5m. made the signal for the boats to tow the Pompee,--Caesar engaging the southernmost ships,--Audacious, ditto,--Caesar opened her fire on the island battery,--Audacious and Caesar becalmed near the island reef,--boats employed towing the ship's head round; afternoon,--light winds and variable weather,--engaging the enemy; at 12h. 33m. made the signal for the Hannibal being aground,--employed engaging the southernmost ship; at 1h. 17m. Audacious wore,--made the signal for armed-boats to proceed as denoted; at 1h. 35m. the action ceased,--found the main-mast shot through in five places, (and other damage which need not be mentioned,) nine men killed, twenty-five wounded, and seven missing; at 5h. came-to at Gibraltar, with the small bower employed warping alongside of the sheer hulk.

The Venerable's log, which we have examined at the depot at Deptford, and which is signed by Captain Hood, fully corroborates the above, with the addition,--"At 12h. 40m. sent the first lieutenant in the pinnace to a.s.sist the Hannibal;" and this officer (Lieutenant Collis) in his own journal mentions the same fact. When he arrived at the Hannibal, she was in possession of the enemy; and he was taken prisoner, with his boat's crew, by persisting to go on board after he was warned by Lieutenant (now Colonel) Connolly, of the Marines. He says it was in consequence of the ensign being reversed that the boats were sent; and, before any of the boats reached her, she was in possession of the French, who hoisted the colours union downwards themselves, and that they never were hoisted in that manner at any other time.

These facts are also corroborated by the logs and journals of the Audacious and Spencer, which will be given in the next chapter. Every ship, indeed, mentions the impossibility of affording any a.s.sistance to the Hannibal, and that the signal was not made to leave off action until her situation was utterly hopeless.

The nature of the well-protected road of Algeziras being fully manifest in the diagram facing the 346th page, it is unnecessary to point out the difficulties the squadron had to contend with from the five strong batteries, which were served with much effect by the French artillerymen. The numerous gun-boats stationed at Algeziras for the annoyance of our commerce, were from their constant practice in that kind of warfare, of themselves a most formidable enemy; besides, the a.s.sistance they afforded in warping their ships in-sh.o.r.e, and placing them in such a position as to enable the different batteries to support them. But the failure of the attack must be mainly attributed to the unsteadiness and faintness of the wind, which enabled none of the squadron to obtain the position it wished; that is, in-sh.o.r.e of the enemy: while, by falling calm at a moment the most disadvantageous, it left the ships exposed to the enemy's fire without the possibility of returning it.

The loss sustained by each ship was severe. The Caesar had her master, Mr. William Grave, six seamen, and two marines, killed; her boatswain, G.W. Forster, seventeen seamen, one boy, and six marines, wounded; besides the capture of Lieutenant Janvarin, a volunteer, Mr. Richard Best, and seven seamen, who were taken by boarding the Hannibal when in possession of the enemy. Her masts, particularly the main-mast, and yards, were very much injured; her boats were all cut to pieces, besides that taken at the Hannibal; and there were many shots in her hull. The Pompee had Mr. P. Roxborough, master, Mr. Stewart, midshipman, ten seamen, and three marines killed; Lieutenants Cheesman, Stapleton, and Innes, Messrs. Currie, Hillier, and Hibbert, fifty-three seamen, and ten marines, wounded. She was so completely damaged in masts, rigging, and sails, that all hope of refitting her as promptly as the rest was at an end. The Spencer had Mr. Spencer, a midshipman, and five seamen, killed; Mr. Chatterton, midshipman, twenty-three seamen, and three marines wounded. She was damaged chiefly in her rigging and sails, which were soon repaired. The Venerable had Mr. W. Gibbons, midshipman, and eight seamen, killed; Messrs. Austin and Collins, midshipmen, twenty seamen, and four marines, wounded; and eight missing. The Hannibal had seventy-five killed, among whom were Mr. D. Lindsay, clerk, and Lieut. James Williams, R.M.; and seventy wounded and missing. The Audacious had eight killed; Lieut. Day, of the Marines, thirty-one seamen and marines, wounded. The total loss of the squadron being one hundred and twenty-three killed, two hundred and forty-two wounded, and twenty-two missing.

