Civil War and Reconstruction in Alabama - Part 21
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Part 21

Colonel J. C. Bradley presented a memorial from the minority of the committee. It was the same as the other memorial, except that the part relating to the appointment of a military governor was omitted. Such an official was not desired nor needed, he stated. After some discussion both memorials were adopted and each person present signed the one he preferred. The chairman appointed a committee to bear the memorials to the President. The general sentiment of the meeting and of the people seemed to be that, since they had failed to maintain their independence, there was nothing left to do but to accept as a working basis the theory that a state could not secede, and to get straight into the Union by having the President restore the suspended animation of the Const.i.tution. The best and shortest way, they thought, was for Governor Watts to convene the legislature, which should begin the work, and a convention of the people would complete it. Governor Watts and the Supreme Court (Stone and Phelan) approved the action of the meeting, though they took no part in it.[884]

Another meeting on the same day (May 11), at Guntersville, in Marshall County, in the heart of the devastated section of the state, proposed to submit cheerfully to the decision of war and return to the Union. Two soldiers, Major A. C. Baird and Colonel J. L. Sheffield,[885] were the leaders in the meeting.[886] Two ma.s.s-meetings were held in Covington County (one at Andalusia on May 17) and pa.s.sed resolutions favoring a restoration of the Union. The Union General Asboth said that these people had returned to their allegiance early in April and had organized and armed to resist the "rebels." The resolutions were signed by 280 and 376 persons respectively. Asboth reported great excitement on account of the action taken by the meeting.[887] On May 23 there was a meeting of citizens in Franklin County. James W. Ligon was president, H. C. Tompkins, vice-president, and R. B. Lindsey (governor in 1870-1872) addressed the meeting. This meeting seems to have been behind the times, for it accepted the overtures of Thomas made April 13, and promised to a.s.sist cheerfully in restoring law and order. They were anxious to resume former friendly relations to the United States and wanted a state convention called to settle matters.[888]

About this time the President, General Grant, and Stanton, by repeated orders, managed to reach the generals who were encouraging the movement toward Reconstruction, and put an end to their plans by ordering them not to recognize the state government in Alabama and to prevent the a.s.sembly of the legislature.[889] Thereupon, on May 23, a memorial was signed by 106 prominent citizens of Mobile, asking the President to take steps to enable Alabama to be restored to the Union. Robert H. Smith[890] and Percy Walker[891] were sent as a committee to General Granger, who commanded in the city, to ask him to transmit the memorial to the President. General Granger did so with the indors.e.m.e.nt that no impediment existed to immediate restoration, that the signers were influential men and represented the sentiment of the people of the state.[892] At Athens, in Limestone County, the citizens met and adopted resolutions declaring that all must be restored to the Union; that the state officials should be recognized, but that a new election should be held under the laws of Alabama as they were before secession; that a convention was not necessary and in the present unsettled condition of the county it would be dangerous to hold one; that the const.i.tution of 1819, changed by amendment, should be used. The murder of Lincoln was deplored.[893] Similar meetings were held all over the state, especially in north Alabama.[894]

The "loyal" element held a meeting in north Alabama about the first of June.[895] Resolutions were introduced by K. B. Seawell to the effect that the government of Alabama had been illegally set aside in 1861 by a combination of persons regardless of the best interests of the state, that secession was not the act of the people, and that the Confederacy was a usurpation. It was decided that Alabama must go back to the Union, and the authority of the United States was invoked to enable "loyal" citizens to form a state government.[896] The sentiments of the more violent "unionists" or tories may be understood from a letter of D. H.

