Putin showed the cross to Bush a month later at a meeting in Genoa, Italy.

"We had a very successful meeting. And I had convinced him that I no longer viewed Russia as an enemy, and I viewed him, on a personal level, as somebody with whom we could deal."

The phone call that weekend in September was important. "What he is saying is, 'Go get them, we want you to be successful.' However, in his tone it was clear that he needed rea.s.surance that this was not a play to establish a long-term military presence in what was his former territory" - an a.s.surance Bush said he readily gave.

KAREN HUGHES WAS at church on Sunday, September 23, when her pager went off, the president calling from Camp David. He was snappish.

"You all don't get it," he said.

Her draft statement on the president's Executive Order freezing the financial a.s.sets of terrorists completely missed the point. This was no ordinary bit of business to be handled by the treasury secretary in a routine press conference - it was big news, and they had to make it so.

"This is the first bullet in the war against terrorism. This is the first strike. It's not with guys in uniform. It's guys in pinstripes. This will hone in on the fact that this is a completely different kind of war. I should be making this announcement."

Hughes called Dan Bartlett.

"You know anything about this?"

Bartlett said yes. Normally the secretary of the treasury announced when a.s.sets were frozen.

They quickly realized that normal did not apply. Bush had repeatedly told them it would be up to them to communicate why and how this war was different. They had dropped the ball.

LATER THAT SUNDAY, the princ.i.p.als met again - Cheney, Powell, Rumsfeld, Tenet and Shelton. Rice presided, and laid out the agenda. "I want to hear from George Tenet on the chief of station report," she said. "I want to talk about our strategy on Afghanistan, and then I want to talk about the Putin/Ivanov conversations."

Tenet's chief of station in Islamabad, Pakistan, a very experienced regional expert, Bob, (CIA officers who are still operating undercover are identified by their first names only.) had cabled an eight-page SECRET "Field Appraisal" that Tenet wanted to summarize.

"I asked the chief of station, how do we use covert action? How do you think about military targets? How do you think about sequencing?"

Mullah Omar, the supreme spiritual leader of the Taliban, would throw his lot in with bin Laden and the Taliban would "fatalistically" join in that support, the appraisal said. Tribal elders and ardent Afghan nationalists - of which there were no shortage among the Taliban - were growing increasingly skeptical of Mullah Omar for his hard-line fundamentalist brand of Islam and for his support of bin Laden and the Arab terrorists. The station chief suggested that the U.S. could play to those differences.

"The threat of U.S. action has provoked fissures within the Taliban that can be exploited," Tenet recounted. "There are tribal contacts with thousands of fighters. Our message: It's the Afghans against the Arabs. . . . Omar defied the elders, he picked the wrong side."

The warlords and opposition commanders were plentiful in both the north and south, according to the station chief. The cable did not identify them by name, but indicated that one had several thousand fighters and a few others had 500 or 1,000 men. A half-dozen commanders had about 200 fighters, which he said might seem small but were important.

"September 11 was a heinous crime not consistent with the Koran. Choosing sides is a zero-sum game," Tenet said. "We need to encourage the king."

The king, Mohammed Zahir Shah, a moderate, pro-Western ethnic Pashtun, ruled the country from 1933 to 1973, a period of relative prosperity and stability. In exile in Rome since being deposed by his prime minister in a bloodless coup, he had many supporters in Afghanistan and internationally. There was hope that the 86-year-old monarch might inspire a revolt against the ruling Taliban and perhaps a.s.sume a leadership role in an interim government.

The main point in Bob's cable was that the war had to be cast as Afghans against the foreigners. "We need to brand these folks as outsiders. We need to go after Arab facilities and destroy the Arab infrastructure," Tenet said.

"We need to go after the Taliban leadership and then go after the Taliban more generally." Bob had stressed the importance of public diplomacy - the propaganda war - and suggested two themes. First, remind everyone about the successful CIA effort to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan in the 1980s by supporting the native resistance movement. Second, underscore that the U.S. had no desire for territory or permanent bases in the region.

"We need to push the tribals into combat," Tenet said. The best opportunity for success was to get the opposition forces to do the work. "We need to give them reconnaissance, we need to help target the al Qaeda leadership, we need to have Afghans fighting Arabs and striking Arab targets. There should be quick, surgical ground attacks. We're pa.s.sing money, we have got to pa.s.s communication equipment."