The loss of the French and Spaniards, by their own accounts, was considerable; the former having three hundred and six killed,--among whom were Captains Moncousu, of the Dessaix, seventy-four, and Lalonde, of the Indomptable, eighty-four,--and near five hundred wounded; five gun-boats were sunk, and others damaged; and the forts, in which eleven men were killed, received considerable injury. The ships suffered a good deal in hull, masts, and rigging; but not so much as was antic.i.p.ated.

The French, as might be expected, from their usual disregard to truth, made this out one of the most brilliant exploits ever performed. Their account stated that three French ships had completely beaten six English, which took refuge in Gibraltar after leaving the Hannibal in their possession, &c.; saying nothing of the heavy batteries and gun-boats they had to contend with. But the Spaniards, in the Madrid Gazette extraordinary, represented the "action as very obstinate and b.l.o.o.d.y on both sides; and likewise on the part of the batteries, which decided the fate of the day:" and in another place, "the fire of our batteries was so hot and well supported that the enemy suffered most from them; and particularly it is to the St. Jago we owe the capture of the English ship, for her bold manoeuvre of attempting to pa.s.s between the French Rear-admiral's ship, the Formidable, and the sh.o.r.e, made her take the ground; and, notwithstanding the utmost exertions to get her afloat, it was found impossible to move her. Then the fire from the battery very soon dismasted her, and compelled her to strike."[34]

[34] James, vol. iii. p. 120.

The diagram, besides pointing out the situations of the five strong batteries, which so completely protect the harbour, and which did the greatest execution, shows the first position of the ships about the time they all anch.o.r.ed, and before the enemy's ships had warped near the sh.o.r.e. The second, represented by the outlines, shows the situation of the hostile squadrons at the time the Hannibal struck, when the Pompee had nearly reached the Mole, the distance of which from Algeziras is little more than four miles, and the Spencer was considerably advanced in that direction.

We cannot conclude our account of this action without a few remarks on the circ.u.mstances we have related. There cannot be a doubt that, had the enemy remained in the position he held at the commencement of the action, every ship would have been taken. Praise is certainly due to Admiral Linois for his able manoeuvre of warping his ships aground, being the only chance he had of escaping; while it was acknowledging that, as long as his ships were continued afloat, he had no confidence in protection from the batteries, strong as they were, against the valour and perseverance of British seamen.

Although the attack was not crowned with the success it merited, in a national point of view the result was as complete as if the whole squadron had been destroyed, as the enemy were thereby prevented from proceeding further in the execution of the ulterior object of their expedition; and the chance of this alone was sufficient to justify Sir James in this bold and daring attempt, which, it will be seen, ultimately led to one of the most glorious achievements which adorn the annals of the empire.[35]

[35] The discrepancies between the diagram and _some_ of the statements given in the logs, are easily accounted for by the changes which took place in the positions of the ships during the action.

CHAPTER XV.

1801.

Observations on the Battle of Algeziras.--Copies of the Journals of the Spencer, Audacious, and Venerable.--Remarks on them.--Further particulars.--The Spanish account.--The French account.--Bulletin from the Moniteur.--Anecdote of an occurrence at St. Malo.--Sword presented to Linois.--Lines on the occasion.--His improvement of Naval tactics.--Epigram.--Anecdote of the intrepidity of one of the Caesar's men.

It has been mentioned in the preceding chapter that, owing chiefly to the minutes of Captain Ferris's court-martial, and to the discrepancies in different statements, a controversy has arisen on the subject. In order to avoid the possibility of our becoming a party thereto, correct copies of the logs, which are now at the Record Office in the Admiralty, are subjoined, after having been compared with those at Somerset House.

Copy of the Log of his Majesty's ship Spencer, 6th July 1801.

Moderate and cloudy,--spoke his Majesty's ship Caesar, which informed us of having intelligence of three sail of French line-of-battle ships and a frigate being in Algeziras Bay,--answered the signal to prepare for battle at anchor,--employed clearing ship for battle at anchor; at 6h.

Apes hill S.E.; at half-past 6 beat the general to quarters,--ship clear for action; A.M. light airs and variable; at 4h. sprung up a breeze from the westward; at 7h. 58m. saw three French sail-of-the-line and one frigate, lying under the protection of the Spanish batteries of Algeziras, and a strong fortified island to the southward, and a number of forts and redoubts to the westward of them.

