Manual of Military Training - Part 28
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Part 28

(392)

=407. Reconnaissance before attacking.= Before an attack a reconnaissance must be made to determine the enemy's position, the location of his flanks, the character of the terrain, the nature of the hostile field works, etc., in order to prevent premature deployment and the resulting fatigue and loss of time.

It will frequently be necessary to send forward a thin skirmish line in order to induce the enemy to open fire and reveal his position.

(393)

=408. Extent of reconnaissance.= It will frequently be impossible to obtain satisfactory information until after the action has begun. The delay that may be warranted for the purpose of reconnaissance depends upon the nature of the attack and the necessity for promptness. For example, in a meeting engagement, and sometimes in a holding attack, the reconnaissance may have to be hasty and superficial, whereas in an attack against an enemy carefully prepared for defense there will generally be both time and necessity for thorough reconnaissance.

(394)

=409. Reconnaissance in defense.= In defense, reconnaissance must be kept up to determine the enemy's line of advance, to ascertain his dispositions, to prevent his reconnaissance, etc.

Patrols or parties posted to prevent hostile reconnaissance should relieve the main body of the necessity of betraying its position by firing on small bodies of the enemy. (395)

=410. Duration of reconnaissance; protection of flanks.= Reconnaissance continues throughout the action.

A firing or skirmish line can take care of its front, but its flanks are especially vulnerable to modern firearms. The moral effect of flanking fire is as great as the physical effect. Hence, combat patrols to give warning or covering detachments to give security are indispensable on exposed flanks. This is equally true in attack or defense. (396)

=411. Responsibility of infantry commanders for reconnaissance; surprise unpardonable.= The fact that cavalry patrols are known to be posted in a certain direction does not relieve infantry commanders of the responsibility for reconnaissance and security.

To be surprised by an enemy at short range is an unpardonable offense.

(397)

=412. Commander of flank battalion responsible for security of his flank.= The commander of a battalion on a flank of a general line invariably provides for the necessary reconnaissance and security on that flank unless higher authority has specifically ordered it. In any event, he sends out combat patrols as needed.

Where his battalion is on a flank of one section of the line and a considerable interval lies between his battalion and the next section, he makes similar provision. (398)

=413. Patrols established by battalion commanders.= Battalion commanders in the first line establish patrols to observe and report the progress or conduct of adjoining troops when these can not be seen. (399)

FIRE SUPERIORITY

PURPOSE AND NATURE

(See par. 427)

=414. Success in battle dependent upon fire superiority.= In a decisive battle success depends on gaining and maintaining fire superiority. Every effort must be made to gain it early and then to keep it.

Attacking troops must first gain fire superiority in order to reach the hostile position. Over open ground attack is possible only when the attacking force has a decided fire superiority. With such superiority the attack is not only possible, but success is probable and without ruinous losses.

Defending troops can prevent a charge only when they can master the enemy's fire and inflict heavy losses upon him. (400)

=415. Volume and accuracy necessary to obtain fire superiority.= To obtain fire superiority it is necessary to produce a heavy volume of accurate fire. Every increase in the effectiveness of the fire means a corresponding decrease in the effectiveness of the enemy's fire.

The volume and accuracy of fire will depend upon several considerations:

=(a) The number of rifles employed.= On a given front the greatest volume of fire is produced by a firing line having only sufficient intervals between men to permit the free use of their rifles. The maximum density of a firing line is therefore about one man per yard of front.

=(b)= The =rate= of fire affects its volume; an excessive rate reduces its accuracy.

=(c) The character of the target influences both volume and accuracy.= Larger dimensions, greater visibility, and shorter range increase the rate of fire; greater density increases =the effect=.

=(d) Training and discipline= have an important bearing on the rate or volume of fire, but their greatest influence is upon accuracy.

The firing efficiency of troops is reduced by fatigue and adverse psychological influences.

=(e) Fire direction and control improve collective accuracy.= The importance of fire direction increases rapidly with the range. Control exerts a powerful influence at all ranges. (401)

FIRE DIRECTION AND CONTROL

Opening Fire

=416. Long range fire, when effective.= Beyond effective ranges important results can be expected only when the target is large and distinct and much ammunition is used.

Long range fire is permissible in pursuit on account of the moral effect of any fire under the circ.u.mstances. At other times such fire is of doubtful value. (402)

=417. Opening fire in attack.= In attack, the desire to open fire when losses are first felt must be repressed. Considerations of time, target, ammunition, and morale make it imperative that the attack withhold its fire and press forward to a first firing position close to the enemy. The attacker's target will be smaller and fainter than the one he presents to the enemy. (403)

=418. Opening fire in defense.= In defense, more ammunition is available, ranges are more easily determined, and the enemy usually presents a larger target. The defender may therefore open fire and expect results at longer ranges than the attacker, and particularly if the defenders intend a delaying action only.

If the enemy has a powerful artillery, it will often be best for the defending infantry to withhold its fire until the enemy offers a specially favorable target. Vigorous and well-directed bursts of fire are then employed. The troops should therefore be given as much artificial protection as time and means permit, and at an agreed signal expose themselves as much as necessary and open fire. (404)

=419. Opening fire in unexpected, close encounters.= In unexpected, close encounters a great advantage accrues to the side which first opens rapid and accurate fire with battle sight. (405)

Use of Ground

=420. Requisites of ground for cover.= The position of the firers must afford a suitable field of fire.

The ground should permit constant observation of the enemy, and yet enable the men to secure some cover when not actually firing.

Troops whose target is for the moment hidden by unfavorable ground, either move forward to better ground or seek to execute cross fire on another target. (406)

=421. Skillful use of ground reduces visibility.= The likelihood of a target being hit depends to a great extent upon its visibility. By skillful use of ground, a firing line may reduce its visibility without loss of fire power. Sky lines are particularly to be avoided.

(407)

Choice of Target

=422. Target to be chosen.= The target chosen should be the hostile troops most dangerous to the firers. These will usually be the nearest hostile infantry. When no target is specially dangerous, that one should be chosen which promises the most hits. (408)

=423. Target not to be changed except for good reason.= Frequent changes of target impair the fire effect. Random changes to small, unimportant targets impair fire discipline and accomplish nothing.

Attention should be confined to the main target until substantial reason for change is apparent. (409)

=424. Flanking fire to be delivered when opportunity offers.= An opportunity to deliver flanking fire, especially against artillery protected in front by shields, is an example warranting change of target and should never be overlooked. Such fire demoralizes the troops subjected to it, even if the losses inflicted are small. In this manner a relatively small number of rifles can produce important results. (410)