"Does it help advance the mission?" asked Bush.

"Yes," Tenet said.

Bush wanted it done.

"There is little change from the chief of station approach," Rice said, referring to the ideas suggested in the cable from Islamabad. "Do we need to change the target list?"

"Well, we are going to hit the SAM and air defense up front," said Tenet, referring to the surface-to-air missile sites. The CIA director was directly involving himself in military discussions because it was his men who were ready to go in on the ground while the Pentagon was lagging. "Are there any other Taliban targets we want to strike in the north?"

It remained an open question. Once the U.S. exhausted the target set of Taliban air defenses, operations would be hamstrung without men on the ground to scout out targets and relay precise coordinates. There was enough s.p.a.ce in southern Afghanistan to begin inserting ground forces, though the situation was not optimal. In the north, however, they would have to explore alternative approaches since Uzbekistan had not yet committed on basing rights.

"Can we base in the Northern Alliance areas?" asked Cheney. Another possibility was to launch from Tajikistan, which had agreed to support the U.S. But the flight path from there into northern Afghanistan was treacherous and involved climbing over a tall mountain range.

"We have a deadline on Uzbekistan as 4 P.M.," said Franks. "If we can't get it, we'll have to drop the north, do it later, and do the south now. In the south, we'll have to operate off carriers" in the Indian Ocean, Franks said, what they called a "lily pad" strategy, using the carriers as oceangoing stepping-stones.

They reviewed comments that some Islamic scholars had made about the Pentagon's name for the operation. "Operation Infinite Justice" had been quickly criticized for its insensitivity to the Muslim faith, which holds that only Allah can mete out infinite justice. The name was shelved. Rumsfeld said he had decided on "Enduring Freedom."

But the Pentagon's image problem was a minor worry for Rumsfeld compared to the major overhaul of the armed services he had begun, and was now executing while trying to conduct a war. Skeptics were saying that he could not transform the military and fight a war. But Rumsfeld's thinking was, If you're fighting a different kind of war, the war transforms the military.

We're changing our Special Operations Forces so they have a global role, he said. They won't be tied to individual geographic areas under the CINCs any longer, that is, not limited to certain operational theaters.

Tenet saw the transformation as not limited to the Pentagon; the CIA was thinking anew as well. "And we're working between the military and our covert people side by side," he added, "with transparency between them, deconflicting and viewing both in a global context." Deconflicting meant keeping their forces from shooting each other.

They discussed whether to issue a white paper, designed to prove that bin Laden and al Qaeda were behind the September 11 attacks.

Did they want or need a white paper? Rumsfeld asked. It could set an awful precedent. Suppose they wanted to launch a preemptive military attack on terrorists or some state sponsor? They could create an expectation that some white paper would follow. That might not be possible. National security decisions about military action often had to be made on the best available evidence and that might fall far short of courtroom proof. They could be setting themselves up.

While American and allied intelligence services were beginning to unravel the trail of the September 11 attacks, the evidence was circ.u.mstantial and somewhat fragmentary, though there were some hard nuggets. The danger of issuing a white paper that presented evidence was that it could condition people to view the war on terror as a law enforcement operation, within the model of the judicial system with its evidentiary standards, burden of proof on the government and proof beyond a reasonable doubt - things that could not possibly be met. on terror as a law enforcement operation, within the model of the judicial system with its evidentiary standards, burden of proof on the government and proof beyond a reasonable doubt - things that could not possibly be met.

Powell wanted some kind of white paper if possible. He had to deal with European and Arab states where the leaders wanted evidence and proof.

Turning to the outline of the war, Rumsfeld said, "We ought to have a broad beginning and an ending. It ought to focus on al Qaeda - it shouldn't focus on UBL. . . . It's not over if we get his head on a platter. And the failure to get his head on a platter is not failure."

The president asked about international partic.i.p.ation in the first phase of the operation.

"Look, we're not able to define a special operations role for our own forces," Rumsfeld replied. "Until we can do that, how can we talk about including others?"

