Now, Lute said, for this year's version in Marja, McChrystal was advertising an improvement-just two U.S. battalions to one Afghan battalion, for example. But Lute said when you dug into the numbers, the reality was very different. The Afghan units were composed of dramatically fewer soldiers than U.S. units. And McChrystal was counting the Afghan police, which improved the ratios. But there was a lot of smoke and mirrors. They were recycling the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), which was a cut above the normal police, a kind of gendarme force. The ANCOP moved from dangerous trouble spot to dangerous trouble spot. But these ANCOP essentially now say, I signed up to be a policeman and I'm basically the first guy through the door in operation after operation. The gendarme force voted with its feet, and the attrition rate was 75 percent annually. The model was supposed to be just a 15 percent attrition rate.

The other problem was that the ANCOP were in Marja and they were now supposed to go to Kandahar. Who would police Marja?

Astonishingly at the end of their hour-long meeting, Jones said, "That sounds like good progress."

God damn, Lute thought. Had he and Jones been in the same meeting?

Jones later said all the news from Afghanistan was not good, and the war was not like a light switch that could be turned off. "But McChrystal's upbeat," he said.

After the meeting with Nicholson, Lute went back to Colonel Tien and the rest of his team. "Let's start building the scheduled strategic review," he said. "There's no reason building it in November," just a month before it would be due. They could make the slides for the December review now. "I can pretty much predict that Kandahar's going to look a lot like it looks today. There's no reason to work the weekends in November. We might as well just do it during the workday in May and June." He emphasized, "We might as well do this leisurely and get going on it because I can tell you what the outcome's going to look like." The president had directed that the military not go anywhere unless they could transfer in 18 to 24 months, he reminded them. He told them about the Nicholson meeting. "Well, the best case, with big caveats, the guy on the ground is saying 24 months.

"This is a house of cards," he added.

A few days later, Petraeus was flying back from a trip, another in his endless travels, and he came to the rear of the plane to visit with his executive officer and Colonel Gunhus, his spokesman. It was unusual. Normally Petraeus was all work-and some sleep-at the front of the plane. This evening he also had had "some grape," as Gunhus called it, a single glass of wine.

Several days earlier Petraeus had told the Associated Press that Times Square bomber Faisal Shahzad had been a "lone wolf." Shahzad had attempted to set off a makeshift bomb in his SUV, which he had parked by the crowded Midtown Manhattan tourist area on the evening of May 1. The bomb smoked but failed to explode. By calling Shahzad a "lone wolf," Petraeus had meant that he had not operated in the United States with any assistance. But the story read as though Petraeus was contradicting claims by others in the Obama administration that Shahzad had been trained by the Pakistani Taliban (TTP). Petraeus had told the Associated Press that Times Square bomber Faisal Shahzad had been a "lone wolf." Shahzad had attempted to set off a makeshift bomb in his SUV, which he had parked by the crowded Midtown Manhattan tourist area on the evening of May 1. The bomb smoked but failed to explode. By calling Shahzad a "lone wolf," Petraeus had meant that he had not operated in the United States with any assistance. But the story read as though Petraeus was contradicting claims by others in the Obama administration that Shahzad had been trained by the Pakistani Taliban (TTP).

Petraeus and Gunhus had prepared a short press release to correct the miscommunication. But first the general had asked Gunhus to contact Denis McDonough in the White House to get his advice. McDonough had said to do nothing, let it blow over, it was not a big deal. This was just short of an order, so the release was not issued. But once again it looked like Petraeus was at odds with the White House. As the plane roared to its next destination Gunhus noted that the White House still had a tendency to leave Petraeus twisting in the wind.

They knock you down every chance they get, Gunhus said.

"They're fucking with the wrong guy," Petraeus said.

To address worries of a nuclear terrorist attack in the United States, Brennan ran a top-to-bottom classified exercise on Tuesday, May 18, testing how the intelligence agencies and federal government would respond. Called COOPEX 2010 (Continuity of Operations Exercise), it was essentially a scripted war game in which terrorists detonated a small, crude nuclear weapon in Indianapolis, taking down several city blocks and killing thousands.

In the hypothetical scenario, the terrorists had access to about 17 kilograms of fissile material. After the Indianapolis blast, enough was left over for a second bomb, which the terrorists planned to set off in Los Angeles.

Obama himself participated, appearing on the secure video with a series of questions. How did this happen? Who most likely did it? Was it state-sponsored? How can we retaliate?

As part of the game, the nuclear material had come from a country much like Pakistan, but the attack was not state-sponsored because that country-just as Pakistan was in some cases-had been fighting the terrorist group responsible for it. No immediate retaliation against the country was deemed necessary.

