Morrell was sickened. Gibbs was relishing it too much, "like a pig in shit," as he told others later.

The next day Obama accepted McChrystal's resignation, and he proposed that Petraeus take over. Though it would involve a technical demotion because as central commander Petraeus was the boss, it was an idea that would address both the military and political problems. The Iraq hero would come to the rescue of Afghanistan.

Obama met alone with Petraeus for 40 minutes. Obama told me Obama told me, "Dave Petraeus was the only person who fit the bill."

I noted that it was a demotion.

"He certainly doesn't consider it a demotion," the president said. "I think that Dave Petraeus understands that this is the single most important job that anybody in our military could be doing right now."

At 1:43 P.M P.M. on Wednesday, June 23, the president announced the changes in the Rose Garden. He said he admired McChrystal's "long record of service,"

"remarkable career," and "his enormous contributions." Pulling out all the stops, the president added, "Indeed it saddens me to lose the service of a soldier who I've come to respect and admire."

He said that Petraeus would "maintain the momentum and leadership that we need to succeed.

"He is setting an extraordinary example of service and patriotism by assuming this difficult post." Calling Afghanistan "a very tough fight," Obama said, "I welcome debate among my team, but I won't tolerate division."

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In the interview I had with the president on July 10, 2010, Obama offered his thoughts about the nature of war and his efforts to limit and eventually end American's combat role in Afghanistan. on July 10, 2010, Obama offered his thoughts about the nature of war and his efforts to limit and eventually end American's combat role in Afghanistan.

Where would you begin a book-or movie-about your handling of the Afghanistan war? I asked. What would be the first scene?

"You know," he answered, "I'd probably start it back in 2002, when the debate was taking place about the run-up in Iraq. And that was probably the first speech I gave on foreign policy that got a lot of attention."

This was the speech he gave as an Illinois state senator at a rally in Chicago, declaring himself one of the early opponents of President Bush's plan for a war in Iraq. It became famous during the presidential campaign. He said such a war would lead to a "U.S. occupation of undetermined length, at undetermined cost, with undetermined consequences."

Isn't this undetermined cost, time and consequence, I asked, "the nature of all war?"

"You are absolutely right," Obama said. "To quote a famous American, 'War is Hell,'" he continued, referring to the line by Union Civil War General William Tecumseh Sherman. "And once the dogs of war are unleashed, you don't know where it's going to lead. When I entered into office, we had two wars taking place. So once you're in, what you're trying to do is impose clarity on the chaos."

I was struck by the strong language-"Hell" and "the dogs of war" and "chaos." He clearly saw the dark, unfathomable side of war.

"You have an obligation," he continued, "to work over, again and again, your goals, your mission, your progress. Are we staying focused? Are we preventing mission creep? Are we clear about the endgame?" The policymakers had to have extraordinary discipline during wartime, he added. "It entails so much of the country's resources, so much of our blood and treasure, and unleashes so many passions." And he worried about "the ease with which something [war] gets momentum."

"And you can't lose a war or be perceived to lose a war, can you?" I asked.

"I think about it not so much in the classic, do you lose a war on my watch? Or win a war on a president's watch? I think about it more in terms of, do you successfully prosecute a strategy that results in the country being stronger rather than weaker at the end of it?" He noted there would be no formal surrender in either the Iraq or Afghanistan wars.

"It is very easy to imagine a situation in which, in the absence of a clear strategy," he said, "we ended up staying in Afghanistan for another five years, another eight years, another 10 years. And we would do it not with clear intentions but rather just out of an inertia. Or an unwillingness to ask tough questions."

He reaffirmed his timeline-that in July 2011 he would begin thinning out U.S. forces. "Sometime next year we will have been there 10 years," Obama told me. "A decade. By far our longest war. And I think it is part of my obligation as president to look at our efforts in Afghanistan, in the context of all the other issues that face this country and our long-term national security." So his timeline, he said, reminded everyone "there's urgency here," that the international forces would not be there forever. "It forced, I think, our military to think not in terms of infinite time and infinite resources."

