General McClellan reached Fortress Monroe, April 2, 1862, and commenced his march up the peninsula. The country is low and flat, and the season was unusually wet and dismal. The objective point was Richmond, seventy-five miles away, and the first obstruction met by the Federal army was at Yorktown. The defense adopted by General Magruder was a series of dams extending along the Warwick River, which stretched across the peninsula from the York to the James River, a distance of thirteen miles. The fords along the Warwick had been destroyed by dams defended by redoubts, and the invader and defender were stationed in dense swamps. At dam No. 1 Toombs' troops were often under fire. They fought with spirit. Each detachment was on duty defending the dam forty-eight hours, and between long exposure in the trenches, the frequent alarms, and sharp sorties, the service was very exhausting. It was only possible to change troops at night. On the 16th of April Toombs writes:

One of my regiments, the 17th Georgia, had a skirmish day before yesterday. They acted splendidly, charging the Yankees, and driving them from the rifle-pits, killing, wounding, and taking prisoners over one hundred of the enemy. I lost but two killed and a few wounded.

At the siege of Yorktown in the early part of May, 1862, General Toombs commanded a division consisting of his own and Semmes' brigades. He had 2357 men in his own and 2342 in Semmes' brigade, making about 4700 troops in line. During this siege General Magruder reports that General Toombs supported Cobb's brigade, and promptly and energetically led the remainder of his command under fire, arriving just before the enemy ceased their attack, and in time to share its danger. General Magruder had only 11,000 men under him in the peninsula, and General Huger but 8000, to oppose McClellan's march with 80,000. Johnston and Lee both p.r.o.nounced the peninsula untenable, and on the 4th of May Yorktown was evacuated.

After the retreat from the peninsula, General Johnston concentrated his entire army behind the Chickahominy River, sixteen miles from Richmond.

On the 12th of May General Toombs writes home that his command near the Chickahominy was "resting easily after a disagreeable march from Yorktown. I hear that there is great consternation in Richmond.... The loss of New Orleans gives us a terrible blow, and, followed by Norfolk, makes it necessary for us to strike a decisive blow somewhere." On 19th of May, 1862, he writes home from the camp near Richmond:

We seem to have come up here to defend this city. You ask me my opinion of the present state of the country. It is bad enough. The utter incompetency of Mr. Davis and his West Point generals have brought us to the verge of ruin.

If McClellan is unwise enough to fight us here, we shall whip and drive him out of Virginia.... As to Richmond, it will never be taken while this army is here.

General Toombs' estimate of the army and of the futility of an attack from McClellan was justified when, after the 26th of June, the Army of the Potomac, almost in sight of the spires of Richmond, was forced to reel back, in the deadly clinch of a seven days' combat, to the James River. The Confederate army changed its position from one of retreat to a brilliant and aggressive policy, and the subtle tactics of Johnston gave way to the bold strokes of Lee. The South was thrilled with victory.

General Toombs frequently referred to the incompetency of Mr. Davis. The letters which have just been quoted were written to his wife, and were not made public then, but he did not hesitate to express his opinion openly. Jefferson Davis and Mr. Toombs had some differences while the former was Secretary of War under Franklin Pierce and Mr. Toombs was in the Senate. Mr. Toombs believed that President Davis was too partial to West Point, at which school Mr. Davis had been trained, and that in his management of the army he showed the tenacity of a martinet rather than the breadth of a statesman.

In February, 1859, the Army Appropriation bill had come up before the United States Senate. Mr. Toombs attacked, and Mr. Davis defended the whole system. Mr. Toombs contended that the compensation of army officers was too great. It was more than the same talent could command in any other walk of life. It was upon a wrong basis. "You take a boy of sixteen and send him to West Point, and when he comes out you give him $1400 a year. In the course of a few years you carry him up to $3000, $6000, or $8000. Take the general employment of the youths of the country who are educated at the different colleges for all civil purposes. You may have the highest amount of genius and intellect, and you get nothing like such average there. It will take them many years to make that much money." Mr. Toombs declared that a brigadier general's commission was higher than that of a United States Senator. "I think,"

