The system which is known under the name of Religious Liberalism or Indifference has been recently avowed in our own country with a frankness and boldness which can leave no room for doubt in regard to its ultimate tendency. The late Blanco White avowed it as his mature conviction, that "to declare any one unworthy of the name of Christian because he does not agree with your belief, is to fall into the intolerance of the articled Churches; that the moment the name Christian is made necessarily to contain in its signification belief in certain historical or metaphysical propositions, that moment _the name itself becomes a creed_,--the _length_ of that creed is of little consequence."[229] This is the extreme on one side, and it plainly implies that _no one article of faith_ is necessary, and that a man may be a Christian who neither acknowledges an historical Christ, nor believes a single doctrine which He taught! But there is an extreme also on the other side, which is exemplified in the singularly eloquent, but equally unsatisfactory, treatise of the Abbe Lamennais,[230] in which, as _then_ an ardent and somewhat arrogant advocate of the Romish Church, he attempts to fasten the charge of _Indifference_ or _Liberalism_ on the Protestant system, and to prove that there can be no true faith, and of course no salvation, beyond the Catholic pale. The chief interest of his treatise depends on his peculiar "theory of cert.i.tude," to which we shall have occasion to advert in the sequel; in the meantime, we may notice briefly the grievous error into which he has fallen in treating of the faith which is necessary to salvation. He _overstates_ the case as much, at least, as it has been _understated_ by the abettors of Liberalism. The latter deny the necessity of _any_ articles of faith; the former demands the implicit reception of _every_ doctrine propounded by the Romish Church. He repudiates the distinction between _fundamentals_ and _non-fundamentals_ in Religion, and insists that, as every truth is declared by the same infallible authority, so every truth must be received with the same unquestioning faith. He forgets that while all the truths of Scripture ought to be believed by reason of the Divine authority on which they rest, yet some truths are more directly connected with our salvation than others, as well as more clearly and explicitly revealed. Nor are we justly liable to the charge of "Indifference" or "Liberalism" when we tolerate a difference of opinion, on some points, among men who are, in all important respects, substantially agreed: for true toleration is the fruit, not of unbelief or indifference, but of charity and candor; and it is sanctioned in Scripture, which enjoins that we should "receive those who are weak in the faith, but not to doubtful disputations," and that "every man should be fully persuaded in his own mind."[231]

But it is not so much in its relation to the articles of the Christian faith, as in its bearing on the different forms of true and false religion, that the theory of Liberalism comes into collision with the cause of Theism, and evinces its infidel tendencies. If any one can regard with the same complacency, or with the same apathetic indifference, all the varieties of religious or superst.i.tious belief and worship; if he can discern no radical or important difference between Monotheism and Polytheism, or between the Protestant and Popish systems; if he be disposed to treat each of these as equally true or equally false, as alike beneficial or injurious in their practical influence, then this may be regarded as a sufficient proof that he is ignorant of the evidence, and blind to the claims, of truth,--a mere skeptical dreamer, if not a speculative Atheist.

An attempt has recently been made to place the theory of Religious Liberalism on a philosophical basis, by representing religion as a mere _sentiment_, which may be equally elicited and exemplified in various forms of belief and worship. Several writers, following in the wake of Schleiermacher, who gave such a powerful impulse to the mind of Germany, have made Religion to consist either in _a sense of dependence_, or in _a consciousness of the infinite_; and this sentiment, as well as the spontaneous intuitions of reason with which it is a.s.sociated, is said to be alike natural, universal, and invariable, the essential principle of all Religion, the root whence have sprung all the various forms of belief and worship. These varieties are supposed to be more or less rational and salutary, according to the conception which they respectively exhibit of the nature and character of G.o.d,--a conception which may be endlessly diversified by the intellect, or the imagination, or the pa.s.sions of different men; while all the forms of belief are radically identical, since they all spring from the same ground-principle, and are only so many distinct manifestations of it.

