[36] Jurien de la Graviere, _Guerres Maritimes_, ii. 220, note.

[37] This highly important signal appears to have been generally overlooked in accounts of the action. Yet Collingwood's journal is so precise about signals that there can be no doubt he made it. Agamemnon in Nelson's column answered it under the impression it was general. Her log says, 'Answered signal No. 50'--that is, 'To keep on the larboard line of bearing though then on the starboard tack. Ditto starboard bearing if on larboard tack.' Captain Moorsom also says, 'My station was sixth ship in the rear of the lee column; but as the Revenge sailed well Admiral Collingwood made my signal to keep a line of bearing from him which made me one of the leading ships through the enemy's line.' No other ship records the signal. Probably few saw it, for in the memorandum which Collingwood issued two years later he lays stress on the importance of captains being particularly watchful for the signals of their divisional commander. See _post_, pp. 324 and 329.

[38] Collingwood to Marsden, October 22. same to Parker, November 1.

Same to Pasley, December 16, 1805.

[39] See _supra_, p. 119. Villeneuve saw this. In his official despatch from the Euryalus, November 5, he says 'Notre formation s'effectuait avec beaucoup de peine; mais dans le genre d'attaque que je prevoyais que l'ennemi allait nous faire, cette irregularite meme dans notre ligne ne me paraissait pas un inconvenient.'--Jurien de la Graviere, _Guerres Maritimes_, ii. 384.

_LORD NELSON_, 1803.

[+Clarke and McArthur, Life of Nelson, ii. 427+.[1]]

_Plan of Attack_.

The business of a commander-in-chief being first to bring an enemy's fleet to battle on the most advantageous terms to himself (I mean that of laying his ships close on board the enemy, as expeditiously as possible, and secondly, to continue them there without separating until the business is decided), I am sensible beyond this object it is not necessary that I should say a word, being fully a.s.sured that the admirals and captains of the fleet I have the honour to command will, knowing my precise object, that of a close and decisive battle, supply any deficiency in my not making signals, which may, if extended beyond those objects, either be misunderstood, or if waited for very probably from various causes be impossible for the commander-in-chief to make. Therefore it will only be requisite for me to state in as few words as possible the various modes in which it may be necessary for me to obtain my object; on which depends not only the honour and glory of our country, but possibly its safety, and with it that of all Europe, from French tyranny and oppression.

If the two fleets are both willing to fight, but little manoeuvring is necessary, the less the better. A day is soon lost in that business. Therefore I will only suppose that the enemy's fleet being to leeward standing close upon a wind, and that I am nearly ahead of them standing on the larboard tack. Of course I should, weather them. The weather must be supposed to be moderate; for if it be a gale of wind the manoeuvring of both fleets is but of little avail, and probably no decisive action would take place with the whole fleet.[2]

Two modes present themselves: one to stand on just out of gun-shot, until the van ship of my line would be about the centre ship of the enemy; then make the signal to wear together; then bear up [and]

engage with all our force the six or five van ships of the enemy, pa.s.sing, certainly if opportunity offered, through their line. This would prevent their bearing up, and the action, from the known bravery and conduct of the admirals and captains, would certainly be decisive. The second or third rear ships of the enemy would act as they please, and our ships would give a good account of them, should they persist in mixing with our ships.

The other mode would be to stand under an easy but commanding sail directly for their headmost ship, so as to prevent the enemy from knowing whether I should pa.s.s to leeward or to windward of him. In that situation I would make the signal to engage the enemy to leeward, and cut through their fleet about the sixth ship from the van, pa.s.sing very close. They being on a wind and you going large could cut their line when you please. The van ships of the enemy would, by the time our rear came abreast of the van ship, be severely cut up, and our van could not expect to escape damage. I would then have our _rear_ ship and every ship in succession wear [and] continue the action with either the van ship or the second as it might appear most eligible from her crippled state; and this mode pursued I see nothing to prevent the capture of the five or six ships of the enemy's van. The two or three ships of the enemy's rear must either bear up or wear; and in either case, although they would be in a better plight probably than our two van ships (now the rear), yet they would be separated and at a distance to leeward, so as to give our ships time to refit. And by that time I believe the battle would, from the judgment of the admiral and captains, be over with the rest of them. Signals from these moments are useless when every man is disposed to do his duty. The great object is for us to support each other, and to keep close to the enemy and to leeward of him.

If the enemy are running away, then the only signals necessary will be to engage the enemy on arriving up with them; and the other ships to pa.s.s on for the second, third, &c., giving if possible a close fire into the enemy on pa.s.sing, taking care to give our ships engaged notice of your intention.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] From the original in the St. Vincent Papers. Also in Nicolas, _Despatches and Letters_, vi. 443. Obvious mistakes in punctuation have been corrected in the text.

[2] _Cf._ the similar remark of De Chaves, _supra_, p. 5.

_LORD NELSON_, 1805.

[+Nicolas, Despatches and Letters, vii.+[1]]

_Memorandum_.

_Secret_. Victory, off Cadiz, 9th October, 1805.

