"F. Now what becomes of your vaunted RIGHTS of man? According to you, the chief merit of man is obedience; and whatever is ordered and commanded is RIGHT and JUST. This is pretty well for a _democrat_. And those have always been your sentiments?

"H. Always; and those sentiments confirm my democracy.

"F. Those sentiments do not appear to have made you very conspicuous for obedience. There are not a few pa.s.sages, I believe, in your life, where you have opposed what was _ordered_ and _commanded_. Upon your principles, was that RIGHT?

"H. Perfectly.

"F. How now! Was it _ordered_ and _commanded_ that you should oppose what was _ordered_ and _commanded_! Can the same thing be at the same time both RIGHT and WRONG?

"H. Travel back to Melinda, and you will find the difficulty easily solved." (The people of Melinda are all _left-handed_, i. e., _their right_ is _our left_. But they are as _right_-handed as we are; for they use that hand in preference which is _ordered_ by their custom, and is therefore _their right hand_, and leave out of employ the other, which is, therefore, their _left_ hand.) "A thing may be at the same time both RIGHT and WRONG, as well as RIGHT and LEFT. It may be _commanded_ to be done and _commanded_ not to be done. The law--that which is _laid down_--may be different by different authorities.

"I have always been most obedient when most taxed with disobedience.

But my RIGHT hand is not the RIGHT hand of Melinda. The RIGHT I revere is not the right ordered by sycophants: the _jus vagum_, the capricious command of princes or ministers. I follow the LAW _of G.o.d_, (what is _laid down_ by him for the rule of my conduct,) when I follow the laws of human nature: which without any human testimony we know must proceed from G.o.d; and upon these are founded the RIGHTS of man, or what is _ordered_ for man. I revere the const.i.tution and const.i.tutional laws of England, because they are in conformity with the LAWS of _G.o.d_ and _nature_; and upon these are founded the rational rights of Englishmen. If princes, or ministers, or the corrupt sham-representatives of the people, _order_, _command_, or _lay down_ any thing contrary to that which is _ordered_, _commanded_, or _laid down_ by G.o.d, human nature, or the const.i.tution of this government, I will still hold fast by the higher authorities. If the meaner authorities are offended, they can only destroy the body of the individual, but never can affect the RIGHT, or that which is ordered by their superiors."[5]

[5] See his whole article on Rights.

Thus he is found to agree with Webster, that the _will of G.o.d_ is the ultimate _genus_ of the RIGHT. That is RIGHT, which conforms to the will of G.o.d as _laid down in law_--whether that law be a _written revelation_, nature, or the customs of society, (as in the case of the _right_ and _left_ hand,) as the exponent of that will--they are what is ordered in the case, and make the RIGHT. Hence he condemns as "wretched mummery" the distinction admitted by M. Portalis, between obedience to a command, and obedience to what is RIGHT and JUST in itself, and, on the same ground, p.r.o.nounces it "highly improper" to say, with Mr. Locke, "G.o.d has a RIGHT to do it: we are his creatures."

For truly if his will be the ultimate _genus_ of RIGHT, then he can have no _rights_, for there is certainly no superior to whose _commands_ he conforms in the acts of his will. But precisely at this point let us take our stand. I affirm on the authority of Scripture, no less than sound philosophy, (always in harmony,) that _G.o.d has_ RIGHTS, and that the distinction of M. Portalis is in many instances correct; and that hence Tooke, Dr. Paley, (who also concurs in this view--see his article Rights, in his Moral Philosophy,) Dr. Webster, with many others of great distinction, strangely err, not in their etymology of this word, but in that hypothesis by which they make it a significate of the _will of G.o.d_. We cannot agree with them that RIGHTS and DUTIES which are reciprocal, are resolvable only into the will of G.o.d--have his will alone for their ultimate foundation. I take ground back of this. True, I say with them--and I claim full credit in the declaration--that the volitions, the acts of G.o.d, are always RIGHT; but I do not say that his will makes the essential or true distinction between _right_ and _wrong_. We dare not a.s.sume that G.o.d, could, by an act of volition, make the _right_ to be the _wrong_, and the _wrong_ to be the _right_--good evil, and evil good! It is absurd to a.s.sume that G.o.d can do things that are in themselves contradictory.

