NELSON'S TACTICAL MEMORANDA

INTRODUCTORY

The first of these often quoted memoranda is the 'Plan of Attack,'

usually a.s.signed to May 1805, when Nelson was in pursuit of Villeneuve, and it is generally accompanied by two erroneous diagrams based on the number of ships which he then had under his command. But, as Professor Laughton has ingeniously conjectured, it must really belong to a time two years earlier, when Nelson was off Toulon in constant hope of the French coming out to engage him.[1] The strength and organisation of Nelson's fleet at that time, as well as the numbers of the French fleet, exactly correspond to the data of the memorandum. To Professor Laughton's argument may be added another, which goes far actually to fix the date. The princ.i.p.al signal which Nelson's second method of attack required was 'to engage to leeward.'

Now this signal as it stood in the Signal Book of 1799 was to some extent ambiguous. It was No. 37, and the signification was 'to engage the enemy on their larboard side, or to leeward if by the wind,' while No. 36 was 'to engage the enemy on their starboard side if going before the wind, or to windward if by the wind.' Accordingly we find Nelson issuing a general order, with the object apparently of removing the ambiguity, and of rendering any confusion between starboard and larboard and leeward and windward impossible. It is in Nelson's order book, under date November 22, 1803, and runs as follows:

'If a pennant is shown over signal No. 36, it signifies that ships are to engage on the enemy's starboard side, whether going large or upon a wind.

'If a pennant is shown in like manner over No. 37, it signifies that ships are to engage on the enemy's larboard side, whether going large or upon a wind.

'These additions to be noted in the Signal Book in pencil only.'[2]

The effect of this memorandum was, of course, that Nelson had it in his power to let every captain know, without a shadow of doubt, under all conditions of wind, on which side he meant to engage the enemy.

To the evidence of the Signal Book may be added a pa.s.sage in Nelson's letter to Admiral Sir A. Ball from the Magdalena Islands, November 7, 1803. He there writes: 'Our last two reconnoiterings: Toulon has eight sail of the line apparently ready for sea ... a seventy-four repairing. Whether they intend waiting for her I can't tell, but I expect them every hour to put to sea.'[3] He was thus expecting to have to deal with eight or nine of the line, which is the precise contingency for which the memorandum provides. There can be little doubt therefore that it was issued while Nelson lay at Magdalena, the first week in November 1803.[4]

The second memorandum, which Nelson communicated to his fleet, soon after he joined it off Cadiz, is regarded by universal agreement as the high-water mark of sailing tactics. Its interpretation however, and the dominant ideas that inspired it, no less than the degree to which it influenced the battle and was in the mind of Nelson and his officers at the time, are questions of considerable uncertainty. Some of the most capable of his captains, as we shall see presently, even disagreed as to whether Trafalgar was fought under the memorandum at all. From the method in which the attack was actually made, so different apparently from the method of the memorandum, some thought Nelson had cast it aside, while others saw that it still applied. A careful consideration of all that was said and done at the time gives a fairly clear explanation of the divergence of opinion, and it will probably be agreed that those officers who had a real feeling for tactics saw that Nelson was making his attack on what were the essential principles of the memorandum, while some on the other hand who were possessed of less tactical insight did not distinguish between what was essential and what was accidental in Nelson's great conception, and, mistaking the shadow for the substance, believed that he had abandoned his carefully prepared project.