The president said his message to the Afghan government was: "Our commitment to your long-term security and stability will extend for a very long time, and in the same way that our commitment to Iraq will extend beyond our combat role there. But it's time for us to start thinking in terms of how you guys are going to be able to stand on your own two feet."

Near the end of the interview, the president noted that since much of the story had to do with the relationship between civilian leadership and the military, he ought to offer his views.

"I am probably the first president who is young enough that the Vietnam War wasn't at the core of my development," he said. He was 13 in 1975 when the United States finally withdrew from Vietnam.

"So I grew up with none of the baggage that arose out of the dispute of the Vietnam War. I also had a lot of confidence, I guess, coming in that the way our system of government works civilians have to make policy decisions. And then the military carries them out. You know, I don't see this as a civilian versus military situation the way I think a lot of people coming out of Vietnam do. I also don't see it as a hawk/ dove kind of thing.

"So a lot of the political frames through which these debates are being viewed don't really connect with me generationally. I'm neither intimidated by our military, nor am I thinking that they're somehow trying to undermine my role as commander in chief."

At the beginning of the interview, which was scheduled for an hour, the president told me, "You're on the clock." He called final halt after one hour and 15 minutes. "That's it, I have to go, all right?"

"Okay," I said. "There are unanswered questions."

"Of course there are," he said, rising from his chair in the Oval Office.

"Thank you, sir."

As we walked out together, Obama said, "Sounds like you've got better sources than I do."

"No, sir."

"Have you ever thought of being the DNI director?" he asked, laughing lightly. "Huh? Or CIA?"

I laughed as well. We shook hands as we entered the small anteroom off the Oval Office. He was wearing informal Saturday clothes-dark olive chinos and a checkered blue shirt with an open collar.

I said I had one more question and handed him a quotation from the World War II history book The Day of Battle The Day of Battle by Rick Atkinson, a former colleague at by Rick Atkinson, a former colleague at The Washington Post The Washington Post. I keep a photocopy of the passage in my home office.

Obama stood and read: "For war was not just a military campaign but also a parable. There were lessons of camaraderie and duty and inscrutable fate. There were lessons of honor and courage, of compassion and sacrifice. And then there was the saddest lesson, to be learned again and again ... that war is corrupting, that it corrodes the soul and tarnishes the spirit, that even the excellent and the superior can be defiled, and that no heart would remain unstained." but also a parable. There were lessons of camaraderie and duty and inscrutable fate. There were lessons of honor and courage, of compassion and sacrifice. And then there was the saddest lesson, to be learned again and again ... that war is corrupting, that it corrodes the soul and tarnishes the spirit, that even the excellent and the superior can be defiled, and that no heart would remain unstained."

I wanted to ask, Did war corrupt everyone? Did no heart go unstained? Did war corrupt everyone? Did no heart go unstained? But the president was obviously in a hurry. But the president was obviously in a hurry.

"I sympathize with this view," he said, returning the quote to me. "See my Nobel Prize acceptance speech." The president disappeared back into the Oval Office. No more questions.

I went home and dug out the speech he delivered in the Oslo City Hall on December 10, 2009.

And there it was: "The instruments of war do have a role to play in preserving the peace. And yet this truth must coexist with another-that no matter how justified, war promises human tragedy. The soldier's courage and sacrifice is full of glory, expressing devotion to country, to cause, to comrades in arms. But war itself is never glorious, and we must never trumpet it as such. So part of our challenge is reconciling these two seemingly irreconcilable truths-that war is sometimes necessary and war at some level is an expression of human folly." to play in preserving the peace. And yet this truth must coexist with another-that no matter how justified, war promises human tragedy. The soldier's courage and sacrifice is full of glory, expressing devotion to country, to cause, to comrades in arms. But war itself is never glorious, and we must never trumpet it as such. So part of our challenge is reconciling these two seemingly irreconcilable truths-that war is sometimes necessary and war at some level is an expression of human folly."

The Afghanistan War was now in General Petraeus's hands. Jones, for one, knew how bad the situation was and thought Petraeus was probably saying to himself, "What have I gotten myself into?"