Omnipotent, we know, he is; but such things are not the objects of power, any more than things which _are_ the objects of power, are, in the same sense, the objects of Omniscience. To affirm that he could make the _right_ to be the wrong, is as _false_ as it would be impious to affirm that he _would_ do it, if he could--false, because, if he can, he has not deposited the truth in that great master-work of his hand, the mind of man; for, by the power of the intuition he has given us, we are a.s.sured that the idea is in itself a gross absurdity. And if this be not decisive of the question, then neither intuition nor the deductions of intuition are of any authority. Man is the victim of a false guide within! He may "eat and drink, for to-morrow he dies!"

There will be no more of him; or, what is worse, he is but a link in a chain of sentient beings who are governed by a cruel fate, which regards not the distinctions of _right_ and _wrong_; and he may be the sport of wickedness in the world to come, as he has been the victim of deception in this! I think it more than error to reason thus! I think it profane!

We may take ground back of this--ground as honorable to G.o.d as it is exalting to man and encouraging to his hopes. It is true, that both rect.i.tude and duty, together with liberty, are resolvable into the essential good. Or, in other words, _freedom_, _rect.i.tude_, and _duty_ are the modes of thought in which we conceive of the good as existing in the soul of man, and that they are, each of them, in their distinct nature and harmonious union, the true ideal of the good--the modes of thought, also, in which the intuition of man perceives the good in the case of every moral action which is good. And concerning the good in itself, which is thus in an humble degree perceived by us, it is certainly a reality which is immutable and eternal. G.o.d did not make it--nor was it made. It is of the essential nature of G.o.d, and eternal. He is the great impersonation of the good. His will, his volitions, in all cases, are but the expressions of this high attribute. His will, therefore, always conforming to the essential good, is a perfect rule of what is right in itself, and proper to be observed by us, as a rule of duty or conduct. Such a rule, it will be seen, is eminently adapted to the wants of humanity; but, at the same time, his will and the good are different realities. The one is an essential quality of his holy nature, and the other is, to a certain extent, an expression of this attribute in the form of volitions. That the will of G.o.d did not make the right in itself, will readily appear.

Is it to be conceived that there ever was a period in eternity past, when truth was not truth, or when truth did not exist? when _the good_ was not the _good_, or when the good did not exist? But does it not accord with the clearest teachings of reason, that the truth always was the truth, and ever will be the truth? that the good always will be the good? That two and two are equal to four; that to affirm a thing to be and not to be at the same time is an absurdity and a contradiction; and that things equal to one and the same thing are equal to one another, we say are all intuitive truths--we cannot be mistaken about them. So also in morals: that the truth is good; that virtue is good; that a good action is not an evil action; and that to affirm that a good action is not a good action is an absurdity, a contradiction, we say, _are all intuitions_--_we cannot be mistaken about them_. But is it not equally intuitive that these things were always so--that these truths were always truths--the good was always the good, just as certainly as that they are so now? Then the _eternity_ of these things is just as certainly an intuition, as that they exist now is an intuition. Hence the eternity of G.o.d, who is the great impersonation of this high quality, or whose attribute it is, is an intuitive truth. Hence his will did not make it, for it is absurd to say that he made himself. His will, therefore, which, in given cases, is his volition, is but the expression of this essential quality of his holy nature. Hence his will is a rule of right, because in all cases it conforms to the good, but it did not make the good.

Therefore the RIGHT, as it conforms to the essential GOOD, is of the nature of the GOOD. It is properly a significate of the good, and not a significate of the _will of G.o.d_. Things agreeing with one and the same thing agree with each other. Hence it coincides with the will of G.o.d. But such coincidence does not const.i.tute any thing _right_ in itself; but it is because, like the will of G.o.d, it conforms to, or is of the nature of, the ESSENTIAL GOOD, _that it is right_. The RIGHT then, in itself, is the GOOD. The GOOD is the true generic idea which cla.s.sifies all the different applications of this term. So far as any thing is of the nature of the GOOD, it is in itself RIGHT. So far as any thing, to which the idea of the RIGHT applies, is negative of the _good_, i. e., is evil, it is WRONG.