Bingham,[897] then at West Point, New York. He said that reconstruction must not be committed to the hands of the "rebels"; that Parsons, who was spoken of for provisional governor, was not one of the "union" men of Alabama and would use his influence to secure control to the old slave dynasty; that his appointment would be unfair to the "union" men; that the ma.s.ses were coerced and deluded into fighting the battles of slavery; "I, George W. Lane,[898] and J. H. Larcombe," he said, "never gave way to secession." The non-slaveholding whites in slaveholding districts were trained to obey, he wrote, and the official cla.s.s used its influence to keep the non-slaveholders in ignorance. Hence the small number of slaveholders (of whom most were owners of few slaves and hence were union men) controlled the "union" population of over 5,000,000. He said that the Alabama delegates, then in Washington,[899] were not inactive in producing these results, though they claimed to be "unionists." They were once "union" men, but went over. Now they alleged that they were carried into rebellion by a great wave of public feeling. Such men should not be trusted until they had pa.s.sed through a probationary state.[900]

The southerners who wanted immediate restoration of const.i.tutional rights and privileges on the basis of the Crittenden Resolution of 1861,[901]

soon found that this plan would not work; so, to make the best of a bad situation, all accepted the Johnson plan and declared that the state, since it had not had the right to secede, must still be in the Union. The press and the prominent men, even those who would be disfranchised by the President's plan, gave it a hearty support in order to give peace to the land and restore civil government.[902] At this time the Johnson plan promised to be one of merciless proscription of the prominent men. As Johnson himself expressed it: "The American people must be made to understand the nature of the crime, the length, the breadth, the depth, and height of treason. For the thousands who were driven into the infernal rebellion there should be amnesty, conciliation, clemency, and mercy. For the leaders, justice--the penalty and the forfeit should be paid. The people must understand that treason is the blackest of crimes and must be punished."[903] The leaders were not afraid of such threats and meant not to stand in the way. The people intended to make the best they could out of a bad state of affairs. They believed then and always that their cause was right, secession justifiable and necessary; that the provocation was great, and that they were the aggrieved party; that the abolitionists and fanatics forced secession and civil war. But since they were beaten in war, after they had done all that men could do, they meant to accept the result and abide by the decision of the sword. There was a general purpose to stand by the government--certainly no dream of opposition to it. The people meant (which was neither treasonable nor unreasonable) to ally themselves to the more conservative political party in the North in order to secure as many advantages as possible to the South. Their aim was to preserve as much of their old const.i.tution as they could, all the while recognizing that state sovereignty and slavery ended with the war. Their course in ceasing at once all useless opposition and proceeding to secure reinstatement on the old terms was, _The Nation_ declared, "a display of consummate political ability." Southerners like to think that had Lincoln lived his plan would have succeeded, and that the most shameful chapter of American history would not have to be written.[904] Johnson helped to ruin his own cause and his supporters along with it. The people never seem to have taken seriously the proposed merciless plans of Johnson, and the opposition of moderate advisers and the pleasure of pardoning southern "aristocrats" (and later Radical criticism) caused a distinct modification of his policy in the direction of mildness until the proscriptive part was almost lost sight of.[905]

The southern leaders[906] saw clearly that there was no hope for their party unless the President could win the fight against the Radicals in Congress, and they attempted to disarm northern hostility outside Congress until the Radical party, aided by the rash conduct of the President, educated the people of the North to the proper point for approving drastic measures.[907]

The President begins Restoration

On May 29 the President began his attempt at restoration by proclaiming amnesty to all, except certain specified cla.s.ses of persons. They were pardoned and therefore restored to all rights of property, except in slaves, on condition that the following oath be taken:--

"I ________________ do solemnly swear (or affirm) in the presence of Almighty G.o.d, that I will henceforth faithfully support, protect, and defend the Const.i.tution of the United States, and the Union of the states thereunder; and that I will, in like manner, abide by and faithfully support all laws and proclamations which have been made during the existing rebellion, with reference to the emanc.i.p.ation of slaves: So help me G.o.d."[908]

Fourteen cla.s.ses of people were excluded from the benefits of this proclamation; of these twelve were affected in Alabama:--

(1) The civil or diplomatic officers, or domestic or foreign agents of the Confederacy; (2) those who left judicial positions under the United States to aid the Confederacy; (3) all above the rank of colonel in the army and lieutenant in the navy; (4) those who left seats in the United States Congress and aided the Confederacy; (5) those who resigned commissions in the United States army and navy to escape service against the Confederacy; (6) persons who went abroad to aid the Confederacy in a private capacity; (7) graduates of the naval and military academies who were in the Confederate service; (8) the war governors of Confederate states; (9) those who left the United States to aid the Confederacy; (10) Confederate sailors (considered as pirates); (11) all in confinement as prisoners of war or for other offences; (12) those who supported the Confederacy and whose taxable property was over $20,000.

