I. Man, we find, is endowed with a self-acting power of will, which is called mental liberty, and hence he is accountable. For although it is admitted that there cannot be a volition without a motive, yet it is an idea inseparable from our notions of mental liberty, that there cannot be any thing in these motives necessitating the volition; for in that case it would not be free. But he is free to adopt either the right or the wrong motive of volition, and therefore he is accountable for his actions. Nor does it follow that this liberty confers the _right_ to do _wrong_. His liberty, as we have shown, is to be understood in a sense agreeing with the coincident ideas of _right_ and _duty_. We are all conscious, that so soon as we perceive _the good_, in any case, we have a feeling of _obligation_ to observe it as the rule of conduct, and to avoid the contrary as _wrong_; that is, _each man has a conscience_. Hence, although man has the _power_ to do wrong, he has no _right_ to do wrong; but only a _right_ to do that which is good. Such, and such only, is the true subjective _right of self-control_. It is not a right to do as we may please, unless we shall please to do that which, in itself, is _right_; that is, _the good_.

II. His fall, we have seen, has had the effect to place him in such circ.u.mstances, that the attributes of his lower nature, his appet.i.tes, propensities, and pa.s.sions, often have such ascendency as motives of action, that he is always liable to do wrong. Many reasons, _a priori_, could be given for this. The mind is first brought into contact with the outward world through the bodily senses. They come first into play; and hence the natural sensibilities are first developed. The will, in the form of spontaneous volition, is accustomed, from earliest life, to act from these as a motive, for the reason that there is no other from which it can act. The pure intelligence, the percipient of the good, and the corresponding feelings of obligation, unfold themselves slowly; and long before it may be said that the mind is matured, the will is accustomed to make the natural sensibilities the motive of spontaneous volition. Now the will is, like all other faculties of the mind, subject to the great law of habit; and if not checked, restrained according to the true idea of government, a _habit_ of submission is formed, which, if not early dissolved, becomes a confirmed habit. The will, instead of being the governing power of the mind, becomes, in truth, the faculty governed. _It has lost the power of self-control._ It has become the slave of pa.s.sion--confirmed in the habit of submission. It is precisely at this point of mental degradation that Paul declares of "vessels of wrath," those who have brought themselves into this state by their own act, that "they are fitted to destruction." Now, in view of these facts and the principles already established, what are the rights of man?

First. In the state of infancy. It has been proved that the subjective endowments of humanity, and whatever is necessary to their existence and operation, are the _natural right of man_. That the undeveloped good is the endowment of this form of humanity will not be disputed: hence whatever is necessary to its existence and operation, is the natural right of infants. But it is obvious that a governing power, existing somewhere, is indispensably necessary in the case of the child; that is, a power must exist sufficiently potent to control the spontaneous volitions of the will, or, in the circ.u.mstances of its position, it will probably extinguish its own liberty, by the law of habit. Government, then,--absolute government,--is necessary to the existence and operation of the endowment of humanity in the state of infancy; and therefore absolute government is the _natural right of the infant_. Hence all civil governments have exercised (so far as the will and physical condition are concerned) an absolute despotism over the child, and have recognized the parent, or some one appointed in the place of the parent, as the agent of its functions in this respect. Not to accord to the infant this extreme form of control, would be a practical denial of its natural rights. Therefore this extreme form of despotism, so far from being a curse, is the natural right of infants--the good to which they are ent.i.tled by nature. And again, the civil government accords to the child a progressive modification of this form of government under given circ.u.mstances. It requires its agent to relax the stringency of this control, and to extend a privilege of self-control, in the ratio in which the pure intelligence and feelings of obligation or duty are _practically_ developed. For a child who had become, to a certain extent, a subject of duty, and was disposed to fulfil this duty, but was kept, _per force_, in the physical condition of infancy until he lost the use of his limbs, would be considered as deprived of the right of self-control to that extent, and thereby cruelly treated. The agent in such a case would be severely punished, and the child committed to other hands.