"We need to plan as if things won't go well," Bush said. What was the scenario if there was no split in the Taliban? "We need to war-game it out, figure out how to keep the pressure on them and effect change, even if things don't go the way we want."

When he commented later in an interview about why he, the perennial optimist, wanted to examine bad scenarios, Bush said, "I think my job is to stay ahead of the moment. A president, I guess, can get so bogged down in the moment that you're unable to be the strategic thinker that you're supposed to be, or at least provide strategic thought. And I'm the kind of person that wants to make sure that all risk is a.s.sessed. There is no question what the reward is in this case. But a president is constantly a.n.a.lyzing, making decisions based upon risk, particularly in war, risk taken relative to the - what can be achieved." He had advisers "who have seen war, who have been in situations where the plan didn't happen the way it was planned."

Whether it was trying to stay ahead of the moment, a.s.sessing risk or reaching a consensus, he said, "I just think it's instinctive. I'm not a textbook player. I'm a gut player."

He and the others were increasingly discovering there was no textbook for this war.

At the meeting, Rumsfeld said, "Look, as part of the war on terrorism, should we be getting something going in another area, other than Afghanistan, so that success or failure and progress isn't measured just by Afghanistan?"

It was becoming clearer and clearer that the defense secretary didn't want success to hinge on Afghanistan. The targets were meager. What could they actually accomplish?

But Bush's focus remained Afghanistan, he recalled. "Obviously, there were some who discussed Iraq. That's out of the question at this point. I mean, I didn't need any briefings." Rumsfeld wanted to show that the war on terror was global, the president said. "Rumsfeld wanted to make sure that the military was active in other regions. My point was that the degree of difficulty had to be relatively small in order to make sure that we continued to succeed in the first battle."

Cheney's biggest concern was still the possibility that bin Laden or other terrorists would acquire and use weapons of ma.s.s destruction. Nothing had suggested that al Qaeda possessed any nuclear devices, but there was a concern about biological and chemical weapons.

"Can we do a good enough job of identifying targets in Afghanistan that relate to BW/CW?" Cheney asked. "It should be a top priority.

"We need to have a deliberate strategy but also we need to hit him before he hits us. Give additional targets."

"We need to ratchet down my trip to the Far East," Bush said. The president was scheduled to travel to Shanghai for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit later in October and then visit Beijing, Tokyo and Seoul. They should cancel the latter three cities. "I need to be here."

Later that morning Bush welcomed j.a.panese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to the White House. In a private meeting, he told Koizumi the problem of terrorism was theirs together. "In this new war," Bush said, "cutting off funding is just as important as dropping a bomb. Aid to Pakistan is just as important as landing troops." He was going to be deliberate, patient, because the consequences would be great. "We're angry, but we're not stupid."

ABOUT 4 A.M. Washington time the next morning, Wednesday, September 26, a husky 59-year-old man with a round, cheerful face and gla.s.ses was huddled in the back of a Russian-made, CIA-owned Mi-17 helicopter that was going to have to strain to climb 15,000 feet to clear the Anjoman Pa.s.s into the Panjshir Valley of northeastern Afghanistan. It was 12:30 P.M. there.

Gary was leading the first critical wave of President George W. Bush's war against terrorism. With him was a team of CIA covert paramilitary officers with communications gear that would allow them to set up direct cla.s.sified links with headquarters. Between his legs was a large strapped metal suitcase that contained $3 million in United States currency, nonsequential $100 bills. He always laughed when he saw a television show or movie where someone pa.s.sed $1 million in a small attache case. It just wouldn't fit.

Several times in his career, Gary had stuffed $1 million into his backpack so he could move around and pa.s.s it to people on other operations. He had signed for the $3 million as usual. What was different this time was that he could dole it out pretty much at his own discretion.