The cla.s.ses excluded embraced practically all Confederate and state officials, for the latter had acted as Confederate agents, all the old political leaders of the state, many of the ablest citizens who had not been in politics but had attained high position under the Confederate government or in the army, the whole of the navy,--officers and men,--several thousand prisoners of war, a number of political prisoners, and every person in the state whose property in 1861 was a.s.sessed at $20,000 or more. According to the proclamation the a.s.sessment was to be in 1865, but it was made on the basis of 1861, at which time slaves were included and a slaveholder of very moderate estate would be a.s.sessed at $20,000. In 1865 there were very few people worth $20,000.

It was provided that persons belonging to these excepted cla.s.ses might make special application to the President for pardon, and the proclamation promised that pardon should be freely granted.[909] The oath could be taken before any United States officer, civil, military, or naval, or any state or territorial civil or military officer, qualified to administer oaths.[910] In Alabama 120 army officers were sent into all the counties to administer the amnesty oath. These officers were strict in barring out "all improper persons" and subscription went on slowly until the military commander issued orders that all who were eligible must take the oath.

Less than 50,000 persons took the oath; 90,000 had voted in 1860.

There was a fight for appointment to the provisional governorship. William H. Smith of Randolph and D. C. Humphreys of Madison, both of whom had opposed secession, then entered the Confederate service, and later deserted; D. H. Bingham of Limestone, who had been a tory during the war; and L. E. Parsons of Talladega, who had aided the Confederacy materially and d.a.m.ned it spiritually--all wanted to oversee the restoration of the state.[911]

June 21, 1865, the President, acting as commander-in-chief of the army and under the clause in the Const.i.tution requiring the United States to guarantee to each state a republican form of government and protect each state against invasion and domestic violence,[912] proceeded to breathe the breath of life into the prostrate state by appointing Lewis E. Parsons provisional governor.[913]

It was made the duty of Parsons to call a convention of delegates chosen by the "loyal"[914] people of the state. This convention was to amend or alter the state const.i.tution to suit the changed state of affairs, to exercise all the powers necessary to enable the people to restore the state to its const.i.tutional relations with the central authority, and to set up a republican form of government. All voters and delegates must have taken the oath of amnesty, and must have the qualifications for voters prescribed by the Alabama const.i.tution and laws prior to the secession of the state. This excluded the fourteen proscribed cla.s.ses and said nothing of the negroes. The convention, when a.s.sembled, was to prescribe qualifications for voters and for office holders. The military and naval officers of the United States were directed to a.s.sist the provisional officials and to refrain from hindering and discouraging them in any way.

The Secretary of State was directed to put in force in the state of Alabama all laws of the United States, the administration of which belonged to the State Department. The Secretary of the Treasury was directed to nominate a.s.sessors, collectors, and other treasury officials, and to put into execution in Alabama the revenue laws of the United States. The Postmaster-General was ordered to establish post-offices and post routes and to enforce the postal laws. The Attorney-General and the Federal judges were directed to open the United States courts in the state. The Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Interior were ordered to put in execution the regulations of their respective departments, so far as related to Alabama.[915]

In making appointments to office in the southern states, the departments were to give preference to "loyal"[916] persons of the district or state where they were to serve. If no "loyal" persons could be found in the state or district, such persons might be imported from other states or districts.

