_The Morale of an Army important to Discipline._

No reliance can be placed on the conduct of troops in action with the enemy, who have been accustomed to plunder, and those officers alone can expect to derive honour in the day of battle from the conduct of the troops under their command, who shall have forced them, by their attention and exertions, to behave as good soldiers ought in their cantonments, their quarters, and their camps.

_March 5, 1814._

English officers are very strictly instructed, and those who mean to serve their country well must obey their instructions, however fearless they may be of responsibility. Indeed, I attribute this fearlessness very much to the determination never to disobey, as long as the circ.u.mstances exist under which an order is given.

_April 16, 1814._

_French Feelings about the Slave Trade._

You (Mr. Wilberforce) judge most correctly regarding the state of the public mind here upon this question. Not only is there no information, but, because England takes an interest in the question, it is impossible to convey any through the only channel which would be at all effectual, viz., the daily press. n.o.body reads anything but the newspapers; but it is impossible to get anything inserted in any French newspaper in Paris in favour of the abolition, or even to show that the trade was abolished in England, from motives of humanity. The extracts made from English newspapers upon this, or any other subject, are selected with a view, either to turn our principles and conduct into ridicule, or to exasperate against us still more the people of this country; and therefore the evil cannot be remedied by good publications in the daily press in England, with a view to their being copied into the newspapers here.

I must say that the daily press in England do us a good deal of harm in this as well as in other questions. We are sure of the king and his government, if he could rely upon the opinion of his people. But as long as our press teems with writings drawn with a view of irritating persons here, we shall never be able to exercise the influence which we ought to have upon this question, and which we really possess.

_Letter to Mr. Wilberforce, October 8, 1814._

The real power in Spain is in the clergy.

_October 20, 1814._

Les choses neuves, surtout quand elles sont compliquees, ne vont pas bien.

_Letter to Doumouriex, November 3, 1814._

FRANCE.

_Effects of Buonaparte's Government of France._

Ce qu'il y a de pis c'est le mecontentement general, et la pauvrete universelle. Cette malheureuse revolution et ces suites ont ruine le pays, de fond en comble. Tout le monde est pauvre, et, ce qui est pis, leurs inst.i.tutions empechent qu'aucune famille devienne riche et puissante. Tous doivent donc necessairement viser a remplir des emplois publics, non, comme autrefois, pour l'honneur de les remplir, mais pour avoir de quoi vivre. Tout le monde donc cherche de l'emploi public.

Buonaparte laissa une armee de million d'hommes en France, outres les officiers prisonniers en Angleterre et en Russie. Le roi ne peut pas en maintenir le quart. Tous ceux non employees sont mecontens. Buonaparte gouvernait directement la moitie de l'Europe, et indirectement presque l'autre moitie. Pour des causes a present bien develloppees et connues, il employait une quant.i.te infinie de personnes dans ses administrations; et tous ceux employes, ou dans les administrations exterieures, civiles, ou dans les administrations militaires des armees, sont renvoyes, et beaucoup des ceux employes dans les administrations interieures; a cette cla.s.se nombreuse ajouter la quant.i.te d'emigres, et de personnes rentres, tous mourant de faim, et tous convoitant de l'emploi public afin de pouvoir vivre, et vous trouverez que plus des trois quarts de la cla.s.se de la societe, non employee a la main d'oeuvre ou a labourer la terre, sont en etat d'indigence, et, par consequence, mecontens. Si vous considerez bien ce tableau, qui est la stricte verite, vous y verrez la cause et la nature du danger du jour. L'armee les officiers, sourtout, sont mecontens. Ils le sont pour plusieurs raisons inutiles a detailler ici, mais ce mecontentement pourra ce vaincre en adoptant des mesures sages pour ameliorer l'esprit.

_Letter to Doumouriex, November 26, 1814._

_Re-establishment of the Bourbons necessary to the Peace of Europe._

I have frequently told your highness, and every day's experience shews me that I am right, that the only chance of peace for Europe consists in the establishment in France of the legitimate Bourbons. The establishment of any other government, whether in the person of----, or in a regency in the name of young Napoleon, or in any other individual, or in a republic, must lead to the maintenance of large military establishments, to the ruin of all the governments of Europe, till it shall suit the convenience of the French government to commence a contest which can be directed only against you, or others for whom we are interested. In this contest we shall feel the additional difficulty, that those who are now on our side will then be against us, and you will again find yourself surrounded by enemies. I am convinced that the penetration of your highness will have shewn you the danger of all these schemes to the interests of the emperor, and that you will defeat them all by adhering to that line of conduct (in which you will find us likewise) which will finally lead to the establishment in France of the legitimate government, from which alone can Europe expect any genuine peace.

_May 20, 1815._

_Effects of Waterloo._

I may be wrong, but my opinion is, that we have given Napoleon his death-blow: from all I hear, his army is totally destroyed, the men are deserting in parties, even the generals are withdrawing from him. The infantry throw away their arms, and the cavalry and artillery sell their horses to the people of the country, and desert to their homes. Allowing for much exaggeration in this account, and knowing that Buonaparte can still collect, in addition to what he has brought back with him, the 5th corps d'armee, under Rapp, which is near Strasbourg, and the 3rd corps, which was at Wavre during the battle, and has not suffered so much as the others, and probably some troops from La Vendee, I am still of opinion that he can make no head against us--qu'il n'a qu'a se pendre.

_June 23, 1815._

Some of the regiments (the new ones I mean) are reduced to nothing; but I must keep them as regiments, to the great inconvenience of the service, at great expense; or I must send them home, and part with the few British soldiers I have.

I never was so disgusted with any concern as I am with this; and I only hope that I am going the right way to bring it to an early determination some way or other.

_June 25, 1815._

_Waterloo described to a Soldier._

Notre Bataille du 18 a ete une de geans; et notre succes a ete complet, comme vous voyez. Que Dieu me favorise a.s.sez pour que je n'en aie plus, parceque je suis desole de la perte de mes anciens amis et comrades.

Mon voisin et collaborateur (Blucher) est en bonne sante quoique un peu souffrant d'une chute qu'il a faite d'un cheval blesse sous lui dans la bataille du 16.

_Letter to Doumouriex, June 26, 1815._

_If Buonaparte is to be put to Death, he will not be his Executioneer._

General----has been here this day to negociate for Napoleon's pa.s.sing to America, to which proposition I have answered, that I have no authority. The Prussians think the Jacobins wish to give him over to me, believing that I will save his life.---- wishes to kill him; but I have told him I shall remonstrate, and shall insist upon his being disposed of by common accord. I have likewise said that, as a private friend, I advised him to have nothing to do with so foul a transaction; and that he and I had acted too distinguished parts in these transactions to become executioners, and that I was determined that, if the sovereigns wished to put him to death, they should appoint an executioner, which should not be me.

_June 26, 1815._

_The "Pounding Match."_

You will have heard of our battle of the 18th. Never did I see such a pounding match. Both were what the boxers call "gluttons." Napoleon did not manoeuvre at all. He just moved forward in the old style, in columns, and was driven off in the old style. The only difference was that he mixed cavalry with his infantry, and supported both with an enormous quant.i.ty of artillery.

I had the infantry for some time in squares, and we had the French cavalry walking about as if they had been our own. I never saw the British infantry behave so well.

_Letter to Marshal Beresford, July 9, 1815._