Atheism, in its skeptical form, must either be a mere _sense of doubt_ in regard to the sufficiency of the evidence in favor of the being and perfections of G.o.d; or _a speculative system_, which attempts to justify that doubt by some theory of philosophical skepticism, either partial or universal. In the _latter_ case, it may be best dealt with by showing that it affects the certainty of our common knowledge, not less than that of our religious belief, and that we cannot consistently reject Theology, and yet retain our convictions on other cognate subjects of thought. In the _former_ case, it should be treated as a case of ignorance, by ill.u.s.trating the evidence, and urging it on the attention of those who have hitherto been blind to its force; reminding them that their _not seeing_ it is no proof that it does not exist, and that _doubt_ itself on such a question, so nearly affecting their duty and welfare, involves a solemn obligation to patient, candid, and dispa.s.sionate inquiry.

"A skeptic in religion," says Bishop Earle, "is one that hangs in the balance with all sorts of opinions, whereof not one but stirs him, and none sways him. A man guiltier of credulity than he is taken to be; for it is out of his belief of everything that he fully believes nothing.

Each religion scares him from its contrary, none persuades him to itself.... He finds reason in all opinions, truth in none; indeed, the least reason perplexes him, and the best will not satisfy him.... He finds doubts and scruples better than resolves them, and is always _too hard for himself_.... In sum, his whole life is a question, and his salvation a greater, which death only concludes, and then he--is resolved."[240]

This second phase or form of Skepticism, which we have designated as _Partial_ or _Religious Skepticism_, admits the possible cert.i.tude of human knowledge in other respects, and especially in regard to secular and scientific pursuits, but holds that religious truth is either altogether inaccessible to man with his present faculties, or that its certainty cannot be evinced by any legitimate process of reasoning.

These two positions are in some respects widely different, although they are often combined, and always conducive to the same result,--the practical negation of Religion. Many who never dream of doubting the certainty of human knowledge, in so far as it relates to their secular or scientific pursuits, are p.r.o.ne to cherish a skeptical spirit in regard to religious or spiritual truths; and this, not because they have examined and weighed the evidence to which Theology appeals, and found it wanting, but rather because they have a lurking suspicion that men, with their present faculties, are incapable of rising to the knowledge of supernatural things, and that they could attain to no certainty, while they might expose themselves to much delusion, by entering on the inquiry at all. This is their apology for _ignoring_ Religion altogether, and contenting themselves with other branches of knowledge, which are supposed to be more certain in themselves as well as more conducive to their present welfare. In this respect, it is deeply instructive to remark that Infidelity has been singularly at variance with itself. At one time, in the age of Herbert, human reason was extolled, to the disparagement of Divine Revelation; it was held to be so thoroughly competent to deal with all the truths of Theology, and to arrive, on mere natural grounds, at such an a.s.sured belief in them, that no supernatural message was needed either to ill.u.s.trate, or confirm, or enforce the lessons of Nature: but now, when the lessons of Nature herself are called in question, human reason is disparaged as incompetent to the task of deciphering her dark hieroglyphics, and while she can traverse with firm step every department of the material world, and soar aloft, as on eagle's wings, to survey the suns and systems of astronomy, she is held to be incapable alike of religious inquiry and of divine instruction! There is, indeed, a striking contrast between the high pretensions of Reason in matters of philosophy, and the b.a.s.t.a.r.d humility which it sometimes a.s.sumes in matters of faith.