Thus Mr. Parker tells us that, stripping the "religious sentiment" in man "of all accidental circ.u.mstances peculiar to the age, nation, sect, or individual, and pursuing a sharp and final a.n.a.lysis till the subject and predicate can no longer be separated, we find as the ultimate fact, that the religious sentiment is this,--'_a sense of dependence_.' This sentiment does not itself disclose the character, and still less the nature and essence, of the object on which it depends, no more than the senses declare the nature of _their_ objects. Like them it acts spontaneously and unconsciously, as soon as the outward occasion offers, with no effort of will, forethought, or making up the mind. But the religious sentiment implies its object; ... and there is but _one religion_, though _many theologies_."[232]

There is, as it appears to us, a mixture of some truth with much grave and dangerous error, in these and similar speculations. It is an important truth, and one which has been too often overlooked in treating the evidences of Natural Theology, that the _sentiments_ of the human mind, not less than its intuitive perceptions or logical processes, have a close relation to the subject of inquiry; but it is an error to suppose that _all_ the sentiments having a religious tendency can be reduced to _one_, whether it be called "a sense of dependence" or "a consciousness of the infinite," for there are other sentiments besides these which are equally subservient to the uses of Religion, such as the sense of moral obligation, of the true, of the ideal, of the sublime, and of the beautiful. It is also an important truth, that there are spontaneous "intuitions of reason," or fundamental and invariable "laws of thought," which come into action at the first dawn of experience, and which have a close connection with the proof of the being and perfections of G.o.d; but it is an error to suppose that the proof depends _exclusively_ on these, or that it could be made out irrespective of the evidence afforded by the works of Creation and Providence. It is further an important truth, that the religious sentiment, or religious tendency, is natural to man, and that it may appear either in the form of Religion or Superst.i.tion: but it is an error to suppose that "there is but _one religion_, although _many theologies_;" for these theologies must spring from fundamentally different "conceptions of G.o.d," and what are these conceptions, in their ultimate a.n.a.lysis, but so many beliefs, doctrines, or dogmas, which, whether formally defined or not in articles of faith, have in them the self-same essence which is supposed to belong only to the bigotry of "articled churches?" But the fundamental, the fatal error of all these speculations, is the denial of any _stable and permanent standard of objective truth_. Truth is made purely _subjective_, and, of course, it must also be progressive, insomuch that the truth of a former age may be an error in the present, and the supposed truth of the present age may become obsolete hereafter. So that there is really nothing certain in human knowledge; and "truth" may be justly described as never existing, but only _becoming_, as never possessed, though ever pursued; it is a _verite mobile_, a truth not in _esse_, but in _fieri_.

Hence we read in recent speculations of a "new Christianity," of a "new Gospel," and of "the Church of the Future," as if there could be any other Christianity than that of the New Testament, any other Gospel than that of Jesus Christ, or any other Church than that of apostolic times.

I have adverted to this theory, because, while it is of little value in a speculative point of view, it is often found to exert a powerful practical influence, especially on "men of affairs," men who have travelled in various countries, or who have been employed in the arts of diplomacy and government; and who, finding religious worship everywhere, but clothed in different forms, and marking its subserviency to social and political interests, have been too p.r.o.ne to place all the varieties of belief in the same category, if not precisely on the same level, and to regard with indifference, perhaps even with indulgence, the grossest corruptions both of Natural and Revealed Religion. The world is surely old enough, and its history sufficiently instructive, to prove, even to the most indifferent statesmen, that truth is always salutary, and error noxious, to the commonwealth, and that nowhere is society more safe, orderly, or stable, than in those countries which are blessed with "pure and undefiled religion." But let the opinion spread from the prince to the peasant, from the aristocracy to the artisans, from the philosopher to the public, that there is either no difference, or only a slight and trivial one, between truth and error, that it matters little what a man believes, or whether he believes at all: let the general mind of the community become indoctrinated with such lessons, and it needs no prophetic foresight to predict a crisis of unprecedented peril, an era of reckless revolution. A philosophic dreamer may affect a calm indifference, a bland and benignant Liberalism; but a nation, a community, cannot be neutral or inert in regard to matters of faith: it must and will be either religious or irreligious, it must either love the truth or hate it: it is too sharp-sighted, and too much guided by homely common sense, to believe that systems so opposite as Paganism and Christianity, or Popery and Protestantism, are harmonious manifestations of the same religious principle, or equally beneficial to the State.

FOOTNOTES:

[224] M. COUSIN, "Introduction," I. 318, 391, 405, 419; II. 134. Ibid., "Fragmens Philosophiques." Preface, VII.

[225] VALROGER, "Etudes Critiques," pp. 115, 126, 151, 308, 316. MARET, "Essai sur Pantheisme," p. 249.

[226] P. LEROUX, "Sur l'Humanite," 2 vols.

[227] BUDDaeUS, "De Atheismo et Superst.i.tione," pp. 184, 212.