In this measure the difference appears between the Lincoln and the Johnson plan of restoration. Lincoln believed that the executive should only make things easy for the people to erect a government for themselves. He kept as much as possible in the background and let it appear that the movement originated with the people. Several times he merely suggested that negroes with certain qualifications should be granted the suffrage. Johnson, on the other hand, made it clear that he was the source of all authority in the movement. He himself made stringent regulations of the suffrage, thus creating a body of citizens, and set up a government of his own for the purpose of creating a new state government. The people were to do as he bade them. He did not suggest negro suffrage in any form and was, like most southern Unionists, opposed to it. The Johnson provisional government was a military government with the President as the source of authority.

Parsons was a military governor appointed by the commander-in-chief and paid by the War Department.[917] Lincoln's provisional government would have been popular government based on election by the people.

The appointment of Parsons gave general satisfaction to all parties except the more violent tory element in the northern part of the state, who wanted men like D. H. Bingham or William H. Smith. A correspondent of _The Nation_ who travelled among them in August, 1865, when this element of the people seemed likely to form a strong portion of the new ruling cla.s.s of the South, before the President modified his plans, said of them: they are ignorant and vindictive, live in poor huts, drink much, and all use tobacco and snuff; they want to organize and receive recognition by the United States government in order to get revenge--really want to be bushwhackers supported by the Federal government; they "wish to have the power to hang, shoot, and destroy in retaliation for the wrongs they have endured"; they hate the "big n.i.g.g.e.r holders," whom they accuse of bringing on the war and who, they are afraid, would get into power again; they are the "refugee," poor white element of low character, shiftless, with no ambition.[918] To proscribe the ma.s.s of leading citizens, the experienced men in public affairs, as Johnson's plan at first promised to do, would have had serious results, but his later, more liberal, policy restored the rights of all except the more prominent. But the old leaders were never again leaders, thinking it more politic to put forward less well-known men. At first Johnson had the mountaineer's dislike of the "slave aristocracy," as he called it, and his plan was devised to humiliate and ruin this cla.s.s.[919]

A month after his appointment Governor Parsons issued (July 20) a proclamation to the people, drawn largely from the census of 1860, showing how prosperous the state was at that time and inviting attention to the present condition of affairs. The question of slavery and secession, he said, had been decided against the South, but every political and property right, except slavery, still remained. He thus repudiated any former belief he may have had in the right of secession. A funny comparison was made in exuberant language and with many mixed metaphors, likening the Union to a steamship and the state of Alabama to a man swimming around in the water, trying to get on board. The following officers of the Confederate state government who were in office on the 22d of May,[920]

1865, were reappointed to serve during the continuance of the provisional government: justices of the peace, constables, members of common councils, judges of courts, except probate, county treasurers, tax collectors and a.s.sessors, coroners, and munic.i.p.al officers. Judges of probate and sheriffs who were in office on May 22 were directed to take the amnesty oath and serve until others were appointed. All officers reappointed were to take the amnesty oath and give new bond. The right was reserved to remove any officer for disloyalty or for misconduct in office. Thus there was a continuity between the Confederate administration and the "restoration" administration.

The civil and criminal laws of the state as they stood on January 11, 1861, except as to slavery, were declared in full force, and an election of delegates to a const.i.tutional convention was ordered for August 31, and the convention was to meet on September 10.[921] No one could vote in the election or be a candidate for election to the convention who was not a legal voter according to the law on January 11, 1861, and all voters and candidates must first take the amnesty oath or must have been pardoned by the President. Instructions were given as to how a person who was excluded from the benefits of the amnesty proclamation might proceed in order to secure a pardon. A list of questions was appended by which "an improper person" might test his case and see how bad it was. They ran like this:--

(1) Are you under arrest? Why? (2) Did you order, advise, or aid in the taking of Fort Morgan and Mount Vernon? (3) Have you served on any "vigilance" committee for the purpose of trying cases of disloyalty to the Confederate States? (4) Did you order any persons to be shot or hung for disloyalty to the Confederate States? (5) Did you shoot or hang such a person? (6) Did you hunt such a person with dogs? (7) Were you in favor of the so-called ordinance of secession? (8) You are not bound to answer any except the first of these questions. (9) Will you be peaceable and loyal in the future? (10) Have proceedings been inst.i.tuted against you under the Confiscation Act? (11) Have you in your possession any property of the United States?[922]