For those who did not entirely grasp Nelson's meaning there is much excuse. We who are able to follow step by step the progress of tactical thought from the dawn of the sailing period can appreciate without much difficulty the radical revolution which he was setting on foot. It was a revolution, as we can plainly see, that was tending to bring the long-drawn curve of tactical development round to the point at which the Elizabethans had started. Surprise is sometimes expressed that, having once established the art of warfare under sail in broadside ships, our seamen were so long in finding the tactical system it demanded. Should not the wonder be the converse: that the Elizabethan seamen so quickly came so near the perfected method of the greatest master of the art? The attack at Gravelines in 1588 with four mutually supporting squadrons in echelon bears strong elementary resemblance to that at Trafalgar in 1805. It was in dexterity and precision of detail far more than in principle that the difference lay. The first and the last great victory of the British navy had certainly more in common with each other than either had with Malaga or the First of June. In the zenith of their careers Nelson and Drake came very near to joining hands. Little wonder then if many of Nelson's captains failed to fathom the full depth of his profound idea. Naval officers in those days were left entirely without theoretical instruction on the higher lines of their profession, and Nelson, if we may judge by the style of his memoranda, can hardly have been a very lucid expositor. He thought they all understood what with pardonable pride he called the 'Nelson touch.' The most sagacious and best educated of them probably did, but there were clearly some--and Collingwood, as we shall see, was amongst them--who only grasped some of the complex principles which were combined in his brilliant conception.

An a.n.a.lysis of the memorandum will show how complex it was. In the first and foremost place there is a clear note of denunciation against the long established fallacy of the old order of battle in single line. Secondly, there is in its stead the reestablishment of the primitive system of mutually supporting squadrons in line ahead. Thirdly, there is the principle of throwing one squadron in superior force upon one end of the enemy's formation, and using the other squadrons to cover the attack or support it if need arose. Fourthly, there is the principle of concealment--that is, disposing the squadrons in such a manner that even after the real attack has been delivered the enemy cannot tell what the containing squadrons mean to do, and in consequence are forced to hold their parrying move in suspense. The memorandum also included the idea of concentration, and this is often spoken of as its conspicuous merit. But in the idea of concentration there was nothing new, even if we go back no further than Rodney. It was only the method of concentration, woven out of his four fundamental innovations, that was new. Moreover, as Nelson delivered the attack, he threw away the simple idea of concentration. For a suddenly conceived strategical object he deliberately exposed the heads of his columns to what with almost any other enemy would have been an overwhelming superiority. On the other hand, by making, as he did, a perpendicular instead of a parallel attack, as he had intended, he accentuated--it is true at enormous risk--the cardinal points of his design; that is, he departed still further from the old order of battle, and he still further concealed from the enemy what the real attack was to be, and after it was developed what the containing squadron was going to do.

Concentration in fact was only the crude and ordinary raw material of a design of unmatched subtlety and invention.

The keynote of his conception, then, was his revolutionary subst.i.tution of the primitive Elizabethan and early seventeenth century method for the fetish of the single line. For some time it is true the established battle order had been blown upon from various quarters, but no one as yet had been able to devise any system convincing enough to dethrone it. It will be remembered that at least as early as 1759 an Additional Instruction had provided for a battle order in two lines, but it does not appear ever to have been used.[5] Rodney's manoeuvre again had foreshadowed the use of parts of the line independently for the purpose of concentration and containing. In 1782 Clerk of Eldin had privately printed his _Essay_, which contained suggestions for an attack from to-windward, with the line broken up into echeloned divisions in close resemblance to the disposition laid down in Nelson's memorandum. In 1790 this part of his work was published. Meanwhile an even more elaborate and well-reasoned a.s.sault on the whole principle of the single line had appeared in France. In 1787 the Vicomte de Grenier, a French flag officer, had produced his _L'Art de la Guerre sur Mer_, in which he boldly attacked the law laid down by De Gra.s.se, that so long as men-of-war carried their main armament in broadside batteries there could never be any battle order but the single line ahead. In Grenier's view the English had already begun to discard it, and he insists that, in all the actions he had seen in the last two wars, the English, knowing the weakness of the single line, had almost always concentrated on part of it without regular order. The radical defects of the line he points out are: that it is easily thrown into disorder and easily broken, that it is inflexible, and too extended a formation to be readily controlled by signals. He then proceeds to lay down the principle on which a sound battle order should be framed, and the fundamental objects at which it should aim[6]. His postulates are thus stated:

'1. De rendre nulle une partie des forces de l'ennemi afin de reunir toutes les siennes contre celles qui l'on attaque, ou qui attaquent; et de vaincre ensuite le reste avec plus de facilite et de cert.i.tude.