Each federal department and agency had to weigh in with evaluations and recommendations. The Agriculture Department noted that the price of food was shooting through the roof. Some discussion focused on the demand for services and treatment at Indianapolis hospitals, but no one addressed the question of clean water, one of the major needs after a nuclear fallout. Such an attack would create mass panic and almost unimaginable dislocations in the economy and transportation, making 9/11 look small. But COOPEX 2010 included no discussion of what Congress, the media or 300 million Americans were doing. The attack was presented in a vacuum, as if all those people stayed on the sidelines.

Michael Morell, named deputy director of the CIA a month earlier, raised a different problem. According to his calculations, there was likely enough fissile material for yet another bomb. "We haven't found the third bomb," Morell said.

"Brennan went ripshit," recalled one senior participant. This was designed as a two-bomb scenario, not three. "And he's trying to wrap it up neatly and tidily, but Morell kept wondering if there was a third bomb. What about a third bomb? And they couldn't wrap it up." This participant said the whole exercise was "dumbfounding" and "surrealistic," demonstrating that the administration seemed woefully unprepared to deal with such an attack.

During my Oval Office interview with the president, Obama volunteered some extended thoughts about terrorism: "I said very early on, as a senator, and continued to believe as a presidential candidate and now as president, that we can absorb a terrorist attack." with the president, Obama volunteered some extended thoughts about terrorism: "I said very early on, as a senator, and continued to believe as a presidential candidate and now as president, that we can absorb a terrorist attack."

I was surprised.

"We'll do everything we can to prevent it, but even a 9/11, even the biggest attack ever, that ever took place on our soil, we absorbed it and we are stronger. This is a strong, powerful country that we live in, and our people are incredibly resilient."

Then he addressed his big concern, "A potential game changer would be a nuclear weapon in the hands of terrorists, blowing up a major American city. Or a weapon of mass destruction in a major American city. And so when I go down the list of things I have to worry about all the time, that is at the top, because that's one area where you can't afford any mistakes. And so right away, coming in, we said, how are we going to start ramping up and putting that at the center of a lot of our national security discussion? Making sure that that occurrence, even if remote, never happens."

Obama sent Jones, Panetta and Lute to Pakistan, yet again, for May 19 meetings with the country's leaders. Times Square bomber Faisal Shahzad, a 30-year-old U.S. citizen born in Pakistan, had been trained by the Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP), the Taliban branch fighting against the Pakistani government.

Jones and Panetta were looking for a breakthrough, hoping this time would be different. It now seemed more likely than ever that a terrorist trained in Pakistan would carry out a deadly attack on U.S. soil. On past trips, they had prodded Pakistan to do more about the safe havens used by al Qaeda, the Quetta Shura Taliban, the Haqqani network and LeT. The Pakistanis had for the past year argued that their main priority was TTP. Now Jones and Panetta would have to try to persuade them to do more about that group.

"We're living on borrowed time," Jones said at the meeting with Zardari and other top Pakistani officials. "We consider the Times Square attempted bombing a successful plot because neither the American nor the Pakistani intelligence agencies could intercept it and stop it." Only luck prevented a catastrophe.

Jones said that President Obama wanted four things: full intelligence sharing, more cooperation on counterterrorism, faster approval of visas for U.S. personnel, and, despite past refusals, the sharing of airline passenger data.

If, God forbid, Shahzad's SUV had blown up in Times Square, we wouldn't be having this conversation, Jones warned. The president would be forced to do things that Pakistan would not like.

"The president wants everyone in Pakistan to understand if such an attack connected to a Pakistani group is successful there are some things even he would not be able to stop. Just as there are political realities in Pakistan, there are political realities in the United States.

"No one will be able to stop the response and consequences. This is not a threat, just a statement of political fact."

Wait a second, Zardari replied, if we have a strategic partnership, why in the face of a crisis like you're describing would we not draw closer together rather than have this divide us?

President Obama's only choice would be to respond, Jones said. There would be no alternative. The U.S. can no longer tolerate Pakistan's a la carte approach to going after some terrorist groups and supporting, if not owning, others. You are playing Russian roulette. The chamber has turned out empty the past several times, but there will be a round in that chamber someday.

Jones did not reveal that an American response could entail a retribution campaign of bombing up to 150 known terrorist safe havens inside Pakistan.

"You can do something that costs you no money," Jones said. "It may be politically difficult, but it's the right thing to do if you really have the future of your country in mind. And that is to reject all forms of terrorism as a viable instrument of national policy inside your borders."