[228] RICHARD BENTLEY, "On Freethinking," Boyle Lectures. VILLEMANDY, "Scepticismus Debellatus," III. His words are remarkable:--"Pa.s.sim haec, aliaque generis ejusdem, placita disseminantur,--neque verum neque bonum, qualia sunt in seipsis, posse dignosci; hinc que adeo sectandam esse duntaxat c.u.m veri, tum boni, similitudinem: quae si stent ac valeant,--illud omne erit verum, illud omne aequum,--illud omne pium et religiosum,--illud omne utile, quod _cuiquam tale videatur_; privatam cujusque conscientiam supremam esse agendorum, vel non agendorum, normam."

[229] JAMES MARTINEAU, "Rationale of Religious Inquiry," p. 108.

[230] F. DE LAMENNAIS, "Essai sur l'Indifference en matiere de la Religion," 4 vols. Paris, 1844.

[231] Romans 14: 1, 5.

[232] THEODORE PARKER, "Discourse of Matters pertaining to Religion,"

pp. 14, 17.

CHAPTER VIII.

THEORIES OF CERt.i.tUDE AND SKEPTICISM.

We formerly adverted to the distinction between Dogmatic and Skeptical Atheism; and, believing that the _latter_ is the form in which it is most prevalent, as well as most insidious and plausible, we now propose to review some recent theories both of Cert.i.tude and Skepticism, which have sometimes been applied to throw doubt on the evidence of Christian Theism.

The Academy of Moral and Political Sciences in the French Inst.i.tute announced in 1843 the theory of Cert.i.tude as the subject of a Prize Essay, and issued the following _programme_ as a guide to the compet.i.tors in the selection of the princ.i.p.al topics of discussion:

"1. To determine the character of Cert.i.tude, and what distinguishes it from everything else. For example, Is Cert.i.tude the same with the highest probability?

"2. What is the faculty, or what are the faculties, which give us Cert.i.tude? If several faculties of knowledge are supposed to exist, to state with precision the differences between them.

"3. Of Truth and its foundations. Is truth the reality itself,--the nature of things falling under the knowledge of man?--or is it nothing but an appearance,--a conception, necessary or arbitrary, of the human mind?

"4. To expound and discuss the most celebrated opinions, ancient and modern, on the problem of Cert.i.tude, and to follow them out into their theoretical and practical consequences. To subject to a critical and profound examination the great monuments of Skepticism,--the writings of s.e.xtus, Huet, Hume, and Kant.

"5. To inquire what are, in spite of the a.s.saults of Skepticism, the certain truths which ought to subsist in the Philosophy of our times."

Such was the comprehensive _programme_ of the French Inst.i.tute; and many circ.u.mstances concurred at the time to impart a peculiar interest to the compet.i.tion. M. Franck's volume[233] contains the Report of the Section of Philosophy on the papers which had been prepared, and offers a careful a.n.a.lysis and critical estimate of their contents. Various other works[234] not concerned in the compet.i.tion appeared before and after it, showing how much the philosophical mind of France had been occupied with this great theme, while in Britain it was attracting little or no attention.

This is the most recent discussion, on a great scale, of the theory of Cert.i.tude. But the question, far from being a new or modern speculation, is as old as Philosophy itself, and has been perpetually reproduced in every age of intellectual activity. Plato discusses it, chiefly in the Theaetetus, Sophist, and Parmenides; it was agitated by Pyrrho, Enesidemus, and s.e.xtus Empiricus, with that peculiar subtlety which belonged to the mind of Greece; and in more recent times it has reappeared in the writings of Montaigne and Bayle, Huet and Pascal, Glanville, Hume, and Kant. Even during the middle age, the controversy between the Nominalists and Realists had an important bearing on this subject: so that from the whole history of Philosophy we derive the impression of its fundamental importance, an impression which is deepened and confirmed by the transcendent interest of the themes to which it has been applied.

In our present argument, we are concerned with it only so far as it stands connected with the foundations of Theology, or as the right or wrong solution of the general question might affect the evidence for the Being and Perfections of G.o.d. We do not propose, therefore, to offer a full exposition of the philosophy of Cert.i.tude, still less to inst.i.tute a detailed examination of the various theories which have been propounded respecting it. It will be sufficient for our purpose if we merely sketch a comprehensive outline of the subject, and select some of the more prominent points which have the most direct bearing on the grounds of our religious belief. Thus much may be accomplished by considering, _first_, the statement of the problem, and, _secondly_, the solution of it.

