[13] The Barham copy ends here. The second sheet has not been found.

NELSON AND BRONTe.[1]

INSTRUCTIONS AFTER TRAFALGAR

INTRODUCTORY

The various tactical memoranda issued after Trafalgar by flag officers in command of fleets are amongst the most interesting of the whole series. The unsettled state of opinion which they display as the result of Nelson's memorandum is very remarkable; for with one exception they seem to show that the great tactical principles it contained had been generally misunderstood to a surprising extent.

The failure to fathom its meaning is to be accounted for largely by the lack of theoretical training, which made the science of tactics, as distinguished from its practice, a sealed book to the majority of British officers. But the trouble was certainly intensified by the fact--as contemporary naval literature shows--that by Nelson's success and death the memorandum became consecrated into a kind of sacred doc.u.ment, which it was almost sacrilege to discuss. The violent polemics of such men as James, the naval chronicler, made it appear profanity so much as to consider whether Nelson's attack differed in the least from his intended plan, and anyone who ventured to examine the question in the light of general principles was likely to be shouted down as a presumptuous heretic. Venial as was this att.i.tude of adulation under all the circ.u.mstances, it had a most evil influence on the service. The last word seemed to have been said on tactics; and oblivious of the fact that it is a subject on which the last word can never be spoken, and that the enemy was certain to learn from Nelson's practice as well as ourselves, admirals were content to produce a colourable imitation of his memorandum, and everyone was satisfied not to look ahead any further. To no one did it occur to consider how the new method of attack was to be applied if the enemy adopted Nelson's formation. They simply a.s.sumed an endless succession of Trafalgars.

The first outcome of this att.i.tude of mind is an 'Order of Battle and Sailing,' accompanied by certain instructions, issued by Admiral Gambier from the Prince of Wales in Yarmouth Roads, on July 23, 1807, when he was about to sail to seize the Danish fleet.[2] His force consisted of thirty of the line, and its organisation and stations of flag officers were as follows:

VAN SQUADRON

Division 1. Commodore Hood (No. 1 in line).

Division 2. Vice-Admiral Stanhope (No. 6).

CENTRE DIVISION

Division 1.} Admiral Gambier (No. 15).

Division 2.}

REAR SQUADRON

Division 1. Rear-Admiral Essington (No. 25).

Division 2. Commodore Keats (No. 30).

Gambier's fleet was thus organised in three equal squadrons (the centre one called 'the centre division') and six equal subdivisions.

The commander-in-chief was in the centre and had no other flag in his division, Similarly each junior flag officer was in the centre of his squadron and led his subdivision, but he had a commodore to lead his other subdivision. These two commodores also led the fleet on either tack. So far all is plain, but when we endeavour to understand by the appended instruction what battle formation Gambier intended by his elaborate organisation it is very baffling. Possibly we have not got the instruction exactly as Gambier wrote it; but as it stands it is confused past all understanding, and no conceivable battle formation can be constructed from it. All we can say for certain is that he evidently believed he was adopting the principles of Trafalgar, and perhaps going beyond them. The sailing order is to be also the battle order, but whether in two columns or three is not clear. Independent control of divisions and squadrons is also there, and even the commodores are to control their own subdivisions 'subject to the general direction' of their squadronal commanders, but whether the formation was intended to follow that of Nelson the instruction entirely fails to disclose.

The next is a tactical memorandum or general order, issued by Lord Collingwood for the Mediterranean fleet in 1808, printed in Mr. Newnham Collingwood's _Correspondence of Lord Collingwood_.