"We rejected it," Zardari said.

Jones begged to differ. He cited evidence of Pakistani support or toleration of Mullah Omar's Quetta Shura and the Haqqani network, the two leading Taliban groups killing U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan.

As a result of FBI interviews done in the United States and other intelligence, Panetta said they had a good outline of the TTP network, showing ties to the Times Square bomber Faisal Shazad. He took out a so-called link chart showing the connections. "Look, this is it," the CIA director explained. "This is the network. Leads back here." He traced it out with his finger for the Pakistani leaders. "And we're continuing to pick up intelligence streams that indicate TTP is going to conduct other attacks in the United States."

This was a matter of solid intelligence, he said, not speculation.

"Just to be clear," the CIA director added, "the Times Square bomber, thank God, did not get enough training." His training in bomb making had been compressed. "But if that had gone off, perhaps hundreds, if not thousands, of American would've been killed." Underscoring Jones's point, he said, "If that happens all bets are off."

"If something like that happens," Zardari said defensively, "it doesn't mean that somehow we're suddenly bad people or something. We're still partners."

No, both Jones and Panetta said. There might be no way to save the strategic partnership.

Jones and Panetta were very specific about the alarming intelligence they had gathered.

The LeT commander of the 2008 Mumbai attack, Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, who is being held by Pakistani authorities, is not being adequately interrogated and "he continues to direct LeT operations from his detention center," Jones said.

LeT is operating in Afghanistan and the group carried out a recent attack at a guesthouse there. Intelligence also shows that LeT is threatening attacks in the United States and the possibility "is rising each day," Jones said.

The recent attack on Bagram Airbase, Afghanistan, was coordinated with the Haqqani network in Miram Shah, the capital of North Waziristan. "We have intercepts to prove that."

Zardari didn't seem to get it.

"Mr. President," his foreign minister, Shah Mehmood Qureshi, said, "This is what they are saying. They're saying that TTP was involved in this attack in Times Square. They're saying that if, in fact, there is a successful attack in the Untied States, they will take steps to deal with that here, and that we have a responsibility to now cooperate with the United States."

Afterward, the Americans met privately with General Kayani. Although Kayani had graduated from the U.S. Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, he was a product of the Pakistani military system-nearly 40 years of staring east to the threat posed by India. His training, exercises, maps, intelligence focus and the bulk of Pakistani troops were directed toward India. This was part of a Pakistani officer's DNA. It was hard, perhaps impossible, for a Pakistani general to put his binoculars down, turn his head over his shoulder, and look west to Afghanistan.

Jones told Kayani the clock was starting now on all four of the requests. Obama wanted a progress report in 30 days.

But Kayani would not budge very much. He had other concerns. "I'll be the first to admit, I'm India-centric," he said.

In the meeting with Kayani, Panetta laid out a series of additional requests for CIA operations. He had come to believe that the Predator and other unmanned aerial vehicles were the most precise weapons in the history of warfare. He wanted to use them more.

Pakistan allowed Predator drone flights in specified geographic areas called "boxes." Since the Pakistanis had massive numbers of ground troops in the south, they would not allow a "box" in that area.

"We need to have that box," Panetta said. "We need to be able to conduct our operations."

Kayani said he would see that they had some access.

The Americans pressed on the Haqqani network. The Pakistanis had their 7th Infantry Division headquarters nearby. Why was there little sharing of intelligence?

Kayani did not explain.

Jones and Panetta left feeling they had made only baby steps. "How can you fight a war and have safe havens across the border?" Panetta asked in frustration. The latest intelligence showed trucks crossing the border that were full of Taliban combatants with all kinds of weapons packed in the back. They were being waved through into Afghanistan to kill Americans at checkpoints controlled by the Pakistanis. "It's a crazy kind of war," Panetta said.

The U.S. needed some kind of ground forces, he concluded. "We can't do this without some boots on the ground. They could be Pakistani boots or they can be our boots, but we got to have some boots on the ground." The U.S. quick-strike JSOC units were too visible. The main alternative was a giant expansion of the covert war. His 3,000-man Counterterrorism Pursuit Teams (CTPT) were now conducting cross-border operations into Pakistan.

Lute supervised the writing of a three-page trip report to the president that Jones signed. It contained a pessimistic summary, noting first the gap between the civilian and military authority in Pakistan. The U.S. was getting nowhere fast with these guys, talking with Zardari, who could deliver nothing. On the other hand, Kayani had the power to deliver, but he refused to do much. Nobody could tell him otherwise. The bottom line was depressing: This had been a charade. Jones said he was once again alarmed that success in Afghanistan was tied to what the Pakistanis would or would not do. The White House was almost right back to where it had started with Pakistan in 2009.