But there is another, and a still more subtle, form of Partial or Religious Skepticism. It does not absolutely deny the possibility of religious knowledge, nor does it dogmatically affirm that man, with his present faculties, can have no religious convictions; it contents itself with saying, and attempting to prove, that the cert.i.tude of religious truth cannot be evinced by any legitimate process of reasoning. It examines the proof, and detects flaws in it. It discusses, with a severe and critical logic, the arguments that have been employed to establish the first and most fundamental article of Theology, the existence of G.o.d; and discarding them one by one, it reaches the conclusion that, whether true or not, it cannot be proved. Strange as it may appear, these sentiments have been embraced and avowed by men who still continue to profess their belief in G.o.d and Religion. Some have held that proof by reasoning is impossible, but only because it is superfluous. They distinguish between _reason_ and _reasoning_; and hold that while the latter is incompetent to the task of proving the existence of G.o.d, the former spontaneously suggests the idea of a Supreme Cause, and imparts to it all the certainty which belongs to a direct intellectual intuition. Others distinguish between the _Speculative_ and the _Practical_ Reason; and hold that while the former cannot prove by an unexceptionable argument the existence of G.o.d, the latter affords a sufficient groundwork for religious belief and worship. Others, again, speak not so much of reason or reasoning, as of _sentiment and instinct_, as the source of our religious beliefs; and instead of addressing arguments to the understanding, they would make their appeal to the feelings and affections of the heart. There is still another cla.s.s of writers who resolve all human knowledge, whether relating to things secular or spiritual, into what they call the principle of faith (_foi_), and to this cla.s.s belong two distinct parties who are widely different from each other in almost everything else. It is important, therefore, to mark the radical difference between their respective systems, since it is apt to be concealed or disguised by the ambiguous use of the same phraseology by both. The one party may be described as the disciples of a _Faith-Philosophy of Reason_, the other of a _Faith-Philosophy of Revelation_: the former resolving all our knowledge into the intuitive perceptions or first principles of the human intellect, considered as a kind of divine and infallible, though natural inspiration; the latter contending that in regard at least to the knowledge of theological truth, human reason is utterly powerless, and can only arrive at certainty by faith in the divine testimony. The two are widely different, yet there are points of resemblance and agreement betwixt them, and on this account they have sometimes been cla.s.sed together under a wide and sweeping generalization.

The form of Partial Skepticism to which these remarks apply is perhaps more common than it is generally supposed to be. On what other principle, indeed, can we account, at least in the case of religious men, for the indifference and even aversion with which they turn away from any attempt to prove by natural evidence the existence and providence of G.o.d? The prevalence of such feelings even within the Christian community has been admitted and deplored by one of the most profound spiritual teachers of modern times;[241] and it can only be explained, where Religion is cherished and professed, on the supposition that they regard _proof by argument_ as superfluous, either because it is superseded by the natural instincts and intuitions of the human mind, or by the authoritative teaching of Divine Revelation. But it ought to be seriously considered, on the one hand, that the instincts and intuitions of human reason are not altogether independent of the natural evidence which is exhibited in the const.i.tution and course of Nature; and, on the other hand, that Revelation itself refers to that natural evidence, and recommends it to our careful and devout study.

Besides the theories of Partial Skepticism to which we have already referred, there is a mongrel system which seems to combine the two opposite extremes of Doubt and Dogmatism, and which, for that reason, may be not inaptly designated as _Skeptico-Dogmatic_.[242] Ever since the era of the Reformation, when the principle of free inquiry, and the right or rather the duty of private judgment in matters of Religion, were so strenuously affirmed and so successfully maintained, there has been a standing controversy between the Popish and Protestant Churches respecting the rival claims of Reason and Authority as the ultimate arbiter on points of faith. Extreme opinions on either side were advanced. One party, repudiating all authority, whether human or divine, rejected alike the testimony of Scripture and the decrees of the Church, and, receiving only what was supposed to be in accordance with the dictates of Reason, sought to establish a scheme of Rationalism in connection with at least a nominal profession of Christianity. The opposite party, not slow to detect the error into which extreme Protestants had fallen, and intent seemingly on fastening that error on all who had separated themselves from the Catholic Church, affirmed and endeavored to prove that Rationalism, in its most obnoxious sense, is inherent in and inseparable from the avowed principles of the Reformation, and that the recognition of the right of private judgment is necessarily subversive of all authority in matters of faith. They did not see, or if they did see, they were unwilling to acknowledge that Rationalism is a very different thing from the legitimate use of Reason; and that while the former repudiates all authority, whether human or divine, the latter may bow with profound reverence to the supreme authority of the Inspired Word, and even listen with docility to the ministerial authority of the Church, in so far as her teaching is in accordance with the lessons of Scripture. It may be safely affirmed that the Confessions and Articles of all the Protestant Churches in Europe and America do recognize the authority both of G.o.d and the Church, and are as much opposed to Rationalism, considered as a system which makes Reason the sole standard and judge, as they are to the opposite extreme of lordly domination over the faith and consciences of men. But such a controversy having arisen, it was to be expected that while eager partisans, on the one side, might unduly exalt and extol the powers and prerogatives of Reason, the adherents of Romanism, which claims the sanction of infallibility for her doctrines and decrees, would be tempted to follow an opposite course, and would seek to disparage the claims of Reason with the view of exalting the authority of the Church.