No order of battle is given; but two years later, in issuing an additional instruction, he refers to his general order as still in force. In this case we have the battle order, and it consists of twenty of the line in two equal columns, with the commander-in-chief and his second in command, second in their respective divisions. There were no other flag officers in the fleet.[3] The memorandum which is printed below will be seen to be an obvious imitation of Nelson's, and nothing can impress us more deeply with the merit of Nelson's work than to compare it with Collingwood's. Like Nelson, Collingwood begins with introductory remarks emphasising the importance of 'a prompt and immediate attack' and independent divisional control; and in order to remedy certain errors of Trafalgar, he insists in addition on close order being kept throughout the night and the strictest attention being paid to divisional signals, thinking no doubt how slowly the rear ships at Trafalgar had struggled into action, and how his signal for line of bearing had been practically ignored. Then, after stating broadly that he means with the van or weather division to attack the van of the enemy, while the lee or larboard division simultaneously attacks the rear, he differentiates like Nelson between a weather and a lee attack. For the attack from to-windward he directs the two divisions to run down in line abreast in such a way that they will come into action together in a line parallel to the enemy; but, whatever he intended, nothing is said about concentrating on any part of the enemy, or about breaking the line in all parts or otherwise.

The attack from to-leeward is to be made perpendicularly in line ahead. In this formation his own (the weather column) is to break the line, so as to cut off the van quarter of the enemy's line from the other three quarters, and the lee column is to sever this part of the enemy's line a few ships in rear of their centre. So soon as the leading ships have pa.s.sed through and so weathered the enemy, they are to keep away and lead down his line so as to engage the rear three fourths to windward. This is of course practically identical with the lee attack of Nelson's memorandum. The only addition is the course that is to be taken after breaking the line. One cannot help wondering how far the leading ships after pa.s.sing the line would have been able to lead down it before they were disabled, but the addition is interesting as the first known direction as to what was to be done after breaking the line in line ahead after Rodney's method. Seeing the grave and obvious dangers of the movement it is natural that, like Nelson, Collingwood hoped not to be forced to make it; what he desired was a simple engagement on similar tacks. His 'intended attack' as in Nelson's case is clearly that from to-windward.

Turning then again to the windward attack, we see at once its superficial resemblance to Nelson's, but so entirely superficial is it that it is impossible to believe Collingwood ever penetrated the subtleties of his great chiefs design. The dual organisation is there and the independent divisional control, but nothing else. The advance squadron has gone, and with it all trace of a containing movement. There is not even the feint--the mystification of the van.

Concentration too has gone, and instead of the sound main attack on the rear, he is most concerned with attacking the van. True, he may have meant what Nelson meant, but if he had really grasped his fine intention he surely must have let some hint of it escape him in his memorandum. But for the windward attack at least there is no trace of these things, and Nelson's masterly conception sinks in Collingwood's hands into a mere device for expediting the old parallel attack in single line--that is to say, the line is to be formed in bearing down instead of waiting to bear down till the line was complete. We can only conclude, then, that both Collingwood and Gambier could see nothing in the 'Nelson touch' but the swift attack, the dual organisation, and independent divisional control.

There is a third doc.u.ment, however, which confirms us in the impression already formed that there were officers who saw more deeply. It is a tactical memorandum issued by Admiral the Hon. Sir Alexander Forrester Inglis Cochrane, Bart., G.C.B., uncle of the more famous Earl of Dundonald. It is printed by Sir Charles Ekin, in his _Naval Battles_, from a paper which he found at the end of a book in his possession containing 'Additional Signals, Instructions, &c.,'

issued by Sir A.I. Cochrane to the squadron under his command upon the Leeward Islands station.' He commanded in chief on this station from 1805 to 1814, but appears never to have been directly under Nelson's influence except for a few weeks, when Nelson came out in pursuit of Villeneuve and attached him to his squadron. He was rather one of Rodney's men, under whom he had served in his last campaigns, and this may explain the special note of his tactical system. His partiality for Rodney's manoeuvre is obvious, and the interesting feature of his plan of attack is the manner in which he grafts it on Nelson's system of mutually supporting squadrons. He does not even shrink from a very free use of doubling which his old chiefs system entailed, and he provides a special signal of his own for directing the execution of the discarded manoeuvre. The 'explanation' of another of his new signals for running aboard an enemy 'so as to disable her from getting away' is also worthy of remark, as a recognition of Nelson's favourite practice disapproved by Collingwood.

