To call this perfectly natural and legitimate and frequently practised measure of warfare "a war of starvation" against women and children is a good deal of an exaggeration. Though inconvenienced, you are very far from the danger of starvation. Indeed, all your spokesmen not only admit this fact but defiantly proclaim it.

That against that blockade as well as for the destruction of English commerce you are making use of your amazingly perfected submarines appears to me entirely justified, _so long as in that use you keep within the limits of legitimate warfare_. Nor do I deny that England, in certain respects, has arbitrarily and it seems rather fatuously interfered with the rights of neutrals; that she has employed against you some irritating measures of petty and apparently purposeless chicanery and given you cause for resentment by certain vindictive and perhaps unfair provisions and procedures enacted at the very start of the war against German firms and German interests within English jurisdiction.

It must also, I believe, be admitted that you were justified in looking upon some of the boastful edicts of Winston Churchill, with reference to the conduct of English merchant vessels, as provocations which gave you legitimate ground for retaliation within recognized limitations.

But that Germany should have used these provocations and this phrase of "starvation warfare" as a basis for _reprisals which actually do const.i.tute warfare against women and children, is a blow in the face to the world's conscience_.

Against England's infringements of the strict limits of neutral rights and against the subjecting of neutrals to certain unjust, irritating and rather senseless annoyances, America has not failed to protest.

She has in several cases received satisfaction and acceptable a.s.surances. She should, and, I have no doubt, she will insist firmly on her rights in the cases still under discussion. But--and that makes the vast difference between the English and German infractions of the rights of neutrals--_in no single case have such acts on the part of England involved the sacrifice of a human life_.

You say that Germany is not responsible for the war. It is nevertheless a fact that it was Germany who first _declared_ war.

Perhaps it would have come even if not declared by Germany, but in that "perhaps" lies a fearful burden of responsibility.

You speak of the vast "Austro-German inferiority" in fighting men, as compared to France and Russia, which you had to counteract by rapidity and initiative of proceeding.

First, this inferiority of your 120 millions to the Franco-Russian 200 millions (the English, _at that time_, could not have entered into your reckoning) is not such a "vast" one, even on paper, when one considers how many millions of the Russians could not for many months be included in the reckoning, in consequence of the huge distances separating them from the scene of action.

Secondly, you had the enormous advantage of strategic railroads, which the Russians lacked.

Thirdly, you and the Austrians occupying contiguous territory and holding the inner lines were able to move your troops from East to West, and _vice versa_, as occasion demanded, while the Russians and French were separated and had to fight on the outer lines; and--

Fourthly, every one knows that in modern warfare far less depends on the number of men than on preparation, leadership and ammunition. And that in these respects the Russians certainly, and at the outset also the French, laboured under a "vast inferiority" is not open to question.

_It cannot be admitted therefore that the fact of the Russian mobilization made it a necessity for you to precipitate war_, especially on the very day when Austria, who was in a far more exposed position than you, declared herself ready at last, notwithstanding the Russian mobilization, to enter into direct diplomatic discussion with Russia.

If Germany had waited but three days after that declaration by her ally, before delivering her ultimatum to Russia, either the war would have been avoided altogether, or Russia would have had to face the world as the aggressor, with all the forces of what Bismarck termed "imponderabilia" against her. And it would be an insult to Germany's efficiency to question that she could have found measures short of rushing into war, to meet and offset for another few days the menace of Russian mobilization--apart from the fact that there is some reason to suspect that this Russian mobilization on the German frontier was deliberately provoked by certain Machiavellian manoeuvres in Berlin.

On the 30th and 31st of July, respectively, Sir Edward Grey telegraphed as follows to the English amba.s.sador in Berlin for transmission to the Imperial Chancellor:

"... You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add most earnestly that one way of maintaining good relations with England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe. If we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I believe, be _ipso facto_ improved and strengthened. For that object his Majesty's Government will work in that way with all sincerity and good will....

"And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely pa.s.sed, my _own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be a.s.sured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia and ourselves, jointly or separately_. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has. .h.i.therto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, _but if this present crisis_, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, _be safely pa.s.sed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto_....

"_I said to the German Amba.s.sador this morning that #if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St.

Petersburg and Paris, and go to the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it, his Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences#_; otherwise, I told the German Amba.s.sador that if France became involved we should be drawn in."