Gary had been an officer in the Directorate of Operations of the CIA for 32 years, the type of CIA clandestine operative that many thought no longer existed. In the 1970s, he had been an undercover case officer in Tehran and then Islamabad. He had recruited, developed, paid and run agents who reported from within the host governments. In the 1980s, he served as chief of the CIA base in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and later as chief of station for Kabul. The American Emba.s.sy in Kabul was closed due to the Soviet invasion, so he operated out of Islamabad. In the 1990s, he served as deputy chief of station in Saudi Arabia, then chief of a secret overseas station that operated against Iran. From 1996 to 1999, he had been chief of station in Islamabad, and then deputy chief of the CIA's Near East and South Asia operations division at Langley.

On September 11, Gary had been almost out the door, weeks away from retirement and in the agency's 90-day retirement transition program. Another officer had taken over as deputy division chief. His wife was delighted.

Gary had been pulled back inside the door on the Sat.u.r.day that President Bush had the day-long meeting with his war cabinet at Camp David, September 15. That day, he had received a call from Cofer Black, the head of the agency's counterterrorism center, asking him to come into headquarters.

Black told him, "I know you're ready to retire. But we want to send a team in right away. You're the logical person to go in." Not only did Gary have the experience, he spoke Pashto and Dari, Afghanistan's two main languages.

The team would be a small group of CIA operatives and paramilitary officers working out of the super-secret Special Activities Division of the Directorate of Operations.

"Yeah, I'll go," Gary said. When he was Islamabad station chief he had made several covert trips into Afghanistan, meeting with the Northern Alliance leaders, bringing in cash, normally $200,000 - a bag of money on the table. He had known Ahmed Shah Ma.s.soud. Ma.s.soud had held the rival warlords together, and his a.s.sa.s.sination was surely designed to rid the opposition Northern Alliance of that glue and leadership.

Go in, Black told Gary, convince the Northern Alliance to work with us, which shouldn't be too hard given the situation and the fact that Ma.s.soud was just a.s.sa.s.sinated by the same people who attacked New York and the Pentagon. Prepare the ground in Afghanistan to receive U.S. forces, to give them a place to come in and stage operations. with us, which shouldn't be too hard given the situation and the fact that Ma.s.soud was just a.s.sa.s.sinated by the same people who attacked New York and the Pentagon. Prepare the ground in Afghanistan to receive U.S. forces, to give them a place to come in and stage operations.

The post-Ma.s.soud situation among the Northern Alliance was unclear. Gary's team would be the first in. No backup. Minimal available search and rescue teams to get them out if something went wrong.

Four days later, on September 19, Black called Gary back to his office. The team, formally called the Northern Afghanistan Liaison Team (NALT), was given the codeword "Jawbreaker." They were to deploy the next day, proceed to Europe and then into the region and into Afghanistan as fast as possible.

Jawbreaker had another a.s.signment. The president had signed a new intelligence order, the gloves were off.

"You have one mission," Black instructed. "Go find the al Qaeda and kill them. We're going to eliminate them. Get bin Laden, find him. I want his head in a box."

"You're serious?" asked Gary. Black had a penchant for dramatizing and Gary knew the presidential restraints on direct killing and a.s.sa.s.sination. He was the guy who had told CIA a.s.sets, the GE/SENIOR bin Laden tracking teams, that they could not ambush bin Laden's convoy because it would be deemed a.s.sa.s.sination.

"Absolutely," Black said. The new authority was clear. Yes, he said, he wanted bin Laden's head. "I want to take it down and show the president."

"Well, that couldn't be any clearer," Gary replied.

Gary left Washington the next day, and the team hooked up in Asia. There was a maddening wait for visas and clearances to get into Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

Now in the helicopter, he had to worry through the two-and-a-half-hour overflight into Afghanistan. A CIA man in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, was in regular radio contact with the Northern Alliance and had radioed that the team was heading in. But the radio link was not secure, and though the territory they were flying over was supposed to be controlled by the Northern Alliance, any Taliban or al Qaeda with a Stinger missile or a Z-23 antiaircraft gun on a hilltop could have shot the Mi-17 out of the air. and had radioed that the team was heading in. But the radio link was not secure, and though the territory they were flying over was supposed to be controlled by the Northern Alliance, any Taliban or al Qaeda with a Stinger missile or a Z-23 antiaircraft gun on a hilltop could have shot the Mi-17 out of the air.