Parsons appointed to a.s.sist him a full staff of secretaries as follows: Wm. Garrett, Secretary of State; M. A. Chisholm, Comptroller of Accounts; L. P. Saxton, Treasurer; ---- Collins, Adjutant-General; M. H. Cruikshank, Commissioner for the Dest.i.tute; John B. Taylor, Superintendent of Education.

A report on the condition of the treasury on September 1, 1865, shows that of $791,294 in the treasury on May 24, 1865, only $337 was in silver and $532 in gold. The rest was in state and Confederate money, now worthless.

The financial status of the provisional treasury was uncertain. Receipts from July 20 to September 21, 1865, were $1766 and disburs.e.m.e.nts had been $1572. The bonded debt of the state, held in London, was $1,336,000, in New York, $2,109,000, a total of $3,445,000.[923]

Parsons could hardly do otherwise than reappoint the old state officials as temporary officers, but it created some dissatisfaction in the state and much in the North; and in truth the Confederate state officers in 1865 were not, in general, very efficient, being old men, cripples, incapables, "bomb-proofs," "feather beds," and deadheads. They were not much liked by any party unless perhaps by the few who put them in office. The _Huntsville Advocate_ may have been voicing the objections of either "tory" or "rebel" when it condemned Governor Parsons's reappointment of the _de facto_ state officers--"they are not the proper persons to rekindle the fires of patriotism in the hearts of the people."[924]

The provisional governor was obliged to rely upon inferior material in restoring the state government. Though the President's plan soon was shorn of its worst proscriptive features, the work of restoration had begun by excluding the natural leaders from a share in the upbuilding of the state, and they were thus rendered somewhat indifferent to the process. The cla.s.s to whom the task fell was good, but it was not the best. The best men went into the southern army or otherwise committed themselves strongly to the cause of the Confederacy. The strong men of the state who sulked in their tents during the war were few in numbers, and they were usually disgruntled and cranky, and now, without influence, were much disliked by the people. The so-called "union" men who stayed at home in "bomb-proof"

offices, or as teachers, overseers, ministers, etc., were not the kind of men to reconstruct the shattered government. The few who had openly espoused the Union cause had not the character, experience, and training necessary to fit them to rule a state. Though the administration began on a basis of very inferior material, yet the modification of the plan of the President gradually admitted the second-rate leaders to political privileges, and, had the experiment continued, they would have gradually resumed control of the politics of the state. It was in some degree the hope of this that made them willing to submit to proscription and exclusion for a while and support the reconstruction measures of the President. They hoped for better times.[925]

Parsons revised the official lists thoroughly, and many of the old officers were discharged and new ones appointed. However, they had little to do; the army and the Freedmen's Bureau usurped their functions. A proclamation of August 19, 1865, directed the probate judge, sheriff, and clerk in each county to destroy, after August 31, old jury lists and make new ones from the list of names of "loyal" citizens who had taken the amnesty oath and registered. Circuit court judges were directed to hold special sessions of court for the trial of state cases and to have their grand juries inquire particularly into the cases of cotton and horse stealing, now common crimes.[926]

"Proscribing Proscription"

One of the princ.i.p.al occupations of the provisional government was securing pardons for those who were excluded from the general amnesty of May 29, 1865. Governor Parsons was for reconciliation, and those who hoped to profit by the disfranchis.e.m.e.nt of the leaders complained of the lenient treatment of the latter. Parsons's policy of "proscribing proscription"

was greatly disliked by those who would profit by disfranchis.e.m.e.nt. If it were continued, they saw there would be no spoils for them. One of the aggrieved parties related a case which might well have been his own: A prominent "union" man went to the President to get his pardon, stating that he had been as much a Union man as possible for the last four years.