Hence, in the ratio in which the pure intelligence is unfolded, and feelings of obligation arise, or conscience is developed, and becomes the practical rule of action, the individual _acquires_ the right of self-control, and only in that ratio. This right may ultimately reach to all things in themselves good--the civil government always holding the authority to punish departures from duty, and thereby always abridging men of the moral power to do wrong, (because it never could be their right to do wrong,) and always fortifying them in the right exercise of liberty of will, by furnishing motives, addressed to their intelligence and pa.s.sions, to observe the right and to avoid the wrong in the exercise of the volitive power. Therefore, the _natural right of man_ is the right to such absolute control by others, in the earlier periods of his life, as that his will may retain its self-acting power unimpaired, as his mind is naturally unfolded by time and circ.u.mstances; and to such modification of this absolute control in after life, as may afford him due restraint under temptation to do wrong, and proper encouragement, at all times, to do right.

Second. _The right of man in a state of maturity._

1. The government should accord him all his natural rights, and protect him in the exercise of the same. That is, the political government should cooperate with the Divine to preserve his will in its normal condition as a self-acting power, and to guarantee to him the exercise of this power of self-action in all things good. The man who is protected in the enjoyment of this inherent liberty of will, is a free man in the strictest sense of the word. The government over him may be concentrated in the hands of one man, or it may be divided among an aristocracy, more or less numerous, or it may be what is called a democracy, but this does not of itself affect the fact of his freedom. If the government secure him in the enjoyment of these rights, and of all which necessarily attaches to them, he is essentially free. The kind of government, as a hereditary monarchy, or a democratic republic, does not, of itself, determine the actual freedom of its subjects. History furnishes many examples of government in which the power of control was concentrated in the hands of but one, or of a few individuals, which afforded its subjects the highest amount of essential liberty. To this day, "_the freedom of the British Const.i.tution_"--as much as we justly prefer our own--is by no means an idle boast. It is a great mistake to suppose that a government which deposits the sovereignty among the great ma.s.s of the people, is the only free government. We are constrained to acknowledge that it is better to be oppressed by _one_, or by a few tyrants, than by a mult.i.tude of tyrants. It is not _this_ or _that kind_ of government that makes the subject essentially free. But it is the fact that the controlling power, whether wielded by one or by many, secures each man in the enjoyment of his natural rights--affords him that system of appliances which develops and matures the self-acting power of his will--discourages all abuse of this power, and fully protects him in the proper exercise of it in the pursuit of the essential good.

_It is this that makes him free._

We prefer, for those to whom it is applicable, a democratic republic; because it is a more secure government, and less liable to an abuse of power; not because it is necessarily a more free government than any other. Another form of government may secure equal freedom in every essential particular; and this form may be as oppressive as any other; and whenever it is so, the condition of the down-trodden minority is far more hopeless than is that of the oppressed majority under some other form of government. Still, in certain conditions of the people, it is a much more secure form of government. The sovereigns of a state should always be socially equal, and, at the same time, honest as well as intelligent. Such rulers will not be oppressors. If the sovereigns of a democracy are intelligent, for the reason that but few partic.i.p.ate directly and personally in the administration of government and the spoils of office, they have but few inducements to corruption, and are more likely to be honest. The ma.s.s of the people, though often wrong in opinion, are always right in sentiment--they mean to do right, and they desire to do right. If they do err in a given case, they may usually be set right, for they have no motive to stay wrong. Hence, we think that when the condition of intelligence is fulfilled in the case of those occupying a social footing, we may expect a wiser and purer government; whilst the extent to which they may partic.i.p.ate in the affairs of government, giving it a firmer hold upon their affections, cannot fail to make it a more secure government. It is widely different in the case of a government concentrated in the hands of a few. The sovereigns are at the same time the administrators of law. They share not only the honors of sovereignty, but also the immediate profits of sovereignty--the spoils of office. Temptations to abuse power are always present and active.