Second, the report said the Pakistanis did not have the same sense of urgency as the Americans. Should there be another terrorist attack in the U.S., the Pakistanis suggested that something could be worked out after the fact. There were regular terrorist attacks in Pakistan, so they could not understand the traumatic impact of a single, small act on the U.S. homeland. The Pakistanis were making another mistake by applying that same logic to India. They did not comprehend that India might not show restraint if LeT, the group behind the 2008 Mumbai attack, struck there again. Indian Prime Minister Singh, who had barely survived Mumbai politically, would have to respond.

But the Pakistanis also wielded tremendous leverage over the U.S. because they gave tacit approval for drone strikes. Furthermore, the intelligence indicated the Pakistanis believed the U.S. would not jeopardize their relationship because some 70 to 80 percent of the U.S. and NATO supplies for the Afghanistan War came through Pakistan, and there was no way to supply everything by air. The Pakistanis would not even have to close the supply routes, just allow some of the extremists to shut down bridges and overpasses.

The options for Obama would be significantly narrowed in the aftermath of an attack originating out of Pakistan. Before such an attack, however, he had more options, especially if there was a way for Pakistan to make good on his four requests. Some 150 visa applications for U.S. military and intelligence operatives were being withheld that were over six weeks old, and U.S. embassy personnel were now required to renew their visas every 90 days. The Pakistanis were dragging their feet on visas for U.S. personnel to carry out the transfer of equipment that the Pakistani military needed. It was insane, Jones thought.

The easiest accommodation would be for the Pakistanis to share the names of all airline passengers traveling to or from Pakistan. The investigations of the two bombing attempts in New York City by Zazi and Shahzad established that both went to Pakistan for training, but the U.S. government did not have any record of their travels.

The Pakistanis had countered in the past that disclosing airline data would violate their sovereignty. They also suspected it would give the U.S. insight into where their intelligence officers were going. Most ISI agents were flying east to India or Bangladesh, so the U.S. had proposed just getting data on flights heading west to the Persian Gulf, Europe and the United States. But the Pakistanis had stubbornly resisted.

In the event of a terrorist attack, Lute worried that it would be hard for Obama to defend Pakistan because their leaders had refused to do what had been simple and easy, especially on the visas and passenger lists. If two near-misses were the leading edge of a trend, what would it take to wake the Pakistanis up?

When I interviewed President Obama two months after the failed Times Square bombing, he played up Pakistan's counterterrorism efforts. "They also ramped up their CT cooperation in a way that over the last 18 months has hunkered down al Qaeda in a way that is significant," he said.

"But still not enough," I interjected.

"Well, exactly."

32

It had been a rough 16 months for Dennis Blair. The DNI had failed in his effort to name the chief intelligence officer in each foreign capital. The CIA had won and the feud The CIA had won and the feud had gone public. Blair had also conducted a nonpublic war against two other sources of power for the CIA. In his view, the CIA was using the President's Daily Brief as a house rag for telling Obama their triumphs-even something as minor as an operation involving three guys and a pickup truck. He edited out these advertisements for the CIA's wares, saying, "I'm not going to give that to the president." had gone public. Blair had also conducted a nonpublic war against two other sources of power for the CIA. In his view, the CIA was using the President's Daily Brief as a house rag for telling Obama their triumphs-even something as minor as an operation involving three guys and a pickup truck. He edited out these advertisements for the CIA's wares, saying, "I'm not going to give that to the president."

He also went after the CIA covert action programs, attempting to trim them and align them more with overt U.S. policies. "Covert action programs "Covert action programs should continually be considered for transition to non-covert activities," he wrote in one SECRET proposal rejected by the White House. should continually be considered for transition to non-covert activities," he wrote in one SECRET proposal rejected by the White House.

Blair grew so frustrated that at one point he declared, "I think the CIA is fundamentally an organization that's like a really finely trained, not very smart, dangerous animal that needs to be controlled very closely by adults."

By May 2010, President Obama was telling Jones and others, "Isn't it about time to get rid of Blair?" There had been too many fights with the CIA. And Blair had also pushed too hard for a no-spying agreement with the French that Obama and the rest of the cabinet opposed.

Without informing Blair, members of Obama's staff began shopping around the DNI job, talking about it with deputy secretary of state Jim Steinberg, Chuck Hagel, a former Republican senator from Nebraska, and John McLaughlin, a former deputy director of the CIA. When word about this reached Blair, he complained and soon had a meeting with Obama.