"I am delighted to hear that," the President said. Directly the "union"

man said that he had been forced to become somewhat implicated in the rebellion, that he had been obliged to raise money by selling cotton to the Confederates, and, as he was worth over $20,000, it was necessary to get a pardon. "Well, sir," the President answered, "it seems that you were a Union man who was willing to let the Union slide. Now I will let you slide." On the other hand, Judge Cochran of Alabama told the President that he had been a rabid, bitter, uncompromising rebel; that he had done all he could to cause secession, and had fought in the ranks as a private; that he regretted very much that the war had resulted as it had; that he was sorry they had not been able to hold out longer. But he now accepted the results. The President asked: "Upon what ground do you base your application for pardon? I do not see anything in your statement to justify you in making such an application." Judge Cochran replied, "Mr. President, I read that where sin abounds, mercy and grace doth much more abound, and it is upon that principle that I ask for pardon." The pardon was granted.[927]

The President in the end granted pardons to nearly all persons who applied for them, but not a great number applied. The total number pardoned in Alabama from April 15, 1865, to December 4, 1868, was less than 2000, and of these most were those who had been worth over $20,000 in 1861 and had aided the Confederacy with their substance. For this offence (for offence it was in Johnson's eyes) 1456 people (of whom 72 were women) were pardoned before the general amnesty in 1868.[928] How many of this cla.s.s of excepted persons did not ask for pardon is not known. It is certain that all who possessed that amount of wealth a.s.sisted the Confederacy.

Half at least of the $20,000 must have been slave property.[929]

Few of the state and Confederate officials applied for pardon. Many worth over $20,000 in 1861 did not apply. Most of those who were wealthy in 1861 lost all they had in the war. To December 31, 1867, the President had pardoned in Alabama only 12 generals, viz. Battle, Baker, F. M. c.o.c.kerill, Clayton, Deas, Duff C. Green, Holtzclaw, Morgan, Moody, Pettus, Roddy, and Wood; 11 members of the Confederate Congress had been pardoned, 1 former United States judge, 1 former member United States Congress, 1 West Point graduate; 2 naval officers, and 2 governors. These were the only prominent political leaders who applied for pardon.[930]

SEC. 3. THE "RESTORATION" CONVENTION

Personnel and Parties

The election for delegates was held August 31, and the convention met in Montgomery September 12 and adjourned on September 30. The total vote cast for delegates was about 56,000,[931] a very large vote when all things are considered. This being a representative body of the men who were to carry out the Johnson plan of restoration, it will be of interest to examine closely the personnel of the convention. There were 99 delegates, of whom only 18 were under forty years of age, the majority being over fifty; it was a body of old rather than middle-aged men; 26 were natives of Alabama; 24 were born in Georgia; Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina furnished 28; Maryland, Kentucky, and Tennessee, 14; 6 were from northern states, and 1 from Ireland. There were 23 Methodists; 19 Baptists; 16 Presbyterians (the most able members), and 5 Episcopalians; 34 belonged to no church (not a mark of respectability at that time). There were 33 lawyers and 42 farmers and planters; 6 physicians, 9 merchants, 2 teachers, and 7 ministers. The proportion of ministers and non-church-members is remarkable. As to politics, 45 were old Whigs and had voted for Bell and Everett electors in 1861, 24 voted for Breckenridge, and 30 for Douglas; 18 had been in favor of immediate secession and a few of these were now called "precipitators"; 11 had been in the convention of 1861, and 10 had then voted for secession. Only one member of the convention of 1861 from the southern and central parts of the state was returned to the convention of 1865. All the others had by their course in the war made themselves ineligible. Fifty-two had had no previous experiences in public life. There were two ex-governors, two former members of Congress, and one who had been minister to Belgium.[932]

[Ill.u.s.tration: PARTIES IN THE CONVENTION OF 1865.]