Hence arose what has been called POPISH PYRRHONISM,--a system which attempts to combine Doubt with Dogmatism, and to establish the cert.i.tude of religious knowledge on the sole basis of authority, which is somehow supposed to be more secure and stable when it rests on the ruins of human reason. Not a few significant symptoms of a tendency in this direction have appeared from age to age. It was apparent in some of the writings, otherwise valuable, of Huet, Bishop of Avranches; some traces of it are discernible in the profound "Thoughts of Pascal;" but it was reserved for the present age to elaborate this tendency into a theory, and to give it the form of a regular system. This task was fearlessly undertaken by the eloquent but versatile Lamennais, while as yet he held office in the Church, and was publicly honored as one who was worthy to be called "the latest of the Fathers." His "Essay on Indifference in Matters of Faith," exhibits many proofs of a profound and vigorous intellect, and contains many pa.s.sages of powerful and impressive eloquence. We heartily sympathize with it in so far as it is directed against that Liberalism which makes light of all definite articles of faith; but we deplore the grievous error into which he has been seduced by his zeal for the authority of the Church, when he attempts to undermine the foundations of all belief in the trustworthiness of the human faculties. In opposition to the claims of private judgment, he contends for the necessity of a Reason more elevated and more general as the only ground of Cert.i.tude, the supreme rule and standard of belief.

This normal Reason he finds in the doctrine and decrees of an Infallible Church, wherever the Church is known; but where the Church is yet unknown, or while it was yet non-existent in its present organized form, he seeks this more general Reason in the common sense or unanimous consent of the race at large, and affirms that this is the sole ground of Cert.i.tude, and the ultimate standard of appeal in every question respecting the truth or falsity of our individual opinions.[243] He holds that the authority both of the Church and of the Race is _infallible_; and that its infallibility neither requires nor admits of proof.[244] With the view of establishing this one and exclusive criterion of Cert.i.tude, he a.s.sails the evidence of sense, the evidence of consciousness, the evidence of memory, the evidence even of axiomatic truths and first principles, and involves everything except ecclesiastical authority or general reason in the same abyss of Skepticism.[245] He ventures even to affirm that "Geometry itself, the most exact of all the Sciences, rests, like every other, on common consent!" No wonder, then, that he should also found exclusively on _authority_ our belief in the existence and government of G.o.d.

An intelligent member of his own communion propounds a very different, and much more reasonable, opinion: "Il n'y a pas d'autorite morale qui n'ait besoin de se prouver ellememe, d'une maniere quelconque, et d'etablir sa legitimite. En definitive, c'est a l'individu qu'elle s'addresse, car on ne croit pas par ma.s.se, on croit chacun pour soi.

L'individu reste donc toujours juge, et juge inevitable de l'autorite intellectuelle qu'il accepte, ou de celle qui s'offre a lui. Nous n'avons pas a examiner si cette disposition const.i.tutive de l'esprit humain est bonne ou mauvaise; la seule question que l'on en fait est vaine et sterile. Nous sommes necessairement amenes par l'observation physchologique a constater qu'il faut que l'homme croie a la fidelite du temoignage de ses sens individuels, et a la valeur de sa raison personelle, avant de faire un pas au-dela."[246]

We think it unnecessary to enter into a detailed discussion of this strange and startling theory, especially as the altered position of the writer in his relation to the Church before his death may be held to indicate that to a large extent it had been abandoned by himself. Nor should we have thought it worthy even of this transient notice, had we not discerned symptoms of an incipient tendency in a similar direction among some writers in the Protestant ranks. It should be remembered by divines of every communion that the rational faculties of man and their general trustworthiness are necessarily presupposed in any Revelation which may be addressed to them; and that in Scripture itself frequent appeals are made to the works of Creation and Providence, as affording at once a body of natural evidence, and a signal manifestation of His adorable perfections. It were a vain thing to hope that _faith in G.o.d_ may be strengthened by a spirit of _Skepticism_ in regard to Reason, which const.i.tutes part of His own image on the soul of man.

It is but common justice to add that the speculations of Lamennais, so far from being sanctioned, were openly censured, by some of the most distinguished of his fellow-ecclesiastics. Such writers as Valroger, Gioberti, and the late Archbishop of Paris, gave forth their public protest against them, and have thereby done much to vindicate their Church from the imputation of conniving at the progress of Skepticism.