The president listed his reasons why the retired admiral was not working out as DNI. Blair responded to them in writing, defending himself and detailing his accomplishments.

After reading Blair's response, Obama phoned him on Thursday, May 20. "I have decided and I'm going to make the change," the president said.

He then offered Blair a face-saving exit. Take your time, weeks, even months, Obama said. Come up with a personal reason or any explanation. He would support any story Blair wanted, the president said. A smooth transition was in everyone's interest. After all, they were at war.

Blair was deeply offended. He wasn't ill. His family was fine. And he had told people he would stay as DNI for four years because part of the problem with the office had been the constant turnover at the top.

"You want me to lie?" Blair asked.

No, Obama said, I didn't mean that at all.

Fire me, Blair basically said.

That's exactly what Obama did.

Within several minutes of the conversation, Jake Tapper of ABC News reported on the network's Web site that Blair was leaving. of the conversation, Jake Tapper of ABC News reported on the network's Web site that Blair was leaving.

About 5 P.M P.M. on June 21, Gates called Jones. "There's an article coming out in Rolling Stone Rolling Stone magazine that's not very good about McChrystal," he said. magazine that's not very good about McChrystal," he said. It contained some disparaging and mocking comments It contained some disparaging and mocking comments from McChrystal and his senior staff about administration officials. One unnamed McChrystal aide called Jones a "clown" who is "stuck in 1985." McChrystal himself was quoted saying that Obama's strategy review was "painful" and "I was selling an unsellable position." Recounting McChrystal's stay in Paris, including a heavy-drinking evening with his wife and senior staff, the article revealed the commanding general as anti-French. Gates said he planned to release a statement reprimanding McChrystal, but hoped to salvage the situation and avoid a setback to the war strategy. from McChrystal and his senior staff about administration officials. One unnamed McChrystal aide called Jones a "clown" who is "stuck in 1985." McChrystal himself was quoted saying that Obama's strategy review was "painful" and "I was selling an unsellable position." Recounting McChrystal's stay in Paris, including a heavy-drinking evening with his wife and senior staff, the article revealed the commanding general as anti-French. Gates said he planned to release a statement reprimanding McChrystal, but hoped to salvage the situation and avoid a setback to the war strategy.

"I'm not sure that goes far enough," Jones said. "This is pretty sensational stuff." The article also quoted unnamed McChrystal aides who took shots at Biden, Holbrooke and Eikenberry.

McChrystal called Biden about the profile. "I have compromised the mission," he said.

He also apologized to Holbrooke and said he had offered his resignation to Gates.

Later that evening the president met with Emanuel and Jones, who recommended that Obama order McChrystal back to Washington. Don't do anything now, Jones suggested, but sleep on it.

Obama agreed and the next morning McChrystal was ordered to return to Washington-a dramatic statement in itself. Jones told Gates that protecting McChrystal was noble. "But you don't want to put yourself between him and the president."

Gates proposed that he issue the first two paragraphs of his statement criticizing McChrystal, and Jones agreed. "I believe that General McCrystal "I believe that General McCrystal made a significant mistake and exercised poor judgment," Gates said in his statement. made a significant mistake and exercised poor judgment," Gates said in his statement.

At the Pentagon, Geoff Morrell, Gates's spokesman and confidant, was in agony. It was like seeing a funnel cloud rising for Gates and the whole military establishment. The article would once again expose the messiness and mistrust between the White House and the military. Morrell's job was to quell what he called the "family feud," downplay its significance, respond to protect the military without appearing disloyal to the administration. To get into detail about the rift would only further reveal the divide that he believed was, in part, a consequence of the prolonged AfPak strategy review. The fact was that the White House had its version, claiming that the president had dramatically asserted civilian control while the military version was that it had basically gotten what it wanted. The tensions had abated in public and since gone underground. Now they were headed for another public airing. He tuned into Gibbs's noon press briefing, knowing that the press secretary would be operating under presidential instructions.

"Is removing the general from his position at least an option the president is considering?" one reporter asked. at least an option the president is considering?" one reporter asked.

"I would say all options are on the table," Gibbs replied.

Fair enough, Morrell thought.

"I think the magnitude and graveness of the mistake here are profound," Gibbs said next, shooting way beyond Gates's comment that it was a mistake and poor judgment.

Gibbs reported that Obama was "angry" upon seeing the article and was recalling McChrystal "to see what in the world he was thinking."

"So you're questioning whether or not General McChrystal is capable and mature enough for this job he has?"

"You had my quote right," Gibbs said.