The CIA had purchased the reliable Russian helicopter more than a year earlier for $1.5 million. The Mi-17 is a workhorse, not a handsome machine, but it provided good cover. The U.S. had upgraded theirs with better avionics, night vision capability and a paint job to match the Northern Alliance fleet.

Because the copter would have to climb 15,000 feet to clear the mountains, Gary had consolidated their equipment, weapons and other packages to lighten the load. They had brought lots of food because they had no idea what conditions they would find, or whether they would have to live off the land.

Jawbreaker comprised 10 men - Gary, a senior deputy, a young Directorate of Operations case officer who had four years in Pakistan and spoke excellent Farsi and Dari, an experienced field communications officer who had worked in tough places, a former Navy SEAL, another paramilitary operative, a longtime agency medic, two pilots and a helicopter mechanic. The men spanned nearly 30 years in age, different shapes and sizes. They wore camping clothes and baseball caps.

Jawbreaker touched down in a landing field about 70 miles north of Kabul, in the heart of Northern Alliance territory at about 3 P.M. local time.

Two Northern Alliance officers and about 10 others greeted them. They loaded the gear on a big truck and drove about a mile to a guest house that Ma.s.soud had fixed up in a tiny village. The village had been cordoned off with a checkpoint at each end. The Alliance officers were nervous and wanted the team out of sight.

Their quarters were in a primitive building with a concrete floor covered with a pseudo-carpet. The roof consisted of tree trunks across, then packing crate material on top, followed by a mud layer. The air was dusty as h.e.l.l, and the dirt never went away.

The toilet was a hole in the floor that they could urinate into or squat over.

By about 6 P.M., they had their secure communications up. Gary sent a cla.s.sified cable asking for some resupplies. In the exuberance of the safe arrival and mindful of Gofer Black's request about bin Laden's head, he added a line to the cable requesting some heavy-duty cardboard boxes and dry ice, and if possible some pikes.

GARY'S FIRST MEETING that evening was with Engineer Muhammed Arif Sawari, who headed the Alliance's intelligence and security service. Arif had argued to his commander Ma.s.soud that he not receive the two men who a.s.sa.s.sinated him, though they had come as journalists with letters of introduction. Nonetheless, because he had been in charge of security, and because the a.s.sa.s.sination had taken place in his office, he was under immense pressure to help pull the Alliance together.

Arif recognized Gary from the previous December, when as deputy division chief, he had met with Ma.s.soud in Paris. Arif seemed to relax. "You were there," he said.

Gary nodded and placed a bundle of cash on the table: $500,000 in 10 one-foot stacks of $100 bills. He believed it would be more impressive than the usual $200,000, the best way to say, We're here, we're serious, here's money, we know you need it.

"What we want you to do is use it," he said. "Buy food, weapons, whatever you need to build your forces up." It was also for intelligence operations and to pay sources and agents. There was more money available - -much more. Gary would soon ask CIA headquarters for and receive $10 million in cash.

The Northern Alliance welcomes you, Arif said.

The plan, Gary said, was to prepare the way for the U.S. military forces. "We don't know how they're coming or how many, but we're looking at Special Forces, you know, small units, guys coming in to do operations and help you and help your army and coordinate between your forces and the U.S. forces that are going to come and attack the Taliban army. We need to coordinate this." Great, Arif said.

AT THE WHITE HOUSE, the president and Rice talked privately about when military action might begin.

"I have to have a good sense of this timing of when we really are going to be ready to go," Bush told her. "Because I have to keep preparing the American people. They've been through a terrible shock. They can't just cease to hear from us. I have to know when something's going to get started."

Did she think they would be ready early next week - Monday or Tuesday?