Valroger's testimony is strong and decided: "M. de Lamennais pretendait que la raison individuelle est incapable de nous donner la Cert.i.tude.

Cette pretention est, suivant, nous absurde et funeste. N'est ce pas par notre raison individuelle que la verite-arrive a nous et devient notre bien? Quel moyen plus immediat pourrons-nous avoir de saisir la verite?

Quel principe de connaisance ou de Cert.i.tude pourrait-on placer entre nous et notre raison? Et comment pourrions-nous l'employer, si ce ne'est avec notre raison? N'est ce pas une contradiction flagrante de vouloir persuader quelque chose a des hommes que l'on a declares incapables de connaitre certainement quoi que ce soit? A quoi bon une methode, une autorite infaillible, un enseignement Divin, si nous n'avons que des facultes trompeuses pour user de ces secours? Nous croyons, nous, que la raison individuelle peut connaitre avec cert.i.tude toutes les verites necessaires a l'accompliss.e.m.e.nt de notre destinee. Si nous avons besoin de la Grace, de la Revelation, de la Tradition, et de l'Eglise pour atteindre le but supreme de notre vie,--sur une foule de questions subalternes, nous peuvons arriver a une cert.i.tude complete, sans recourir a aucune exterieure, a aucun secours surnaturel."[247]

Gioberti is equally explicit: "M. de Lamennais dans sa theorie sur la Cert.i.tude, confond les deux methodes, Ontologique et Physiologique; il les rejette toutes les deux, et leur subst.i.tue la seule methode d'Autorite. Mais la methode d'Autorite est impossible sans un fondement Ontologique, et c'est une manifeste pet.i.tion de principe que d'etabler l'Ontologie sur l'Autorite."[248]

And the late Archbishop of Paris,--the same who fell before the barricades, a martyr to Charity if not to Truth, and who seems to have had a wakeful eye on the progress of philosophic speculation,--took occasion, in a preface to the Abbe Maret's "Theodicee," to declare that Lamennais' system was obnoxious to the Church, because of its opposition to the doctrine of Rational Cert.i.tude: "Tout le monde sait que le clerge de France avait repousse le systeme de M. de Lamennais precis.e.m.e.nt a cause de son opposition a la Cert.i.tude Rationnelle constanment professee dans nos ecoles; et tout le monde peu savoir que les Bossuet, les Fenelon, les Descartes out raisonne, et que nous aussi nous raisonnons et discutons avec nos accusateurs," ... "preuve irrecusable que LE RATIONALISME ET LA RAISON SONT DEUX CHOSES FORT DIFFERENTES."[249]

PERRONE has given a similar testimony, and we cannot doubt that the more thoughtful adherents of Romanism must be sensible of the danger which is involved in any attempt to combine Rational Skepticism with Dogmatic Authority.

It were well, however, if they would reconsider their position with reference to this whole question, in its more general bearings in conection with their doctrine as to the rule of faith; and weigh, with candid impartiality, the arguments which have been adduced by Protestant writers on the subject.[250]

FOOTNOTES:

[233] M. A. FRANCK, "Rapport," Paris, 1847. M. A. JAVARY, "Ouvrage Couronne par l'Inst.i.tut," 1847.

[234] M. ED. MERCIER, "De la Cert.i.tude, dans ses Rapports avec la Science et la Foi," 1844. M. A. VERA, "Probleme de la Cert.i.tude," 1843.

ABBe GERBET, "Des Doctrines Philosophiques sur la Cert.i.tude, dans leur Rapports avec les Fondemens de la Theologie." ABBe DE LAMENNAIS, "Du Fondement de la Cert.i.tude," 1826. Vols. II. and III. of the "Essai sur l'Indifference en Matiere de la Religion." 4 vols., 1844.

[235] M. FRANCK, p. 237. M. JAVARI, p. 28.

[236] AMAND SAINTE, "Vie de Spinoza," p. 201. ABBe LAMENNAIS, "Essai sur l'Indifference," IV. 256.

[237] FENELON, "Oeuvres Spirituelles," I. _138_.