In regard to the _statement_ of the problem, it is necessary, in the first instance, to ascertain its precise import, by determining the meaning of the term Cert.i.tude. The programme of the Academy very properly places this question on the foreground, Is Cert.i.tude the same with the highest probability? And it is the more necessary to give precedence to this part of the inquiry, because it is notorious that there is a wide difference between the philosophical and the popular sense of Cert.i.tude,--a difference which has often occasioned mutual misunderstanding between disputants, and a profitless warfare of words.

In the philosophical sense of the term, that only is said to be _certain_ which is either an axiomatic truth, intuitively discerned, or a demonstrated truth, derived from the former by rigorous deduction; while all that part of our knowledge which is gathered from experience and observation, however credible in itself and however surely believed, is characterized as _probable_ only. In the popular sense of the term, Cert.i.tude belongs to all those truths, of whatever kind and in whatever way acquired, in regard to which we have no reason to be in doubt or suspense, and which rest on sufficient and satisfactory evidence. A philosopher is _certain_, in his sense of the term, only of what he intuitively perceives or can logically demonstrate; a peasant is _certain_, in his sense of the term, of whatever he distinctly sees, or clearly remembers, or receives on authentic testimony. There is much reason, we think, to regret the existence of such a wide difference between the philosophical and the popular sense of an expression, which must occur so often both in speculative discussion and in the intercourse of common life. It may be doubted whether the metaphysician is ent.i.tled to borrow the language of society, and to engraft upon it an arbitrary definition of his own, different from and even inconsistent with that which it bears in common usage. Nor can he plead necessity as a sufficient excuse, or the accuracy of his definition as an effectual safeguard, since, however needful it may be to discriminate between _different species_ of Cert.i.tude, by marking their peculiar characteristics and respective sources, surely this might be done more safely and satisfactorily by designating one kind of it as Intuitive, another as Demonstrative, another as Moral, or Experimental, or Historical, than it can be by any arbitrary restriction of the _generic_ term to one or two of the many species which are comprehended under it.

No doubt there is a real distinction, and one of great practical importance, between _cert.i.tude_ and _probability_; but this distinction is not overlooked in the language of common life;--it is only necessary to determine what truths belong respectively to each: whereas when all the truths of Experience, and even, in some cases, those of scientific Induction, are ranked under the head of _probability_ merely, is it not evident that the language of Philosophy is in this respect at variance with the prevailing sense of mankind?

An attempt has sometimes been made to draw a distinction between _popular_ and _philosophical_ Cert.i.tude, or, in other words, between the unreflecting belief of the many and the scientific belief of the few.

Thus, M. Franck distinguishes Cert.i.tude, first of all, from the blind faith which commences with the earliest dawn of intelligence: then, from the doubt which supervenes on the initial process of inquiry; and then, from that half-knowledge, that middle term between doubt and certainty, which is called _probability_. And M. Javari speaks of Cert.i.tude "as the complete demonstration, acquired by reflection, of the legitimacy of any judgment, or of the reality of any object: this is definitive and scientific cert.i.tude, which is contrasted with that belief, however strong, which springs, not from the _reflective_, but the _direct and spontaneous_ exercise of our faculties."[235] It must be evident that, according to this definition of the term, Cert.i.tude, in the scientific sense of it, as the product of philosophical reflection, must be the privilege and prerogative of the few, who have been led by taste or education to cultivate the study of Psychology; while the vast majority of men, who are nevertheless as _certain_ of the truths which they believe, and, to say the very least, as little liable to doubt or skepticism, as any cla.s.s of philosophers whatever, must be held to have no Cert.i.tude, just because they have no Science. It seems to be a.s.sumed that Cert.i.tude is the creation of Science, the product of reflective thought; whereas it may be demonstrably shown that without Cert.i.tude, Science would be impossible, and that reflection can give forth nothing but what it finds previously existing in the storehouse of human consciousness. It surveys the streams of belief, and may trace up these streams to their highest springs; but it does not, it cannot, create a new truth, or give birth to a higher cert.i.tude. We have no disposition, a.s.suredly, to underrate the value of philosophical reflection, or to disparage the science of Psychology; the former may collect the materials and the latter may attempt the construction, of a goodly and solid fabric: but we cannot admit that the certainty of all our knowledge depends upon either of them, or that it is confined exclusively to the metaphysical inquirer. Reflection adds nothing to the contents of human consciousness: it examines our fundamental beliefs, but originates none of them; it discerns the elements and sources of certainty, but can neither produce nor alter them. Its sole province is to examine and report. If Cert.i.tude, in the philosophical sense of it, belongs to the _reflex_, Certainty, in the popular sense, belongs to the _direct_ and _spontaneous_, operations of the human mind. We see and believe, we remember and believe, we compare and believe, we hear and believe, and that, too, with a feeling of confidence which needs no argument to confirm it, and to which all the philosophy in the world could impart no additional strength. Cert.i.tude is not the creation of Philosophy, but the object of its study; it exists independently of Science, and is only recognized by it; and it would still exist as a const.i.tuent and indestructible element of human consciousness were Metaphysics scattered to the wind.

