BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERT TOOMBS.

General Hill was a good man and a brave soldier. His devotion to the Confederate cause was undoubted, but his zeal sometimes made him harsh, and more than once he placed himself in the position of reflecting upon the conduct of others. On one occasion at the battle of Chickamauga, where General Hill was in command of the extreme right of the Confederate line, on the second day of the battle information was brought to him of the sudden and unexpected advance of a strong Federal force against his line. It proved to be the division of the Federal General Gordon Granger. General Hill and General W. H. T. Walker, who commanded two divisions under General Hill, proceeded at once to the threatened point, to ascertain the situation of affairs, accompanied by some members of their staff. Arrived at a point where this new arrival of Federal forces could be seen, General Walker deferred to General Hill and asked him, "What do you wish me to do?"

"What do I want you to do?" said Hill with severity, and even with something like a snarl, "I want you to fight."

General Walker flushed up in a moment. He was not a man to deserve any reflection upon his courage or to bear it when offered. No man in the old army had a higher and more deserved reputation for dashing courage.

He had been desperately wounded in Florida, and again wounded, supposed to be mortally, in leading the a.s.sault on Chapultepec in the Mexican War, and had, on many occasions, given undoubted evidence of his valor and fidelity. He answered hotly, "Of course I will fight; you know that, General Hill, well enough; but, by G.o.d! sir, there are two ways of fighting, one to whip and the other to get whipped."

The point was a good one. Major Joseph B. c.u.mming, chief of General Walker's staff, who related this incident, says it had the desired effect.

When Longstreet marched against Pope he stationed General Toombs'

brigade to guard one of the fords of the Rapidan. Toombs was absent at the time and when he rode up ordered them back to camp. General Longstreet heard of Toombs making stump speeches and "referring in anything but complimentary terms of his commander." He sent General Toombs to Gordonsville. Afterward he received an apology from Toombs and directed him to join his command. ["]As we were preparing for the charge at Mana.s.sas (second battle), Toombs got there, riding rapidly with his hat in his hand, and was much enthused. I was just sending a courier to his command with a dispatch. 'Let me take it,' he exclaimed.

'With pleasure,' I responded, and handed him the paper. He put spurs to his horse and dashed off, accompanied by his courier. When he rode up and took command of his brigade there was wild enthusiasm, and, everything being ready, an exultant shout was sent up, and the men sprang to the charge. I never had any more trouble with Toombs. We were afterward warm personal friends."

On the 30th of August, 1862, Hon. A. H. Stephens wrote to Mrs. Toombs that General Toombs was still at Gordonsville. He said:

How long he will remain, I do not know. I thought at first that it would only be for a day or two, or until General Longstreet could receive and reply to two notes he had written, explaining to my mind very fully and satisfactorily his acts and conduct, which, it seems to me, General Longstreet had misunderstood. Such is still my opinion, and yet I may be mistaken. I do not know much of General Longstreet. I only know that General Toombs, who does know him, always expressed very high admiration of him as an officer.

At the second battle of Mana.s.sas, August 29, 1862, Toombs' brigade in Jones' division held the rear of Longstreet's corps. Early in the morning the brigade took up the march in the direction of the old battlefield of Mana.s.sas, where heavy firing was heard. Arriving at noon it was stationed on the extreme right, or upon the Mana.s.sas Gap railroad. The brigades formed in echelon. General Longstreet in his published report commended especially General Toombs for gallant conduct at Mana.s.sas Plain.

General D. R. Jones, in his report of Mana.s.sas, says:

General Toombs, released from arrest, under which he had been since the 18th of August, came upon the field shortly after his brigade went in under fire and accompanied it in action.

Captain H. L. French, of the 17th Georgia Regiment, says: "Soon after our engagement, to our great satisfaction, we unexpectedly met our gallant commander, Brigadier General Robert Toombs, who, antic.i.p.ating the fight, had ridden hard all day. He was greeted with hearty cheers, and said, 'Boys, I am proud of the report given of you by General Jones.

I could not be with you to-day, but this was owing to no fault of mine.

To-morrow I lead you.'"