said he, "it requires as great qualifications to govern this country as it does to be a brigadier general." Officers had increased far beyond the wants of the country. Members of Congress appoint cadets for the different districts; "they are generally a.s.sociated in some way, as brothers, sons, or cousins, with the governing power." He thought a salary of $600 or $900 for the West Point graduates enough. According to the way army commissions were valued in England, the commission of a lieutenant who graduated at West Point could not be worth less than $50,000. The pay of a captain was higher than that of a judge. That position required the highest ability and integrity, and the average salary of a judge was but $2000, without traveling expenses. Mr. Toombs contended that West Point men seldom reflected any opinions but those of the government which employed them. They seldom sympathized with the people, and he wanted a government of the people. "You take a boy to West Point," he said, "give him quarters, and fuel, and clothes, and maintain him, and you say he has rendered service. When the citizens of this country send their sons to college they pay their expenses or work their way through; but when a boy is carried to West Point he is taken care of; a house is provided for him; clothes are provided for him; instructors are provided for him, and that is called being in service. I lay down the proposition that the true theory of wages, if you employ these people to keep the peace, is exactly the same--a constable's pay--you ought to pay them what they can be had for."

Mr. Davis held that army officers were constantly tempted to resign by offers of higher pay. It was the training of these men in the service, not for the service, it was their attachment for the country which made them so valuable. It was better to instruct men for officers' places and then appoint them, than to appoint them and then instruct them. He thought appointments were free from partisan selection. A soldier's devotion was as broad as the continent. A West Point cadet is a warrant officer; he goes there to serve the government as it may direct. It directs him to stay there until he has sufficient elementary instruction to properly discharge the duties of an officer.

The debate showed the views of the two men, and indicated the differences which, from points of public policy, soon deepened into personal dislike. On the 30th of May, Toombs wrote from the army, "Davis is polite and formal; so am I."

In the latter part of 1862 it was evident that the two armies must meet and contend for the mastery in Virginia. The day before the seven days'

fighting commenced, Dr. Steiner said to General Toombs, his intimate friend: "General, I have a favor to ask of you. Keep your mind unclouded during these important operations." Dr. Steiner knew that during the heat and excitement of battle, temptation was great among soldiers to take ardent spirits, a practice that had grown somewhat upon General Toombs during his service in the field, and which at times deprived him of his best powers. "Why, doctor, I gladly promise," said the great Georgian. Nor did he, during the week, take a gla.s.s of any sort of liquor.

General Toombs' brigade was the First Brigade, First Division, Army of Northern Virginia, and during the campaign of the peninsula, was in Magruder's division. On June 15, 1862, Toombs occupied the most exposed position, which was held for nine days. Magruder recommended relief for his troops, which had been suffering from lack of rest and care. Just before the seven days' fight Toombs' brigade was placed in D. R. Jones'

division and Magruder commanded his own, Jones', and McLaw's divisions, holding about 13,000 men. Toombs' brigade was composed of the 1st, 15th, 17th, and 20th Georgia regiments.

On the 26th of June Toombs' brigade was posted upon the east of Garnett's House, on Golding's farm, just in front of the enemy. Both sides threw up breastworks so near that neither could advance its picket line. "Just before dark," says Dr. Steiner, "Mr. Toombs received orders to charge the enemy, firing having been heard on the left. The position was a dangerous one. A charge at that time of the evening was perilous.