'2. De ne presenter a l'ennemi aucune partie de son armee qui ne soit flanquee et ou il ne put combattre et vaincre s'il vouloit se porter sur les parties de cette armee reconnues faibles jusqu'a present.'

Never had the fundamental intention of naval tactics been stated with so much penetration, simplicity, and completeness. The order, however, which Grenier worked out--that of three lines of bearing disposed on three sides of a lozenge--was somewhat fantastic and c.u.mbrous, and it seems to have been enough to secure for his clever treatise complete neglect. It had even less effect on French tactics than had Nelson's memorandum on our own. This is all the more curious, for so thoroughly was the change that was coming over English tactics understood in France that Villeneuve knew quite well the kind of attack Nelson would be likely to make. In his General Instructions, issued in antic.i.p.ation of the battle, he says: 'The enemy will not confine themselves to forming a line parallel to ours.... They will try to envelope our rear, to break our line, and to throw upon those of our ships that they cut off, groups of their own to surround and crush them.' Yet he could not get away from the dictum of De Gra.s.se, and was able to think of no better way of meeting such an attack than awaiting it 'in a single line of battle well closed up.'

In England things were little better. In spite of the fact that at Camperdown Duncan had actually found a sudden advantage by attacking in two divisions, no one had been found equal to the task of working out a tactical system to meet the inarticulate demands of the tendency which Grenier had noticed. The possibilities even of Rodney's manoeuvre had not been followed up, and Howe had contented himself with his brilliant invention for increasing the impact and decision of the single line. It was reserved for Nelson's genius to bring a sufficiently powerful solvent to bear on the crystallised opinion of the service, and to find a formula which would shed all that was bad and combine all that was good in previous systems.[7]

The dominating ideas that were in his mind become clearer, if we follow step by step all the evidence that has survived as to the genesis and history of his memorandum. As early as 1798, when he was hoping to intercept Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt, he had adopted a system which was not based on the single line, and so far as is known this was the first tactical order he ever framed as a fleet commander. It is contained in a general order issued from the Vanguard on June 8 of that year, and runs as follows, as though hot from the lesson of St. Vincent: 'As it is very probable the enemy will not be formed in regular order on the approach of the squadron under my command, I may in that case deem it most expedient to attack them by separate divisions. In which case the commanders of divisions are strictly enjoined to keep their ships in the closest possible order, and on no account whatever to risk the separation of one of their ships.'[8] The divisional organisation follows, being his own division of six sail and two others of four each. 'Had he fallen in with the French fleet at sea,' wrote Captain Berry, who was sent home with despatches after the Nile, 'that he might make the best impression upon any part of it that should appear the most vulnerable or the most eligible for attack, he divided his force into three sub-squadrons [one of six sail and two of four each]. Two of these sub-squadrons were to attack the ships of war, while the third was to pursue the transports and to sink and destroy as many as it could.'[9] The exact manner in which he intended to use this organisation he had explained constantly by word of mouth to his captains, but no further record of his design has been found. Still there is an alteration which he made in his signal book at the same time that gives us the needed light. We cannot fail to notice the striking resemblance between his method of attack by separate divisions on a disordered enemy, and that made by the Elizabethan admirals at Gravelines upon the Armada after its formation had been broken up by the fireships. That attack was made intuitively by divisions independently handled as occasion should dictate, and Nelson's new signal leaves little doubt that this was the plan which he too intended. The alteration he ordered was to change the signification of Signal 16, so that it meant that each of his flag officers, from the moment it was made, should have control of his own division and make any signals he thought proper.

But this was not all. By the same general order he made two other alterations in the signal book in view of encountering the French in order of battle. They too are of the highest interest and run as follows: 'To be inserted in pencil in the signal book. At No. 182. Being to windward of the enemy, to denote I mean to attack the enemy's line from the rear towards the van as far as thirteen ships, or whatsoever number of the British ships of the line may be present, that each ship may know his opponent in the enemy's line.'

