DEAR X.:

Many thanks for your very interesting letter of April 27th. The spirit which animates Germany is indeed a great and mighty one. It is a spirit of unity and brotherhood among her people, of willing sacrifice and heroic striving, coupled with the pa.s.sionate conviction and faith that her cause is just and righteous, that it must and will win, and that not only is victory a necessity for national existence, but that in its train it will bring blessings to the whole of the universe.

Wherever and whenever in the world's history such a spirit--born of the stirring of the profoundest depths of national or religious feeling--has manifested itself, it has invariably been attended by a more or less marked fanaticism among the people concerned; by a condition of mind easily comprehensible as a psychological phenomenon, yet acutely prejudicial to the ability to preserve an objective point of view, and to arrive at an impartial judgment.

It is but natural that in the atmosphere which surrounds you and under existing circ.u.mstances, a man even of such sober, clear and independent mentality as yourself should think and feel in the way manifested by your letter. Even if it were in my power, I would not try _at this time_ to shake your faith and patriotic determination.

Since, however, you ask me to continue this exchange of opinions, I will endeavour further to make plain to you my ideas as to this most deplorable and accursed war.

The views I am expressing are, I believe, the views as well of the great majority of thinking people in America. And I would remind you that America as a whole, by reason of the racial composition of her population, is essentially free from national prejudice or racial bias. With her many millions of inhabitants of German origin, her disposition could not be anti-German in the ordinary course of affairs--and indeed never was so before the war.

With her millions of Jews and her liberal tendencies she cannot be pro-Russian. With her historical development in the course of which her only serious wars have been fought against Great Britain (which country, moreover, during certain critical periods in the Civil War between North and South, evidenced inclination to favour the South and thus aroused long continuing resentment in the Northern States), and for many other reasons, her disposition cannot be that of an English partisan--and was not so before the war.

The predominant sentiment of the American people in the Boer War was anti-English; in the Balkan War their sympathies were pro-Turkish; in the Italian-Turkish War, anti-Italian; in the Russo-j.a.panese War, pro-j.a.panese, although it was fully realized that from the point of view of America's material and national interests, the strengthening of j.a.pan was hardly desirable.

It may sound to you very improbable, yet it is none the less true that America, of all the great nations, is probably the one least swayed by eagerness to attain material advantage for herself through her international policies. I do not claim that this arises necessarily from any particular virtue in her people. It may be rather the result of her geographical and economic situation.

America returned to China the indemnity growing out of the Boxer Rebellion. To Spain, conquered and helpless, she paid, entirely of her own free-will, $20,000,000 for the Philippines. She refused to annex Cuba. In spite of strong provocation she abstained from taking Mexico.

Although not a land as yet of the highest degree of culture, America is a land of high and genuine humanitarianism and of a certain nave idealism.

I hear your ironic rejoinder, "and out of pure humanitarianism, you supply arms to our enemies, and _thus prolong the war_."

The answer lies in the accentuation of the last four words, which can only mean that, but for the American supply of arms, the Allies, from lack of ammunition, would speedily be defeated, _i. e._ America is to co-operate in preserving for that country which has most extensively and actively prepared for war, the full and lasting advantage of that preparation.

That would put a premium on war preparations--on an armed and therefore necessarily precarious peace--since it is but human nature that, given a difference which he considers serious enough for ground for a quarrel, a man armed to the teeth would be less inclined to settle the matter peaceably than one who is not so well prepared for a fight.

Apart from this, the German complaint about the prolongation of the war through the American supply of arms is proof in itself that the refusal of such supplies would const.i.tute a positive act of partiality in favour of Germany.