Just in front lay a deep gulch--Labor-in-Vain Ravine--which was alive with the enemy, and the charge must be through an unprotected field of wheat and clover. General Toombs was astonished at the order. His first instructions had been to put himself near Garnett House, to hold his position and to take advantage of any retreat of the enemy. He doubted the authenticity of the order, and sent word that he would not obey unless in writing. Pretty soon written instructions were returned and General Toombs prepared for what he believed to be a forlorn hope. He advanced seven companies of the 2d Georgia Regiment, 750 men, under Colonel B. M. b.u.t.t, toward the enemy in the face of a heavy front and flank fire. Colonel Williams' regiment crossed the field at double-quick under a galling fire from the opposite side of the ravine. Unshaken by fearful odds, they held their ground and replied with spirit. The 15th Georgia Regiment, under Colonel McIntosh then entered the fight, and this gallant officer was mortally wounded. The 17th Georgia charged on the left and the 20th on the right. The engagement was a very b.l.o.o.d.y one. Over 200 of Toombs' men were lost and several valuable officers were killed. The opposing troops were a part of General Hanc.o.c.k's command, and the firing ceased only with the night. Next morning the enemy retreated, and Toombs' men pressed forward and held their position. General Toombs was censured for this engagement, for which, it seems, he was in no wise responsible.

On the 1st of July, about three o'clock in the afternoon, commenced one of the famous battles of the war. McClellan's army had gotten away from its perilous position astride the Chickahominy, and now found itself united and strongly intrenched on the heights of Malvern Hill. All hope of destroying that army was gone, and it was evident that an engagement must ensue, with the odds in favor of the Union army. It was in many respects like the battle of Gettysburg, except that the Confederate forces were not handled with the precision and effectiveness of the historic sorties against Cemetery Heights. The battlefield was in plain range of the enemy's gunboats, and there was much surprise that General Lee should have sanctioned an engagement at that point. General D. H.

Hill misunderstood the signal for attack at Malvern Hill, and late in the afternoon ordered the charge. Toombs' brigade had been marching and countermarching all day, and went into action much thinned from the effects of the sharp fighting at Labor-in-Vain Ravine. There was no concerted attack. The charge seems to have been made by brigades, even single regiments being thrown forward. They advanced through a swamp, and the difficulties of the charge, owing to a murderous fire which raked the plain from the hills, 600 yards away, cannot be exaggerated.

Toombs' brigade was one of the first to reach the plateau swept by fifty guns. It advanced with Anderson's brigade, but obliqued to the left about half-way up the hill, and took position near a fence, where the troops, suffering fearfully from the cool, deadly aim of the Federal gunners, were ordered to lie down and secure some shelter from the cannon-shot. It was at this time that General D. H. Hill rode up to General Toombs and ordered his brigade forward. Some sharp words ensued between these officers, and the men moved forward handsomely to the brow of the hill. At this time, however, the steady stream of fugitives pressing back from the charge, broke the alignment of the brigade and separated the regiments. Colonel b.u.t.t's regiment went forward with Kershaw's brigade. The whole Confederate charge was soon checked and the troops fell back in disorder. Their loss was fully 5000 men, and the loss in Toombs' brigade was 219 men, making his losses in the two engagements over one-third of his entire number. Malvern Hill was a blunder which was never repeated, but it was a disastrous one for the Georgia troops.

The subjoined correspondence will be understood in the light of the meeting of General D. H. Hill and General Toombs near Malvern Hill during the progress of the charge of the Confederate forces.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION, In the Field, July 6, 1862.

MAJOR GENERAL D. H. HILL.

_Sir_: Military movements since Tuesday last have prevented an earlier reply to your conversation with me on the battlefield that evening. I understood you to say, among other things, that "Your (my) brigade would not fight"; that you "always knew it would not fight"; that it "pretended to want to fight, but would not"; "Where were you when I was riding in front on my horse trying to rally your brigade?" I desire first to know whether I am correct in my understanding of your language, and if not, wherein I am mistaken.

And secondly, to request of you such explanation of that language as you may choose to give.

I am sir, Your obedient servant, ROBERT TOOMBS.

July 6, 1862.

_General_: Your note has just been received. My remarks were personal to yourself and not to your brigade. I did not in the slightest degree reflect on your men. What I said was in substance this: "You have been wanting to fight, and now that you have one, you have got out of it."

There were witnesses to our conversation, and if my remarks were severer, I will let you know.

It may be well to suggest to you that, as the commanding officer on the field, I have an official report to make which will not be modified by your note.