No. 183. 'I mean to press hard with the whole force on the enemy's rear.'[10]

Thus we see that at the very first opportunity Nelson had of enforcing his own tactical ideas he enunciated three of the principles upon which his great memorandum was based, viz. breaking up his line of battle into three divisional lines, independent control by divisional leaders, and concentration on the enemy's rear. All that is wanting are the elements of surprise and containing.

These, however, we see germinating in the memorandum he issued five years later off Toulon. In that case he expected to meet the French fleet on an opposite course, and being mainly concerned in stopping it and having a slightly superior force he is content to concentrate on the van. But, in view of the strategical necessity of making the attack in this way, he takes extra precautions which are not found in the general order of 1798. He provides for preventing the enemy's knowing on which side his attack is to fall; instead of engaging an equal number of their ships he provides for breaking their line, and engaging the bulk of their fleet with a superior number of his own; and finally he looks to being ready to contain the enemy's rear before it can do him any damage.

Thus, taking together the general order of 1798 and the Toulon memorandum of 1803, we can see all the tactical ideas that were involved at Trafalgar already in his mind, and we are in a position to appreciate the process of thought by which he gradually evolved the sublimely simple attack that welded them together, and brought them all into play without complication or risk of mistake. This process, which crowns Nelson's reputation as the greatest naval tactician of all time, we must now follow in detail.

Shortly before he left England for the last time, he communicated to Keats, of the Superb, a full explanation of his views as they then existed in his mind, and Keats has preserved it in the following paper which Nicolas printed.

'Memorandum of a conversation between Lord Nelson and Admiral Sir Richard Keats, the last time he was in England before the battle of Trafalgar.[11]

'One morning, walking with Lord Nelson in the grounds of Merton, talking on naval matters, he said to me, "No day can be long enough to arrange a couple of fleets and fight a decisive battle according to the old system. When _we_ meet them" (I was to have been with him), "for meet them we shall, I'll tell you how I shall fight them. I shall form the fleet into three divisions in three lines; one division shall be composed of twelve or fourteen of the fastest two-decked ships, which I shall keep always to windward or in a situation of advantage, and I shall put them under an officer who, I am sure, will employ them in the manner I wish, if possible. I consider it will always be in my power to throw them into battle in any part I choose; but if circ.u.mstances prevent their being carried against the enemy where I desire, I shall feel certain he will employ them effectually and perhaps in a more advantageous manner than if he could have followed my orders" (he never mentioned or gave any hint by which I could understand who it was he intended for this distinguished service).[12] He continued, "With the remaining part of the fleet, formed in two lines, I shall go at them at once if I can, about one third of their line from their leading ship." He then said, "What do you think of it?" Such a question I felt required consideration. I paused. Seeing it he said, "But I will tell you what _I_ think of it. I think it will surprise and confound the enemy. They won't know what I am about. It will bring forward a pell-mell battle, and that is what I want."[13]

Here we have something roughly on all-fours with the methods of the First Dutch War. There are the three squadrons, the headlong 'charge'

and the _melee_. The reserve squadron to windward goes even further back, to the treatise of De Chaves and the Instructions of Lord Lisle in 1545. It was no wonder it took away Keats's breath. The return to primitive methods was probably unconscious, but what was obviously uppermost in Nelson's mind was the breaking up of the established order in single line, leading by surprise and concealment to a decisive _melee_. He seems to insist not so much upon defeating the enemy by concentration as by throwing him into confusion, upsetting his mental equilibrium in accordance with the primitive idea. The notion of concentration is at any rate secondary, while the subtle scheme for 'containing' as perfected in the memorandum is not yet developed. As he explained his plan to Keats, he meant to attack at once with both his main divisions, using the reserve squadron as a general support. There is no clear statement that he meant it as a 'containing' force, though possibly it was in his mind.[14]

There is one more piece of evidence relating to this time when he was still in England. According to this story Lord Hill, about 1840, when still Commander-in-Chief, was paying a visit to Lord Sidmouth. His host, who, better known as Addington, had been prime minister till 1804, and was in Pitt's new cabinet till July 1805, showed him a table bearing a Nelson inscription. He told him that shortly before leaving England to join the fleet Nelson had drawn upon it after dinner a plan of his intended attack, and had explained it as follows: 'I shall attack in two lines, led by myself and Collingwood, and I am confident I shall capture their van and centre or their centre and rear.'