The U.S. action would not succeed if the Northern Alliance took over or even seemed to take over the country. The Pashtun majority would not accept that. It would lead to civil war and tribalism as bad as what we have inherited, Tenet said. "Let's ask the Pakistanis for everything they have on al Qaeda." The appraisal expressed confidence in President Musharraf.

"We want to hold off on the Taliban," Tenet continued, "so as not to destabilize Pakistan and our relationship with Pakistan." There was still sufficient support for the Taliban in Pakistan that a military campaign conspicuously against the Taliban could undermine Musharraf. "We want to get al Qaeda moving into enclaves, which may allow us to target them and exploit them."

"How does the strategy work domestically?" Rumsfeld asked. "We don't want to look like we are pounding sand." Rumsfeld knew that was loaded. "Pounding sand" was Bush's derisive expression for the weak efforts of the Clinton administration - cruise missiles into tents and so forth. "That's why we had Taliban military targets in our target set," Rumsfeld continued. The Taliban had the military a.s.sets, limited as they were, a few aircraft and radars. "We have to have something to hit. There is not a lot of al Qaeda to hit." The intelligence so far on al Qaeda largely showed tents and mud huts and empty training camps.

Looking for something actionable in the station chief's largely conceptual report, Rumsfeld lobbed a key question: What is my target set?

"We might focus on the Arab brigade up north," replied Tenet, "because there are defined Arab units." The Arab brigade - also known as Brigade 055 - was the Taliban's elite fighting force. Trained in bin Laden's terror camps and so loyal that anyone who dared to retreat in battle was shot, the roughly 1,000 brigade members were the core of the Taliban/al Qaeda army. The best 100 or so soldiers served as bin Laden's personal security detail; the others fanned out across key cities in the north, spurring on the rank-and-file troops.

Target the brigade at the start, Tenet suggested, and whatever they did would just be a beginning. Tenet mentioned some Muslim commentators who might support what the U.S. wanted to do.

"Maybe we should put some people on the ground," Rumsfeld said, "to conduct humanitarian operations both in the north and the south. Small units. It will help mute some criticism of our operations.

"We need actionable intelligence to let us work through this program," he said. He was not satisfied with the intelligence he was receiving. "We also need to think through our declaratory policy to divide Taliban from the al Qaeda and to divide other Taliban from Mullah Omar."

Propaganda and diplomatic pressure on the Taliban should be the focus, Powell said. "It is not the goal at the outset to change the regime but to get the regime to do the right thing." They could wait to see how the Taliban responded. "We hit al Qaeda targets because they were used for terrorism in the past." He understood that it was difficult to separate the two. "We'll sneak up on the Taliban issue," he proposed.

Uzbekistan had not yet responded to the U.S. They needed to reevaluate. What was its importance? How much did they need it?

The answer was they needed it a lot.

Rice said they needed to get on the ground in Afghanistan to gather intelligence about the enemy.

"Where do you want boots on the ground?" Powell asked.

"The north is more secure," offered Tenet, but they ultimately agreed that it would be best to get people in the north and the south.

"Boots on the ground has a value in and of itself," said Rumsfeld. "It gives a different image for the United States." Leaning forward. "We're not invading, we're not going to stay. But we need to start creating an environment in which Afghanistan becomes inhospitable to the al Qaeda and the Taliban."

Rice wanted to settle on how they would present all of this to the president the next day. She liked to deliver the president clear, unambiguous summaries that reflected their thinking. The best way frequently was to orchestrate and script the next day's NSC meeting. They agreed on who was going to say what, and in what order.

IN A MORNING intelligence briefing with Tenet during this period, the president was going over the threats - threats to malls, buildings, cities, businesses, individuals, bridges, tunnels, sporting events, any large gathering place.

"We can't chase everything," he said. He wanted a risk a.n.a.lysis. "Let's prioritize, let's a.s.sess risk and then let's figure out the strategy necessary to deal with each risk."

Bush recalled in an interview, "It was the continuation of understanding the frame of mind of the enemy. In order to win a war, you must understand the enemy.

"What I was very worried about at the time was the psychological effect of a dirty type of bomb." A so-called crude radiological bomb could be made by taking highly radioactive material, such as spent reactor fuel rods, and wrapping the material around conventional explosives. "Whether you're alone or with your National Security Council, you begin to think about and talk about worst case scenarios, and how to deal with them. You know there are some pretty devastating worst case scenarios that we've got to think through."