One report of this engagement declares that as Toombs dashed into the fire and joined his men, he waved his hat and shouted, "Go it, boys! I am with you again. Jeff Davis can make a general, but it takes G.o.d Almighty to make a soldier!"

The expulsion of Pope only accelerated the momentum of the Army of Northern Virginia. From the front of Richmond, the theater of operations was transferred at once to the front of Washington, and the Union army was again on the defensive. General Lee, freed from the necessity of guarding the Confederate capital, resolved to invade Maryland. He reasoned that the prestige of the invasion would advance the cause of the young nation abroad; that it would relieve Virginia from incursions during the winter, and that the presence of the army in Maryland would raise the standard of revolt and cause the liberation of that State from the Union cause. Lee's army, however, was not equal to such an expedition. It was not well clothed or armed, and barely numbered 40,000, while McClellan had 80,000.

Toombs' brigade accompanied Longstreet's corps in its counter-march from Hagarstown to Hill's support. On the 14th of September these were withdrawn to the valley of the Antietam. The creek of Antietam runs obliquely to the source of the Potomac, and empties into that river six miles above Harper's Ferry. The Confederate lines were, on the 15th, drawn up in front of Sharpsburg, Longstreet being on the right of the road from Sharpsburg.

In this place the creek is crossed by four stone bridges, and three of these were strongly guarded by the Confederates. Burnside's army corps was stationed on the Sharpsburg Turnpike, directly in front of bridge No. 3. The preliminary deploy occupied the 16th of September, an artillery duel enlivening the time before the battle. Burnside lay behind the heights on the east bank of the Antietam and opposite the Confederate right, which, Swinton says, it was designed he should a.s.sail, after forcing the pa.s.sage of the Antietam by the lower stone bridge. The part a.s.signed to General Burnside was of the highest importance, for a successful attack by him upon the Confederate right, would, by carrying the Sharpsburg Crest, force Lee from his line of retreat by way of Shepherdstown. Swinton says this task should have been an easy one, for the Confederate forces at this point had been drawn upon to recruit the left where Hooker had made his furious a.s.saults.

There was left in the right wing of the Confederate army but a single division of 2500 men under General D. R. Jones, and the force actually present to dispute the pa.s.sage of the stone bridge did not exceed 400.

These troops were under the direction of General Robert Toombs, and this engagement made his reputation as a fighter and was one of the most brilliant and memorable of the Civil War. It was one o'clock before Burnside charged. General Lee, in his report of the battle, said:

In the afternoon the enemy advanced on our right, where General Jones' division was posted, who handsomely maintained his position. General Toombs' brigade, guarding the bridge on Antietam Creek, gallantly resisted the approach of the enemy, but his superior number enabling him to extend his left, he crossed below the bridge and a.s.sumed a threatening att.i.tude on our right, which fell back in confusion. By this time, between 3 and 4 o'clock P.M., A.

P. Hill, with five of his brigades, reached the scene of action and drove the enemy from the position they had taken. The bridge was defended with two regiments of Toombs' brigade (2d and 20th) and the batteries of General Jones. General Toombs' small command repulsed five different a.s.saults made by greatly superior forces, and maintained its position with distinguished gallantry....

Toombs charged the flank of the enemy, while Archer moved upon the front of the Federal line. The enemy made a brief resistance and then ran in confusion.

Such commendation from the commander-in-chief of the Confederate army speaks for itself.

Speaking of the last charge, when the Federals were driven back over the creek in the counter-attack, General Jones says:

General Toombs, whom I had sent for, arriving from the right with a portion of his brigade (11th Georgia Regiment) was ordered to charge the enemy. This he did most gallantly, supported by Archer's brigade, delivering fire at less than fifty yards, dashing at the enemy with the bayonet, forcing him from the crest and following him down the hill.

General Garnett's report credits Toombs with having "reenforced the right just after it had been driven back, and restored the fortunes of the day in that quarter."

From the report of General Toombs it appeared that when he first moved into Maryland he was a.s.signed to command a division composed of Toombs', Drayton's, and Anderson's brigades, and took possession of Hagerstown.