Hence we find that such governments are more frequently oppressive.

Withal, even in cases in which they are not, (for they need not be,) for the reason that the ma.s.s of the people do not immediately partic.i.p.ate in the affairs of government, they are not as devoted to its interests, and hence the government cannot be as secure. For these reasons, a democratic republic is called by way of eminence a _free government_; but, evidently, not because it is the only form which secures freedom to its subjects. Any of these forms are legitimate when they are so adapted to the condition of the people as to secure to them the highest amount of freedom of which that condition will admit.

2. The government should secure to him all his acquired rights, or the rights which he acquires by the proper use of his essential rights. Of these, we notice,

1. His rights of social equality with those with whom he holds common interests, pleasures, benefits, happiness, and duties. These rights usually vary with the condition of different individuals, or different cla.s.ses of individuals. It will not be maintained that an infant or idiot, and a man of rude intellect and vulgar habits, have interests and duties common to each other, and common to persons in a different condition, in any such sense as would ent.i.tle them all to social equality. Both their mental and physical condition would be a bar to any such equality. So in the case of the s.e.xes, difference in physical condition is a bar, except in the marriage state. So also certain races of men are by their physical condition barred from social equality, in many respects, with those of other races. Those duties required by one condition in order to attain the essential good are very different from those of another condition which are necessary to attain the same object. But the privilege of social equality with all in a similar condition, which results from the discharge of the duties of that condition, is the right of every one. Some will require positive law to secure them; as in the marriage relation, the social as well as other rights of the parties must be secured by law; whilst others will be better secured by leaving them to be regulated by the conventional usages of society--only another form of government. But there is an obvious difference in the social rights of men which government is bound to respect, unless it would arrest the progress of civilization; because it is an inequality founded in that difference of condition, against which no government can provide, nor was it intended that it should provide. We notice,

2. That government should secure to him all those political rights to which he is ent.i.tled by making a proper use of his essential rights.

We need not specify all the political rights which may be regarded acquired rights. It is sufficient to consider this topic in regard to the question of sovereignty. We say, that all the members of a given society, having a common interest in that society, are ent.i.tled to share the sovereignty of its government _on certain conditions, and on no other conditions_. We take the ground that mere humanity, in itself considered, does not ent.i.tle any one to the rights of political sovereignty. If this were so, we should be bound to place females, together with minors of both s.e.xes, and the inmates of State prisons, among the sovereigns of society. They are all perfect specimens of humanity. Of the first it may be said, they are often equal in intellect with the other s.e.x, and in other respects are generally superior specimens of humanity. These all have an interest in society common to all other members of it, and yet it is admitted that they should not be numbered among the sovereigns of the land. What is it, then, that ent.i.tles a man to the right of political sovereignty?

First--He should have reached that point in mental development in which he will have a capacity, in common with others, to understand and appreciate the leading principles of government and their applications. Second--He should have reached that period in life in which there is usually a corresponding development of the moral sense--the feeling of obligation to do right--which affords a reasonable guaranty for the faithful application of his knowledge in discharging the duties of sovereignty. Third--He should be in that state of social equality which gives him a common interest, a common happiness, and common duties as a citizen, with other sovereigns, which will also afford a necessary guaranty for the faithful performance of his duties. And, Fourth--He should be in that physical condition, also, which is necessary to the duties of so responsible a position, under all ordinary circ.u.mstances. If one or more of these conditions exclude a whole s.e.x, together with all minors, idiots, felons, and foreigners, they at the same time limit it to a definite cla.s.s of males, and bar all others from any t.i.tle to it. No sensible man would admit that the power of sovereign control inherent in government could, with safety to the only legitimate object of government, the happiness of the subjects, be deposited with any other cla.s.s of men. But those who fulfil these conditions have a right to rule. They have acquired it by the performance of those duties which have elevated them to the condition of being qualified for sovereignty. It should not be withheld. If those in a society qualified for sovereignty be numerous, the government should take the popular form--a democratic republic. But if those qualified to rule are a limited portion of the whole society, some other form of government is more appropriate.