There were several extreme "union" men, a few "precipitators," who, however, made no factious opposition, and a large majority of conservative men. The votes on test questions showed a wide difference between the extremists from north Alabama and the other members. The proportion was about 63 conservatives to 36 north Alabama anti-Confederates. It was the old sectional division. The minority was made up about equally of rampant "union" men and old conservative Whigs; the majority, of the more liberal Whigs and conservative Democrats. Neither party was as united as the parties had been in 1861. There were almost as many minor divisions as there were members, but the most of them acted together in order to transact business, and none were allowed to obstruct. As a body the convention was much inferior in ability to that of 1861 and lacked experience. Nearly all were men of ordinary ability, while those of 1861 were the best from both sections of the state. Yet this was quite a respectable conservative body.[933] The secessionists and former Democrats were the ablest members, and were more inclined to accept the results of war in a philosophical spirit, and, making the best of things, to go to work to bring order out of political chaos. The _Herald_ correspondent said that John A. Elmore was the strongest man in the convention. He had been an ardent secessionist of the Yancey school, yet in the convention he did more than any other man to bring the weaker men around to correct views and harmony of action.[934]

Ex-Senator and Ex-Governor Fitzpatrick was chosen to preside, and Governor Parsons administered the amnesty oath. The convention at once notified President Johnson of the desire and intention of the people to be and to remain loyal citizens of the United States. It indorsed his administration and policy and asked him to pardon all who were not included in the amnesty proclamation of May 9, 1865.[935]

Debates on Secession and Slavery

The debate on the action to be taken as to the ordinance of secession was warm and extended over the entire session. The dispute was concerning the form of words to be used in repealing or otherwise getting rid of the ordinance of secession. One delegate proposed that it be declared "unconst.i.tutional and therefore illegal and void"; another wanted it declared "null and void"; another, "the so-called ordinance of secession, null and void"; others, "unconst.i.tutional, null and void"; "unauthorized, null and void"; or "unauthorized and void from the beginning." The minority proposition to declare it "unauthorized, null and void," was laid on the table by a vote of 69 to 21, the minority being from north Alabama.

A proposition to declare it "unconst.i.tutional, null and void" was lost by the same vote. And all similar propositions fared about the same.[936]

However, a proposition to say that "it is and was unconst.i.tutional"

secured 34 votes against 59. Clark of Lawrence, who had been in the convention of 1861, wanted this convention to declare the ordinance of secession "unauthorized, null and void," because, he said, in 1861, the majority of the people voted for "union and cooperation," and that, as the convention refused to submit its work to the people, the people were misrepresented and the ordinance of secession was unauthorized. Yet he would not say that it was unconst.i.tutional and void from the beginning.

Other members said that the convention of 1861 had full authority. From the act of the legislature of 1860 which provided for the calling of the convention, the people understood that it had full authority and they also knew that it would use its authority to secede. "Unauthorized" would mean that there was no cause for calling the convention of 1861, and would even deny the right to secede as a revolutionary right. It would mean consent to the doctrine of pa.s.sive obedience, and also that the convention of 1861 and those who supported it had usurped authority, and "we thereby impliedly should leave the memory of our dead who died for their country to be branded as traitors and rebels and turn over the survivors, so far as we are concerned, to the gibbet."[937] The ordinance favored by the majority of the convention declared that the ordinance of secession "is null and void," and was adopted by a unanimous vote.[938] All other ordinances, resolutions, and proceedings of the convention of 1861, and such provisions of the const.i.tution of 1861 as were in conflict with the Const.i.tution of the United States, were declared null and void.[939]

The state bonded debt in aid of the war was $3,844,500, which was held princ.i.p.ally in Mobile. There were other indirect war debts, but no one knew the amount. On a test vote early in the session the convention was divided, 58 to 34, against repudiating the war debt.[940] Later, by a vote of 60 to 19, all debts created by the state of Alabama, directly or indirectly in aid of the war, were declared void, and the legislature was forbidden to pay any part of it, or of any debts contracted directly or indirectly by the Confederacy or its agents or by its authority.[941]