Is this the language of one seeking a quarrel? Why did not Germany act upon the suggestions put forth so urgently, ringing so manifestly true and bearing so evidently the stamp of good faith? Why was the calamity of war thrust upon the world in such hot haste, that you did not even previously inform, far less consult, your then allies, the Italians, in spite of the provisions of the Triple Alliance?

Is it not proved by declarations of Giolitti--certainly no enemy to Germany--before the Italian Parliament some six months back, that _Austria wanted to make war upon Servia as much as two years ago, that is to say, long before the a.s.sa.s.sination of the Austrian heir-apparent afforded the pretext for an ultimatum which spelled war_? I know sufficient of the sentiment prevailing in England and France before the war, as well as of the tendencies of the political leaders and other leading men in those countries, to be absolutely positive that, apart from a few individuals given to noise-making, but not possessing weight or real influence, the people and the Governments of France and England were very far indeed from wanting war.

On the other hand, I agree with you in believing that the Pan-Slavist party in Russia did plan to bring on war. However, they did not want it _yet_ and it is altogether doubtful whether they would have succeeded in their design had they been met by a firm, wise and conciliatory policy on the part of Germany and Austria.

These opponents (the Russians), _by themselves_, as results thus far have shown, and as seemed evident in advance to sober observers, you need never to have considered as your peers in a military sense.

Rather than take the awful responsibility of initiating war, and thus uniting England, France and Russia whole-heartedly against you, you could well have afforded, in calm confidence in your superior efficiency and preparation, to take the lesser risk of letting the Russians come on whenever, in fatuous arrogance, they might have believed themselves strong enough to tackle you and Austria.

In an offensive war, undertaken by Russia, France would have joined, if at all, only half-heartedly, and with her public opinion strongly divided. No English Government, however jingo-militarist, could have obtained the sanction of Parliament to take part in such a war. Your ally, Italy, would in that case not have forsaken you. Public opinion and the moral support of the neutral nations would have been strongly with you. You would a.s.suredly, under such circ.u.mstances, have given the Russians a bad beating, and the world in general would have rejoiced exceedingly at the aggressor's discomfiture.

That the large majority of the people of Germany did not want war, I do not doubt, although (_as was not the case in England and France_) there has been in existence in your country for years a rather alarmingly active and influential party whose open aim was war, and particularly a reckoning with England.

Many of your intellectuals, and particularly many of the teachers of your youth, had come to preach the deification of sheer might. They proclaimed with fanatical arrogance the doctrine that the German nation being the chosen people, superior to all others, was therefore not only permitted, but, indeed, called upon, to impose the blessings of its civilization and "Kultur" upon other countries, by force if necessary, and to help itself to such of their possessions as it deemed necessary for the fulfilment of its destiny.

I believe it is not too much to say that that doctrine and the spirit which bred it are very much akin, in their intolerance, self-righteous a.s.sumption of a world-improving mission, lack of understanding of and contemptuous disallowance for the differing view-points, qualities and methods of others, to the doctrines and the spirit that lay at the bottom of the religious wars throughout the long and evil years when Catholics and Protestants killed one another and wrought appalling bloodshed, destruction and ruin, for the purpose of conferring upon their respective countries the blessings of "the true religion."

Liberal press organs and calm-thinking men in Germany frequently before the war expressed their disapproval of, and misgivings at such preachings and the tendencies and agitation of the jingo party, though naturally you now all stand together and have put aside for the time being the party differences and conflicting opinions and points of view which prevailed prior to the war.

I agree with you in believing, notwithstanding the machinations of the war party, that the Kaiser and the Chancellor, up to a certain fatal moment, when they yielded their judgments to others, meant, _bona fide_, to preserve peace. I am quite persuaded as well that the ma.s.s of the German people did not want war and are entirely honest in their practically unanimous belief that Germany is not responsible for the war, although, unfortunately, the _facts_ prove the contrary.

It is conceivable that you might have been justified in coming forward boldly and straightforwardly and saying to the Triple Entente:

"We are 70 millions strong. We have demonstrated to the world our capabilities in every department of human endeavour and human achievement. We require (or, at least, our people believe, rightly or wrongly, that we require) wider territorial scope for our growth than we possess in our own country and in our colonies. We require, too, an a.s.surance of greater security as to the conditions of our national existence and our economic development.

"You have pre-empted the best part of the world. It is far more than you require. Either see that an appropriate provision is made for us, or, failing that, give us a free hand to conclude mutually agreeable arrangements with Belgium, Portugal or Holland with respect to their over-sea possessions.