But our subject leads us to notice:

Third. _The rights of man in the savage or uncivilized state._

No savage community was ever known to rise unaided to a state of civilization; and every example of savage society furnishes evidence that it is a state into which they have fallen by the tendencies of depraved nature. They are instances in which the government originally enjoyed--both human and Divine--has failed to preserve to the individual that liberty of will in the pursuit of the good which government is designed to secure. The pure intelligence is not sufficiently developed to const.i.tute an enlightened conscience.

Dwelling apart from civilized society, the absence of all the artificial wants of civilization is highly favorable to many of the natural virtues--such as hospitality to strangers, truth, fidelity, and generosity to their friends; but the undeveloped state of the pure reason leaves the moral sense in a state of so much immaturity, as to characterize them as unfaithful, cruel, and revengeful to their enemies. These are characteristics which, in their condition of physical maturity, make them terrible to their neighbors.

Now the question is, What are the rights of such a people? It is useless to discuss this question so far as it relates to mere savage government; for in this view it is a question of no interest. But the question, What rights can they claim of a civilized people? is the one with which we have to deal.

They certainly have a natural right to protection under given circ.u.mstances, and freedom from oppression under all circ.u.mstances. If a civilized people, holding a balance of power in virtue of superior intelligence, have an undisputed right to protect themselves from the cruelty and infidelity of neighboring savages, still it will be admitted that oppression in any proper sense of the term would be an invasion of their natural rights. They have a right to be left in the enjoyment of the highest amount of freedom which their mental state will allow them to use legitimately. And more than this, their natural rights claim for them reasonable exertions to elevate their moral condition. Hence the n.o.ble efforts now being made by the Christian people of this country to evangelize the savages on our border, and the no less commendable efforts of the United States government to favor this design, by an annual appropriation from the national treasury. All this is only according them their rights. But do these rights ent.i.tle them to claim social equality with a civilized people?

That which it is the right of another to claim of me, it is my duty to grant. Is it then my duty to grant social equality to any or to every wandering savage that may chance to pa.s.s my dwelling? Should I not only extend to him the rights of hospitality due to a wandering savage--give him food and shelter in given circ.u.mstances, and treat him kindly in all respects--but extend to him true social equality, such as it is my duty to do to other men in certain states of civilization! No man--himself not a savage--would dare affirm this!

The savage has no right to claim it. The reason is obvious on the principles discussed. Certain social rights arise only on certain conditions of moral development, and the fulfilment of the duties which attach to that state. The savage has not reached this condition; hence has not fulfilled its duties, and is not ent.i.tled to the right of social equality which attaches to that state. For a sensible man to affirm that he has this right in virtue of his mere humanity, would be simply ridiculous. And this being so, it follows, _a fortiori_, that it is much less our duty to allow him an equal partic.i.p.ation in the sovereignty of the State--allow him a control in the affairs of government--share the authority to regulate our relations, domestic and foreign; and even to partic.i.p.ate in governing our families.

The man who should gravely propose in Congress to annex the savage tribes of our border, as sovereign States of this Union, would, by all right-minded men, be regarded as insane. No one of the managers of looms, spindles, and other machinery, among the agrarian portion of our northern community, with all their boasted knowledge of the natural rights of man, and their readiness to accord equal rights to all men, and to protect them in a.s.serting those rights, have, as yet, made up their minds to go thus far--although we may be at a loss to account for it that they so far falsify their principles as not to do so.

Now, as it is not our duty to do this in behalf of a neighboring race of uncivilized people, for the reason that they have no right to it, how does the question stand in regard to a numerous cla.s.s of such persons, spread through a definite section of our country? Does this change of position and contact with civilization confer on them higher rights than it has already been admitted belong to them in a separate state in virtue of their humanity? Is it our duty to accord to them equality of political rights? and for the reason that they are diffused through the ma.s.s of society? Can this position be maintained?

