_Blucher's Vandalism averted._

To Marshal Prince Blucher.--Several reports have been brought to me during the evening and night, and some from the government, in consequence of the work carrying on by your highness on one of the bridges over the Seine, which it is supposed to be your intention to destroy.

As this measure will certainly create a good deal of disturbance in the town, and as the sovereigns when they were here before, left all these bridges, &c., standing, I take the liberty of suggesting to you to delay the destruction of the bridge, at least till they should arrive; or, at all events, till I can have the pleasure of seeing you to-morrow morning.

_July 8, 1815._

The destruction of the bridge of Jena is highly disagreeable to the king and to the people, and may occasion disturbance in the city. It is not merely a military measure, but is one likely to attach to the character of our operations, and is of political importance. It is adopted solely because the bridge is considered as a monument of the battle of Jena, notwithstanding that the government are willing to change the name of the bridge. Considering the bridge as a monument, I beg leave to suggest that its immediate destruction is inconsistent with the promise made to the commissioners on behalf of the part of the army, during the negociation of the convention, viz., that the monuments, museums, &c., should be reserved for the decision of the allied sovereigns.

All that I ask is, that the execution of the orders given for the destruction of the bridge may be suspended till the sovereigns shall arrive here, when, if it should be agreed by common accord that the bridge ought to be destroyed, I shall have no objection.

_July 9, 1815._[8]

[Footnote 8: The Duke rarely writes or speaks twice, when once will do.

On this occasion he was anxious; and--successful.]

_Summary Justice._

To the Sous-Prefet de Pontoise.--J'ai ordonne qu'on vous fa.s.se prisonnier, parceque, ayant envoye une requisition a Pontoise pour des vivres, vous avez repondu que vous ne les donneriez pas, sans qu'on envoie une force militaire a.s.sez forte pour les prendre.

Vous vous etes mis dans les cas des militaires, et je vous fais prisonnier de guerre, et je vous envoie en Angleterre.

Si je vous traitais comme l'usurpateur et ses adherens ont traite les habitans des pays ou ils ont fait la guerre, je vous ferais fusiller; mais, comme vous vous etes const.i.tue guerrier, je vous fais prisonnier de guerre.

_July 13, 1815._

_Characteristic Letter to Marshal Beresford_.

The battle of Waterloo was certainly the hardest fought that has been for many years, I believe, and has placed in the power of the allies the most important results. We are throwing them away, however, by the infamous conduct of some of us; and I am sorry to add that our own government also are taking up a little too much the tone of their rascally newspapers. They are shifting their objects; and, having got their cake, they want both to eat it and keep it.

As for your Portuguese concerns, I recommend you to resign, and come away immediately. It is impossible for the British government to maintain British officers for the Portuguese army, at an expense even so trifling as it is, if the Portuguese government are to refuse to give the service of the army in the cause of Europe in any manner. Pitch them to the devil, then, in the mode which will be most dignified to yourself, and that which will have the best effect in opening the prince's eyes to the conduct of his servants in Portugal; and let the matter work its own way. Depend upon it, the British government must and will recall the British officers.

_August 7, 1815._

SPEECHES IN PARLIAMENT.

_Praise of Lord Hastings and the Indian Army._

He professed his entire concurrence in the tribute of approbation bestowed on the Marquis of Hastings, for his conduct of the late war in India. There could not remain a doubt in the minds of those acquainted with the facts, but that the wisdom of the plan on which it was commenced, and the vigour of its execution, merited the highest praise.

The n.o.ble Duke said, he was pleased that an opportunity, like the present, had occurred to do justice to the services and gallantry of our troops in India, which were often neglected or disallowed. No troops in the world performed their duty better, or observed a more steady discipline. They had evinced their good qualities in all their late transactions, whether acting in great ma.s.ses or small detachments. In all situations they had n.o.bly performed their duty.

_House of Lords, March 9, 1819._

_Impossibility of granting Catholic Emanc.i.p.ation._

The whole question turned upon the degree of security which could be given to the Protestant religion as by law established in Ireland. To consider this, it was necessary to consider how the reformation had been established in Ireland. It was not necessary for him to recall to their lordships remembrance that the unreformed religion had been established in Ireland at the point of the sword, and by means of confiscations. All this was repeated at the revolution, and was fresh in the recollection of the people of Ireland. Keeping in view that the Irish Roman Catholic church, under all oppressions, continued in the same state--the pope having the same influence over the clergy, the clergy the same power over the people; in this state of things, he would ask, whether it was possible that Roman Catholics could be safely admitted to hold seats in parliament? The influence of the priesthood over the people was fostered by the remembrance of the events to which he had alluded; and the idea of unmerited and mutual suffering; and no doubt could be entertained, from their present feelings, that if the Roman Catholics were admitted to the enjoyment of political power, their first exertion would be to restore their religion to its original supremacy; and to recover the possessions and property of which they had been stripped by the reformation. It was, however, said, that securities were offered on the part of the Roman Catholics.