At 8h. 17m. the batteries commenced firing on the Venerable, Pompee, and Audacious,--Venerable commenced firing; at 9h. 11m.

we commenced firing; at 9h. 35m. found the sheet-cable cut through by the enemy's shot; at 9h. 48m. anch.o.r.ed between the Caesar and the Hannibal, Audacious astern, the Pompee on our larboard bow, having a battery and the French Admiral's ship to oppose us on our larboard beam, a battery and gun-boats ahead; at 10h. 33m. dismasted and disabled a gun-boat that was rowing to the a.s.sistance of the others; at 10h. 39m. cut the cable per Admiral's order whilst wearing,--the gun-boats attempted to approach us from under the land, but the brisk fire that was kept up made them retreat in great disorder; at 11h. 3m.

answered the signal to come to the wind on the larboard tack (No. 98); at 11h. 7m. commenced firing at the outer ships of the enemy, which was kept up at intervals.

At 11h. 37m. observed the Hannibal under the batteries at the north end of the town, with her main-top-mast shot away and aground, but keeping up a brisk fire on the enemy's ships and batteries; P.M. Hannibal still on sh.o.r.e, but keeping up a brisk fire at the enemy's ships and batteries; at 1h. 16m. observed the Hannibal to slacken her fire, shortly after the ensign hauled down and hoisted union downwards; at 1h. 35m. observed the enemy's boats boarding the Hannibal; at 1h. 44m. ceased firing,--found the ship had suffered considerably in her hull, having several shots on both sides between wind and water. Our loss in the action was six killed, twenty-seven badly wounded, two of whom died of their wounds. The fore-mast, bowsprit, main-top-mast, main-top-gallant yard, and main-top-sail yard badly wounded; the boats and booms shot through in several places; the cutter and yawl that were towing astern were sunk by the enemy. At 6h. 30m. anch.o.r.ed per signal, and moored ship in Rosia Bay, Gibraltar.

The following is a correct copy of the Audacious's log, at Somerset House.

This log, like the former, begins in the evening of the 5th July 1801.

Wind S.W. P.M. moderate and hazy; half-past 2 tacked,--Cape Trafalgar S.E. three or four leagues,--got springs on the anchors; at 8h. standing up the Gut of Gibraltar,--Admiral S. by W. three-quarters of a mile; at 12h. taken aback, came to the wind on the land-tack; at 6h. Gibraltar Rock N. by E. four or five leagues,--shortened sail to let the Pompee go ahead to her station; at half-past 7, saw the enemy's ships at anchor in Algeziras Roads, consisting of three line-of-battle ships, a frigate, gun-boats, &c.; three-quarters past 7, the batteries commenced firing on our ships as they pa.s.sed; twenty minutes past 8, the enemy's ships began to fire on our ships; at half-past 8, the action became hot on both sides,--the Venerable, Pompee, and Audacious as yet only in action; at half-past 9, the Caesar, Spencer, and Hannibal joined the action against the ships and batteries; at 11h. cut the cables, and tried to tow the ship's head round to the eastward, to bring the ship's broadside to bear on her opponent, but without effect; by this time the sails and rigging being much cut up, and the ship unmanageable, got the kedge anchor with a five-inch hawser out on the starboard bow, and succeeded in bringing the broadside to bear; at noon, light airs inclining to calm,--Caesar, Spencer, under way, still in action.

P.M. dark weather; at forty-five minutes past 12, the Venerable and Pompee hauled to the wind on the starboard tack; at 1h. cut the sheet-cable, and slipped the end of the kedge hawser, and spring on the sheet-anchor,--got the boats ahead to tow,--found the ship drifting under the island fort, which did us considerable injury,--the rocks close under the lee-bow,--cut away the best bower-anchor to check her head, and bring her broadside to bear, it being calm; at twenty minutes past 1, a light breeze sprung up off-sh.o.r.e,--cut away the best bower-cable, and made sail on the starboard tack,--observed the Hannibal on sh.o.r.e, and the enemy take possession of her; at 4h.

anch.o.r.ed in Rosia Bay, Gibraltar.

The next is the journal of Captain Hood of the Venerable.

6th July 1801.