It is notorious that you have a thousand times expressed your disgust that the commanding general did not permit you to fight. It is equally notorious that you retired from the field. These are the two facts of which I reminded you on Tuesday. I made no comment upon them, and if the simple truth has been offensive, the interpretation of it has been your own.

Yours truly, D. H. HILL, BRIGADIER GENERAL TOOMBS. Major General.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION, July 6, 1862.

GENERAL D. H. HILL.

_Sir_: Your note of this date has just been received. It is scarcely necessary for me to say it is not satisfactory. It would be inappropriate to comment upon it properly in this note, and for that reason alone I waive it for the present.

As to your remark that you were the commanding officer on the field on the 1st inst., I never before heard of it, nor do I now think so, but, however that fact may be, I am at a loss to know for what reason you state it unless it was to menace and intimidate me in the pursuit of proper satisfaction for the unprovoked insult you have cast upon me. If that was your object, this note will satisfy you that you have failed in your object. I now demand of you personal satisfaction for the insult you cast upon my command and myself on the battlefield on the 1st inst., and for the repet.i.tion and aggravation thereof in your note of this day. I refer you to my friend Colonel Benning for all necessary arrangements.

Your obedient servant, ROBERT TOOMBS.

CAMP NEAR RICHMOND, VA., July 12, 1862.

_General_: Your note of the 6th was received yesterday. I must again enter my protest against your second declaration that I reflected upon your brigade in the battle of Malvern Hill. Witnesses to our interview affirm that my remarks were entirely personal to yourself.

In regard to your demand for satisfaction, I construe it to mean either that I must apologize to you for the language used by me on the battlefield, or that I must grant you a hostile meeting. If the first interpretation be correct, I will state that I will make full, public, and ample concessions when satisfied that I did you injustice; and this I would do without any demand. I certainly thought that you had taken the field too late, and that you left it too early. You may, however, have done your whole duty, and held your ground as long as it was possible for a brave and skillful officer to hold it. If the facts prove this to be so, no one will be more gratified than myself, and my acknowledgment of error will be cordial and complete.

But if your demand means a challenge, its acceptance, when we have a country to defend and enemies to fight, would be highly improper and contrary to the dictates of plain duty, without reference to higher grounds of action. I will not make myself a party to a course of conduct forbidden alike by the plainest principles of duty, and the laws which we have mutually sworn to serve.

Yours truly, D. H. HILL, Major General.

BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERT TOOMBS.

Just what General Toombs replied to this is not known. The letter has not been preserved in this correspondence. It evidently declared that the explanation was not satisfactory. Major R. J. Moses, Jr., a member of General Toombs' staff, submitted in writing the following report of his recollection of General Hill's words to General Toombs at Malvern Hill:

Where is your brigade, sir? I told you that I wanted a fighting brigade, and your brigade will not fight. I knew it would not, and you are the man who pretends to have been spoiling for a fight. For shame! Rally your troops! Where were you when I was riding up and down your line rallying your troops?

Major Moses adds:

As aid-de-camp of General Robert Toombs, I remained with him until some time after this conversation. Previous to this conversation General Toombs had been about fifteen yards to the rear of the center of his line and his troops were unbroken. There were many men coming by us, but I saw not over ten from General Toombs' brigade. The order was given "Forward, left oblique," and General Toombs moved to the left of his line. When General Hill met him and commenced this attack on the character of himself and his brigade without the slightest provocation, General Toombs had not only been rallying the troops, but continued to use his best endeavors to rally them till late at night. I was with General Toombs the whole time from the commencement of the action until half or three-quarters of an hour after the conversation.

The following is the concluding letter of the correspondence:

July 15, 1862.

_General_: I regret that my last note, which was intended to be conciliatory, has been misunderstood or misappreciated. I take it for granted that you know enough of my previous history to be aware that a hostile meeting, under any circ.u.mstances, would be abhorrent to my principles and character. At this time it would be in the highest degree improper. I have offered you the only redress which I could make even after a meeting, viz., an acknowledgment of error when convinced of that error. As no good can result from a continued correspondence, it will close on my part with this communication.

Yours truly, D. H. HILL, Major General.