On the contrary, the change of position, and the service which in that position they render to the cause of civilization, which is a.s.sumed to acquire for them a right that does not belong to their cla.s.s of persons in a separate position, so far from affording a vindication of this doctrine, furnishes a still stronger reason against it. They are not only uncivilized, but are now in a position to exert an evil influence, which in a separate state they could not do, although they might dwell upon our border. In a separate state, the artificial wants of civilized life are unknown to them. The great sources of temptation to do wrong by invading the rights of neighbors, is not supplied to them by their position. But when in immediate contact with civilization, a great many of these artificial wants are learned by them, and felt to be objects of desire. These desires, by a fixed law of the human mind, must be a constant source of temptation--they clamor for gratification. If the indulgence should not be restrained, either by a system of laws which reached the case, or by the motives which a state of civilization supplies, they would inevitably result in a disregard of the rights of property, and a general depravation of morals. They are without the latter, for they are uncivilized. Hence the demands of their position must be met by laws appropriate to an uncivilized people. The laws appropriate to a state of civilization, cooperating as they do with the motives supplied by that state, are not more than equal to the task of restraining the pa.s.sions of civilized men. To rely upon them in the case of uncivilized men would be the grossest folly. Hence if it were not our duty to share our political rights with such a people, dwelling upon our border, in a separate state, for a much stronger reason it is not our duty to do this for those dwelling in our midst. If it is not our duty to do it, it cannot be their right to claim it; for rights and duties are always reciprocal. But, on the contrary, for the same general reasons by which it becomes the duty of a civilized state to place all its minors under the despotism of parental control, as before defined, it is the duty of the state to place an uncivilized race which may chance to dwell within its borders, under a similar form of government. This despotism need not be oppressive in the one case any more than in the other. It is the proud boast of all our native citizens that they have always lived under a free government; and yet they were brought up to the age of twenty-one under a pure despotism. But this does not deprive them of their right to boast. True, the government conferred almost absolute control upon the parent, or guardian, or master of the apprentice! These might have oppressed them. But the government, which stood ready to vindicate their rights, did not do it. The government, in what it did, only accorded them their natural rights, as we have seen--provided to confer on them the highest amount of freedom of which their condition would admit. It was to them essentially a free government, though in one of the forms of despotism. So in that form of despotism appropriate to a race of uncivilized people dwelling in the midst of a civilized people, if adapted to their condition, or securing to them (as in the case of minors) their natural rights, it is, _for_ them, and _to_ them, a _free government_. So far from being a curse, as many of our philosophers teach, it is a blessing, which their essential rights ent.i.tle them to claim. Any other form of government would be, in their case, as well as in that of minors, a practical denial of their rights; because it would result in the annihilation of their essential rights; that is, the enslavement of their wills to the basest pa.s.sions of fallen nature.

Hence, we find that government, both human and Divine, is a special necessity of man's fallen condition, and coeval with the history of the race: that its legitimate object is to preserve him from that annihilation of his essential liberty of will which would inevitably follow if there were no government, and to secure him in the enjoyment of the highest amount of this liberty which his condition will allow: that to do this, various forms of civil government are admissible; and that the one best adapted to the condition of the people is the one that should be applied, and is the only strictly _free government_ for the people to whom it is appropriate. A democracy applied to minors or savages, in the midst of a civilized people, would be the most grinding of all oppressions. We have seen that the _means_ appropriate to government are suitable penalties addressed to our pa.s.sions of hope and fear: that the only _right_ which a man has to exercise his inherent liberty--that is, the only right he has of self-control--is the authority to do that which, in itself, _is right_--not a right to do _wrong_: that the exclusive authority of government is to restrain man from doing _wrong_, and to protect and encourage him in doing _right_--restrain his _power_ to do wrong, not his power to do right--this it seeks to strengthen. We have seen that the rights of man in a state of minority--and the same of uncivilized men dwelling in a community of the civilized--are to the benefits of an absolute form of government; any other would be only a system of ruinous oppression to them: that at his maturity as a civilized man, he should be protected in the exercise of all the rights which naturally belong to a state of maturity, and also the enjoyment of all those rights which he has acquired by availing himself of the privileges afforded by his condition. Of his acquired rights, we see that on certain conditions he is ent.i.tled to social equality; and that on certain further conditions, he is ent.i.tled to the right of political sovereignty.