It appears, again, to have been a.s.sumed in some recent treatises, that Cert.i.tude belongs only to that portion of truth the denial of which would imply a contradiction, or amount to the annihilation of reason. Is it, then, to be restricted to _necessary_ and _absolute_, as contrasted with _contingent_ and _relative_ truths? Am I not as _certain_ that I see four objects before me, as that two and two make four? Yet the former is a _contingent_, the latter a _necessary_ truth. Is not my personal consciousness infallibly certain? And yet can it be said to belong to the head of necessary truth? Surely Cert.i.tude is unduly restricted when we exclude from it many of our surest and strongest convictions, which relate to truths attested by experience, but the denial of which would involve no contradiction.

The question has been still further complicated by extreme opinions of another kind. It seems to have been a.s.sumed that there can be no Cert.i.tude, unless we can explain the _rationale_ of our knowledge, and even account for the objects of our knowledge by tracing them up to their First Cause, as the ground and reason of their existence.[236]

Now, if the question were, Can you account for your own existence, or for the existence of the world around you, without having recourse to a supreme First Cause? we would answer, No: but if the question be, Can there be any Cert.i.tude prior to the idea of G.o.d, not deduced from it, and capable of existing without it? we would answer, Yes: the little child is certain of its mother's existence before it is capable of knowing G.o.d, and the veriest Atheist is certain of his own existence and that of his fellow-men, even when he professes to doubt or to disbelieve the existence of G.o.d. It may be true that the essential nature and omniscient knowledge of G.o.d is the ultimate and eternal standard of truth and certainty, or, in the words of Fenelon, that "il n'y a qu'une seule verite, et qu'une seule maniere de bien juger, qui est, de juger comme Dieu meme;"[237] and yet it may not be true that all our knowledge is derived by deduction from our idea of G.o.d, or that its entire certainty is dependent on our religious belief. Surely we may be certainly a.s.sured of the facts of consciousness, of the phenomena of Nature, and of many truths, both necessary and contingent, before we have made any attempt to explain the _rationale_ of our knowledge, or to connect it with the idea of the great First Cause; nay, it may be, and we believe it is, by _means_ of these inferior and subordinate truths that we rise to the belief of a supreme, omniscient Mind.

Some writers seem to confound Cert.i.tude with _Infallibility,_ or at least to hold that there can be no Cert.i.tude without it. The _impersonal reason_ of Cousin, the _common sense_ or _generic reason_ of Lamennais, and the _authoritative tradition_ of the Church, have all been severally resorted to, for the purpose of obtaining a ground of Cert.i.tude in the matters both of Philosophy and Faith, such as is supposed to be unattainable by the exercise of our own proper faculties, or by the most careful study of evidence. According to these theories, Cert.i.tude belongs to our knowledge, only because that knowledge is derived from a reason superior to our own,--a reason not personal, but universal; not individual, but generic. When they are applied, as they have been, to undermine the authority of private judgment, and to supersede the exercise of free inquiry; when they are urged as a reason why we should defer to the authority of the Race in matters of Philosophy and to the authority of the Church in matters of Faith; when we are told that the certainty of our own existence depends on our knowledge of G.o.d, and that our knowledge of G.o.d depends on the _common consent_ or _invariable traditions_ of mankind,--we do feel that the grounds of Cert.i.tude, so far from being strengthened, are sapped and weakened by such speculations, and that we have here a new and most unexpected application of the Scottish doctrine of Common Sense, such as may be highly serviceable to the Church of Rome. Protestant writers, indeed, have sometimes appealed to _common consent_ as a collateral proof, auxiliary to that which is more direct and conclusive; but they have done so merely because they regarded it as a _part of the evidence_, well fitted to prove what Dr. Cudworth calls "the naturality of the idea of G.o.d," and not because they confounded it with the _faculty_ by which alone that evidence can be discerned and appreciated. They never regarded it as the sole ground of certainty either in matters of Philosophy or Faith. Nor can it be so considered by any thoughtful mind.