Monday, 6th July, wind variable off Algeziras,--Gibraltar Bay, light breezes, and variable,--the captain went on board the Caesar,--all sail set,--squadron in company,--the captain returned,--got the sheet-cable through the stern-port, and bent it to the anchor,--got springs on the sheet and bower-anchors; at 2h. Captain Hood went on board the Admiral; at 3h.

returned,--received a midshipman and seven men per the Plymouth lugger, and from the Boladore, Spanish lugger; at 4h. Cape Trafalgar, N.E. seven or eight miles,--all sail set,--made and shortened sail occasionally for the squadron, and tacked occasionally,--A.M. do. weather; at 4h. made more sail; at 7h.

discovered the enemy, consisting of three two-decked ships and a frigate, with an Admiral's flag flying, at anchor under the town and batteries of Algeziras, protected by many gun-boats, &c.--all sail set, standing in for the enemy, followed by the Pompee, Audacious, Caesar, Spencer, and Hannibal; at 7h. 50m. the batteries opened their fire on us,--Pompee and Audacious one mile and a half distant from us astern.

At 8h. it fell calm; at 8h. 20m. the Pompee and Audacious, bringing up the breeze, pa.s.sed us to windward, when the enemy's ships opened their fire on us; at 8h. 14m. a light air sprung up,--pa.s.sed the Audacious to leeward, at which time the Pompee and Audacious opened their fire; at 8h. 20m. the breeze dying away, came to with the sheet-anchor, as did the Pompee and Audacious,--hove in the spring; and at 8h. 30m. opened our fire on the French Admiral's ship: at 10h. the Caesar anch.o.r.ed on our bow, and sent a spring on board of us; at the same time the action became general, and the Hannibal got on sh.o.r.e, after attempting to cut off the French Admiral's ship.

At 10h. 20m. the Pompee drifted between us and the French Admiral's,--hove in our spring, and brought our guns to bear on the other enemy's ship on our bow, and the other's stern: at 12h. the Pompee drifted between our fire and the enemy's,--slipt the sheet-cable, and eight-inch hawser, the spring, with the intention of getting alongside the enemy's southernmost ship,--light air springing up at the time from the N.E.; in awaiting this opportunity, the mizen-top-mast, fore-braces, and jibb halyards, with various other standing and running rigging, shot away, and main-mast badly wounded: at 11h. 15m. breeze dying away prevented our intention,--opened our fire on the southernmost ship; at 12h. calm and hazy,--Caesar, Hannibal, Audacious, Spencer, and us still firing on the enemy's ships, batteries, and gun-boats,--boats of the squadron towing off the Pompee to Gibraltar; P.M. calm,--still firing on the enemy's ships, which were warping farther in-sh.o.r.e.

At 12h. 40m. sent Lieutenant Collis in the pinnace to a.s.sist the Hannibal; at 1h. 40m. finding it impossible to near the enemy's ships with safety, it being calm, and a strong current setting in-sh.o.r.e, their batteries firing red-hot shot and throwing sh.e.l.ls, ceased the action as per signal, as did the other ships, and steered for Gibraltar,--observed the Hannibal ceased firing, and hoist the colours reversed, having her fore and mainmasts shot away, and being in ten foot water, rendered all a.s.sistance useless.

24 Nov. 1801.[36]

S. HOOD.

[36] The journal of Lieutenant Collis of the Venerable, the officer who was sent to a.s.sist the Hannibal, and was taken prisoner when on board, but who was sent to Gibraltar on parole, need not be given, as it is an exact copy of the captain's log.

Thus the logs and journals of the captains and officers of the Spencer, Audacious, Venerable, and Caesar, all agree that the Hannibal struck her colours between 1h. 20m. and 1h. 40m. The Pompee, being by this time near the Mole at Gibraltar, could not see nor take minutes of that circ.u.mstance. The Spencer, according to her position at that time, was in the best situation for seeing the Hannibal, and accordingly her log is the most particular. The Caesar's log need not be given, as it would be merely a repet.i.tion of Captain Brenton's narrative. All these agree with Colonel Connolly's testimony, and their evidence is quite conclusive as to the following facts; namely, that the Hannibal struck her colours before the main-mast fell; that these colours were hoisted union down by the enemy, who had possession of the ship before the boats came alongside from the Venerable and Caesar, and that to save her was quite impossible.

The following further particulars relative to the action are given in the extract of a letter from an officer of the Caesar, dated at Gibraltar:

There is one point that needs explanation; namely, when the Caesar cut her cable at half-past ten o'clock, it was from a fine breeze springing up, and the hope of closing with the enemy.