On September 14 he was ordered to Sharpsburg, two of his regiments having been sent to Williamsport to protect the wagon trains. With two small regiments left, General Toombs took position near the bridge over the Antietam on the road to Harper's Ferry. He took possession of the ground with the 20th Georgia Regiment, commanded by Colonel Jonathan B.

c.u.mming, and the 2d Georgia Regiment, commanded by Colonel Holmes. The creek was comparatively straight by this bridge. He formed his regiments along the creek in more open order than was desirable on account of the smallness of his number. Subsequently the 50th Georgia, with scarcely 100 men, was placed under his command. Colonel Eubanks' battery was by order of General Longstreet placed in his rear. The enemy opened on his position on Tuesday evening, the 16th of September. On Wednesday morning, his pickets were driven in and the enemy menaced his position.

The ground descended gently to the creek covered with a narrow strip of woods, affording slight protection. The enemy approached by the road parallel with his line of battle, he says, exposing his flank to a destructive fire. Between 9 A. M. and 1 P. M. the Federals made five attempts to carry the bridge, and were repulsed by the 2d and 20th Georgia regiments. Failing to wrest the bridge from its heroic defenders, the enemy turned his attention to the fords. "Not being able to get reenforcements, and seeing that the enemy would cross and attack my front, right flank, and rear, Colonel Holmes having been killed, Major Harris wounded, both regiments having suffered heavily, ammunition nearly exhausted, and the battery withdrawn, I withdrew my command to a position, designated by Longstreet, opposite the lower fords. This change of position was made very satisfactorily and without serious loss. The 15th and 17th Georgia regiments and part of the 11th, previously detached, now came up and occupied the new position. The 20th and 2d went to the ammunition train to replenish their cartridge boxes.

The enemy moved through the bridge and ford with extreme caution, and lost nearly two hours in crossing, about which time A. P. Hill's division came from Harper's Ferry. I was ordered by Longstreet to put my command in motion to meet the enemy. I found them in possession of the ground I was ordered to occupy, including the bridge road and the suburbs of Sharpsburg. With less than one-fifth the numbers of the enemy and within 100 paces of his lines I determined to give battle. I had instantly to determine either to retreat or to fight. A retreat would have left the town of Sharpsburg and General Longstreet's rear open to the enemy. The enemy advanced in good order to within sixty or eighty paces, when the effectiveness of the fire threw his column into considerable confusion, perceiving which I instantly ordered a charge, which was brilliantly executed by my whole line. The enemy fled in confusion toward the river, making two or three efforts to rally, which were soon defeated. The enemy brought over the bridge a battery. I ordered Richardson's battery to open upon it, and at the same time the 15th and 20th Georgia charged upon it and compelled it to rejoin the flying infantry. I desired to pursue the enemy across the river, but, being deficient in artillery, I sent to General Lee for a battery, which came up too late. I then determined to move my troops to my first position along the river, but received the order to occupy the heights on the opposite side of the road leading to the bridge from Sharpsburg, and there the troops bivouacked for the night."

The gallant conduct of Toombs' brigade at Sharpsburg was the theme on both sides. The country rang with its exploits and the fiery Georgia brigadier became the toast of the army. Burnside's heavy losses abundantly proved the stoutness of the resistance and the deadliness of the charges of the Georgia troops.

The next evening, on the edge of Sharpsburg, General Toombs and his aids crossed a little branch on his way to the headquarters of Colonel Benning. General Toombs rode his famous mare "Gray Alice," so well known to his command. He was not very far over when a troop of cavalry rode up. He challenged them, and they answered "We are friends." Captain Troup of his staff, however, detected the ruse and fired into them. The squad returned the fire. General Toombs was shot through the hand with which he was holding the reins. The gray mare at once became unmanageable and ran back across the branch. As soon as he could control the mare, General Toombs rode back to Colonel Benning and, reporting his wound, turned his brigade over to Colonel Benning. When it became known that General Toombs was wounded his men were deeply pained. Always solicitous for their welfare, his soldiers were devotedly attached to him. He took care of his brigade even to the extremity of violating army discipline. He exacted the utmost consideration for his men, and the officer who periled their safety, or disputed their efficiency, was quickly called to account. Whether against Johnston, Longstreet, or Hill, the First Brigade, First Division, was sure of a fearless champion in the person of its commander.

