Alarmed at this imminent and impending peril to the cause in which he had embarked with all his heart and mind, and desiring to check, if possible, the spread of popular approbation and grateful appreciation of the magnanimous policy of the President in his efforts to bring the people of the United States back to their former friendly and national relations one with another, an individual, styling himself Bishop of Alabama, forgetting his mission to preach peace on earth and good will towards man, and being animated with the same spirit which through temptation beguiled the mother of men to the commission of the first sin--thereby entailing eternal toil and trouble on earth--issued, from behind the shield of his office, his manifesto of the 20th of June last to the clergy of the Episcopal Church of Alabama, directing them to omit the usual and customary prayer for the President of the United States and all others in authority, until the troops of the United States had been removed from the limits of Alabama; cunningly justifying this treasonable course, by plausibly presenting to the minds of the people that, civil authority not yet having been restored in Alabama, there was no occasion for the use of said prayer, as such prayer was intended for the civil authority alone, and as the military was the only authority in Alabama it was manifestly improper to pray for the continuance of military rule.

This man in his position of a teacher of religion, charity, and good fellowship with his brothers, whose paramount duty as such should have been characterized by frankness and freedom from all cunning, thus took advantage of the sanct.i.ty of his position to mislead the minds of those who naturally regarded him as a teacher in whom they could trust, and attempted to lead them back into the labyrinths of treason.

For this covert and cunning act he was deprived of the privileges of citizenship, in so far as the right to officiate as a minister of the Gospel, because it was evident he could not be trusted to officiate and confine his teachings to matters of religion alone--in fact, that religious matters were but a secondary consideration in his mind, he having taken an early opportunity to subvert the church to the justification and dissemination of his treasonable sentiments.

As it is, however, manifest that so far from entertaining the same political views as Bishop Wilmer, the people of Alabama are honestly endeavoring to restore the civil authority in that state in conformity with the requirements of the Const.i.tution of the United States, and to repudiate their acts of hostility during the past four years, and have accepted with a loyal and becoming spirit the magnanimous terms offered them by the President; therefore, the restrictions heretofore imposed upon the Episcopal clergy of Alabama are removed, and Bishop Wilmer is left to that remorse of conscience consequent to the exposure and failure of the diabolical schemes of designing and corrupt minds.

By command of Major-General THOMAS.

WILLIAM D. WHIPPLE, _a.s.sistant Adjutant-General_.

Wilmer had won, and three days after the order was promulgated in Alabama he directed the use of the prayer for the President of the United States.

Two months earlier, the General Council of the Confederate States had provided for such a prayer, but this provision was not to have the force of law in any diocese until approved by the bishop. This was to enable Wilmer to win the fight and then to resume the use of the prayer.[845]

The General Council of the Confederate Church, in November, 1865, decided that each diocese should decide for itself whether to remain in union with the General Council (of the Confederate States) or to withdraw and unite with the General Convention (of the United States). A small party in the northern church wanted "to keep the southern churchman out for a while in the cold," and "to put the rebels upon stools of repentance," but better feeling and better policy prevailed. The southern church was met halfway by the northern church, and the only important reunion of churches separated by sectional strife was accomplished. The diocese of Alabama was the last to join, Bishop Wilmer making the declaration of conformity January 31, 1866.[846]

PART IV

PRESIDENTIAL RESTORATION

CHAPTER VIII

FIRST PROVISIONAL ADMINISTRATION

SEC. 1. THEORIES OF RECONSTRUCTION

Owing to the important bearing upon the problem of Reconstruction of the disputes between the President and Congress in regard to the status of the seceded states, it will be of interest to examine the various plans and theories for restoring the Union. From the beginning of the war the question of the status of the seceded states was discussed both in Congress and out, and with the close of the war it became of the gravest importance. There was nothing in the Const.i.tution to guide the President or Congress, though each sought to base a policy on that ancient instrument. Many questions confronted them. Were the states in the Union or out? If in the Union, what rights had they? If out of the Union, were they conquered territories subject to no law but the will of the United States government, or were they United States territory with rights under the Const.i.tution? Must they be reconstructed or restored, and who was to begin the movement--the people of the states, Congress, or the President?