[238] s.e.xTUS EMPIRICUS, "Adversus Mathematicos," that is, Dogmaticos--teachers of [Greek: mathemata]. GLANVILLE, "Scepsis Scientifica." HUME, and MONTAIGNE, "Essays." H. O'CONNOR, "Connected Essays and Tracts." VILLEMANDY, "Scepticismus Debellatus; seu, Humanae Cognitionis Ratio ab imis radicibus explicata; ejusdem Cert.i.tudo adversus Scepticos quosque veteres ac novos invicte a.s.serta." LAMENNAIS, "Essai sur l'Indifference."

[239] DR. REID, Essays,--"On First Principles," II. 249-252, 293, 300.

SIR WM. HAMILTON, "Reid," pp. 91, 101, 109.

[240] BISHOP EARLE, "Microcosmography," p. 120.

[241] DR. JOHN LOVE, of Glasgow, "Discourses."

[242] COUSIN, "Cours," II. 420, 422. MORELL, "History of Philosophy," I.

251; II. 221, 505, 522. SPINOZA, "Tractatus Theolog.-Polit.," p. 267.

LAMENNAIS, "Essai sur l'Indifference," _pa.s.sim_.

[243] LAMENNAIS, "Essai," II. 6, 7, 52, 60, 258.

[244] Ibid., II. 9, 97, 110.

[245] LAMENNAIS, "Essai," II. 59, 72, 75, 78, 80, 84, 94; IV. 255.

[246] BOUCHITTe, "Histoire des Preuves," p. 478.

[247] VALROGER, "Etudes Critiques," p. 574.

[248] GIOBERTI, "Introduction a l'Etude de la Philosophie," I. 592.

[249] MARET, "Theodicee," Preface, p. VIII.

[250] LA PLACETTE, "De Insanabill Romanae Ecclesiae Scepticismo."

CHAPTER IX.

THEORY OF SECULARISM.--G. J. HOLYOAKE.

Such is the new name under which Atheism has recently appeared among not a few of the tradesmen and artisans of the metropolis and provincial towns of Great Britain. In literature, it is represented by Mr. G. J.

Holyoake, the author of an answer to Paley, the editor of "The Reasoner," and a popular lecturer and controversialist, whose public discussions are duly reported in that periodical, and occasionally reprinted in a separate form.[251] The extensive circulation which these and similar tracts have already obtained, the number of affiliated societies which have been formed in many of the chief centres of manufactures and commerce, the zeal and boldness of popular itinerant lecturers, and the urgent demands which have been incessantly made for the extension of their machinery by means of a _propaganda_ fund, are all indications of a tendency, in some quarters, towards a form of unbelief, less speculative and more practical, but only on that account more attractive to the English mind, and neither less insidious nor less dangerous than any of the philosophical theories of Atheism.

We have often thought, indeed, that should Atheism ever threaten to become prevalent in England, this is the form which it is most likely to a.s.sume. The English mind is eminently practical; it has little sympathy with the profundity of German or the subtlety of French speculation on such subjects. A few speculative spirits may be influenced for a time by the reasonings of Comte, or the representations of "The Vestiges;" but the general mind of the community will desiderate something more solid and substantial; not content with any scientific theory, however ingenious, it will demand a practical system. And we are not sure that "Secularism" may not be made to appear, in the view of some, to be just such a system, since it dismisses or refuses to p.r.o.nounce on many of the highest problems of human thought, insists on the necessary limitation of the human faculties, and seeks to confine both our aspirations and our thoughts to the interests and the duties of the present life. In estimating the probable influence of such a system on the public mind, we must not forget the large amount of practical irreligion which exists even in England, the strong temptation which is felt by many to escape from their occasional feelings of remorse and fear by embracing some plausible pretext for the neglect of prayer and other religious observances, and the disposition, natural and almost irresistible in such circ.u.mstances, to lend a willing ear to any doctrine which promises to relieve them of all responsibility with relation to G.o.d and a future state. The theory of Secularism is adapted to this state of mind; it chimes in with the instinctive tendencies of every unG.o.dly mind; and it is the likeliest medium through which _practical Atheism_ may pa.s.s into _speculative Infidelity_.

Mr. Holyoake, it is true, abjures the name both of an _Atheist_ and _Infidel_. We admire the prudence of his policy, but cannot subscribe to the correctness of his reasons for doing so. "Mr. Southwell," he says, "has taken an objection to the term Atheism. We are glad he has. We have disused it a long time.... We disuse it, because Atheist is a worn-out word. Both the ancients and the moderns have understood by it _one without G.o.d, and also without morality_. Thus the term connotes more than any well-informed and earnest person accepting it ever included in it; that is, the word carries with it a.s.sociations of immorality, which have been repudiated by the Atheist as seriously as by the Christian.