Yet, although we see throughout the marks of the true 'Nelson touch,'

Cochrane's memorandum bears signs of having been largely founded on an independent study of tactical theory. His obligations to Clerk of Eldin are obvious. There are pa.s.sages in the doc.u.ment which seem as though they must have been written with the _Essay on Naval Tactics_ at his elbow, while his expression 'an attack by forcing the fleet from to-leeward' is directly borrowed from Morogues' 'Forcer l'ennemi au combat elant sous le vent.' On the other hand certain movements are entirely his own, such as his excellent device of inverting the line after pa.s.sing through the enemy's fleet, a great improvement on Collingwood's method of leading down it in normal order.

The point is of some interest, for although Cochrane's memorandum is over-elaborate and smells of the lamp, yet it seems clear that his theoretical knowledge made him understand Nelson's principles far better than most of the men who had actually fought at Trafalgar and had had the advantage of Nelson's own explanations. All indeed that Cochrane's memorandum seems to lack is that rare simplicity and abstraction which only the highest genius can achieve.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] The signature does not occur to the draught but was affixed to the originals issued to the admirals and captains of the fleet. To the copy signed by Lord Nelson, and delivered to Captain George Hope, of the Defence, was added: 'N.B.--When the Defence quits the fleet for England you are to return this secret memorandum to the Victory' Captain Hope wrote on that paper: 'It was agreeable to these instructions that Lord Nelson attacked the combined fleets of France and Spain off Cape Trafalgar on the 21st of October, 1805, they having thirty-three of the line and we twenty-seven,'--Nicolas.

The injunction to return the memorandum may well have been added to all copies issued, and this may account for their general disappearance.

[2] For this doc.u.ment the Society is indebted to Commander G.P.W.

Hope, R.N., who has kindly placed it at my disposal.

[3] For this doc.u.ment the Society is again indebted to Commander Hope, R.N.

_ADMIRAL GAMBIER_, 1807.

[+MS. of Commander Hope, R.N. Copy+.]

_Order of Battle and Sailing_.[1]

The respective flag officers will have the immediate direction of the division in which their ships are placed, subject to the general direction of the admiral commanding the squadron to which they belong.

The ships in order of battle and sailing are to keep at the distance of two cables' length from and in the wake of each other, increasing that distance according to the state of the weather.[2]

The leading ship of the starboard division is to keep the admiral two points on her weather bow. The leading ship of the lee division is when sailing on a wind to keep the leader of the weather column two points before her beam; when sailing large, abreast of her.

(Signed) J. GAMBIER.

Prince of Wales, Yarmouth Roads: 23 July, 1807.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] For the actual order to which the instructions are appended see Introductory Note, _supra_, p. 322.

[2] The normal distance was then a cable and a half. See _post_, p.

330 note.

_LORD COLLINGWOOD_, 1808-10.

[+Correspondence of Collingwood, p. 359+.]

From every account received of the enemy it is expected they may very soon be met with on their way from Corfu and Tarentum, and success depends on a prompt and immediate attack upon them. In order to which it will be necessary that the greatest care be taken to keep the closest order in the respective columns during the night which the state of the weather will allow, and that the columns be kept at such a sufficient distance apart as will leave room for tacking or other movements, so that in the event of calm or shift of wind no embarra.s.sment may be caused.

Should the enemy be found formed in order of battle with his whole force, I shall notwithstanding probably not make the signal to form the line of battle; but, keeping in the closest order, with the van squadron attack the van of the enemy, while the commander of the lee division takes the proper measures, and makes to the ships of his division the necessary signals for commencing the action with the enemy's rear, as nearly as possible at the same time that the van begins. Of his signals therefore the captains of that division will be particularly watchful.

If the squadron has to run to leeward to close with the enemy, the signal will be made to alter the course together, the van division keeping a point or two more away than the lee, the latter carrying less sail; and when the fleet draws near the enemy both columns are to preserve a line as nearly parallel to the hostile fleet as they can.

In standing up to the enemy from the leeward upon a contrary tack the lee line is to press sail, so that the leading ship of that line may be two or three points before the beam of the leading ship of the weather line, which will bring them to action nearly at the same period.