Now, we ask, in what sense can it be said that legitimate government is a concession of some rights, in order to secure others? Certainly, in no good sense, seeing it only limits his power to do _wrong_, by laying him under suitable disabilities, and that it does this in order to secure both the power and the privilege of doing right. But by falsely a.s.suming that government is a concession of rights, and that the government in which every citizen does not make a voluntary concession of the rights exercised by government is a cruel oppression, men fall upon conclusions which, when carried out, (and principles will tend to work out their results,) lead to agrarianism: that is, the destruction of all rights, by the annihilation of all civilization.

And again we ask, How does it follow that the domestic slavery of the negro in America is an abridgment of his inalienable rights? Certainly not from the fact that he is placed under an absolute form of control, for we have seen that, in certain conditions of humanity, that is the only form of government that will secure any freedom at all: as in the case of all minors, and the case of an uncivilized race that may chance to be diffused among the ma.s.s of a civilized people. If, then, his government be an oppression at all, it is because his state of civilization, and the relative circ.u.mstances of his condition, have acquired for him the _rights of social equality_ and the _rights of political_ sovereignty. These are questions of fact that will be considered in their proper place.

LECTURE VI.

THE ABSTRACT PRINCIPLE OF SLAVERY DISCUSSED ON SCRIPTURE GROUNDS, AND MISREPRESENTATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLE EXAMINED.

The true subjective right of self-control defined according to the Scriptures--The abstract principle of slavery sanctioned by the Scriptures--The Roman government--Dr. Wayland's Scripture argument examined and refuted--The positions of Dr. Channing and Prof. Whewell examined and refuted.

The inquiry, if the inst.i.tution of domestic slavery existing amongst us agrees in its _details_ with the teachings of the Holy Scriptures, is reserved for a future lecture. We now inquire how far it agrees with the Holy Scriptures in its great fundamental principles?--the abstract principles which, thus far, have been shown to be right.

We, of course, acknowledge the full authority of the Scriptures.

Although not a formal philosophical treatise, the Bible embodies no other than the profoundest principles both of mental and moral science; and all its teachings are in accordance with them. "To the law," then, "and to the testimony." Do they sanction the principles I have sought to establish? Do they accord to man any other subjective right of self-control than simply the _right_ to do that which in itself is _right_--that is, _good_? True, they a.s.sume that he has the _power_ to do wrong, but at the same time they deny to him _all right_ to do wrong. All those scriptures which forbid his doing _wrong_, and enjoin it upon him to do _right_, under severe penalties for disobedience, are in proof. They are too numerous and familiar to require that I quote them. They all a.s.sume that he has power to do either _right_ or _wrong_, but only a _right_ to do that which is _right_. Whoever, then, sets up a _right_ to do a thing, and can give no better reason for it than that he has power to do it in virtue of his humanity, and that therefore others should not interpose obstacles in the way of his doing it, on peril of abridging him of a natural right, a.s.sumes far more than the Scriptures allow him; nay, he a.s.sumes that which is forbidden him in Holy Scripture, no less than in reason and common sense; and if allowed to exercise such lawless power, under the plea of _natural right_, he could not fail to put an end to all law, and to precipitate society into a state of anarchy. Therefore, the government which places minors, aliens, and citizens, who at the same time allow themselves to be subjects of a foreign prince, together with uncivilized persons, in circ.u.mstances in which they cannot, or are not likely, to injure their neighbors, or to injure society, does not, for that reason, deprive them of a _natural_ right, unless it could be shown that they have a natural right to do the very thing which the Scriptures declare they have no right to do, that is, to injure their neighbors! It further follows, that the right to do an act which involves accountability, is the right to do that which, _in itself_, _is right_; or, in other words, the only natural right of self-control is the right to do that which is good. Hence, those who claim for any cla.s.s of society a right to political sovereignty, should be prepared to show that the essential good requires that such privilege be accorded them, or they fail to establish their right, for the reason that no right can ever be justly _acquired_ which does not coincide with the natural right to do good.