Non-theism is a term less open to the same misunderstanding, as it implies the simple non-acceptance of the Theist's explanation of the origin and government of the world."[252]

But "Non-theism" was afterwards exchanged for "Secularism," as a term less liable to misconstruction, and more correctly descriptive of the real import of the theory. "_Secularists_ was, perhaps, the proper designation of all who dissented extremely from the religious opinions of the day."--"Freethinking is the _Secular_ sphere; drawing its line of demarcation between time and eternity, it works _for the welfare of man in this world_"--"The _Secularist_ is the larger and more comprehensive designation of the Atheist."[253] With all this coyness and fastidiousness about names, there can be no doubt that the character of the system is essentially atheistic: "We refuse to employ the term G.o.d, not having any definite idea of it which we can explain to others,--not knowing any theory of such an existence as will enable us to defend that dogma to others. We therefore prefer the honest, though unusual designation of Atheist; not using it in the sense in which it is commonly employed, as signifying _one without morality_, but in its stricter sense of describing those _without any determinate knowledge of Deity_."[254] "That the Atheist does consider matter to be eternal is perfectly correct; and for this reason, no Atheist could make use of such a term as that matter _originally_ possessed, or _originally_ was; whatever is eternal has no origin, beginning, or end.... Organized plants and animals--man also with his n.o.ble intellect--are not _now_ at least produced by supernatural causes; and the Atheist, without positively a.s.serting that there _must_ have been a beginning to life in this earth, argues that if a plant, an animal, or a man, can be produced at this time without supernatural interference, so also a first plant, a first animal, or a first man, may have been naturally produced in this earth under the right circ.u.mstances,--circ.u.mstances which probably cannot occur in the present condition of our globe. Our difficulties and our ignorance are not in the least dispelled, but on the contrary complicated and increased, by the adoption of the ancient belief in a Supernatural Contriver and Maker, who, after existing from eternity in absolute void and solitude, suddenly proceeded to create the universe out of nothing or out of himself."[255] The editor thinks "the course to be taken is to use the term Secularists as indicating general views, and accept the term Atheist at the point at which Ethics declines alliance with Theology; always, however, explaining the term Atheist to mean 'not seeing G.o.d,' visually or inferentially; never suffering it to be taken (as Chalmers, Foster, and many others represent it) for Anti-theism, that is, hating G.o.d, denying G.o.d, as _hating_ implies personal knowledge as the ground of dislike, and _denying_ implies infinite knowledge as the ground of disproof."[256]

These extracts are sufficient to ill.u.s.trate the peculiar character of this popular form of Infidelity. It is not a philosophical system, although philosophical terms are often employed by its advocates; it does not even profess to solve, as the theory of Development does, any of the great problems of Nature. We shall offer a brief statement of its distinctive peculiarities, as it is developed by Mr. Holyoake, and suggest some considerations which should be seriously pondered by those who may be tempted to exchange Christianity for Secularism.

1. The theory of Secularism is a form, not of _dogmatic_, but of _skeptical_, Atheism; it is dogmatic only in _denying the sufficiency of the evidence_ for the being and perfections of G.o.d. It does not deny, it only does not believe, His existence. There may be a G.o.d notwithstanding; there may even be sufficient evidence of His being, although some men cannot, or will not, see it. "They do not deny the existence of G.o.d, but only a.s.sert that they have not sufficient proof of His existence."[257] "The Non-theist takes this ground. He affirms that natural reason has _not yet_ attained to (evidence of) Supernatural Being. He does not deny that it _may do so_, because the capacity of natural reason in the pursuit of evidence of Supernatural Being is not, so far as he is aware, fixed."--"The power of reason is yet a growth. To deny its power absolutely would be hazardous; and in the case of a speculative question, not to admit that the opposite views may in some sense be tenable, is to a.s.sume your own infallibility,--a piece of arrogance the public always punish by disbelieving you when you are in the right."[258] Accordingly the thesis which Mr. Holyoake undertook to maintain in public discussion was couched in these terms:--"That we have _not sufficient evidence_ to believe in the existence of a Supreme Being independent of Nature;"[259] and so far from venturing to deny His existence, he makes the important admission, that "_denying implies infinite knowledge as the ground of disproof_."