"I really don't know," she replied carefully. Her private thought was that it was unlikely they would be ready in five or six days. But she didn't feel it was her place to tell the president that this wasn't likely or possible. She was a coordinator. If pressed hard after the president had heard the views of the others, she would give her opinion, but only then. It was premature for her to speak, and there was no telling what Rumsfeld and Franks might say. Rumsfeld, in particular, was often full of surprises. "It's a question you should put before the group," Rice suggested.

In an interview, the president recalled this day. "One of my jobs is to be provocative," he said, "seriously, to provoke people into - to force decisions, and to make sure it's clear in everybody's mind where we're headed. There was a certain rhythm and flow to this, and I was beginning to get a little frustrated. ... It was just not coming together as quickly as we had hoped. And I was trying to force the issue without compromising safety."

At this point he understood how cautious the military is. "It's very important to realize how do you balance the military's desire to cover all contingencies at least once, maybe sometimes twice - they're relatively risk-adverse and they should be, after all they're dealing with people's lives - versus the need to, for whatever reason, to show action."

He had a number of thoughts that caused him to want to be provocative with his war cabinet. "The idea of attacking an enemy, a command I had never given before, is and still is a significant decision by a president. And I wanted to make sure that the people understood that we were getting ready to attack and that I wanted a clarification of their points of view." He said he wanted to ask, "Does anybody doubt?

"I can only just go by my instincts. Listen, I am a product of the Vietnam world. There is a very fine line between micromanaging combat and setting the tactics" on one hand, which he didn't want to do, and "to kind of make sure there is a sense of, not urgency, but sense of purpose and forward movement." He worried that the United States had lost its edge. "My job is to make sure that that blade is sharp.

"My instincts were beginning to tell me that there was kind of an anxiety beginning to build. And I wanted to make sure that our coalition knew we were tough." Some allies were praising him for showing initial restraint, and he added sarcastically, "We've got a coalition of people who - they love the idea that the United States hasn't immediately rushed into action."

His visit to Ground Zero in New York City was still on his mind. "These people looking at you in the eye, these tired faces, 'You go get 'em.' And we're going to get 'em, there's no question about that." He didn't feel public pressure at that point. "On the other hand, my body, my clock is just - or however you want to - instincts ... I am pushing.

"The president and the war council have got to obviously be decisive, but not be hasty."

So provocation was going to be one tool. Did he explain or warn Rice or the other war cabinet members that he was testing, planning on being provocative?

"Of course not. I'm the commander - see, I don't need to explain - I do not need to explain why I say things. That's the interesting thing about being the president. Maybe somebody needs to explain to me why they say something, but I don't feel like I owe anybody an explanation."

A NUMBER OF pressing matters were coming to a head the morning of Wednesday, September 26, when the NSC met.

Tenet turned to some of the secret operations. The CIA had been able to work some renditions abroad - capturing or s.n.a.t.c.hing suspected terrorists in other countries. Various foreign intelligence services were either cooperating or were being bought off to take suspected terrorists into custody.

In most cases, the suspects were turned over to the local police or law enforcement agencies. It was an effective way to put suspected al Qaeda operatives on ice indefinitely and to question them. Tenet had big ambitions for the rendition program, hoping to take hundreds of suspected terrorists, if not more, out of circulation. Most CIA stations abroad had lists and information on the al Qaeda suspects in their countries. In countries such as Egypt, Jordan or certain African states where civil liberties and due process were not significant issues, the intelligence services were more than willing to accommodate CIA requests. The free ride for terrorists abroad was going to cease.

"We're looking at something going on in Sudan," Tenet said. "We're looking at something going in Bulgaria, we're looking at something that involves the Iraqis and we're looking at something involving Hezbollah," the Iranian-supported terrorist organization, "and South America."

Tenet made it clear the rendition program was not only global but broad. Targets would include terrorist groups other than al Qaeda.

The president, obviously pleased, asked, "At what point are we going to feel comfortable talking about these things?" It was another potential scorecard that could be announced publicly.

The operations were sensitive and most countries were opposed, pa.s.sionately, even violently, to any publicity that would show they were in bed or in the pay of the American CIA. When there were dozens or even hundreds of successful renditions, the aggregate numbers might be able to be released.

