being listed before the less likely. In case of doubt, the higher priority is awarded by the commander to enemy courses which are more dangerous from his (the commander's) point of view.

In other instances, no priority can properly be indicated.

As a result of this study, the commander may now be able to combine certain enemy courses. In any case, he closes this portion of the estimate with a list of them, cla.s.sified so far as he finds justifiable, and thus made available for further effective use in the estimate.

SECTION IV

SELECTION OF THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION

The extent to which detail is desirable in Section IV of the Estimate will vary with the nature of the problem (page 95). Experience usually demonstrates, however, that an estimate in only the necessary detail escapes the danger inherent in undue detail which would tend to befog the main issues. As the commander proceeds with his estimate, he will recognize the need for additional examination into details, and will conduct such examination accordingly.

A. a.n.a.lysis and Comparison of Retained Courses of Action.

The next step in the estimate is the natural one of comparing the commander's retained courses of action with those of the enemy which have been retained for further study. This process consists of executing, in imagination, the plan contained in each of the commander's courses of action, against that in each of the enemy's.

One method is for the Commander to take the initiative with each of his plans and mentally to push it through with vigor. By this procedure, he concentrates his thought on the effect to be produced, on the changed situation which that effect will bring about for the enemy, on the modification in the enemy's effort which will be caused, on the resulting obstacles which these modifications will create, and on the provisions which will have to be made to overcome the obstacles.

It will at once be apparent that the commander may have to re-estimate the enemy situation during this a.n.a.lysis. Such necessity arises because of the changes made by his own course of action upon the enemy situation. The commander will desire to reach a studied conclusion as to what counter action the enemy may take when the nature of the planned action against him becomes evident. This re-estimate of the situation may be brief, as it is an adjustment of factors which are familiar through previous examination. Sometimes the re-estimate will have been made mentally, before reaching this point, and adjustments may already have been made in the written estimate, in antic.i.p.ation of this contingency. Sometimes the commander may find it desirable, after reaching this point, to re-write, at least in part, his original enemy estimate (Section III). The particular procedure adopted is unimportant; the important feature is to recognize that such a re-estimate process is normal, and especially so with reference to this portion of the Estimate.

The foregoing discussion ill.u.s.trates the point that an examination into enemy capabilities is not complete if the commander puts himself in the enemy's place merely for the purpose of estimating the original situation from the enemy viewpoint. In addition, the commander examines each of the enemy's modified problems which the changed situation, created by the execution of the commander's plan, has superimposed upon the enemy's original problem. Thus only can the commander a.n.a.lyze the various ways whereby the enemy may oppose his own proposed courses of action. Thus only may sound conclusion later be reached, in the next subsection of the estimate, as to what course of action, or combination of courses, is the best.

The comparison of plan against plan thus far has been restricted to the method whereby the commander takes the initiative with each of his own retained courses of action. Another method is to imagine the enemy as taking the initiative, carrying through each of his courses against each of the commander's courses. This method is applicable, for instance, to cases where the enemy is able to initiate action which, by its nature, would frustrate the execution of any of the commander's courses. The choice of methods is a matter of judgment on the part of the commander.

It is rarely that courses of action can be compared without resolving each, to some extent, into the detailed operations which it comprises.

However, this a.n.a.lysis is confined, as previously explained (see page 145), to the details whose consideration is necessary for purposes of a sound comparison. In some cases there may be need for study in the greatest detail. Generally, however, the requirement can be met by considering for each operation the kind of action, the types of weapons, and the physical objectives.

During the progress of these a.n.a.lyses of the impact of operations upon each other, there may occur to mind further operations which an alert and awakened enemy may undertake in opposition; the counter to these operations may also suggest itself.

The use of the chart, with positions and forces plotted, is here frequently essential; in tactical problems diagrams and tables showing possibilities of position, distance, speed, maneuver, gun ranges, relative strength in types and weapons are useful.

Through the procedure described above, the commander is afforded further opportunity to test his courses of action, as to suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. He can, once more, view each of his courses from the standpoint of its suitability. The visualized enemy action may introduce considerations, not previously realized, as to whether certain of his own courses are suitable to the appropriate effect desired, when results are envisaged on the basis of the possible opposition. As to feasibility, the a.n.a.lysis permits him to make a further estimate of the enemy capabilities with respect to obstructing or preventing the desired outcome of his (the commander's) courses of action. In addition, by visualizing the pertinent operations involved, he enables himself to evaluate the costs to be expected.

Should the commander conclude, at this stage, that further consideration of any of his courses, so far retained, is not justified, he will naturally reject such courses so as to confine further a.n.a.lysis within narrower limits.

Should he find, during his a.n.a.lysis, that further combinations should be made among his retained courses, he makes such combinations and uses them in his comparison.