The battle of Sharpsburg was a very b.l.o.o.d.y one. The losses on the Federal side were nearly 12,500, while the Confederates lost 8000. Lee withdrew into Virginia, and McClellan was too much demoralized to follow. Longstreet, in summing up the Mana.s.sas and Maryland campaign, declared that in one month the troops had marched over two hundred miles upon little more than half rations and fought nine battles and skirmishes. They had "killed, wounded, and captured nearly as many men as we had in our ranks, besides taking arms and other munitions of war in large quant.i.ties." General Longstreet compliments Brigadier General Toombs for his "gallant defense at the bridge of Antietam and his vigorous charge upon the enemy's flank; he was severely wounded at the close of the engagement."

General Toombs returned to his home after Sharpsburg, and remained several months. He rejoined his command near Fredericksburg, but in March, 1863, wrote a touching farewell to his brigade and resigned his commission in the army of Northern Virginia. It seemed to him that he did not have justice done him at Richmond. He aspired, with the ambition of a soldier, to be promoted in his country's service. His conduct at Sharpsburg, where he wrung admiration from his superior officers, appeared to call for recognition from the President, but he did not receive his major-generalship, and, although more than once in the actual command of a division, did not secure that t.i.tle. It is true that he would have liked the promotion; but he did not expect it. He had written to his wife that he would not be driven from the army until after some great battle, when he should have the opportunity of doing something for his country. "The day after such an event, I will retire if I live through it." The battle had occurred, his record was written upon the stone bridge of Antietam, and his work was at an end.

Postmaster-General Reagan was one of those who recognized the merits of General Toombs. Twice did he approach President Davis with the request that General Toombs be promoted to the command of a division. That official replied promptly that he did not oppose it himself, but that he could not do it without the recommendation of the army officers, and that recommendation had not been given. Possibly the field officers believed the suggestion would have been ungracious to Mr. Davis.

General Toombs had not hesitated to criticise the policy and appointments of the Richmond administration. That practice had strained his relations with the Confederate Government, but Toombs was a man who "would not flatter Neptune for his trident."

General Toombs was not a trained soldier, but he had some fine points of a great commander. He was the soul of energy and common sense. He was bold, dashing, magnetic. He had the quality of infusing his spirit into his men. His quick mind seized the points of a campaign, and his intellect was broad and overmastering. It is related of him that one day in Virginia he hurried to the rear for a conference with Jefferson Davis, to which the President had summoned him, upon some point of civil administration. This business over, he dashed back to the front, where he had an engagement with General Lee over a plan of attack. General Longstreet said Toombs had the kindling eye and rare genius of a soldier, but lacked the discipline of a military man. This was the serious flaw in his character. He had what General Johnston declared was the great drawback about the Southern soldier, "a large endowment of the instinct of personal liberty," and it was difficult to subordinate his will to the needs of military discipline. He had been accustomed to priority, and in whatever company, under whatever conditions he found himself, his had been the part to lead and to rule. As Colonel Thomas W.

Thomas had said of him, "Toombs has always been the big frog in the pond." Men conceded to him this prestige. Under the cast-iron rule of the army he found himself subordinated to men intellectually beneath him, but trained and skilled in the art of war. He was swift to detect error, and impatient in combating blunder. The rule of mediocrity, the red tape of the service, the restraints of the corps, the tactics of the field galled his imperious spirit. He commanded his brigade as he had represented his State in the Senate--as a sovereign and independent body, and like the heroic Helvetian had blazoned on his crest, "No one shall cross me with impunity."

Robert Toombs made a mistake in sinking himself in the routine of a brigade commander. He should have taken the War Department, or, like Pitt, have pushed the war from the floor of the Senate. Swinton says that Abraham Lincoln brought the habits of a politician to military affairs, in which their intrusion can only result in confusion of just relations. There is ineradicable antagonism between the maxims which govern politics and those which govern war.