If Jones had the job as the new commander, he knew exactly what he would say to Obama after making an assessment: "Mr. President, I think the strategy is correct. But it was predicated on the fact that Pakistan would be coerced into moving more than they have been, particularly with regard to the Haqqani network and Quetta Shura." The Taliban war in Afghanistan was being run from these safe havens. And hundreds, if not thousands, of fighters were pouring across the border. The Taliban was taking full advantage of the safe havens to rest and train fighters before rotating them into Afghanistan for combat. In those circumstances, "You can't win. You can't do counterinsurgency. It is a cancer in the plan."

Petraeus also worried about the sanctuaries in Pakistan, but he saw them as more of a challenge than as insurmountable obstacles. "This is slow, hard, frustrating," he acknowledged to his staff. He said it was "a roller coaster existence." He recalled that President Obama had remarked at one of the strategy review sessions, "I've got political capital I can invest here. I'm going to do it. But it's not a renewable resource."

The general disagreed. He thought that political capital was somewhat renewable. It all depended on progress and everyone-Americans, the NATO allies, the Afghans-having a sense that the mission was doable. "That's the central issue." Endurance and persistence were what mattered.

"It's results, boy," he said in front of one of his colonels. "Stay rucked up, keep putting your left foot in front of your right foot."

But history had its cycles and ironies, he knew all too well. He thought back almost four years to the fall of 2006, when Rumsfeld had called him in to discuss his future. Petraeus had commanded the 101st Division during the Iraq invasion in 2003, then headed the training command there in 2004.

What did Rumsfeld want to talk about? Not Iraq but Afghanistan. At the time, many thought it was the war the United States was winning. What about Petraeus going to be commander there?

Petraeus resisted, and they didn't work it out. Several months later in early 2007, he was, of course, in command in Iraq. When he arrived there, he was shocked at the level of violence and instability. Those were the darkest, most awful days with Iraq on the verge of civil war. He went out on patrol into the neighborhoods of Baghdad. They were like ghost towns. It was so bad that at one point he went back to his quarters, and with nobody else around, put his head down on his desk in despair. "What in the world?" he thought to himself that day in 2007 and on a number of occasions later. "Why didn't I just take that Afghanistan job?"

GLOSSARY AfPak Afghanistan-Pakistan, term used to demonstrate that the war in Afghanistan and the al Qaeda and Taliban presence in Pakistan must be addressed with one policy. Afghanistan-Pakistan, term used to demonstrate that the war in Afghanistan and the al Qaeda and Taliban presence in Pakistan must be addressed with one policy.

ANA Afghan National Army, the army of Afghanistan. Afghan National Army, the army of Afghanistan.

ANSF Afghan National Security Forces, umbrella term for the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. Afghan National Security Forces, umbrella term for the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police.

AQAP Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, a branch of al Qaeda whose members include those active in Yemen. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, a branch of al Qaeda whose members include those active in Yemen.

CentCom United States Central Command, the combatant command located in Tampa, Florida, responsible for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. United States Central Command, the combatant command located in Tampa, Florida, responsible for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

COIN Counterinsurgency, the doctrine for using military force to protect a local population. Counterinsurgency, the doctrine for using military force to protect a local population.

CT Counterterrorism, the operations to capture or kill terrorists, often with small quick-reaction military or intelligence units. Counterterrorism, the operations to capture or kill terrorists, often with small quick-reaction military or intelligence units.

CTPT Counterterrorism Pursuit Teams, 3,000-man paramilitary force of highly experienced and skilled Afghans paid, trained and controlled by the CIA. Counterterrorism Pursuit Teams, 3,000-man paramilitary force of highly experienced and skilled Afghans paid, trained and controlled by the CIA.

DNI Director of National Intelligence, oversees the U.S. intelligence community. Director of National Intelligence, oversees the U.S. intelligence community.

FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas, seven Pakistani provinces along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border ruled by tribal chiefs and extremist groups that provide a safe haven for al Qaeda and Taliban extremists. Federally Administered Tribal Areas, seven Pakistani provinces along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border ruled by tribal chiefs and extremist groups that provide a safe haven for al Qaeda and Taliban extremists.

Haqqani network A prominent Taliban insurgent group, active in southeastern Afghanistan. A prominent Taliban insurgent group, active in southeastern Afghanistan.