For how can I be more a.s.sured of an _impersonal reason_ than of my own?

How can I be more certain of the existence and the traditions of other men, than of the facts of my own consciousness, and the spontaneous convictions of my own understanding? or how can I be a.s.sured that, in pa.s.sing from the impersonal reason to the individual mind, from the generic reason to the personal, the truth may not contract some taint of weakness or impurity from the vessel in which it is ultimately contained,--from the finite faculties by which alone it is apprehended and believed?

The fact is that any attempt to prove the truth of our faculties must necessarily fail. Did we set ourselves to the task of proving by argument or by authority that we are not wrong in believing in our own existence or that of an external world, or did we attempt to establish the trustworthiness of our faculties by resolving it into the veracity of G.o.d, our effort must needs be as abortive as it is superfluous, since it involves the necessity not only of proving the fact, but of _proving the proof itself_, and that, too, by the aid of the very faculties whose trustworthiness is in question! There are certain ultimate facts beyond which it is impossible to push our speculative inquiries; certain first or fundamental principles of Reason, which are in themselves indemonstrable, but which const.i.tute the ground or condition of all demonstration; certain intuitive perceptions, which are widely different from rational deductions, but which determine and govern every process of reasoning and every form of belief. To deny the _certainty_ of our intuitive perceptions, merely because we cannot prove by argument the truth of our mental faculties, would virtually amount to a rejection of all evidence except such as comes to us only through _one_ channel, and _that_ the circuitous one of a process of reasoning; while, by the const.i.tution of our nature, we are qualified and privileged to draw it fresh, in many cases, at its spring and fountain-head. It may be as impossible for man to prove the trustworthiness of his intellectual faculties as it is for the bee to prove the truth of its marvellous instinct; but, in either case, the reason may be that any such proof is unnecessary, that it is superseded by the laws of Instinct in the one, and by the laws of Thought in the other, and that by these laws a better and surer provision is made for our guidance than any that could have been found in a mere logical faculty,--a natural and irresistible authority, which the Skeptic may dispute, but cannot destroy, and which, however disowned in theory, must be practically obeyed.

It must be evident that the _various meanings_ which have been attached to the term Cert.i.tude must materially affect both the statement and solution of the general problem, and, more particularly, that they must have an important bearing on the question, whether the doctrine which affirms the Being, Perfections, and Providence of G.o.d, should be ranked under the head of _certain_, or only of _probable_, truth. If, in making use of the term Cert.i.tude, I mean to denote by it something different from the certainty which belongs to the most a.s.sured convictions of the human mind, something that arises, not from the spontaneous and direct exercise of its faculties, but from a process of reflective thought or philosophical speculation, something, in short, that is peculiar to the metaphysical inquirer, and is not the common heritage of the race at large; then, unquestionably, the problem, as thus understood, must leave out of view many of the surest and most universal beliefs of mankind,--beliefs which may be ill.u.s.trated and confirmed by Philosophy, but which are anterior to it in respect to their origin, and independent of it in respect of the evidence on which they severally rest. In the case of Cert.i.tude, just as in the case of every similar term expressive of a simple, elementary idea, the ultimate appeal must be made to individual consciousness. No one can convey to another a conception of Cert.i.tude by means of words, apart from an experimental sense of it in the mind of the latter, any more than he could give the idea of color to the blind or of music to the deaf. It is because we have had experience of it in our own b.r.e.a.s.t.s that we recognize and respond to the descriptions which others give of it. Every one knows what it is to be _certain_ in regard to many things, just because, const.i.tuted as he is, he cannot doubt or disbelieve them. He is _certain_ of his own existence, of the existence of other men, of the facts of his familiar consciousness, of many events long since past which are still clearly remembered, of certain abstract truths which are intuitively discerned or logically demonstrated. These various objects of his thought may differ in other respects, and may occasion a corresponding difference in the _kind_ of Cert.i.tude which is conceived to belong to them; but they all possess the same generic character, and admit, therefore, of being cla.s.sified under the same comprehensive category, as objects of our _certain_ knowledge.