Were the states in their corporate capacity, or the people as individuals, responsible for secession? What punishment was to be inflicted, and on whom or what must it fall--the people or the states? Who or what decides who are the political people of the state? Exactly what was a state? Was the Union the old Union of Washington, or a new one? Congress and the President could never agree in their answers to these questions.[847]

Conservative Theories

As to the status of the seceded states and the proper method of Reconstruction, all interested persons had theories, but the only one which was logical and consistent with regard to the "Const.i.tution as it was" was the so-called Southern theory. This theory was that secession having failed, state sovereignty was at an end; the doctrine was worthless; secession was a nullity, and therefore the states were not out of the Union; the state was indestructible. The war was prosecuted against individuals and not against states, and the consequences must fall upon individuals; the states had all the rights they ever possessed, but, being out of their proper relation to the Union, its officers must take the oath of allegiance to the United States government, representatives must be sent to Congress, and the people must submit to the authority of the government. Then the Union would be restored as it was.[848] At the fall of the Confederacy the general belief was that restoration would proceed along these lines. Many of the higher officials of the United States army were of the same opinion, and on this theory the celebrated Johnston-Sherman convention was drawn up by General Sherman, which promised amnesty to the people and recognition of the state governments as soon as the officials should have taken the oath of allegiance.[849]

Likewise, in the Southwest, General d.i.c.k Taylor, with the approval of General Canby, advised the governors of the states in his department to take steps toward restoring their states to their former relations to the Union. General Thomas, and perhaps General Grant, had likewise advised the people of north Alabama, and the subordinate Federal commanders in the Southwest favored such reconstruction and were inclined to help along the movement. But orders from Washington put an end to any such course by directing the arrest of all state officials who endeavored to act. Among those who had taken steps to restore the former relations with the Union were the governors of Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida.[850]

The Presidential and Democratic theories, like the Southern theory, were based on the doctrine of the indestructibility of the state. In the beginning the Democratic theory would have recognized the state governments of the seceded states and thus practically coincided with the later Southern theory. The Presidential theory, as formulated later, would not have recognized the state governments, and to this view the Democrats came after the war. The Union was indestructible and was composed of indestructible states. To a.s.sert that the states as states were not in the Union was to admit the success of secession and the dissolution of the Union. But the people as insurgents were incapable of political recognition by the United States government. So the state after the war was in a condition of suspended animation: the so-called state governments were not governments in a const.i.tutional sense; the President could have the citizens tried for treason and punished, or he could pardon them and thus restore to them all their former rights, which, of course, included the right to reestablish their governments and to resume their former relations with the Union. Congress had no power to interfere or to disfranchise any man, nor to regulate the suffrage in any way. Its only part in Reconstruction was to admit to Congress the representatives of the states as soon as const.i.tutional government was restored by the people with the a.s.sistance of the President.[851]

The earliest legislative declaration touching this subject was in the Crittenden Resolutions pa.s.sed by the House of Representatives on July 22, 1861.[852] Two days later practically the same resolutions were introduced in the Senate by Andrew Johnson of Tennessee and pa.s.sed with only five dissenting voices.[853] They declared that "war is not waged upon our part in any spirit of oppression, nor for any purpose of conquest or subjugation, nor for the purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established inst.i.tutions of these states, but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Const.i.tution with all the dignity, equality, and rights of the several states unimpaired; and that as soon as these objects are accomplished the war ought to cease."[854] To this declaration of principles the Democratic party adhered throughout the war and after.

The Union as it was must be restored and maintained, one and indivisible.[855]

President Lincoln had no such regard for the "sacred rights of a state" as had the Democrats and his successor, Andrew Johnson. In his inaugural address he a.s.serted that the Union existed before the states and was perpetual; that no state could withdraw from the Union; that secession was null and void; and that the Union was unbroken.[856] In the formation of the provisional governments by the aid of the military authorities in Tennessee, Arkansas, and Louisiana, Lincoln showed that he expected the political inst.i.tutions of 1861 to be restored. In December, 1863, he brought forth this plan for restoration: When one-tenth of the voting population of a state in 1861 should take an oath to support the Const.i.tution and should establish a government on the basis of the state const.i.tution and laws in 1861, such a government would be recognized as the government of the state.[857] In July, 1864, he announced by proclamation that he was unwilling to commit himself formally to any fixed plan of restoration. This was in answer to the Wade-Davis bill pa.s.sed by Congress, which, if approved, would set aside the governments he had erected in Louisiana, Tennessee, and Arkansas, and it showed that he considered it the prerogative of the executive to bring about and recognize the restored government.[858] These restored states he expected to take their places in the Union on the old terms,[859] for as soon as the people submitted and civil governments were established, const.i.tutional relations would be resumed, and Congress would be obliged to admit their representatives.[860] Early in the war, he said nothing about abolition, but rather to the contrary. Later he advocated gradual and compensated emanc.i.p.ation by state action. At the close of the war, after the practical, if not the theoretical, abolition of slavery, he suggested that the newly established governments might, as a measure of expediency, confer the privilege of voting upon the best negroes.[861] He considered the matter of the suffrage beyond the control of the central government. The enfranchis.e.m.e.nt of the negro as a measure of revenge, and as a means of keeping the southern whites down and the Republican party in power, never entered his thoughts.