And the great majority of Americans are convinced that the ruling powers of Germany and Austria, though not perhaps the people themselves, are responsible for the outbreak of the war; that they have sinned against humanity and justice; that at least France and England did not want war; that therefore its advent found them in a comparatively unprepared state, and that it would const.i.tute a decided, serious and unjustifiable action of far-reaching effect _against the Allies_ if America were to put an embargo on war munitions--especially so in view of the fact that as a direct consequence of the treaty-defying invasion of Belgium you are in possession of the Belgian arms factories and iron mines and of about 75 per cent. of all the ore-producing capacity of France.

For neutrals to supply war materials to belligerents is an ancient, unquestioned right, recognized by international law and frequently practised by yourselves. To alter, during the course of a war, a practice sanctioned by the law of nations and hitherto always followed, would const.i.tute a flagrant breach of neutrality, in that it would necessarily help one side and harm the other.

The fact that at one time we forbade the export of arms to Mexico affords no argument in favour of the German contention, for there it was not a case of war between nations, but of civil war. There was also the danger that such arms might eventually be used against America herself, given the possibility that intervention by us in Mexico might later on become necessary.

Commissions from Germany for the supply of arms would have been as acceptable to our factories as were those from the Allies. It is not America's fault if the German fleet does not break through the British cordon and open the way for sea communication with Germany.

The superiority of the British fleet and the resulting consequences must have been known to Germany before she permitted the outbreak of this horrible war. She has no more right to make a grievance of these consequences than the Allies have a right to complain of Germany's superior preparedness and the greater perfection of her instruments of war.

To believe American public opinion influenced by the profits which come to this country from the supply of arms, is to misunderstand completely the American mode of thought and feeling. Moreover these profits go to very few pockets, and public opinion here being anything but unduly complacent towards large corporations and capitalists is by no means inclined to view with favour the gathering in of these huge profits by a very limited number of individuals and concerns.

You quote with approval General von Schlieffen's remark that "in war, after all, the only thing that matters is those silly old victories."

You would surely not say that in the individual's daily struggle for existence or in compet.i.tive industrial strife, "the only thing that matters" is success. Rather you would be the first to grant, as you have always demonstrated in your acts, that there are certain ethical limitations laid down by the conscience and the moral conceptions of humanity, which must be respected in the struggle for success, however keen, even though the very existence of the individual and the maintenance of wife and child be at stake.

Schlieffen's utterance, in the meaning which your quotation gives it, throws overboard everything that civilization and the humanitarian progress of centuries has accomplished towards lessening the cruelty, the hatred and the suffering engendered by war, and towards protecting non-combatants, as far as possible, from its terrors. It is tantamount to the doctrine of the fanatical Jesuit: "The end justifies the means."

And it is something akin to this very doctrine which Germany has made her own and applied in her conduct of this war as she has done in none of her previous wars. _The conviction that everything, literally everything, which tends to ensure victory is permitted to her, and indeed called for, has now evidently a.s.sumed the power of a national obsession._ Thus, the violation of innocent Belgium in defiance of solemn treaty; the unspeakable treatment inflicted on her people; the bombardment, without warning, of open places (which Germany was the first to practise); the destruction of great monuments of art which belonged to all humankind, as in Rheims, and Louvain; the _Lusitania_ horror, the strewing of mines broadcast, the use of poisonous gases causing death by torture or incurable disease; the taking of hostages; the arbitrary imposition of monetary indemnities and penalties, and so forth. It is these facts that the non-combatant nations charge against Germany, and quite apart from the responsibility for the war, it is in them that may be found the main reason why public opinion in neutral countries has more and more turned against Germany as the war has continued.

I say "innocent Belgium," for it is entirely evident that the Belgian-English pourparlers, of which Germany discovered doc.u.mentary evidence, _related merely to the eventuality of Germany's violating Belgian neutrality_, and therefore in no way const.i.tuted a relinquishment of neutrality on Belgium's part. _In so far as these pourparlers did not keep strictly within these limits_ (manifestly as a result of excessive zeal on the part of the English military attache in question) _they were formally and categorically rejected and disavowed, by both the Belgian and English Governments_. This is shown by official papers which have been published. It cannot be doubted that these proceedings of disavowal were entirely _bona fide_, for they took place at a time and under circ.u.mstances such that no one could possibly have imagined that the correspondence evidencing them would ever see the light of day. Inasmuch as you mention these Anglo-Belgian pourparlers as among the reasons justifying Germany's invasion of Belgium, it is worth pointing out that this treaty defying invasion was perpetrated _before_ Germany had discovered the existence of the doc.u.ments which evidenced that such pourparlers had taken place.