IED Improvised explosive device, a makeshift bomb often used by insurgents alongside roads. Improvised explosive device, a makeshift bomb often used by insurgents alongside roads.

ISAF International Security Assistance Force, coalition of forces in Afghanistan from 42 nations, led by the United States. International Security Assistance Force, coalition of forces in Afghanistan from 42 nations, led by the United States.

ISI Inter-Services Intelligence, powerful Pakistani intelligence agency that simultaneously assists the United States in fighting the Taliban extremists while at the same time supporting and funding some Taliban groups. Inter-Services Intelligence, powerful Pakistani intelligence agency that simultaneously assists the United States in fighting the Taliban extremists while at the same time supporting and funding some Taliban groups.

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff, the top uniformed military officers in the United States, including the chairman, vice chairman and heads of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps. Joint Chiefs of Staff, the top uniformed military officers in the United States, including the chairman, vice chairman and heads of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps.

JSOC Joint Special Operations Command, counterterrorism force responsible for planning, preparing and executing rapid and targeted missions to kill or capture high value targets. Joint Special Operations Command, counterterrorism force responsible for planning, preparing and executing rapid and targeted missions to kill or capture high value targets.

LeT Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure), terrorist group affiliated with al Qaeda responsible for the November 26 attacks on Mumbai. It was created and continues to be supported by the Pakistani ISI. Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure), terrorist group affiliated with al Qaeda responsible for the November 26 attacks on Mumbai. It was created and continues to be supported by the Pakistani ISI.

NSC National Security Council, composed of the president and his senior foreign policy team, including the vice president, the secretaries of state and defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the director of national intelligence and at times the director of the CIA. The NSC staff is headed by the national security adviser. National Security Council, composed of the president and his senior foreign policy team, including the vice president, the secretaries of state and defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the director of national intelligence and at times the director of the CIA. The NSC staff is headed by the national security adviser.

PDB President's Daily Brief, TOP SECRET/CODEWORD intelligence briefing presented to the president each morning. President's Daily Brief, TOP SECRET/CODEWORD intelligence briefing presented to the president each morning.

POTUS President of the United States. President of the United States.

Quetta Shura The main Taliban insurgent group, headed by Mullah Omar, based in the Pakistani city of Quetta. The main Taliban insurgent group, headed by Mullah Omar, based in the Pakistani city of Quetta.

RC Regional Command (e.g., RC South, RC East), areas of Afghanistan under the military responsibility of various nations in the ISAF. Regional Command (e.g., RC South, RC East), areas of Afghanistan under the military responsibility of various nations in the ISAF.

RDI Rendition, Detention and Interrogation, controversial covert counterterrorist programs run by the CIA including the transport of suspected terrorists to the U.S. or other countries, CIA detention of terrorists, and interrogation methods employed by the CIA. Rendition, Detention and Interrogation, controversial covert counterterrorist programs run by the CIA including the transport of suspected terrorists to the U.S. or other countries, CIA detention of terrorists, and interrogation methods employed by the CIA.

SCIF Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility, secure area or isolated room in a building designed to prevent surveillance during sensitive discussions. Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility, secure area or isolated room in a building designed to prevent surveillance during sensitive discussions.

SIP Strategic Implementation Plan, a 40-page classified document sent by the White House to the Pentagon on July 17, 2009, stating that a key element of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan was to "defeat the extremist insurgency." Strategic Implementation Plan, a 40-page classified document sent by the White House to the Pentagon on July 17, 2009, stating that a key element of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan was to "defeat the extremist insurgency."

TTP Tehrik-e-Taliban, Pakistani branch of the Taliban that threatens the Pakistani government and the security of its nuclear arsenal. Intelligence showed that the would-be Times Square bomber, Faisal Shahzad, was trained by the TTP. Tehrik-e-Taliban, Pakistani branch of the Taliban that threatens the Pakistani government and the security of its nuclear arsenal. Intelligence showed that the would-be Times Square bomber, Faisal Shahzad, was trained by the TTP.