President Johnson succeeded to the policy of Lincoln, or, at least, to Lincoln's belief that restoration was a matter for the executive attention, not for the legislative. He a.s.serted that secession was null and void from the beginning; that a state could not commit treason; that by the attempted revolution the vitality of the state was impaired and its functions suspended but not destroyed; that it was the duty of the executive to breathe into the inanimate state the life-giving breath of the Const.i.tution. He recognized no power in Congress to pa.s.s laws preliminary to or restricting the admission of duly qualified representatives of the states.[862]

[Ill.u.s.tration: RECONSTRUCTION LEADERS.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

CHARLES SUMNER.

THADDEUS STEVENS.]

The plan of Lincoln was, in theory and at first in practice, objectionable. It would recognize as the political people of a state the loyal minority, which would be an oligarchy, and the principle of the rule of majorities would thus be repudiated. Those who claimed to be loyal were not promising material for a new political people, and the "10 per cent"

governments were treated with just contempt. But the plan was based, not on any narrow principle of legality, but on the broader grounds of justice and expediency, and was capable of expansion into a very different plan from what it was in the beginning. As applied to Louisiana and Arkansas, it was severely, and in theory justly, criticised on the ground that the President was a.s.suming absolute authority in dealing with the seceded states, and that by this plan the entire political power would be given to a small cla.s.s not capable of using it. As later modified, his plan would have admitted to partic.i.p.ation in Reconstruction nearly or quite all the citizens of the southern states.

President Johnson, a war Democrat, gave promise of being more harsh than Lincoln in the work of restoration. Lincoln's policy was based on expediency; Johnson's, on the narrow legal principles of a State Rights Democrat. He had a strong regard for the "sacred rights of a state." He proposed to reestablish the state governments by means of a political people of the lower cla.s.ses, and the old political leaders were to be disfranchised. Lincoln imposed certain conditions on individuals as a prerequisite to partic.i.p.ation in reconstruction. Having created by the pardoning power a political people, he expected the initiative to come from them. The executive then retired into the background and waited the impulse of the people. He shrank from interfering with the states, not from any great respect for their rights, but from motives of policy. As Johnson applied his theory, there was little initiative left to the people. The executive authority as the source of power set the machinery of restoration in motion, and the people were obliged to do as he ordered, many of them being at first excluded from partic.i.p.ation. The whole programme was prescribed by him, and he watched every step of the progress made. For a firm believer in the rights of states he took strange liberties with them while restoring their suspended animation. Lincoln advised a limited suffrage for the blacks; but negroes could have no part in the Johnson scheme. Like Lincoln, however, Johnson so modified his plan that practically all the white people were to take part in the reestablishment of the government. The conservative theories contemplated restoration, not reconstruction.

Radical Theories

The Republican majority in Congress soon advanced from the position taken in the Crittenden-Johnson resolutions. Most of the Republican party had no fixed opinions in regard to Reconstruction, but formed a kind of a centre or swamp between the Democrats and the President on the one extreme, and the Radicals on the other. The plan of Lincoln, as first announced and applied, was offensive to all parties, and some leaders never seem to have recognized that the President had, to any appreciable degree, modified his policy. The extreme Radicals were not sorry to have the matter of reconstruction fall from the hands of the wise and kind Lincoln into those of the narrow and vindictive Johnson. But the seeming defection of the latter soon disappointed those who were in favor of harsh measures in dealing with the defeated southerners. The best-known of the Radical theories advanced in opposition to the presidential policy were (1) the State Suicide theory of Charles Sumner, (2) the Conquered Province theory of Thaddeus Stevens, and (3) the Forfeited Rights theory, practically the same as the Conquered Province theory, but expressed in less definite language for the benefit of the more timid members of the Republican party.