The GOOD, therefore, as an ultimate _genus_, is much more extensive in meaning than the RIGHT. It extends to all _physical_ as well as _moral_ good. Our subject requires us to consider it only so far as it applies to humanity. And how far is this? When Jehovah created man, he p.r.o.nounced him to be "very good," i. e., essentially good in the attributes of his nature. He was created in "his own image: in the image of G.o.d created he him." "And the Lord G.o.d formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and _man became a living soul_." That is, he was created a pure spiritual intelligence. He had a clear and correct perception and judgment of pure abstract truth, and of the relations of truth; with the corresponding feelings of obligation to duty, and a power of will sufficient to control the mental states within the sphere of its operations. Now, as a pure intelligence, thus endowed, he is within the limits of his capacity a cause within himself--strictly a self-acting agent, and hence accountable. And as he was created with a feeling of obligation to observe the good as a rule in all his conduct, he was created a subject of duty--he was under obligation to do, to act; and as in each of these respects, and in all others, he was created in conformity with the essential good, he was _rectus_, _right_. All this is implied in that declaration of his essential nature, as a pure spiritual intelligence, (who was therein made in the image of G.o.d,) which defined him to be "_very good_." Nor can we think of this good as a quality or attribute of humanity, without being conscious, if we reflect closely, of a.s.sociating in our minds the idea that the being who personates it is for that reason _free_; that for that reason he is _rectus_, _straight_, conformed to the good as the rule, that is, _right_; and that for the same reason he is under obligation--it is his _duty_ to act according to that rule. Every instance of moral action that is good implies these ideas: it is _free_, it is _rectus_, _straight_, and it is done in accordance with _duty_. In the same sense in which _life_, _sense_, and _motion_ enter into and so form the comprehension of the creature, animal; so _liberty_, _rect.i.tude_, and _duty_ form the comprehension of moral good, so far as it applies to humanity. These are distinct ideas.

Still they coincide, and either implies the others as correlatives.

Hence we say of a _free_ action that it is _good_, implying that it is at the same time _rectus_, and done in accordance with duty; and of an action in conformity to a proper rule, that it is _good_, implying at the same time that it is _free_, and done in accordance with _duty_; and also of an action in compliance with _duty_, that it is _good_, implying that it is also _free_, and straight, i. e., conformed to rule: thus in each case we imply the correlative ideas.

Now, whatever is in my possession by natural endowment is _mine_, in the strictest sense. Hence, _freedom_ is mine, _duty_ is mine, and _rect.i.tude_ is mine, because the _good_ is mine, and those are the elements of the good, each one implying the others.

Hence arises the idea of _natural right_: that is, the _right_ with which I am endowed by the const.i.tution of my nature as a rational being. But what is that RIGHT? Evidently, the _good_. The good as an attribute is in my possession. I am const.i.tuted with it and by it.

Hence it is inalienable. Divest me of the good as an attribute of my nature, i. e., liberty, rect.i.tude, and duty, and I sink at once in the scale of being: I cease altogether to be a rational or accountable being.

Let no one imagine that this position conflicts with the well-known fact that man is a fallen being. For although fallen, he is still accountable. True, his moral nature is in ruins, but still it is a moral nature. Though disordered, it is not eradicated. Hence the restoration by grace is called a conversion; but if the essential moral nature of man had been destroyed by the fall, and an attribute of essential evil had taken the place of it, his restoration could not be called, as it is, a _change_, but should be called in the strictest sense an _original_ creation. Hence, although man is fallen, depraved--and we need not object to the strong terms in which this depravity is usually expressed--still we find that the sentiment of all mankind is on the side of virtue, on the side of the good; and that men, though unchanged by sovereign grace, are still required to be honest, gentlemanly, and in all things regardful of each other's rights. We admit of exceptions or modifications of this only in the case of those in whom humanity has not been fully developed, as before noticed, and those in civilized life who have so far abused their moral nature as, in the language of Paul, to fit themselves for destruction. Therefore, it still remains that the _good_ in the form of rect.i.tude, _right_, is in some modification an endowment of my nature: the _right_, in itself, is mine by nature.