Germany's reasoning that she was compelled to take the initiative in violating the treaty of neutrality in order to avoid the imminent danger that England and France would do so first and thereupon advance troops against her through Belgium, is, even if such reasoning were morally admissible, no valid argument; for, only a few days before, England and France had solemnly pledged themselves in the face of the whole world to respect Belgium's neutrality.

If, as you believe, England had been planning for years to attack Germany via Belgium, would she not then have had in readiness an invading force somewhere near adequate for such an undertaking?

Instead she had the mere bagatelle of 75,000 or 100,000 men, which in the first months of the war actually const.i.tuted her whole available continental fighting force.

To any one of unprejudiced judgment there remains, therefore, no choice but the conclusion that Germany's violation of Belgium did not even have the excuse of being a measure of self-defence, but, as the Chancellor in effect admitted in his first speech on the subject in the Reichstag, was undertaken simply because "in war the only thing that matters is those silly old victories."

Not, as you say, in obedience to England's command (what power had England either to command or enforce her commands?), but from a compelling impulse of national honour did Belgium oppose the German breach of neutrality with force of arms, though it would evidently have been to her material interest to comply with Germany's summons or at any rate to offer merely nominal resistance.

Holland and Switzerland would have done the same thing under similar circ.u.mstances, as would any other self-respecting nation. Moreover, what weight could Belgium attach to Germany's promise of immunity in case she yielded, when at the very moment Germany, by her own act, was demonstrating but too clearly how little she considered herself bound by her promise or indeed by a solemn international treaty?

What the Germans have accomplished on the battlefields, as well as within their own country, is proof of such great national qualities, that it compels the tribute of admiration, even from your enemies.

These qualities would indeed have gone far to justify her claim to hegemony, had they not been linked unfortunately--at least among your ruling cla.s.ses and intellectual leaders--with ways of thought and action which are anti-humanitarian, oppressive and generally intolerable to the rest of the world.

The theory of "frightfulness" in the conduct of warfare which Germany now preaches and practises is no new discovery. On the contrary it is a very ancient one--so old, in fact, that long ago it had come to be discarded and superseded in European warfare and pa.s.sed into the limbo of forgotten things. There, until resurrected by your countrymen, it lay for generations, along with much else which the human race had overcome and left behind in the progress of culture and humanity--a progress achieved by strenuous toil, sacrifices and suffering in the course of many centuries.

Such words and ideas are met with contempt and derision by your spokesmen and termed mere phrases and sentimentality. _If these are mere phrases then the whole upward struggle of the world for endless years past has been based upon and aiming at phrases and sentimentality._

I read recently an article in a German paper written by one of your professors of international law, in which he maintained, evidently quite unconscious of the incredible monstrosity of his logic, that, because the Russians in their invasion of East Prussia had acted like barbarians, you therefore had the unquestioned right, as a measure of reprisal, to bombard and destroy Oxford and Cambridge!

And what have you gained from your "frightfulness"? Your victories have been due to quite other qualities. By your "frightfulness" you have steeled your enemies to the utmost limit of sacrifice; you have embittered neutral opinion; you have disappointed and grieved your friends and "sown dragons' teeth," the offspring of which will arise against you many years even after the conclusion of peace.

How differently would you be judged now if you had tempered your mighty power with mercy and self-restraint; if with the consciousness and use of superior strength and ability you had coupled chivalry and generosity!