Again, we have shown that the abstract principle of slavery is control by the will of another, with its correlatives: that this is an essential element of all government; for a government which did not exercise the right to control men, even against their wills, under given circ.u.mstances, would be no government at all. Do these views accord with the teachings of the Holy Scriptures? That control is an essential idea of government, is an intuitive perception, and needs no proof. The question then resolves itself into this: Do the Scriptures sanction government? That the Bible itself is only a system of government, will not be disputed. It _forbids_ and _commands_, and requires all men to conform their volitions to its requirements, as to that which is in itself good. Moreover, it sanctions civil government in the most express terms: "Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of G.o.d: the powers that be are ordained of G.o.d. Whosoever, therefore, resisteth the power," that is, the authority of government, "resisteth the ordinance of G.o.d; and they that resist shall receive to themselves d.a.m.nation," etc. (Rom. xiii.

1-7. See A. Clarke's notes.) This was said to the Roman Christians, and was an injunction to obey Caesar's government. In that government, it is well known, the slavery element greatly predominated: but little room was left for the exercise of self-control; political sovereignty being denied to the people. In declaring government, even in this extreme form of controlling the wills of men, to be his appointment, G.o.d establishes the _principle, as in itself right_. Dr. Wayland, however, (see article, Modes in which Personal Liberty may be violated,) affirms, "that the gospel is diametrically opposed to the _principle_ of slavery."

The moral precepts of the Bible, which he a.s.sumes to be diametrically opposed to the principle of slavery, are, (as quoted by himself,) "Thou shalt love _thy neighbor as thyself_; and _all things whatsoever_ ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them." He says that, "were this precept obeyed, it is manifest that slavery could not in fact exist for a single instant. The _principle_ of the precept is absolutely subversive of the _principle_ of slavery." That the gospel should, nevertheless, acknowledge slaveholders (for neither the Jewish nor the Roman law _required_ any citizen to hold slaves) as "_believers_," and "_worthy of all honor_,"

and require of the Christian slaves held by them to acknowledge them as _brethren_, that is, good men, and accord them _all honor_, is evidently a troublesome question to the Doctor. There is no room for surprise. The second scripture quoted, it is allowed, interprets the first. In what sense then are we to understand the duty inculcated in the second? There are only two senses in which the form of the expression will allow us to evolve any significance whatever. The first is, Do unto another whatsoever you would have him to do unto you, if you were in his situation; and the second is, Do unto another whatsoever you would have a _right_ to require another to do unto you, if you were in his circ.u.mstances.

Now if we could suppose that the Saviour intended his language to be understood in the first sense, it will not perhaps be disputed that it is our duty to abolish domestic slavery, for we should, no doubt, desire to be released, if we were in a state of domestic slavery. But, unfortunately for the argument, this interpretation would not stop at the abolition of domestic slavery in the case of the African. It would reach to the domestic slavery of the child also. There is scarcely a wayward lad in Christendom who could not justly claim release from parental restraint on the same principle! Nay, more, the criminal at the bar of civil justice, the inmates of State prisons, and the poor man in his hovel, would all claim release! And as that which is duty in others, in such cases, is a right in them, not to grant them release would certainly be a denial of their just rights! Is this the sense in which Dr. Wayland would have us understand the Saviour of mankind? Certain it is, that this is the only sense in which his words can be understood so as to involve the necessary abolition of slavery!