But the good, as an attribute, is an _active_ principle. We were endowed with it for the purpose of movement--for results. It is my duty to act _right_--straight, or in accordance with the _good_ as a rule. Hence, whatever is a necessary _condition_ of the operation of this active principle, the essential good, is in itself a good which is either in my possession, and hence is mine by possession; or it _ought_ to be in my possession, and hence is mine by just t.i.tle.

Hence, to breathe, under all circ.u.mstances, together with all physical motion and the sustenance of the body, which involves the right of property to a certain extent, each in given circ.u.mstances, is the natural right of every one. So also the right of the embryo-man, the idiot, the imbecile, the uncivilized, or the savage, to protection and defence, is a natural right; and for the same reason, to be protected and defended from certain helpless conditions by others, is the natural right of every one in all states of humanity. Because each of these, and of all similar things, is in itself good, being a necessary condition of the operation of the essential good, and is either in our possession or ought to be in our possession; each one is also a _natural right_, the good that is or ought to be in our possession.

But there are _acquired rights_.

It is the _duty_ of man to act, from the very fact that he is endowed with the attribute of the _good_, which envelops the idea of duty. He also has _power_ to act from the very same natural const.i.tution. Now, if he use this _power_ as duty and rect.i.tude indicate that he should do, all nature teaches, what the Bible confirms, that he will glorify G.o.d, i. e., exemplify his goodness, and therein promote his own happiness and the happiness of those with whom he is a.s.sociated; or, in other words, he will secure for himself and confer upon his fellows eminent benefits resulting from the performance of his duty.

Now, whatever results to him in this way is certainly his by possession, or by Divine grant, as much so as any natural _right_; but these _benefits_, being of the nature of the essential good, (for the reason that they are _benefits_, are in themselves _right_,) result to him in the performance of his duty, and therefore are _his rights_.

But the acquisition is made to depend upon the exercise of his _arbitrary_ volition. If he use this in pursuance of duty, they follow. If he use it in violation of duty, they do not follow. Hence, if he realize them at all, either by possession or by t.i.tle, they are _acquired_, and therefore are acquired _rights_ or benefits.

Therefore, _acquired rights_ may be defined, such good, in the form of benefits or privileges, as results from the performance of duty.

Logically, they belong to the cla.s.s of the essential good called benefits or privileges, with the "_essential difference_" that they are such as result from the performance of duty. Any other result, though in itself of the nature of the essential good, yet, as it conferred no benefit, could not be said to be _our right_. Capital punishment, for example, when in accordance with the Divine will, is in itself of the nature of the essential good; still, it would be an abuse of language to say, in any ordinary case, that it was the right of the criminal to be hung! because for no reason that we can imagine does it confer any benefit or privilege upon the criminal. To be _acquired rights_, therefore, they must not only be of the nature of the good--that is, actual benefits--but this good must result from the performance of duty, and not from the non-performance of duty, as in the example given.

The definition corresponds with the language of common sense. All men, in speaking of cases which are supposed to involve the question of _rights_, employ the term in this sense. You say, of a farmer in a given case, that he had no _right_ to an abundant harvest: why?

because he neglected his farm: his lands were not properly prepared, and the growing crop was left open to depredations from stock: that is, he neglected his duty; he had no _right_ to the benefit of an abundant harvest. And again, you say to a neighbor, You should have paid a certain sum of money to A., in a given case. He had a _right_ to the money, because he complied with the conditions on which the money was to be paid. _He did his duty_, and therefore had a _right_ to the money. Thus, the neglect of duty negatives _right_ in the one case, and the performance affirms it in the other, according to the common usage of language.

Another idea which clearly enters into the common and correct use of this term is that it is reciprocal with _obligation_: that is, wherever there is a right in one person, there is a corresponding obligation, _duty_, upon others. If one man has a _right_ to an estate, others are under obligation, that is, it is their _duty_, to abstain from it. If the letting of it alone be the result of duty on the part of others, the enjoyment of it by him must also result from duty on his part, or the ideas do not coincide: that which was duty in one set of men would not be duty in another, in regard to the same thing, and in correlative circ.u.mstances. This would be absurd: therefore, the duty of one set of men to let another alone in the enjoyment of a certain benefit, implies the correlative idea that they enjoy the benefit in virtue of doing their duty. Hence, those benefits which are our rights result to us from the performance of our duty.