During General Toombs' absence in the field, he opposed the Conscript Acts of the Confederate administration. He believed them arbitrary and unjust. He considered that this was a tendency toward centralization which the Confederate Government was fighting; that it placed too much power in the hands of one man; that it was deadly to States' Rights and personal liberty, and that it would impair the efficiency of the army by lowering its patriotism. The champion of this anti-administration policy in Georgia was Linton Stephens, the brother of the vice president.

Toombs in the field, the elder Stephens in Congress, and Linton Stephens in the Georgia Legislature, fought the Conscription and Impressment Acts. Hon. Joseph E. Brown, the war Governor of Georgia, was also a vigorous opponent of this policy. This influence gave rise, in the early part of 1864, to the Peace Resolutions of Linton Stephens, who sustained Governor Brown in his policy, to inaugurate State action for "the preservation of rights and the attainment of peace." Linton Stephens, in a strong letter to General Toombs at that time, called attention to the fact that since the war began neither side had made any effort to stop the effusion of blood. He believed that the professional soldiers and West Point generals would never permit the cessation of hostilities.

Such men, he thought, would not, in human nature, desire peace. "How can it be explained," he wrote, "that both governments have fought on during these long years of blood and tears and desolation, without either one offering terms of peace, and with both running a swift race of rivalry in usurping the most despotic power under the ever-recurring and false plea of necessities of war? Have both governments formed designs that cannot be accomplished in peace, and which seek opportunity and shelter in the confusion and panic of war?"

Mr. Linton Stephens was a leading lawyer and legislator in Georgia. He was a man of great ability. He had started the practice of law in the office of Robert Toombs, and had been a political follower and close friend of the great Georgian. He had served upon the bench of the Supreme Court of his State, and at the close of the war his political influence was probably greater than that of any man at home. He was fearless, inflexible, high-toned, and full of power. He did not hesitate to condemn the legislation asked for by Mr. Davis, and joined Mr. Toombs in opposing the appointment of General Bragg as supervisor of all military operations. Mr. Stephens believed that the next step after the Impressment Act would be the organization of all labor into a military system under government control.

The result of the policy of Mr. Davis justified the protest of the Georgians, but there is nothing to warrant the belief that Mr. Davis was moving toward military despotism or that he relished the continuance of strife. He saw that the South was in for the war. Desperate situations required desperate remedies. He grasped the government with a strong hand, and lacked neither nerve nor patriotism. The principles of this policy were unsound, but the motives of Jefferson Davis were pure. Nor was there reason to sustain the wholesale denunciation of West Point.

That school of soldiers was the backbone of the army, and the fact that so many Southern men gave up commissions in the United States army and came South when their States seceded, overthrew the idea that they were tools of the general government and had lost ident.i.ty or sympathy with people at home. But General Toombs was bold and impatient in his positions.

Equally opposed was he to the policy adopted in Georgia of recommending the planting of all grain and no cotton. From Richmond he wrote in March, 1864, directions to his brother Gabriel Toombs, who managed his plantations in Washington:

I do not care to change my crops. I wish to raise an abundant provision crop and then as much cotton as I can.... Brown's and Chambers' policy is all foolishness....

As to what I shall choose to plant on my own estates, I shall neither refer it to newspapers, nor to public meetings, nor to legislatures. I know what sort of people compose these cla.s.ses. Let them take up arms and come with me to drive the intruders away from our soil, and then we will settle what sort of seed we will put into it.

CHAPTER XXIII.

WITH THE GEORGIA MILITIA.

General Toombs' next appearance in the field was as adjutant and inspector-general of General G. W. Smith's division of Georgia militia.

He was present during the battles before Atlanta, the engagement at Peachtree Creek, and the siege of the city. General J. E. Johnston had just been relieved from command of the Confederate forces, and General J. B. Hood placed in charge. General Toombs wrote from Atlanta:

The tone of the army has greatly improved. We are now receiving reenforcements from the West. Davis, having kicked Johnston out, now feels obliged to sustain Hood, so the country is likely to get good out of evil. General Hood is displaying great energy and using his best exertions for success. I think very well of him. He is a most excellent man, and undoubtedly of great military talent. Whether equal or not to this great struggle, time must prove.