Orders were given for that purpose to the Audacious and Venerable; the Caesar wore round them, and brought her broadside to bear on the Indomptable's bow, lying there (about three cables distant from her) a considerable time, with the fore-top-sail to the mast (aback). The Audacious, bringing up a breeze from the north-west, pa.s.sed between us and the enemy, who, in this part of the day, suffered materially, his fore-top-mast going about five minutes before twelve o'clock.

Shortly afterwards, the Audacious and Caesar were becalmed upon the broadside of the Indomptable, without being able to bring one of their guns to bear,--the Caesar not more than three cables' length from the island battery, and the Audacious still nearer,--both ships drifting on the reef.

It was at this time that Sir James Saumarez formed the resolution of attacking the island with marines. Boats were signalised for the purpose; but, being all employed with the Pompee, or sunk by the enemy's fire, it was found impracticable. A breeze again sprung up, and Sir James directed his ship to be laid alongside of the Indomptable, in the firm resolution of carrying her. The sails were trimmed for that purpose as well as the crippled state of the masts would allow, but a calm ensued. The Venerable had never received the breeze from the time of her cutting, and still lay unmanageable. The Spencer had drifted considerably in repairing her rigging.

The following is a translation of the Spanish official account of the battle of Algeziras, 6th July 1801:

The division of three French line-of-battle ships and one frigate, under the command of Rear-admiral Citizen Linois, that sailed from the road of Toulon on the 25th last June, destined for Cadiz, came in sight of this station and bay on the 1st of July; and, the Levant wind having failed on entering the Straits, they cruised between the coast of Africa and that of Europe, in which they captured the English brig of war the Speedy, of sixteen guns, that was a Mahon packet, and was conducting to Gibraltar a prize, the merchant brig the Union, loaded with oil and provisions.

The continuation of the westerly winds obliged the said division to come into this port on the 5th instant, at seven in the evening. From that moment, recollecting the desperate attacks of the English at Alexandria and Copenhagen, we could not but expect that their squadron, which had been seen off Cadiz on the 3rd instant, under the command of Rear-admiral Saumarez, would come and attack this division. So it happened.

As soon as the English received intelligence where the French had anch.o.r.ed, they steered directly for the Straits; and, on the 6th instant, at half-past six in the morning, six English ships doubled the Point of Carnero, and, coming round the island of Algeziras, advanced in a line within half cannon-shot of the French ships. The batteries of St. Garcia and the island opened their fire upon the English; and afterwards the frigate and republican ships.

As soon as the English line came opposite the French ships at anchor, they opened upon them an animated, bold, and unremitting fire. The English Admiral having placed himself against the French, and the British ship Hannibal being under sail, cannonaded furiously the French Admiral, who, with superior spirit and success, resisted them; insomuch that, having carried away the Admiral's mizen-mast, and sails of the main and fore-mast, with no small damage of his hull, the commander of the English ship Hannibal, despising the fire from the battery of St. Jago, pushed on to his succour; and, intending to place the French Admiral between two fires, by running between him and the sh.o.r.e, had the imprudence, being unacquainted with his position, to place himself within a quarter of a gun-shot of the battery, and ran aground. He relieved his Admiral, who, after this, went out of the action; but he lost his own ship and crew, as the fire from the battery and French Admiral dismantled him, and killed three parts of his ship's company.

Until this ship's surrender, which was about the time of the retreat of the English Admiral, the fire was constant upon the two French ships and frigate, as well as upon the seven Spanish gun-boats, the batteries of the island, St. Garcia, St. Jago, La Almiranta, and Almirante, which, as opportunity offered, returned their fire.

The battle lasted from half-past eight o'clock in the morning, when the fort of St. Garcia opened its fire, till two in the afternoon, when the last shot was fired from the French ship Indomptable. The persevering, active, and tremendous fire of the enemy, and that of the two nations (French and Spanish), were only distinguishable by the prudence, skill, and greatness of soul with which the allied chiefs directed theirs, and the audacity, temerity, and confusion which were shown in that of the English. The idea of this kind of fighting, which we form from the account of the battles of Alexandria and Copenhagen, does not, in proportion to the numbers engaged, bear any comparison with that of Algeziras, either in point of bloodiness or obstinacy.

The English, after having left the glory and the field of battle to the two nations, covered with shame, and taught by dear-bought experience, have only given an unequivocal proof of their inveterate hatred to France and Spain; since, not being able to obtain any advantage over the French and Spanish forces, they directed their fire against an inoffensive town, which received no small injury in the buildings. This is the only glory which the arms of Great Britain have to boast of.