'Those,' concluded Sidmouth, 'were his very words,' and remarked how wonderfully they had been fulfilled.[15] Hill and Sidmouth at the time were both old men and the authority is not high, but so far as it goes it would tend to show that an attack in two lines instead of one was still Nelson's dominant idea. It cannot however safely be taken as evidence that he ever intended a concentration on the van, though in view of the memorandum of 1803 this is quite possible.

Finally, there is the statement of Clarke and McArthur that Nelson before leaving England deposited a copy of his plan with Lord Barham, the new first lord of the admiralty. This however is very doubtful. The Barham papers have recently been placed at the disposal of the Society, in the hands of Professor Laughton, and the only copy of the memorandum he has been able to find is an incomplete one containing several errors of transcription, and dated the Victory, October 11, 1805. In the absence of further evidence therefore no weight can be attached to the oft-repeated a.s.sertion that Nelson had actually drawn up his memorandum before he left England.

Coming now to the time when he had joined the fleet off Cadiz, the first light we have is the well-known letter of October 1 to Lady Hamilton. In this letter, after telling her that he had joined on September 28, but had not been able to communicate with the fleet till the 29th, he says, 'When I came to explain to them the _Nelson touch_ it was like an electric shock. Some shed tears and all approved. It was new--it was singular--it was simple.' What he meant exactly by the 'Nelson touch' has never been clearly explained, but he could not possibly have meant either concentration or the attack on the enemy's rear, for neither of these ideas was either new or singular.

On October 3 he writes to her again: 'The reception I met with on joining the fleet caused the sweetest sensation of my life.... As soon as these emotions were past I laid before them the plan I had previously arranged for attacking the enemy, and it was not only my pleasure to find it generally approved, but clearly perceived and understood.'[16]

The next point to notice is the 'Order of Battle and Sailing' given by Nicolas. It is without date, but almost certainly must have been drawn up before Nelson joined. It does not contain the Belleisle, which Nelson knew on October 4 was to join him.[17] It also does include the name of Sir Robert Calder and his flagship, and on September 30 Nelson had decided to send both him and his ship home.[18]

The order is for a fleet of forty sail, but the names of only thirty-three are given, which were all Nelson really expected to get in time. The remarkable feature of this order is that it contains no trace of the triple organisation of the memorandum. The 'advanced squadron' is absent, and the order is based on two equal divisions only.

Then on October 9, after Calder had gone, there is this entry in Nelson's private diary: 'Sent Admiral Collingwood the Nelson touch.'

It was enclosed in a letter in which Nelson says: 'I send you my Plan of Attack, as far as a man dare venture to guess at the very uncertain position the enemy may be found in. But, my dear friend, it is to place you perfectly at your ease respecting my intentions and to give full scope to your judgment for carrying them into effect.' The same day Collingwood replies, 'I have a just sense of your lordship's kindness to me, and the full confidence you have reposed in me inspires me with the most lively grat.i.tude. I hope it will not be long before there is an opportunity of showing your lordship that it has not been misplaced.' On these two letters there can be little doubt that the 'Plan of Attack' which Nelson enclosed was that of the memorandum. The draft from which Nicolas printed appears to have been dated October 9, and originally had in one pa.s.sage 'you' and 'your'

for the 'second in command,' showing that Nelson in his mind was addressing his remarks to Collingwood, though subsequently he altered the sentence into the third person. Only one other copy was known to Nicolas, and that was issued in the altered form to Captain Hope, of the Defence, a ship which in the order of battle was in Collingwood s squadron, but Codrington tells us it was certainly issued to all the captains.[19]