However, he defers, until the next subsection, his choice of the course to be finally selected, or his conclusion that none can justifiably be adopted. The process of comparison is confined to deduction, rearrangement, and justified rejection, preliminary to weighing and selecting in the next subsection.

B. Determination of the Best Course of Action.

The commander is now ready to ponder over his retained courses of action as further a.n.a.lyzed in the light of enemy opposition. All of these courses, if carried out, are presumably competent, in varying extent, to attain the appropriate effect desired. He will now examine and consider them with the specific intent of coming to a conclusion as to which one, or which combination, he will select as the best. The a.n.a.lysis of each course of action in comparison with each enemy course has made possible a comparison, to this end, of the commander's retained courses with each other.

At this point, therefore, the commander again a.s.sembles his retained courses of action.

He includes the combinations which the preceding a.n.a.lysis has indicated belong properly together. He then considers the final tabulation in the light of the considerations now to be noted.

The conclusive tests are now made for suitability, for feasibility, and for acceptability as to consequences. Because of the importance of this terminal a.n.a.lysis, it is desirable that the tests be as precise as possible.

The commander now has, in addition to his list of the retained courses of action, a summarized comparison of each with the others, under the several pertinent headings. He next examines this all-inclusive summary, with the intent of selecting the best course of action.

It may be found that one, or another, or a combination, is best.

Again, there is the possibility of considering, as best, a course of action which, if carried out, will only complete an initial stage toward the accomplishment of the motivating task.

If the result of the a.n.a.lysis has demonstrated that there is no satisfactory course of action, this fact is here stated, with a notation as to the reasons for such opinion. In this case the commander faces a dilemma.

Usually a task imposed on the commander by higher authority will be a carefully considered a.s.signment of part of the superior's planned effort. The commander may expect normally to find that his own estimate of the situation will yield courses of action which, if successfully carried out, will accomplish the task a.s.signed. The reasoned plan of the superior is a safeguard in this respect.

Nevertheless, realism requires that the commander be fully prepared to meet the possible dilemma:--When he cannot envisage a course of action for accomplishing the a.s.signed task, or when, of the several courses of action under consideration, he finds none satisfactory, what is he to do? (See page 70).

Under these circ.u.mstances the commander reviews his estimate in all its aspects. By minute re-examination he endeavors to find ways of accomplishing his a.s.signed task. If he cannot accomplish the task, he seeks for ways whereby he can further such accomplishment so far as is reasonably feasible. If unable, in any degree, to further the accomplishment of his task, he endeavors to contribute, so far as he feasibly and acceptably can, to the accomplishment of the purpose of his mission.

It is to be expected, of course, that, if unable to accomplish his a.s.signed task, the commander will make constructive representations (page 103) to higher authority. The latter may then a.s.sign additional forces or may otherwise alter the problem,--for example, by a.s.signing a new task. However, a situation such as described may occur when the commander is alone in a distant theater or when for other reasons he finds himself unable to communicate, in time, with higher authority.

In such a situation the commander is under the necessity of determining, for himself, a task which is suitable, feasible, and acceptable under the circ.u.mstances (page 52).

It is evident that, at some point in the foregoing procedure, the commander has been forced to abandon the solution of his basic problem, because he has found that there is no sound solution. He has not completely abandoned the solution of his original problem, because he has not yet exhausted all of its possibilities. However, the solution of the original problem has unquestionably entered a new phase, or step.

The new step presents the commander with a new problem, a phase in the solution of the original problem; the new problem is related to the abandoned basic problem, because it arises out of the same situation, which has not changed. The new problem is, however, differentiated from the basic problem because it is based on a different incentive.

The incentive for the solution of the new problem arises directly out of a decision made by the commander himself, i.e., his decision that no sound solution for the basic problem can be found. The new problem is one for the commander himself to solve, i.e., it cannot properly be delegated to a subordinate for solution, because its solution is necessary as a basis for the commander's detailed plan. For these reasons the new problem is, by definition (page 106), a subsidiary problem, of the type distinctive of the second step.

At what point in the solution of the original problem does the commander abandon the basic problem and proceed with the solution of the new, subsidiary problem which has arisen as described? There are various possible answers, all with a basis of reason, to this question.

From the standpoint of theoretical precision, it might be said that the basic problem is abandoned when the conclusion is reached that its motivating task cannot be accomplished. It might also be said that the basic problem is abandoned when the conclusion is reached that the commander can in no way contribute toward the accomplishment of the motivating task.

Practical experience indicates, however, that the basic estimate can profitably be utilized until the conclusion is reached that no contribution can be made to the purpose of the mission. At this point a new estimate, subsidiary to the basic estimate, necessarily begins.

This view is confirmed, theoretically, by the fact that, at this point in the procedure, a radical change occurs with respect to the appropriate effect desired. In such circ.u.mstances, the commander concludes that he cannot contribute, in any degree, to the accomplishment of his immediate superior's general plan.