The CIA's first paramilitary team had entered Afghanistan, Tenet said. "We're deploying some small UAVs," meaning the aerial Predator drones that were armed. "We've established some contacts. We're urging the local forces to go after some small targets. We've got some real-time intelligence now to provide targeting information, and we've got our search and rescue in place so we can get some people out if we get in trouble.

"We're in contact with three leaders in the north. We've got 100 targets we're going to work." Focusing on the southern region, he said, "In the south we've got contacts with the southern tribes - we're beginning to get some access. We're using similar messages as we did in the north about what we're about." That meant firm declarations would be made about the U.S. having no territorial ambitions or desire for a permanent presence in Afghanistan.

"The British, as you know, have some sources in the south," Tenet continued. "We're paired up with them. And we're going to add some of our people to their people. We're going to try and work to encourage some defections and surrender from Taliban folks in the south." By sharing with the British, he said they would make sure the two countries' operations or operatives didn't run over each other. "We have sources, contacts in the south, we're going to try and see if we can integrate them and run it as a single operation effectively.

"And then, of course, we need to understand and coordinate the relations between what we're doing in the north and what we're doing in the south," Tenet said. That was a big question, one of many large uncertainties.

Powell said he was working access through Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. "We've had contact now with the president of Tajikistan," Powell said, "and he's given us basically everything we want. He wants to work with us directly, not through any intermediary, and wants us to keep it confidential."

He turned to Oman. "A message is going in today," he said, a request for basing rights, "and I'm pessimistic."

Part of the problem was an ongoing British military exercise in Oman that was crowding out s.p.a.ce, such as parking places on airfields and the like, Powell said. "The question in some sense is this a reason or an excuse for being slow to respond to our request? But we're working it." The Omanis had shown no outward signs that they were uninterested in cooperating, but accommodating British war games didn't seem like a particularly good rationale for keeping the U.S. out - especially since the British had pledged support in the real war getting underway in Afghanistan. Maybe they were missing something, or doing too much extrapolating of the Omani position.

Rice had called David Manning, Blair's foreign affairs adviser. Manning had a.s.sured her they weren't going to allow an exercise to stand in the way of getting U.S. forces on the ground.

Powell said they were working Qatar, one of the smallest Gulf States, as a potential intermediate stop for U.S. military forces, which then could jump to U.S. Navy aircraft carriers acting as lily pads on their way to Afghanistan. Cheney was going to make a phone call to Qatar, where he had relationships stemming from the 1991 Gulf War.

Powell said that Sudan, a notorious haven for terrorists, seemed to be cooperating with the CIA. "We got a good reaction from them on the financing terrorism EO," the Executive Order on freezing terrorist a.s.sets.

"We expect to get a good resolution on terrorism out of the OIC," Powell added, referring to the Organization of the Islamic Conference, a group representing the interests of 57 Muslim nations.

"I'm a little worried about our people in the emba.s.sies in Indonesia and Malaysia," Tenet said. There had been threats. Al Qaeda presence in those countries was formidable.

"I'll take that one on," Powell said. The State Department had already issued a general warning on Indonesia that extremist elements might be planning to target U.S. facilities there. Recently, anti-American sentiment had begun spilling over from the militant Islamic minority into the general public and government. The former president, Abdurrahman Wahid, had publicly called the U.S. a "terrorist nation." The current vice president had said the 9/11 attacks could help America "cleanse its sins."

"I want to talk more about humanitarian a.s.sistance to Afghanistan," the president said, "and I want to hear about options for getting things going in the south."

Defense announced it was working the a.s.sistance issue, and Tenet said he was pushing hard on the options for the south.

"I want to make sure we've got our declaratory policy right," Bush said. Were they saying what they were doing and planned on doing? Clearly, many in the war cabinet, including Tenet, thought the Taliban were so tight with al Qaeda that for practical purposes they were inseparable. But Bush's ultimatum to the Taliban was still on the table.