So far, then, we have the case thus--that whatever Nelson may have really told Lord Sidmouth, and whatever may have been in his mind when he drew up the dual order of battle and sailing, he had by October 9 reverted to the triple idea which he had explained to Keats. Meanwhile, however, his conception had ripened. There are marked changes in organisation, method and intention. In organisation the reserve squadron is reduced from the original twelve or fourteen to eight, or one fifth of his hypothetical fleet instead of about one third--reduced, that is, to a strength at which it was much less capable of important independent action. In method we have, instead of an attack with the two main divisions, an attack with one only, with the other covering it. In intention we have as the primary function of the reserve squadron, its attachment to one or other of the other two main divisions as circ.u.mstances may dictate.

The natural inference from these important changes is that Nelson's conception was now an attack in two divisions of different strength, the stronger of which, as the memorandum subsequently explains, was to be used as a containing force to cover the attack of the other, and except that the balance of the two divisions was reversed, this is practically just what Clerk of Eldin had recommended and what actually happened in the battle. It is a clear advance upon the original idea as explained to Keats, in which the third squadron was to be used on the primitive and indefinite plan of De Chaves and Lord Lisle as a general reserve. It also explains Nelson's covering letter to Collingwood, in which he seems to convey to his colleague that the pith of his plan was an attack in two divisions, and, within the general lines of the design, complete freedom of action for the second in command. How largely this idea of independent control entered into the 'Nelson touch' we may judge from the fact that it is emphasised in no less than three distinct paragraphs of the memorandum.

Such, then, is the fundamental principle of the memorandum as enunciated in its opening paragraphs. He then proceeds to elaborate it in two detailed plans of attack--one from to-leeward and the other from to-windward. It was the latter he meant to make if possible. He calls it 'the intended attack,' and it accords with the opening enunciation. The organisation is triple, but no special function is a.s.signed to the reserve squadron. The actual attack on the enemy's rear is to be made by Collingwood, while Nelson with his own division and the reserve is to cover him. In the event of an attack having to be made from to-leeward, the idea is different. Here the containing movement practically disappears. The fleet is still to attack the rear and part of the centre of the enemy, but now in three independent divisions simultaneously, in such a way as to cut his line at three points, and to concentrate a superior force on each section of the severed line. To none of the divisions is a.s.signed the duty of containing the rest of the enemy's fleet from the outset. It is to be dealt with at a second stage of the action by all ships that are still capable of renewing the engagement after the first stage. 'The whole impression,' as Nelson put it, in case he was forced to attack from to-leeward, was to overpower the enemy's line from a little ahead of the centre to the rearmost ship. He does not say, however, that this was to be 'the whole impression' of the intended attack from to-windward. 'The whole impression' there appears to be for Collingwood to overpower the rear while Nelson with the other two divisions made play with the enemy's van and centre; but the particular manner in which he would carry out this part of the design is left undetermined.

The important point, then, in considering the relation between the actual battle and the memorandum, is to remember that it provided for two different methods of attacking the rear according to whether the enemy were encountered to windward or to leeward. The somewhat illogical arrangement of the memorandum tends to conceal this highly important distinction. For Nelson interpolates between his explanation of the windward attack and his opening enunciation of principle his explanation of the leeward attack, to which the enunciation did not apply. That some confusion was caused in the minds of some even of his best officers is certain, but let them speak for themselves.

After the battle Captain Harvey, of the Temeraire, whom Nelson had intended to lead his line, wrote to his wife, 'It was noon before the action commenced, which was done according to the instructions given us by Lord Nelson.... Lord Nelson had given me leave to lead and break through the line about the fourteenth ship,' _i.e._ two or three ships ahead of the centre, as explained in the memorandum for the leeward attack but not for the windward.