Charles Sumner, the Radical leader of the Senate, set forth the Suicide theory in a series of resolutions to the effect that the ordinances of secession were void, and, when sustained by force, amounted to abdication by the state of all const.i.tutional rights; that the treason involved worked instant destruction of the body politic, and the state became territory under the exclusive control of Congress. Consequently, there were no state governments in the South, and all peculiar inst.i.tutions had ceased to exist--among them slavery. Sumner constantly a.s.serted that Congress now had exclusive jurisdiction over the southern territory.[863]

He made strong objection to the despotic power of the President as applied in dealing with the seceded states, and declared that the executive was encroaching upon the sphere of Congress, which was the proper authority to organize the new governments. The seceded states, he affirmed, by breaking the const.i.tutional compact had committed suicide, and no longer had corporate existence, and that the "loyalists," who were few in number, should not have the power formerly possessed by all. The whole South was a "tabular rasa," "a clean slate," upon which Congress might write the laws.[864] The existence of slavery was declared to be incompatible with a republican form of government, which it was the duty of Congress to establish. For it is necessary to such a form of government that there be absolute equality before the law, suffrage for all, education for all, the choice of "loyal" citizens for office, and the exclusion of "rebels." The negro must take part in Reconstruction, for his vote would be needed to support the cause of human rights and "the party of the Union"--meaning, of course, the Republican party.[865]

Sumner cared little for the Const.i.tution except for the clause about guaranteeing a republican form of government to the states, and on this he based the power of Congress to act. The Declaration of Independence was to him the supreme law and above the Const.i.tution, and to make the government conform to that doc.u.ment was his aim. He wearied his colleagues with his continual harping on the Declaration of Independence as the fundamental law, upon which footing the seceded states must return. That, he declared, would destroy slavery and all inequality of rights, political and civil.[866]

The Conquered Province theory was originated by Thaddeus Stevens, the Radical leader of the House of Representatives, who, however, refused to call it a theory. He made no attempt to harmonize his plan with the Const.i.tution, and frankly expressed his opinion that there was nothing in the Const.i.tution providing for such an emergency; that the laws of war alone should govern the action of Congress, allowing no const.i.tutions to interfere.[867] It was impossible to execute the Const.i.tution in the seceded states, he said, which the victors must treat "as conquered provinces and settle them with new men and exterminate or drive out the present rebels as exiles from this country."[868] Every inch of the soil of the southern states should be held for the costs of the war, to pay damages to the "loyal" citizens and pensions to soldiers and their families, and slavery should be abolished.[869] Secession, according to Stevens, was so far successful that the southern states were out of the Union and the people had no const.i.tutional rights.[870] All ties were broken by the war. The states in their corporate capacities made war, and were out of the Union so far as the conqueror might choose to consider them, and must come back into the Union as new states or remain as conquered provinces with no rights except such as the conqueror might choose to grant. Perpetual ascendency of the North must be secured by giving the ballot to the negro, by confiscation, and by banishment. The Const.i.tution, in his opinion, had been torn to atoms; it was now a "bit of worthless parchment," and there could be no reconstruction on the basis of that instrument. Congress had absolute jurisdiction over the whole question.[871] Stripped of its violence, Stevens's theory was probably the correct one from the point of view of public law. It was more in accord with historical facts. It recognized the great changes wrought by war in the structure of the government. It was frank, explicit, and practical.

Unfortunately, the statesmanship necessary to carry to success such a plan was entirely lacking in its supporters.

Sumner would limit the authority of Congress only by the provisions of the Declaration of Independence; Stevens would have Congress unchecked by any law. By martial law and the law of nations, he meant no law at all, as his utterances show; nothing must stand in the way of the absolute powers of Congress. Both theories agreed in reducing the states to a territorial status. Sumner would leave the people of these states the rights of people in the United States territories. Stevens would deny that they had any such rights whatever under any law, but that they were to be considered conquered foes, with their lives, liberty, and property at the mercy of the conqueror.[872]

The Forfeited Rights theory, patched up to suit the more timid Radicals who would not concede that the states had succeeded in getting outside of the Union or that they could be destroyed, was, in effect, the Stevens theory, though recognizing some kind of a survival of the states. The names and boundaries of the states alone survived; the political inst.i.tutions were entirely destroyed, and must be reconstructed by Congress.

It is a waste of time to try to find a basis in the old Const.i.tution for any of the theories advanced. If a legal basis must be had, it will have to be found in the Const.i.tution as revolutionized by seventy-five years of development and four years of war. The main purposes of the congressional plans were to reduce the late dictatorial powers of the President, to remove forever from political power the political leaders of the South, to give the ballot to the negro as a measure of revenge and to a.s.sure the continuation in power of the Republican party.[873]

Owing to the fact that Congress was not in session for several months after the downfall of the Confederacy, the President had a good opportunity to put into operation the executive plan for restoring the southern states to their proper standing in the Union.