You say that Germany is the only great Power which has kept the peace for forty-four years, and made no conquest of territory of any kind by force of arms. It is pertinent to recall in reference to this statement, that in the course of these forty-four years Germany virtually by force has taken a strategically important piece of China, waged war against the Hereros and annexed colonies in Africa and in the Pacific (receiving in exchange for one of them the strategically most valuable island of Heligoland). Yet, speaking generally, the world is bound to recognize with grat.i.tude and admiration that from 1871 to 1914 Germany has refrained from using her enormous military power in attempts at conquest.

Has she had cause to complain of the results of this wise and far-seeing policy?

During that comparatively short period of time she had grown more powerful than any other country. In the well-being of her people, in her wealth and prestige she had advanced and flourished as no other nation. Her industries, her merchant marine had brought her conquest and triumph unequalled in the world's economic history, which find a parallel only in the wonderful military achievements of the Napoleonic era.

Without firing a gun she had turned Holland and Belgium practically into German dependencies. She had achieved predominance in Turkey and established a firm footing in Asia Minor. Her influence in South America and Asia was increasing by leaps and bounds. Even in the British colonies the victorious efficiency of the German commercial conquerors was making itself felt more and more.

And as to this newly discovered naval militarism of England which, you say, "is seeking to force England's will upon the whole world by the force of her mighty fleet," what has it ever done to bar the way to your commerce? Absolutely nothing. A few days ago I read a letter of an American traveller, from which I quote the following extracts:

"Not many years ago I sat on the club veranda at Singapore and counted twenty-five funnels of a single German steamer line. From Singapore I went to North Borneo; there was but one line, a German, and that line carried the British mail.

Later I went to Siam from Singapore. It was on a steamer of this same German line, carrying British mail. There was no other. Thence I went to Hongkong by the same excellent German line. Later I went to Australia--it was by one of this same line. To Java and the Eastern Archipelago, to Penang--it was always this vast German company, doing not only all the German, but the British mail service as well. The German traders, with whom I mixed freely, marvelled at the infantile generosity with which Great Britain opened all her ports to German enterprise, although long-headed people shook their heads at the thought of German skippers having a better acquaintance with British waters than their own people.

"Nowhere in the British colonial world have I found the slightest evidence of commercial monopoly and certainly no favouring of Englishmen at the expense of Germans. Even in India the German commercial traveller has roamed at will and driven Englishmen out of business under the very noses of the Calcutta Council.

"In the Imperial German colonies, on the other hand, competing English traders have been treated to a systematic course of petty official restrictions so vexatious that finally they have given up the attempt to do business under German conditions. When I was in German New Guinea this official persecution went so far that a British trading steamer was even forbidden to get water in order to force it to abandon trade with the natives of that neighbourhood.

"Some British colonies, it is true, do now discriminate in favour of the mother country, but the colonies who do that are self-governing and therefore beyond the mother country's control in economic matters, like Canada. But in so-called Crown colonies like Hongkong, the German trader has the same advantage as any other."

_England has not abused her power at sea_, at least since the eighteenth century, any more than you, previous to this present war, have abused your power on land. Not only has she not stood in the way of your development, but on the contrary _she has given you fair and free access to her markets, with unparalleled liberality_.

That England should now make every endeavour to carry on a strict sea blockade against Germany and should do so in a manner which takes account of the existing circ.u.mstances and novel instruments of naval warfare, is, in the opinion of our leading lawyers, her perfect right, as far at least as it is a matter only between her and Germany.

In the same way the North, during the four years of the American Civil War, did all in her power compatible with the law of nations to prevent, both directly and indirectly, export and import traffic through Southern harbours.

It is true that dissatisfaction has been caused in this country by the interference of England with American commerce. In fact such dissatisfaction is on the increase and is likely to lead in the early future to a vigorous protest on the part of our Government. But the objections to England's practice in no wise depend on any idea of questioning the right under international law of a complete and effective blockade.