On the other hand we have Captain Moorsom, of the Revenge, who was in Collingwood's division, saying exactly the opposite. Writing to his father on December 4, he says, 'I have seen several plans of the action, but none to answer my ideas of it. A regular plan was laid down by Lord Nelson some time before the action but not acted on. His great anxiety seemed to be to get to leeward of them lest they should make off to Cadiz before he could get near them.' And on November 1, to the same correspondent he had written, 'I am not certain that our mode of attack was the best: however, it succeeded.' Here then we have two of Nelson's most able captains entirely disagreeing as to whether or not the attack was carried out in accordance with any plan which Nelson laid down.

Captain Moorsom's view may be further followed in a tactical study written by his son, Vice-Admiral Constantine Moorsom.[20] His remarks on Trafalgar were presumably largely inspired by his father, who lived till 1835. In his view there was 'an entire alteration both of the scientific principle and of the tactical movements,' both of which he thinks were due to what he calls the _morale_ of the enemy's att.i.tude--that is, that Nelson was afraid they were going to slip through his fingers into Cadiz. The change of plan--meaning presumably the change from the triple to the dual organisation--he thinks was not due to the reduced numbers which Nelson actually had under his flag, for the ratio between the two fleets remained much about the same as that of his hypothesis.

The interesting testimony of Lieutenant G.L. Browne, who, as Admiral Jackson informs us, was a.s.sistant flag-lieutenant in the Victory and had every means of knowing, endorses the view of the Moorsoms.[21]

After explaining to his parents the delay caused by the established method of forming the fleets in two parallel lines so that each had an opposite number, as set forth in the opening words of the memorandum, he says, 'but by his lordship's mode of attack you will clearly perceive not an instant of time could be lost. The frequent communications he had with his admirals and captains put them in possession of all his plans, so that his mode of attack was well known to every officer of the fleet. Some will not fail to attribute rashness to the conduct of Lord Nelson. But he well considered the importance of a decisive naval victory at this time, and has frequently said since we left England that, should he be so fortunate as to fall in with the enemy, a total defeat should be the result on the one side or the other.'

Next we have what is probably the most acute and illuminating criticism of the battle that exists, from the pen of 'an officer who was present.' Sir Charles Ekin quotes it anonymously; but from internal evidence there is little difficulty in a.s.signing it to an officer of the Conqueror, though clearly not her captain, Israel Pellew, in whose justification the concluding part was written.

Whoever he was the writer thoroughly appreciated and understood the tactical basis of Nelson's plan, as laid down in the memorandum, and he frankly condemns his chief for having exposed his fleet unnecessarily by permitting himself to be hurried out of delivering his attack in line abreast as he intended. It might well have been done, so far as he could see, without any more loss of time than actually occurred in getting the bulk of the fleet into action. Loss of time was the only excuse for attacking in line ahead, and the only reason he could suppose for the change of plan. If they had all gone down together in line abreast, he is sure the victory would have been more quickly decided and the brunt of the fight more equally borne. Nothing, he thinks, could have been better than the plan of the memorandum if it had only been properly executed. An attack in two great divisions with a squadron of observation--so he summarises the 'Nelson touch'--seemed to him to combine every precaution under all circ.u.mstances. It allows of concentration and containing. Each ship can use her full speed without fear of being isolated. The fastest ships will break through the line first, and they are just those which from their speed in pa.s.sing are liable to the least damage, while having pa.s.sed through, they cause a diversion for the attack of their slower comrades. Finally, if the enemy tries to make off and avoid action, the fleet is well collected for a general chase. But as Nelson actually made the attack in his hurry to close, he threw away most of these advantages, and against an enemy of equal spirit each ship must have been crushed as she came into action. Instead of doubling ourselves, he says, we were doubled and even trebled on. Nelson in fact presented the enemy's fleet with precisely the position which the memorandum aimed at securing for ourselves--that is to say, he suffered a portion of his fleet, comprising the Victory, Temeraire, Royal Sovereign, Belleisle, Mars, Colossus, and Bellerophon, to be cut off and doubled on.[22]

The last important witness is Captain Codrington, of the Orion. No one seems to have kept his head so well in the action, and this fact, coupled with the high reputation he subsequently acquired, gives peculiar weight to his testimony. It is on the question of the advanced or reserve squadron that he is specially interesting. On October 19 at 8 P.M., just after they had been surprised and rejoiced by Nelson's signal for a general chase, and were steering for the enemy, as he says, 'under every st.i.tch of sail we can set,' he sat down to write to his wife. In the course of the letter he tells her, 'Defence and Agamemnon are upon the look out nearest to Cadiz; ... Colossus and Mars are stationed next. The above four and as many more of us are now to form an advanced squadron; and I trust by the morning we shall all be united and in sight of the enemy.'