The points established in this discussion are:

1. That conformity to what is _ordered_ or commanded is not the true generic idea of _the right_ in itself. What is ordered or commanded can only interpret _the right_, when the command itself conforms to the essential good, as in the case of the Divine will. This is always _right_, because it so conforms, or is always an expression of the essential good.

Hence, the _good_ is the true generic idea of _the right_. This alone can interpret _the right_ in any case. Therefore, although man, in virtue of his const.i.tution as a pure intelligence, has the _power_ to do _wrong_, he has not, and never can have, _the right_ to do wrong.

For wrong is the negative of right; and any thing, whether attribute, quality, opinion, doctrine, or act--every thing, whether moral or physical--to be _right_, must be of the nature of the _good_: all else is _wrong, not right_. And it further follows, that the only true subjective _right_ which any man has to exercise his power of self-control, is in doing that which is good, and not in doing that which is evil.

2. The _natural rights_ of man are,

First--The essential good in his possession by natural endowment, and which is therefore inalienable. And, Second--The necessary conditions, whatever they may be, of the operation of the inherent good as an active principle. Some of these are inalienable, and others are alienable. To this view of natural rights the common usage of language conforms.

3. The _acquired rights_ of man are, such good, in the form of benefits or privileges, as results to him from the performance of duty.

LECTURE V.

THE DOCTRINES OF RIGHTS APPLIED TO GOVERNMENT.

Government, human as well as Divine, is a necessity of man's fallen condition--All men concur in this--Man did not originate government: he has only modified the form--The legitimate objects of government, and the means which it employs to effect these objects--The logical inferences: 1. Although he has the power, he has no right to do wrong; 2. As a fallen being, he is, without a government over him, liable to lose the power of self-control--What are the rights of man: 1. In a state of infancy; 2. In a state of maturity; and, 3. In a savage or uncivilized state--Civil government is not founded on a concession of rights.

Philosophers, it seems to me, strangely overlook the tendency of man's fall to modify the operation of the laws of mind; and those who admit the fall still overlook this fact, that the depravity of man's nature was the result of _deprivation_, and not the infusion of an evil principle as an attribute of his nature. But it is not with the theology of this subject that we are now dealing. The fact that, as a fallen being, he was deprived of the immediate presiding influence of the Divine Spirit, is the matter that more immediately engages our attention. His lower physical nature, the great medium of the soul's communication with the outward world, and of consciousness in the embodied state, _originally_ operated in perfect and harmonious subordination to his higher spiritual nature. In this condition, his appet.i.tes, propensities, and pa.s.sions presented no bar to his happiness, or to that of his fellows. The government or control which his situation demanded, we may suppose, was simple, and concerned chiefly his relation to the Deity. But when, on the great occasion of his trial, he exercised his power of self-action, and exalted this nature as a rule of moral action, instead of the essential good of his higher nature, of which the will of G.o.d in the given case was the full and just exponent, there resulted a deprivation of the Divine Spirit, such as entirely changed the relation of those departments of his nature. Under the clouded condition of intellect consequent upon this deprivation, his lower nature, with its appet.i.tes, propensities, and pa.s.sions, is brought into constant and fierce conflict with his spiritual nature. This change in the condition of his humanity presents his case in an aspect altogether new. The history of each individual man becomes the history of a warfare--a warfare with himself, and a warfare with his fellows. With a highly vigorous moral nature, he is also the subject of a carnal or depraved nature. In this state of things, _government_ becomes an _actual necessity of his condition_. The Divine government, with all the aids and appliances afforded by the grand scheme of atonement, must appeal to his pa.s.sions, both of hope and of fear. For it is only by reducing his lower nature to its originally subordinate and harmonious position that an equilibrium will be established, and his primordial happiness regained. But the Divine government, though operating in harmony with the claims of his moral nature, and founded upon the relation which he sustains to Jehovah, and indispensable to his happiness here and hereafter, of itself alone does not meet a great many of the immediate demands of his condition. Hence the statement of Solomon: "Because sentence against an evil work is not executed speedily, therefore the heart of the sons of men is fully set in them to do evil." The consequences of obedience, high and holy as they are, and the consequences of disobedience, great and terrible as they are, are too remote from man, in many states of intellect and feeling in which he often places himself, to meet the immediate demands of his nature.