We cheerfully acquit Dr. W. from the purpose to teach any such agrarian folly. Still, we can see no good reason why one so eminent, as a Christian and a scholar, should permit even an early prejudice as to a practical question, about which he allows that he is uninformed, to betray him into such views of a plain principle as logically involve him in the grossest absurdities.

That the second sense given is the proper one in which to understand the Saviour's doctrine can admit of no dispute. What we should have a _right to claim_, if we were in the circ.u.mstances of a slave, is precisely that which we are to accord to such slave, according to the precept of the Saviour. If we should have a right to claim political sovereignty, in those circ.u.mstances, we are bound to allow them such sovereignty, that is, release them from slavery. This directly involves the question, Whether they are fitted for that self-government which is involved in such sovereignty? That they are not so in virtue of their humanity merely, we have proved; and whether they are so or not, by acquirement, is a practical question which Dr.

Wayland allows that he is not competent to decide. This question will be met in another place. It is sufficient here to state, that the scripture so confidently relied on as repudiating the principle of slavery, is found not to reach the question of the principle at all, and, therefore, is wholly misapplied.

The patriarchal form of government, which existed before the theocracy of the Jews, const.i.tuted the patriarch (he being the head of the family) the owner of slaves. Abraham, Lot, and others, held them in large numbers. These men enjoyed the unqualified approbation of Jehovah, and in their character of slaveholders, no less than in many other respects. According to Dr. W., they enjoyed the Divine approbation in the practice of iniquity; for he says, the Bible condemns both the _principle_ and the _practice_ of slavery!

It is evident that the Jews brought slaves with them from Egypt; for the terms of the Decalogue not only imply that they were familiar with domestic slavery, but also that it was, at that time, an existing practice among them. But more than this, the Decalogue is strictly the const.i.tution which Jehovah himself gave to the Jewish nation. Now to a.s.sume that he provided in this const.i.tution to protect in all time to come (for it is allowed to embody immutable principles) a relation which was, in itself, _an iniquity_, is more than a mere absurdity--_it is profanity_. And it is certain that the tenth article of this const.i.tution provides to protect the right of property in slaves: "_Thou shall not covet thy neighbor's_ MAN-SERVANT, _nor his_ MAID-SERVANT, _nor any thing that is thy neighbor's_."

The Saviour has recognized this law, as it was originally designed to be, of universal obligation and force: "_Think not that I am come to destroy the law or the prophets: I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil_." Matt. v. 17.

In accordance with this fundamental law of the nation, G.o.d proceeded to provide in their civil inst.i.tutions for the operation of a regular system of domestic slavery. Under these inst.i.tutions, a Hebrew might lose his liberty and become a domestic slave, in six different ways.

(See A. Clarke, on Ex. xxi.)

1. In extreme poverty, he might sell his liberty. Lev. xxv. 39: "_If thy brother be waxed poor and be sold unto thee_."

2. A father might sell his child. Ex. xxi. 7: "_If a man sell his daughter to be a maid-servant_."

3. Insolvent debtors became the slaves of their creditors. 2 Kings iv.

1: "_My husband is dead, and the creditor is come to take unto him my two sons to be bondsmen_." Also, Matt. xviii. 25.

4. A thief, if he had not money to pay the fine laid on him by the law, was to be sold for his profit whom he had robbed. Ex. xxii. 3: "_If he have nothing, then he shall be sold for the theft_."

5. A Hebrew was liable to be taken in war, and sold for a slave. 2 Chron. xii. 8.

6. A Hebrew slave who had been ransomed from a Gentile by a Hebrew, might be sold by him who ransomed him to one of his own nation.

All who became slaves under this system were emanc.i.p.ated in the seventh year, except those who should refuse to accept liberty. Ex.