In the current use both of philosophical and popular language, Cert.i.tude is spoken of in a twofold sense. We speak of a belief or conviction of our own minds as possessing the character of Cert.i.tude, when it is so strong, and so firmly rooted that it excludes all doubt or hesitation;--we speak also of an object or event as possessing the same character, when it is so presented to our minds as to produce the full a.s.surance of its reality. Hence the distinction between _subjective_ and _objective_ Cert.i.tude. The former is a fact of consciousness; it is simply the undoubting a.s.sent which we yield to certain judgments, whether these judgments be true or false; it exists in us, and not in the objects of thought; it denotes a condition of our minds, which may, or may not, be in accordance with the actual state of things. The latter is truth or certainty considered _objectively_, as existing in the objects of our knowledge; it is independent of us and of our conceptions; it is _as_ it is, whether it be known or unknown to us; our belief cannot add to its reality, nor can our unbelief diminish or destroy it. Cert.i.tude, considered as a mental state, denotes simply the strength of our conviction or belief, as distinguished from doubt or mere opinion; but, considered as an objective reality, it denotes the ground or reason existing in the nature of things for the convictions which we cherish. _Subjective cert.i.tude_ is not always the index or the proof of _objective truth_, for men often believe with the strongest a.s.surance what they find reason afterwards to doubt or to disbelieve; and the prevalence of many false beliefs, sincerely cherished and zealously maintained, raises the question, how we may best discriminate between truth and error? Hence the various theories of Cert.i.tude, and hence also the antagonist theories of Skepticism.

The theories of Cert.i.tude may be reduced to _three_ cla.s.ses. The _first_ places the ground of Cert.i.tude in _Reason_; the _second_ in _Authority_; the _third_, in _Evidence_, including under that term both the external manifestations of truth, and the internal principles or laws of thought by which we are determined in forming our judgments in regard to them.

Each of these theories, however, has appeared in various phases in the history of philosophical speculation. The Individual Reason of Martineau, the Generic Reason of Lamennais, the Impersonal Reason of Cousin, the Authority of the Race, and the Infallibility of the Church, are specimens of these varieties.

The theory which places the principle of Cert.i.tude in REASON has a.s.sumed at least two distinct shapes. In the one it discards all authority except that of private judgment or individual reason; in the other it appeals to a higher reason, which is said to be impersonal and infallible, and which is supposed to regulate and determine the convictions of the human mind. In the former shape, it appears in the speculations of Martineau; in the latter, it is advocated by Cousin; and in one or other of these shapes it const.i.tutes the ground-principle of RATIONALISM. The theory, again, which places the principle of Cert.i.tude in AUTHORITY has also a.s.sumed two distinct shapes. In the one it speaks of a universal consent or Generic Reason, the reason not of the individual but of the race to which he belongs, and exhibits a singular combination of the Philosophy of Common Sense as taught by Dr. Reid and the Scottish School, with the principle of Authoritative Tradition as taught in the Popish Church; in the other, it refers more specifically, not to the infallibility of the race at large, but to the infallibility of a select body, regularly organized and invested with peculiar powers, into whose hands has been committed the sacred deposit and the sole guardianship of truth, whether in matters of philosophy or faith. In both forms it is presented in the writings of M. Gerbet and M.

Lamennais, and in both it is necessary for the full maintenance of the Popish system of doctrine. The theory, again, which places the principle of Cert.i.tude in EVIDENCE, admits of being exhibited in two very distinct aspects. In the one, it has been treated as if Evidence were purely _subjective_, as if it belonged exclusively to thought, and not to the object of thought, or as if it depended solely on the perceptions of our minds, and not at all on any objective reality which is independent of them, and which is equally true whether it be perceived by our minds or not. In this form it is a theory of Individualism, and has a strong tendency towards Skepticism. In the other aspect, Evidence is regarded as the sole and sufficient ground of Cert.i.tude, but it is viewed both _objectively_ and _subjectively_;--_objectively_, as having its ground and reason in a reality that is independent of our perceptions, and that may or may not be perceived without being the less true or the less certain in itself;--and yet _subjectively_ also, as being equally dependent on certain principles of reason or laws of thought, without which no external manifestation would suffice to create the ideas and beliefs of the human mind, since the evidence which is exhibited externally must not only exist, but must be perceived, discerned, and appreciated, before it can generate belief: but when perceived, it produces conviction, varying in different cases in degree, and amounting in some to absolute certainty, which leaves no room either for denial or doubt.