Hence, that modification of government called civil government, is no less demanded by the necessities of his condition than the Divine.

Civil government deals chiefly with the relations of man to his fellow-man. It coincides with the Divine government. They each aim at the control of the lower nature of man, and the development of his higher nature. The means they employ are the same in principle. They address the same pa.s.sions. The rewards and punishments of the one are in this life, and of the other chiefly in the life to come. Withal, the civil has the sanction of the Divine, and the Divine should always have the sanction of the civil, government. But still they are entirely distinct, and should not be confounded either in theory or in practice. The one is secular, and the other is Divine.

Now, we say that civil government--for of that we are called more particularly to speak--_is a necessity of man's condition_. It dates back as early as the creation of man. G.o.d himself established it in the law he gave to govern the first relation that existed on earth--the relation between Adam and his "helpmeet." After the fall, a necessity arose which gave it a new and more important bearing. We soon see it ramifying itself through all society, and dealing with all the relations of life.

Its necessity and authority, as a great means of controlling the lower nature of man, is among the permanent beliefs of mankind.

Neither legislators nor philosophers originated these beliefs. They are among the intuitions of man. The common judgment of mankind is not more a.s.sured that man exists, than that fallen man must be controlled in his appet.i.tes, propensities, and pa.s.sions--the sum of what is often considered his interest and his happiness--by the _physical powers of government_. Each individual man feels that he needs its powerful sanctions to arm him against himself, when violently tempted to do wrong; and that he needs its sanctions to protect him from outrage and wrong from his fellow-men, when moved by similar forces. The instincts of animal nature are not more certain in their movements than are the _intuitive_ perceptions and spontaneous feelings of mankind, causing them to lean upon the strong arm of civil government, to _control_ the propensities and pa.s.sions, and to promote the free exercise of the higher moral nature of man.

Government is the whole society in action. No people was ever known to exist for any definite period without government. Sometimes, it is true, _the form_ has been the result of implied understandings among the people--as when "there was no judge in Israel:" at others, a master-spirit has a.s.sumed the reins, and been deferred to by common consent; and at others, it has been modified by formal processes--such as conventions and const.i.tutions. Be this, however, as it may, government has always existed. Legislators did not make it. They have had much to do in modifying, directing, and often in corrupting the form; but nothing to do in originating government, in any proper sense of the term. It sprang spontaneously from the common sense of mankind.

An agent indispensable to self-preservation was certainly coeval with the race.

In its true generic sense, that is, in a sense equally applicable to all forms, government is _control_ by the authority of G.o.d and the people. G.o.d, in his word, declares the authority of the magistrate to be his ordinance; and this accords with the intuitive belief and feeling of necessity of all mankind: not that either approves in all cases of the _form_ which government a.s.sumes, but that the generic principle, in all cases, has the sanction of each.

The legitimate object of government is to secure to the people the highest amount of freedom which their moral condition and relative circ.u.mstances will admit. The means which it employs to effect this object, are, 1. Suitable penalties, addressed to their hopes and fears, to lay them under such restraints as to the indulgence of their appet.i.tes, propensities, and pa.s.sions, as thereby to prevent them from operating as a bar to the free exercise of their intellectual and moral powers in pursuit of the _essential_ good; and, 2. The security which it offers to every man, in the exercise of the higher powers of his nature, that he may do it without restraint from the pa.s.sions of men; or, in other words, to guarantee to every man the free exercise of his essential power to do good.

That both the object of government, and the means which it employs, are correctly stated, will not be disputed. All men concur in these views. They underlie all our opinions and reasonings on the subject of civil government. But in a.s.senting to this much, (and how can it be avoided?) may we not stand committed to much more than many theoretical politicians are aware?

Let us trace the logical inferences which arise from the principles discussed.