The pope, it seemed, had in the appointment of bishops, relinquished all to the crown, except the mere conferring of a spiritual blessing. But how had that concession been received by the people of Ireland? It had excited the utmost discontent, and was regarded as an abandonment of the essential principles of their religion, and an attack on their national independence. Did that arise from the people of Ireland having a less clear idea of national independence than other people? No; but they felt if the executive power possessed any control over the appointment of the Roman Catholic bishops, some security would be thereby obtained for the Protestant church. Considering, then, that the whole question turned on the degree of security which could be given, and looking at the various securities which had at several times been proposed, he had never yet seen anything that came up to his notion of that which ought to be required. As to what had been said of the domestic nomination of bishops, he did not see how the laws of the country could operate upon it, so as to make it an adequate security. Then as to the oath of allegiance which the bishop was to take, of what avail could it be, that the law required this oath from a bishop, appointed G.o.d knows how, or by whom? When all these circ.u.mstances were considered, the state of the Irish Catholic church, the way in which the reformation had been effected, the rivalry and enmity between the Catholics and the established church, and the inadequacy of all securities which had been proposed, there was in his opinion, enough to decide the question; for, the first and greatest duty of the legislature was, to secure the establishments as settled at the revolution.

_House of Lords, May 17, 1819._

County meetings if properly regulated, are a fair const.i.tutional mode of taking the sense of the county; but this cannot be the case if they are attended by a mob for the express purpose of supporting one side.

_House of Lords, January 26, 1821._

_The Porte our ancient Ally._

The Ottoman Porte is the ancient ally of this country. It forms an essential part of the balance of power in Europe. The preservation of the Ottoman Porte has been an object of importance not merely to England but also to the whole of Europe; and the changes of possession which have taken place in the east of Europe within the recollection of all who hear me, render its existence as an independent and powerful state, necessary to the well being of this country.

In the late war, had it not been for the influence of the councils of England over the Porte, I may safely say that the disaster which finally led to the establishment of Europe as it now is, would not have occurred to the extent it did in 1812. Under these circ.u.mstances I think we may term the Ottoman Porte the "ancient ally" and friend of this country, even though the treaties upon which our alliance is founded are not of a hundred years standing.

_House of Lords, Jan. 29, 1828._

_Battle of Navarino an untoward Event. Sir E. Codrington acquitted of all blame._

There is one other subject to which I shall address myself, I mean the sense in which the word "untoward" has been used. It was intended by "untoward" to convey, that the event referred to was unexpected--was unfortunate. The sense in which the word was used was this: in the treaty which is not yet before the house, and which cannot, therefore, regularly come under discussion, though all of us have read it, it is mentioned as one stipulation, that the execution of it, if possible, shall not lead to hostilities; and therefore, when the execution of it did lead to hostilities, it was a consequence which the government did not antic.i.p.ate, and which it has, therefore, a right to call untoward.

It was hoped by the former government, that the treaty could be executed without risk of commencing hostilities; and that is rendered quite indisputable, not merely by the treaty, but by the force which the contracting parties sent into the Mediterranean to superintend its operation.

The late administration entertained hopes that those treaties could be carried into execution without hostilities, as your lordships must have perceived from what you have seen of those treaties themselves, as well as from the nature of the force sent to see them carried into execution; and when it was ultimately found that hostilities were likely to ensue, every one must look upon it as an untoward event which could give rise to such a state of things.

When the news of the affair which took place at Navarino reached Constantinople, it was apprehended that a war would ensue, and therefore every one was justified in looking upon it as an untoward event.

It is gratifying, however, to find from his majesty's speech, that those appearances of hostility have ceased to exist, and that hopes are entertained that no impediment will present itself to an amicable adjustment of the question; this, however, does not deprive the transaction of the character of "untowardness" which it originally possessed.

But in making this statement, do I make the slightest charge, do I cast the most distant imputation upon the gallant officer who commanded at Navarino? Certainly not. That gallant officer, in doing as he has done, discharged what he felt to be his duty to his country. His majesty's government have taken that gallant officer's conduct into consideration, and have acquitted him of all blame; and, therefore, it would ill become me to cast the slightest imputation on the distinguished action he performed. It should be recollected, that the gallant admiral was placed in a situation of great delicacy as well as difficulty. He was placed in the command of a combined squadron, in conjunction with two foreign admirals; and his conduct was such, that they placed the most implicit confidence in him, and allowed him to lead them to victory. My lords, I should feel myself unworthy of the situation which I hold in his majesty's councils, if I thought myself capable of uttering a single syllable against that gallant admiral, admiring, as I do, the intrepid bravery with which he conducted himself in a moment of much danger and difficulty.

_House of Lords, January 29, 1828._

_Reason for being Prime Minister._

When I received his majesty's commands to give my opinion respecting the formation of a ministry, it was far from my wish to place myself at its head, or to take any office, other than that which I already held; but finding, in the course of the negotiation which arose out of the commands of his majesty, a difficulty in getting another individual to fill the place, and that it was the unanimous wish of those who are now my colleagues, that I should take it, I determined to accept it; but having so determined, I resigned the office of commander-in-chief.