Clearly then Nelson must have issued some modification of the dual 'order of battle and sailing.' Many years later in a note upon the battle which Codrington dictated to his daughter, Lady Bourchier, he says that on the 20th, in spite of Collingwood's advice to attack at once, Nelson 'continued waiting upon them in two columns according to the order of sailing and the memorable written instruction which was given out to all the captains.'[23] Later still, when a veteran of seventy-six years, he gave to Sir Harris Nicolas another note which shows how in his own mind he reconciled the apparent discrepancy between the dual and the triple organisation. It runs as follows: 'In Lord Nelson's memorandum of October 9, 1805, he refers to "an advanced squadron of eight of the fastest sailing two-decked ships" to be added to either of the two lines of the order of sailing as may be required; and says that this advanced squadron would probably have to cut through "two, three or four ships of the enemy's centre so as to ensure getting at their commander-in-chief, on whom every effort must be made to capture";[24] and he afterwards twice speaks of the enemy's van coming to succour their rear. Now I am under the impression that I was expressly instructed by Lord Nelson (referring to the probability of the enemy's van coming down upon us), being in the Orion, one of the eight ships named, that he himself would probably make a feint of attacking their van in order to prevent or r.e.t.a.r.d it.' Here then would seem to be still further confusion, due to a failure to distinguish between the leeward and windward form of attack. According to this statement Codrington believed the advanced squadron was in either case to attack the centre, while Nelson with his division contained the van. But curiously enough in a similar note, printed by Lady Bourchier on Nicolas's authority, there is a difference in the wording which, though difficult to account for, seems to give the truer version of what Codrington really said. It is there stated that Codrington told Nicolas he was strongly impressed with the belief 'that Lord Nelson directed eight of the smaller and handier ships, of which the Orion was one, to be ready to haul out of the line in case the enemy's van should appear to go down to the a.s.sistance of the ships engaged to meet and resist them: that to prevent this manoeuvre on the part of the enemy Lord Nelson intimated his intention of making a feint of hauling out towards their van,'

&c. There is little doubt that we have here the true distribution of duties which Nelson intended for the windward attack--that is, the advanced squadron was to be the real containing force, but he intended to a.s.sist it by himself making a feint on the enemy's van before delivering his true attack on the centre.[25]

From Codrington's evidence it is at any rate clear that some time before the 19th Nelson had told off an 'advanced squadron' as provided for in his memorandum, and that the ships that were forming the connection between the fleet and the frigates before Cadiz formed part of it. Now Nelson had begun to tell off these ships as early as the 4th. On that day he wrote to Captain Duff, of the Mars, 'I have to desire you will keep with the Mars, Defence and Colossus from three to four leagues between the fleet and Cadiz in order that I may get information from the frigates stationed off that port as expeditiously as possible.' On the 11th, writing to Sir Alexander Ball at Malta, he speaks of having 'an advanced squadron of fast sailing ships between me and the frigates.' The Agamemnon (64) was added on the 14th, the day after she joined. On that day Nelson entered in his private diary, 'Placed Defence and Agamemnon from seven to ten leagues west of Cadiz, and Mars and Colossus four leagues east of the fleet,' &c,[26] On the 15th he wrote to Captain Hope, of the Defence: 'You will with the Agamemnon take station west from Cadiz from seven to ten leagues, by which means if the enemy should move I hope to have constant information, as two or three ships will be kept as at present between the fleet and your two ships.'[27]