SEC. 2. PRESIDENTIAL PLAN IN OPERATION

Early Attempts at Restoration

In the early spring of 1865, Governor Watts, in a speech calling upon the people to make renewed exertions against the invader, said: "We hold more territory than a year ago, more of Texas, Louisiana, and Arkansas, Georgia is overrun but is ready to rise. Our financial condition is better than four years ago. Arms, commissary and quartermaster's stores are more abundant now."[874] But there were no more men. A month later Lee had started on the march to Appomattox; two months later d.i.c.k Taylor was surrendering the last Confederate armies east of the Mississippi; three months later the war governors of Alabama were in northern prisons, and not a vestige of the Confederate or state governments remained. There was no government.

Even before the collapse of the Confederacy there were indications of an approaching revolution in the state government, to be carried out by the union of all discontented factions. The object was to gain control of the state government or to organize a new one and return to the Union. This movement was strongest in north Alabama and was supported and encouraged by the Federal military authorities. One of the disaffected clique testified before the Subcommittee on Reconstruction that in the last years of the war a "Reconstruction" or "Union" party was organized in Alabama, which, at the time of the surrender, had a majority in the lower house of the legislature.[875] But the Senate, elected in 1861, held over and prevented any action by the House. During the year 1865 the "Union" party hoped to secure both the governorship and the Senate in the first elections which were to occur under the new const.i.tution, and thus secure control of the state. But the invasion and surrender stopped the movement.[876]

There were indications during the winter and spring of 1865 that Reconstruction movements were going on in the northern half of the state.

After the invasion of the state in April many people more influential than the ordinary peace party men began to think of Reconstruction. General Thomas authorized the citizens of Morgan, Marshall, Lawrence, and the neighboring counties to organize a civil government based on the Alabama laws of 1861. J. J. Giers, a brother-in-law of State Senator Patton (later governor), was sent by the military leaders to "reorganize civil law."

Thomas invited the people of the other northern counties to do likewise and thus show that they were "forced into rebellion." Colonel Patterson of the Fifth Alabama Cavalry accepted the terms for his forces, and Giers stated that Roddy's men were so pleased with Thomas's letter that they released their prisoners and stopped fighting. A Reconstruction meeting was held at Somerville, Morgan County, and was largely attended by soldiers. This was early in April.[877] In the central and southern portions of the state the movement did not begin until the Federal forces traversed the country. General Steele with the second army of invasion reported from Montgomery, May 1, 1865, that J. J. Seibels, L. E. Parsons, and J. C. Bradley[878] had approached him and had told him that two-thirds of the people of the state would take up arms to "put down the rebels."[879] A meeting was held at Selma, in Dallas County, on May 10, and called upon the governor to convene the legislature and take the state back into the Union. Judge Byrd,[880] one of the speakers, said that the war had decided two things--slavery and the right of secession--and both against the South. He counselled a spirit of conciliation and moderation, and in this he expressed the general sentiment of the people.[881]

A more important meeting was held the next day in Montgomery. A number of the more prominent politicians met to take steps to place the state in the way of readmission to the Union.[882] George Reese[883] of Chambers County presided over the meeting and Albert Roberts was secretary. Seibels introduced resolutions, which were adopted, pledging to the United States government earnest and zealous cooperation in the work of restoring the state of Alabama to its proper relation with the Union at the earliest possible moment. The murder of Lincoln and the attempt on the life of Seward were condemned as "acts of infamous diabolism revolting to every upright heart." The bad effect the crime would have on political matters was deplored. The desire was expressed that all guilty of partic.i.p.ation in the attempt might be brought to speedy and condign punishment, and "we shall hold as enemies all who sympathize with the perpetrators of the foul deed." The majority reported a memorial to the President asking him to permit the governor of Alabama to convene the legislature, which would call a convention in order to restore the state to her political relations to the United States. This they believed was the most speedy method. But if this were not permitted, then the President was requested to appoint a military governor from among the most prominent and influential "loyal"

men of the state and invest him with the power to call a convention. They were encouraged to ask this, the memorial stated, by the recent statement of the President of the principle that the states which attempted to secede were still states, and not being able to secede would not be lost in territorial or other division. "To forever put an end to the doctrine of secession; to restore our state to her former relations to the Union under the Const.i.tution and the laws thereof; to enable her to resume the respiration of her life's breath in the Union,--is a work in which we in good faith pledge you our earnest and zealous cooperation, and we hazard nothing in the a.s.surance that the people of Alabama will concur with us with a majority approaching almost unanimity."