"You will then find us ready to conclude an understanding with you, in order to ensure peace and to make an end, at least, to these continually recurring alarms of war, which are wearing out the nerves and the purse of the whole world. To this end let us call a conference. Meanwhile, no one is to increase the armaments they at present possess, let alone mobilize. But if you are not willing to give us a fair show peaceably, then we warn you to look out for trouble."

In my opinion, such a warning would not have had to be translated into action, for in due course things were bound to come your way by the very force of cause and effect. With a little skill and tact and insight (which traits, as you will probably admit, have hardly been outstanding features of German diplomacy since Bismarck), together with a little patience, everything you could reasonably ask would have been yours in the course of the next ten or fifteen years.

But if the Triple Entente had met a request in the nature of the foregoing with a _non possumus_, or had made no reasonably acceptable offer, and you, after final warning, had resorted to the arbitrament of war, your case would have worn a very different aspect from the present one. Many unprejudiced men amongst neutral people would have looked upon your view-points and conduct as not devoid of justification, instead of turning away with disgust from the sophistries of your writers, who seek to demonstrate that you poor innocent lambs were fallen upon in order to be dragged to the slaughterhouse.

As a matter of fact, however, it is my belief that such a declaration delivered by you to the Triple Entente, firm and determined in spirit and meaning, but friendly and persuasive in language, would have led not to war, but to a lasting understanding.

SUMMARY

To sum up:

1. Until ten years ago, England's relations with you were good--indeed more than good, as is shown, for instance, by the cession of Heligoland. If, as you a.s.sert, hate and envy and ill-will, because of Germany's phenomenal development, and of her increasing strength and push as a compet.i.tor in the markets of the world, had been the moving force in shaping England's att.i.tude towards you, the motive for hostile conduct would have existed at that time just as at present.

As a matter of fact, England's sentiment towards Germany changed only with your aggressive programme of naval construction, and as a consequence of the manifestation in word, in writing and in deed, of certain alarming and menacing tendencies, to which, it is true, more significance and importance probably were attached abroad than in Germany itself--more, perhaps, than they deserved.

_That programme England came to consider, naturally, as directed mainly against herself and as a serious menace_ to her most vital interests and to the conditions of her very existence.

Would not Germany have become uneasy had Russia suddenly announced a policy of concentrating an enormous fleet in the Baltic? (The parallel, though, is far from perfect, in that for you, sea power is not nearly as vital an element as it is and must be for England.)

Your naval policy, together with the arguments which the German Government's spokesmen adduced for it, and the above-mentioned manifestations and agitations, caused very serious and lasting apprehensions in England. They gradually drove her to the Entente with France, and through it, unfortunately perhaps, but necessarily, also with Russia--not as an offensive, but as a defensive measure.

Let me say, in parenthesis, that in the interest of England and France and of the peace of the world, I have always felt inclined to doubt the wisdom of this grouping, however comprehensible and natural it was under the circ.u.mstances. Likewise, I have always doubted the wisdom of the creation of your enormous fleet--a view which was shared by some of your best political thinkers and which appears to have been justified by results.

2. The genesis of the war lay in the fixed idea by which Austria was possessed, since her foreign Minister Aehrenthal succeeded in reaping easy and questionable but profitable laurels some years ago, that she could and ought to adopt a "dashing" policy. There is nothing more dangerous than the foolish and reckless daring of feebleness, when, as happens at times, it is suddenly seized with a mania for heroics.

In fact, as I gleaned from a letter received here within a few days of the outbreak of the war and originating from a particularly authoritative source in Vienna, Austria entirely failed to realize the portentous significance and the inevitable consequences of her unheard-of ultimatum to Serbia.

She believed that she would be left undisturbed to play the conqueror at the expense of that poor little country. Unfortunately, Germany did not see fit to put a stop to that extremely dangerous playing with fire. On the contrary, the German Amba.s.sador in Vienna seems to have encouraged it, actively and deliberately.

3. When finally the crisis had come, with all its terrible meaning, Austria's nerves, at the very last moment, began to give way. She wavered in the face of a world catastrophe.

But your Junkers and other jingoes neither wavered nor hesitated. They saw in their grasp the opportunity for which they had been plotting these many years and they were not minded to let it escape them. They considered the moment peculiarly propitious because of the internal preoccupations of England and France.