During the action, he must, as a rule, leave to the local leaders the detailed conduct of the firing line, posting himself either with his own reserve or in such a position that he is in constant, direct, and easy communication with it.

A commander takes full and direct charge of his firing line only when the line has absorbed his whole command.

When their troops are victorious, all commanders should press forward in order to clinch the advantage gained and to use their reserves to the best advantage. (369)

=384. Lat.i.tude allowed subordinates.= The lat.i.tude allowed to officers is in direct proportion to the size of their commands. Each should see to the general execution of his task, leaving to the proper subordinates the supervision of details, and interfering only when mistakes are made that threaten to seriously prejudice the general plan. (370)

Teamwork

=385. Lat.i.tude allowed subordinates; success depends on coordination of subordinates.= The comparatively wide fronts of deployed units increase the difficulties of control. Subordinates must therefore be given great lat.i.tude in the execution of their tasks. The success of the whole depends largely upon how well each subordinate coordinates his work with the general plan.

A great responsibility is necessarily thrown upon subordinates, but responsibility stimulates the right kind of an officer. (371)

=386. Initiative of subordinates; general plan to be furthered.= In a given situation it is far better =to do any intelligent thing= consistent with the aggressive execution of the general plan, than to search hesitatingly for the ideal. This is the true rule of conduct for subordinates who are required to act upon their own initiative.

A subordinate who is reasonably sure that his intended action is such as would be ordered by the commander, were the latter present and in possession of the facts, has enough encouragement to go ahead confidently. He must possess the loyalty to carry out the plans of his superior and the keenness to recognize and to seize opportunities to further the general plan. (372)

=387. But one supreme will in a battle; subordinates to cooperate.= Independence must not become license. Regardless of the number of subordinates who are apparently supreme in their own restricted spheres, there is but one battle and but one supreme will to which all must conform.

Every subordinate must therefore work for the general result. He does all in his power to insure cooperation between the subdivisions under his command. He transmits important information to adjoining units or to superiors in rear and, with the a.s.sistance of information received, keeps himself and his subordinates duly posted as to the situation.

(373)

=388. Deviation from orders.= When circ.u.mstances render it impracticable to consult the authority issuing an order, officers should not hesitate to vary from such order when it is clearly based upon an incorrect view of the situation, is impossible of execution, or has been rendered impracticable on account of changes which have occurred since its promulgation. In the application of this rule the responsibility for mistakes rests upon the subordinate, but unwillingness to a.s.sume responsibility on proper occasions is indicative of weakness.

Superiors should be careful not to censure an apparent disobedience where the act was done in the proper spirit and to advance the general plan. (374)

=389. Intermingling of units; duties of officers and guides.= When the men of two or more units intermingle in the firing line, all officers and men submit at once to the senior. Officers and platoon guides seek to fill vacancies caused by casualties. Each seizes any opportunity to exercise the functions consistent with his grade, and all a.s.sist in the maintenance of order and control.

Every lull in the action should be utilized for as complete restoration of order in the firing line as the ground or other conditions permit. (375)

=390. Separated officers and noncommissioned officers placing themselves under nearest higher commander.= Any officer or noncommissioned officer who becomes separated from his proper unit and can not rejoin must at once place himself and his command at the disposal of the nearest higher commander. (376)

Anyone having completed an a.s.signed task must seek to rejoin his proper command. Failing in this, he should join the nearest troops engaged with the enemy.

=391. Duty of separated soldiers.= Soldiers are taught the necessity of remaining with their companies, but those who become detached must join the nearest company and serve with it until the battle is over or reorganization is ordered. (377)

Orders

=392. Orders for deployment; combat orders of divisions and brigades usually written.= Commands are deployed and enter the combat by the orders of the commander to the subordinate commanders.

The initial combat orders of the division are almost invariably written; those of the brigade are generally so. The written order is preferable and is used whenever time permits.

If time permits, subsequent orders are likewise written, either as field orders or messages. (378)

=393. Combat orders of regiments and smaller units; verbal messages.= The initial combat orders of regiments and smaller units are given verbally. For this purpose the subordinates for whom the orders are intended are a.s.sembled, if practicable, at a place from which the situation and plan can be explained.

Subsequent orders are verbal or in the form of verbal or written messages. Verbal messages should not be used unless they are short and unmistakable. (379)

=394. Initial combat orders; personal reconnaissance.= The initial combat order of any commander or subordinate is based upon his definite plan for executing the task confronting him.