PRESIDENT OBAMA'S FINAL ORDERS FOR AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN STR ATEGY, OR TERMS SHEET SECRET/NOFORN November 29, 2009 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRINCIPALS From: National Security Adviser AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN STRATEGY This memorandum summarizes the Afghan option discussed among the principals and with the president, sending significant additional U.S. troops in early 2010 in order to degrade the Taliban and set the conditions for accelerated transition to Afghan authorities beginning in July 2011.

New implementation guidance for Afghanistan In support of our core goal, new implementation guidance for Afghanistan follows: United States goal in Afghanistan is to deny safe haven to al Qaeda and to deny the Taliban the ability to overthrow the Afghan government.

The strategic concept for the United States, along with our international partners and the Afghans, is to degrade the Taliban insurgency while building sufficient Afghan capacity to secure and govern their country, creating conditions for the United States to begin reducing its forces by July 2011.

The military mission in Afghanistan will focus on six operational objectives and will be limited in scope and scale to only what is necessary to attain the U.S. goal. These objectives are: Reversing the Taliban's momentum. Denying the Taliban access to and control of key population and production centers and lines of communication. Disrupting the Taliban in areas outside the secure area and preventing al Qaeda from gaining sanctuary in Afghanistan. Degrading the Taliban to levels manageable by the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF). Increasing the size of the ANSF and leveraging the potential for local security forces so we can transition responsibility for security to the Afghan government on a timeline that will permit us to begin to decrease our troop presence by July 2011. Selectively building the capacity of the Afghan government with military focused on the ministries of defense and interior.

Civilian assistance Our military efforts and civilian assistance will be closely coordinated.

Given the profound problems of legitimacy and effectiveness with the Karzai government, we must focus on what is realistic. Our plan includes the way forward in dealing with the Karzai government has four elements: Working with Karzai when we can, working around him when we must; enhancing sub-national governance; strengthening corruption reduction efforts; and implementing a post-election compact.

Afghan-led reintegration and reconciliation are essential pillars of our strategy. Principals will ensure appropriate authorities, programs and resources are in place to support a prioritized comprehensive approach. We must improve coordination of international political and economic assistance to build Afghan capacity.

Afghan-led reintegration. We must improve coordination.

This approach is not fully resourced counterinsurgency or nation building, but a narrower approach tied more tightly to the core goal of disrupting, dismantling and eventually defeating al Qaeda and preventing al Qaeda's return to safe haven in Afghanistan or Pakistan.

Achieving the new implementation guidance for Afghanistan Based on Defense's Option 2A and our discussions with the president, we describe below an approach to enable General McChrystal and ISAF to carry out our implementation guidance and set the conditions for accelerated transition to Afghan authorities.

The key elements of this option, described in detail below, are: An additional 30,000 U.S. troops will be deployed immediately in an extended surge of 18 to 24 months to arrive in Afghanistan in the first half of 2010, along with counterpart civilian personnel and funding.

The secretary of defense is authorized if necessary to commit a limited number of additional enablers to support emerging needs in the range of 10 percent above the 30,000 U.S. troops.

December 2010, an NSC-led assessment of the security situation and other conditions, including improvements in Afghan governance, development of ANSF, Pakistani actions and international support.

July 2011, U.S. forces begin transferring lead security responsibility from our forces deployed to the ANSF and begin reducing U.S. forces. Based on progress on the ground, the president will consider the timing for a shift from combat operations to an advise and assist mission and assess the levels at which our military and civilian support will be sustained.

December 2010 is selected as the next assessment point because it is one year after the additional 33,000 U.S. troops committed in 2009 arrived in Afghanistan, providing sufficient time to assess progress and proof of the operational concept.

Concept In each area secured by U.S. forces, the agreed concept and goal are to accelerate transition to Afghan authorities in 18 to 24 months from July 2009, then to adjust the mission and thin out U.S. forces in that area.

In July 2011, we will assess progress nationwide and the president will consider the timing of changing the military mission.

By July 2011, the 68,000 U.S. forces deployed by 2009 will have been in place for nearly 24 months at least, and in some cases for years longer.

By then we will expect to begin transferring lead security responsibility from these forces to the ANSF and begin reducing U.S. forces to the levels below the extended surge.