Bush, Tenet and Rice tried to think through the possibilities. Clearly, bin Laden and his network liked spectacular. Maybe they would hit monuments, maybe the entertainment industry in some form because of their hatred of American values. Everything was a potential target, from the White House to a small school in the Midwest prairie.

"We're going to have to make some bets about what's likely," Bush said. Make some lists, a report, almost a.s.sess the odds and likelihood. He was serious, ordering Tenet to get after it right away, at once.

Tenet went to a phone in the White House and called his deputy, John McLaughlin, at CIA headquarters.

"We have to put down on paper what we think the targets are," Tenet said.

Huh? McLaughlin thought. Maybe they could send in the telephone books from every place in the world.

"We don't know," Tenet conceded, "because there is not the specificity." He realized the difficulty. "But place your bets." Yes, this had to be on paper. Get the best heads around the table - do it now. Try to figure out what motivates these guys. What are they trying to achieve? What would help them achieve what they are trying to achieve? "Place your bets."

McLaughlin, a soft-spoken, professorial CIA veteran who had risen to the No. 2 position at the agency through the a.n.a.lytical side, was intrigued. Certainly there was a way to think about all of this - intelligence a.n.a.lysis was in part about placing the best bets possible.

SHORTLY AFTER 9:30 on Monday morning, September 24, Bush stepped out into the Rose Garden to speak to reporters.

"At 12:01 this morning, a major thrust of our war on terrorism began with the stroke of a pen," Bush said. "Today we have launched a strike on the financial foundation of the global terror network." He had signed an Executive Order last night - just after midnight, well past his usual bedtime - that immediately froze the financial a.s.sets of several terrorist organizations, several leaders, a front corporation and several nonprofit organizations - 27 in all.

It meant that U.S. banks had to freeze the a.s.sets of the 27 groups and named individuals. The tough order, which went into effect before the start of the banking day, also put pressure on banks and financial inst.i.tutions overseas, where the U.S. had no jurisdiction but where most terrorist money was believed to be held. If those banks failed to share information and freeze terrorist-linked a.s.sets themselves, the Treasury Department could prohibit them from conducting transactions or accessing their a.s.sets in the U.S. It gave Treasury sweeping authority which Bush pledged would be exercised responsibly.

"We have developed the international financial equivalent of law enforcement's 'Most Wanted' list," he said. The list of 27 was just a beginning.

THE PRESIDENT MOVED briskly from the Rose Garden down to the White House Situation Room for the scheduled 9:45 A.M. NSC meeting.

"Mr. President," Cheney began, following the script, "you directed us to discuss the chief of station memo at princ.i.p.als level. We've done that. We've generally adapted our plans to reflect the input from the chief of station memo. Our priority is first to go after the al Qaeda camps, to start narrowing their freedom of action.

"We're going to focus on Omar, to encourage the current Taliban leadership to replace him with someone more amenable to what we need done with respect to al Qaeda.

"Then we will focus on the Taliban military and are also going to go after that al Qaeda brigade in the north."

Cheney was presenting the rough game plan and sequence. But the timing was almost totally up in the air.

The princ.i.p.als had different thoughts on whether to go after the Taliban up front. This had been reflected the day before on the Sunday television talk shows. Powell had said, "That is not uppermost in our minds right now." Rice had hinted otherwise, "It's a very repressive and terrible regime. The Afghan people would be better off without it. We will see what means are at our disposal to do that."

"We're going to crank it up this week," Tenet said. One of his secret paramilitary teams would soon be going into Afghanistan with the Northern Alliance. "We're providing intelligence and surveillance on soft targets. We're going to give them some time to consider."

Tenet turned to the core concepts that he and the CIA leadership had developed with agency experts and from the Islamabad station chief's appraisal. "We want to structure it as Afghanistan versus the outsiders," he said, repeating himself. "We are not invading. We are not occupying. Mullah Omar betrayed the Afghan people. He let in these outsiders. That's the problem."

He said it was important to delay a direct attack on the Taliban. Their missiles and radars would have to be hit initially for defense of the U.S. bombers. "But we'll hold off going hard on the Taliban to see if we get traction on the notion of either a change in Taliban leadership or some other way to break with al Qaeda." And if they didn't get traction, then they would go hard against the Taliban troops and leadership.