Whenever possible the formation of the plan is preceded by a personal reconnaissance of the terrain and a careful consideration of all information of the enemy. (380)

=395. Composition of combat orders.= The combat order gives such information of the enemy and of neighboring or supporting friendly troops as will enable subordinates to understand the situation.

The general plan of action is stated in brief terms, but enough of the commander's intentions is divulged to guide the subsequent actions of the subordinates.

Clear and concise instructions are given as to the action to be taken in the combat by each part of the command. In this way the commander a.s.signs tasks, fronts, objectives, sectors or areas, etc., in accordance with his plan. If the terms employed convey definite ideas and leave no loopholes, the conduct of subordinates will generally be correspondingly satisfactory.

Such miscellaneous matter relating to special troops, trains, ammunition, and future movements of the commander is added as concerns the combat itself.

Combat orders should prescribe communication, reconnaissance, flank protection, etc., when some special disposition is desired or when an omission on the part of a subordinate may reasonably be feared. (381)

=396. Encroaching upon functions of subordinates prohibited; orders to be definite.= When issuing orders, a commander should indicate clearly =what= is to be done by each subordinate, but not =how= it is to be done. He should not encroach upon the functions of a subordinate by prescribing details of execution unless he has good reason to doubt the ability or judgment of the subordinate, and cannot subst.i.tute another.

Although general in its terms, an order must be definite and must be the expression of a fixed decision. Ambiguity or vagueness indicates either a vacillation or the inability to formulate orders. (382)

=397. Orders generally given subordinates through their immediate superiors.= Usually the orders of a commander are intended for, and are given to, the commanders of the next lower units, but in an emergency commander should not hesitate to give orders directly to any subordinate. In such case he should promptly inform the intermediate commander concerned. (383)

Communication

=398. Communication, how maintained.= Communication is maintained by means of staff officers, messengers, relay systems, connecting files, visual signals, telegraph, or telephone. (384)

=399. Lines of communication established by signal corps.= The signal corps troops of the division establish lines of information from division to brigade headquarters. The further extension of lines of information in combat by signal troops is exceptional. (385)

=400. Lines of communication established by regiment; orderlies carry signal flags.= Each regiment, employing its own personnel, is responsible for the maintenance of communication from the colonel back to the brigade and forward to the battalions. For this purpose the regiment uses the various means which may be furnished it. The staff and orderlies, regimental and battalion, are practiced in the use of these means and in messenger service. Orderlies carry signal flags.

(386)

=401. Communication between firing line and major or colonel; company musicians carry signal flags.= Connection between the firing line and the major or colonel is practically limited to the prescribed flag, arm, and bugle signals. Other means can only be supplemental. Company musicians carry company flags and are practiced in signaling. (387)

=402. Communication by artillery with firing line by means of staff officers or through agents.= The artillery generally communicates with the firing line by means of its own staff officers or through an agent who accompanies some unit in or near the front. The infantry keeps him informed as to the situation and affords any reasonable a.s.sistance.

When the infantry is dependent upon the artillery for fire support, perfect coordination through this representative is of great importance. (388)

COMBAT RECONNAISSANCE

=403. Importance of combat reconnaissance; avoidance of deployment on wrong lines.= Combat reconnaissance is of vital importance and must not be neglected. By proper preliminary reconnaissance, deployments on wrong lines, or in a wrong direction, and surprises may generally be prevented. (389)

=404. Protection of troops by proper reconnaissance.= Troops deployed and under fire can not change front, and thus they suffer greatly when enfiladed. Troops in close order formation may suffer heavy losses in a short time if subjected to hostile fire. In both formations troops must be protected by proper reconnaissance and warning. (390)

=405. Difficulty of reconnaissance depends on extent of enemy's screen; strength of reconnoitering parties.= The difficulty of reconnaissance increases in proportion to the measures adopted by the enemy to screen himself.

The strength of the reconnoitering party is determined by the character of the information desired and the nature of the hostile screen. In exceptional cases as much as a battalion may be necessary in order to break through the hostile screen and enable the commander or officer in charge to reconnoiter in person.

A large reconnoitering party is conducted so as to open the way for small patrols, to serve as a supporting force or rallying point for them, and to receive and transmit information. Such parties maintain signal communication with the main body if practicable. (391)

=406. Each separate column to protect itself by reconnaissance.= Each separate column moving forward to deploy must reconnoiter to its front and flank and keep in touch with adjoining columns. The extent of the reconnaissance to the flank depends upon the isolation of the columns.