Such are the three grand theories of Cert.i.tude, and the several distinct forms or phases in which they have severally appeared. We have no hesitation in declaring our decided preference for the second form of the third theory,--that which resolves the principle or ground of Cert.i.tude into EVIDENCE; but EVIDENCE considered both _objectively_ and _subjectively_,--_objectively_, as that which exists whether it is perceived or not, and is independent of the caprices of individual minds, and _subjectively_, as that which must be discerned before its proper impression can be produced, which must be judged of according to the laws of human thought, and which, when so discerned and judged of, imparts a feeling of a.s.surance which no sophistry can shake and no philosophy strengthen.

According to some recent theories, Cert.i.tude belongs to our knowledge, only because that knowledge is derived from a reason superior to our own,--a reason not personal, but universal, not individual but generic, which, although not belonging to ourselves, is supposed to hold communication with our minds: and if this were meant merely to remind us of the limitation of our faculties, and of our consequent liability to error, or even to teach us the duty of acknowledging our dependence on a higher power, it might be alike un.o.bjectionable and salutary; but when it is applied to undermine the authority of private judgment and to supersede the exercise of free inquiry, they have a tendency to excite suspicion and distrust in every thoughtful mind. The capital error which pervades all these speculations consists in not distinguishing aright between the _evidence_ which const.i.tutes the ground of our belief, and the _faculty_ by which that evidence is discerned and appreciated. The Generic Reason of Lamennais, as well as the uniform Tradition of the Church, may const.i.tute, when duly improved, a branch of the objective evidence for the truth, and as such they have been applied even by Protestant writers when they have appealed to _common consent_ as a collateral proof, auxiliary to that which is more direct and conclusive; but they cannot be regarded as the exclusive grounds of the certainty of human knowledge, since this arises from the fundamental, universal, and invariable laws of human thought.

The term Skepticism, again, may denote either a mere _state of mind_,--a state of suspense or doubt in regard to some particular fact or opinion; or _a system of speculative philosophy_, relating to the principles of human knowledge or the grounds of human belief. In the former sense, it implies nothing more than the want of a sure and satisfactory conviction of the truth on the particular point in question. Were it expressed in words, it would simply amount to a verdict of "non liquet." In the latter sense, it imports much more than this; it is not merely a _sense_ of doubt respecting any one truth, but a _system_ of doubt in regard to the grounds of our belief in all truth, a subtle philosophy which seeks to explain the phenomena of Belief by resolving them into their ultimate principles, and which often terminates--in explaining them away. In both forms, it has existed, either continuously or in ever-recurring cycles, from the earliest dawn of speculative inquiry; and while it has seemed to r.e.t.a.r.d or arrest the progress of human knowledge, it has really been overruled as a means of quickening the intellectual powers, and imparting at once greater precision and comprehensiveness to the matured results of Science.

Theoretical Skepticism may be divided into _three_ distinct branches: First, Universal or Philosophical Skepticism, which professes to deny, or rather to doubt the certainty of all human knowledge; secondly, Partial or Religious Skepticism, which admits the possible cert.i.tude of human knowledge in other respects, but holds that religious truth is either altogether inaccessible to our faculties, or that it is not supported by sufficient evidence; thirdly, a mongrel system, which combines Philosophic Doubt with Ecclesiastical Dogmatism, and which may be aptly characterized as the Skeptico-Dogmatic theory.[238]

We agree with Dr. Reid in thinking that Universal Skepticism is unanswerable _by argument_, and can only be effectively met by an _appeal to consciousness_.[239] It might be shown, indeed, that in so far as it a.s.sumes, however slightly, the aspect of a positive or dogmatic system, it is self-contradictory and absurd; it might also be shown that doubt itself implies thought, and thought existence or reality: but the ultimate appeal must be to the facts of human consciousness, and the laws of thought which operate in every human breast. And when such an appeal is made, we can have no anxiety in regard to the result, nor any apprehension that philosophical skepticism can ever become the prevailing creed of the popular mind. There is a risk, however, of danger arising from a different source; it may not be always remembered that the theory of Skepticism must be universal to be either consistent or consequent; and hence it may be _partially applied_ to some truths, while it is practically abandoned in regard to other truths, which are neither more certain nor less liable to objection than the former. Thus the skeptical difficulties which have been raised against the doctrines of Ontology are of such a kind that if they have any validity or force, they bear as strongly against the reality of an external world and the existence of our fellow-men, as against the doctrine which affirms the being of G.o.d: yet many will be found urging them against the latter doctrine, who do not profess to have any doubt in regard to the two former; and it is of paramount importance to show that this is a partial and therefore unfair application of their own principles, and that they cannot consistently admit the one without also admitting the other.