Cheney agreed. "We don't want to hit the Taliban up front, for we don't want to discourage them from changing leadership and breaking with al Qaeda."

Rice voiced her concern that it might unite the Afghans against the United States.

"Are there any doubts about the station chief's a.s.sessment?" asked Cheney.

"All my Afghan people agree with the station chief," Tenet said.

"This should be a template for our strategy. We should use the Afghans in the struggle," Bush said.

"The chief of station and Tommy Franks will discuss this," Tenet replied.

"You need to be exactly clear on what it is you are asking of the Uzbeks," Powell* said. "The bases, the number of people, what are they going to do, how long they are going to be there."

"Look," Rumsfeld said, "we have to say things in a general way, because we don't know what we're going to do until we get there." The Pentagon was still coming up dry on war plans. Privately, Rumsfeld was furious and beating on Franks incessantly.

The Pentagon and the State Department faced a familiar problem of how to secure overflight and basing rights from foreign countries for operations that were not fully knowable until the conflict was under way. Nations that are considering what kind of rights to grant want specific information about the type, length and size of planned operations before granting any permissions. But defense officials had no idea whether a conflict might escalate and demand larger operations. So the military tended to over-request, pushing for as much as possible and thus delaying or prolonging negotiations.

They turned to the question of what the Uzbeks would want in return if an agreement could be reached.

Powell said that they had to be careful about what the cost would be. The initial forays suggested that it would become real rug-merchant work, no first offer would be accepted.

Rice knew that President Karimov wanted action against his internal opposition, the extreme fundamentalist Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). One of the dangers was to let every opposition figure be characterized as a terrorist who would then be subject to the U.S. terrorism war. "We have to make sure we know what we're buying into," she cautioned.

"We need to get al Qaeda before they get us," said Cheney. He was as worried as anyone that they would attack again. "We have to be willing to deal with the Russians to that end."

Several around the table who had worked with Cheney were surprised. They knew how deeply distrustful he had been of the former Soviet Union and the current Russian government. His willingness to work with the remnants of the former "Evil Empire" spoke volumes.

Bush would recall, "I think d.i.c.k began to realize that Putin was different, because he had heard from my discussions with Putin." Cheney "clearly understood that we were evolving toward a relationship that was going to be significantly different, that the Cold War was in fact over."

Powell gave his formulation. "We want Afghanistan to be terrorist-free. If the Taliban can do that, fine. If not, we will work with someone else as long as they make it terrorist-free. Our rhetoric should avoid suggesting we are trying to determine who runs Afghanistan at the end of the day."

The president turned to what was increasingly on his mind. "I want a humanitarian aid drop in the north and the south. I want it coordinated with the military. Can we have the first bombs we drop be food?"

Anyone with a basic understanding of military strategy might have smiled at the question. The noisy slow-moving transport planes used for food drops are sitting ducks until air defense installations are wiped out. Politely, Shelton replied, "Well, you know, you have to be concerned about air defense." He knew it would be negligent to go in there with the first humanitarian a.s.sistance plane and have it shot down.

"How are we coming on Pakistan?" Bush asked.

Hadley reported on a large aid package for Pakistan.

Cheney was less concerned with humanitarian or Pakistani aid than he was with weapons of ma.s.s destruction. "We need to be targeting WMD and drug labs in our initial strikes," the vice president said.

Toward the end Rumsfeld said, "We need to get a list of requests of what we want to ask from each country and break it up into individual pieces."

THE SURPRISE FOR Rice was when the president raised the issue of humanitarian aid. It had not really been discussed among the princ.i.p.als, the deputies or sub-deputies. What was this? Where was it coming from?

For Bush, it was fundamental to what he sees as the moral mission of the United States. I explored the issue with him at length in a later interview. "I was sensitive to this [accusation] that this was a religious war, and that somehow the United States would be the conqueror. And I wanted us to be viewed as the liberator," the president said. The idea of feeding the poor Afghan people appealed to him. He said he didn't believe the people supported the Taliban, and were at best p.a.w.ns. "The idea of bombing a people into submission, therefore causing the government to fall, was not a relevant thought in this war." Bombing the people might make the Taliban stronger. That was the practical consideration. The moral one, he said, was, "We've got to deal with suffering."