Thinking it almost impossible to bring a fleet of forty sail of the line into line of battle in variable winds, thick weather, and other circ.u.mstances which must occur, without such a loss of time that the opportunity would probably be lost of bringing the enemy to battle in such a manner as to make the business decisive; I have therefore made up my mind to keep the fleet in that position of sailing (with the exception of the first and second in command), that the order of sailing is to be the order of battle; placing the fleet in two lines of sixteen ships each, with an advance squadron of eight of the fastest sailing two-decked ships, _which_ will always make, if wanted, a line of twenty-four sail on whichever line the commander-in-chief may direct.

The second in command will,[2] after _my_ intentions are made known to him, have the entire direction of his line; to make the attack upon the enemy, and to follow up the blow until they are captured or destroyed.

If the enemy's fleet should be seen to windward in line of battle, and that the two lines and the advanced squadron can fetch them,[3] they will probably be so extended that their van could not succour their rear.

I should therefore probably make the second in command's[4] signal, to lead through about the twelfth ship from the rear (or wherever he[5] could fetch, if not able to get as far advanced). My line would lead through about their centre; and the advanced squadron to cut two, three, or four ships ahead of their centre, so far as to ensure getting at their commander-in-chief on whom every effort must be made to capture.

The whole impression of the British fleet must be to overpower from two to three ships ahead of their commander-in-chief, supposed to be in the centre, to the rear of their fleet. I will suppose twenty sail of the enemy's line to be untouched; it must be some time before they could perform a manoeuvre to bring their force compact to attack any part of the British fleet engaged, or to succour their own ships; which indeed would be impossible, without mixing with the ships engaged.[6]

Something must be left to chance; nothing is sure in a sea fight beyond all others. Shots will carry away the masts[7] and yards of friends as well as foes; but I look with confidence to a victory before the van of the enemy could succour their rear;[8] and then the British fleet would most of them be ready to receive their twenty sail of the line, or to pursue them, should they endeavour to make off.

If the van of the enemy tacks, the captured ships must run to leeward of the British fleet; if the enemy wears, the British must place themselves between the enemy and the captured and disabled British ships; and should the enemy close, I have no fears as to the result.

The second in command will, in all possible things, direct the movements of his line, by keeping them as compact as the nature of the circ.u.mstances will admit. Captains are to look to their particular line as their rallying point. But in case signals can neither be seen nor perfectly understood, no captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy.

Of the intended attack from to-windward, the enemy in the line of battle ready to attack.

[Ill.u.s.tration][9]

The divisions of the British fleet[10] will be brought nearly within gunshot of the enemy's centre. The signal will most probably be made for the lee line to bear up together, to set all their sails, even steering sails[11] in order to get as quickly as possible to the enemy's line and to cut through, beginning from the twelfth ship from the enemy's rear.[12] Some ships may not get through their exact place; but they will always be at hand to a.s.sist their friends; and if any are thrown round the rear of the enemy, they will effectually complete the business of twelve sail of the enemy.[13]

Should the enemy wear together, or bear up and sail large, still the twelve ships, composing in the first position the enemy's rear, are to be _the_ object of attack of the lee line, unless otherwise directed by the commander-in-chief; which is scarcely to be expected, as the entire management of the lee line, after the intention of the commander-in-chief is signified, is intended to be left to the judgment of the admiral commanding that line.

The remainder of the enemy's fleet, thirty-four sail, are to be left to the management of the commander-in-chief, who will endeavour to take care that the movements of the second in command are as little interrupted as possible.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Sir Harris Nicolas states that he took his text from an 'Autograph [he means holograph] draught in the possession of Vice-Admiral Sir George Mundy, K.C.B., except the words in italics which were added by Mr. Scott, Lord Nelson's secretary: and from the original issued to Captain Hope of the Defence, now in possession of his son, Captain Hope, R.N.'

[2] Lord Nelson originally wrote here but deleted 'in fact command his line and.'--Nicolas.

[3] Lord Nelson originally wrote here but deleted 'I shall suppose them forty-six sail in the line of battle.'--Nicolas.

[4] Originally 'your' but deleted.--_Ibid_.

[5] Originally 'you' but deleted.--_Ibid_.

[6] In the upper margin of the paper Lord Nelson wrote and Mr. Scott added to it a reference, as marked in the text--'the enemy's fleet is supposed to consist of 46 sail of the line, British fleet 40. If either be less, only a proportionate number of enemy's ships are to be cut off: B. to be 1/4 superior to the E. cut off.--_Ibid_.

[7] The Barham copy reads 'a mast.'

[8] Originally 'friends.'--Nicolas.

[9] This is the only diagram found in either of Nelson's memoranda. It is not in the Barham copy.

[10] Nelson presumably means the two main divisions as distinguished from the 'advanced squadron.' This distinction is general in the correspondence of his officers and accords with the arrangement as shown in the diagram. The Barham copy has 'division' in the singular, as though Nelson intended to specify one division only. It is probably a copyist's error.

[11] In the upper margin of the paper, and referred to by Lord Nelson as in the text 'Vide instructions for signal yellow with blue fly. Page 17, Eighth Flag, Signal Book, with reference to Appendix.'--Nicolas.

Steering-sail, according to Admiral Smyth (_Sailors' Word-Book_, p.

654), was 'an incorrect name for a studding sail,' but it seems to have been in common use in Nelson's time.

[12] The Barham copy reads 'their rear.'