Bush had seen satellite pictures of starvation, torture and prison camp brutality on a ma.s.sive scale in North Korea. He also knew of forced starvation in Iraq. "There is a human condition that we must worry about in times of war. There is a value system that cannot be compromised - G.o.d-given values. These aren't United States-created values. There are values of freedom and the human condition and mothers loving their children. What's very important as we articulate foreign policy through our diplomacy and military action, is that it never look like we are creating - we are the author of these values.

"It leads to a larger question of your view about G.o.d." And the lesson, he said, was, "We're all G.o.d's children." He wanted war with both practical and moral dimensions.

After he had proposed that the first bombs be food, the president remembered, everyone got it. "Rumsfeld grasped it, Mr. Hard Guy, who is not a hard guy. He's a very softhearted man in many ways. He understood it immediately." The military might have been bemused at first, he said, but they understood.

The princ.i.p.als met without the president later that afternoon via video teleconference. After routine reports from Ashcroft and Powell, Rice raised the issue of state sponsorship of terrorism. "What is our strategy with respect to countries that support terrorism like Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria and Sudan? How do we define the hurdles they have to jump over to get on the right side of the war on terrorism?" The United States needed some benchmarks by which to evaluate states' terrorist leanings.

"We need a small group, deputies and princ.i.p.als, to look at the next phase in the war on terror," she said.

"TRYING TO ANTIc.i.p.aTE the Next Attack" was the t.i.tle of the highly cla.s.sified three-page paper that arrived in the president's inbox the morning of Tuesday, September 25. It was the report that Bush had requested several days earlier. It was distributed to him and a limited number of his key advisers with the President's Daily Brief (PDB), the most restricted doc.u.ment in Washington.

The report was put together by a "Red Cell" team that Tenet and McLaughlin had set up. The team of experienced CIA a.n.a.lysts and operatives saw all incoming intelligence on bin Laden, al Qaeda and other relevant international terrorism. Their job was to think like bin Laden and his lieutenants and say what the other side - what Bush and Tenet called "the Bad Guys" - might be thinking or doing.

A notation on the paper said that since Red Cell had been directed to think "unconventional" and "out of the box," their thoughts should not be taken as conclusive. The Red Cell had been tasked to consider the "limitless" number of possible terrorist targets, and then to attempt to narrow that down to the most likely future domestic targets given the past practices of al Qaeda. In other words, to place their bets.

The Red Cell had come up with nine categories: 1. Political centers - Washington, D.C., or federal offices anywhere 2. Infrastructure facilities - airports, roads, harbors, railroads, dams, tunnels, bridges 3. Economic systems - Wall Street, Chicago trading centers 4. Energy infrastructure - refineries, oil platforms 5. Military targets - areas of large troop concentrations, Army, Navy, Air Force or Marine bases, weapons storage sites 6. Global telecommunications - electronic communications transit points, Internet computer routing centers, banking nodes 7. Educational centers - Harvard and the Ma.s.sachusetts Inst.i.tute of Technology (MIT) in the Boston area 8. Cultural centers - Hollywood, sports stadiums 9. Monuments and other symbols of national ident.i.ty "UBL tends to go back after targets they considered or previously attacked," the paper said, noting that some possible targets have "multiple values."

The White House had such multiple value as both a political center and a symbol of national ident.i.ty. Bush was living and working at a designated Ground Zero.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY Council met again on Tuesday, September 25, at the White House. The president spoke first. "We can't define the success or failure in terms of capturing UBL."

Tenet reported on the Northern Alliance. "The people are ready to go. They are not Pashtuns, but they are anti-Taliban. We won't be able to hold them back. They will hit both al Qaeda and Taliban targets, because they are all intermixed." A CIA team was about to go in. "We will encourage them to go to the targets. They've got communications gear to give us intelligence. We'll give them money. We will have to decide whether to pay for the Soviet weapons we're going to be provided."

The Northern Alliance controlled a part of the northeast quadrant of the country. "It is a potential base of operations," Tenet said. "We want to push as much pressure from the north and from the south. We'll have meetings with district leaders. We want to seal the borders and make sure the Arabs don't flee."

"Do we want to pay the Russians for Soviet weapons?" Powell asked.