The first phase involved establishing a lodgment and securing the major facilities necessary to bring in and store relief supplies. Since the port and airfield in Mogadishu were key to this purpose, and most of the relief organizations had their primary facilities in the capital, Phase I amounted to securing key installations in Mogadishu. Stretching out to the countryside would come later. We thought this would take thirty days, but we actually completed the first phase in seven.

The second phase involved expanding operations to the major relief centers and setting up secure lines of communication throughout the country's interior, allowing supplies to move unimpeded to the eight operational areas a.s.signed to various American and international forces. The total area covered was half the size of Texas-remote, desolate, and with little usable infrastructure. We estimated this phase would also take thirty days, but the addition of numerous international forces allowed us to complete Phase II by December 28, nineteen days after we landed.

The third phase-"the stabilization phase"-we saw as an undetermined period during which we would develop and improve conditions in preparation for the UN takeover of our mission. To our immense frustration, this phase lasted until March 26, as the UN proved extremely reluctant to a.s.sume the mission. Though we believed that an understanding had been reached between our government and the UN to make the handoff in mid-January, or at the latest mid-February, the UN command was slow to form and take charge, and in general dragged its feet.

The fourth and last phase-the handoff to the UN-lasted until May 4. The transfer to the UN came about only after strong pressure and compromise by the U.S. government.

OUR FIRST few days were incredibly hectic, with pressure to get everything done at once coming from all sides-the leadership in Washington, the press, the Somalis, the relief organizations, and the UN. All of them had their own ideas about what we should do, and they all wanted it done immediately. few days were incredibly hectic, with pressure to get everything done at once coming from all sides-the leadership in Washington, the press, the Somalis, the relief organizations, and the UN. All of them had their own ideas about what we should do, and they all wanted it done immediately.

My first order of business was to get our command and control structure up and functioning. Fortunately, my crew of superb colonels overcame the horrible conditions and got the operations center rolling right off the bat. We were able to clean up the piles of c.r.a.p and run our operation at the same time. There was no exemption for rank; generals through privates all pitched in.

Every staff running a field operation has to quickly and smoothly put into place its "battle rhythm"-its daily routine, schedule of operations, and procedures, all supported by a system of communications and organization for commanding the operation. Traditional combat missions have preset procedures and roles that tend to hold things together even when the operation is fast-breaking. Fast-breaking missions that are nontraditional, and have the additional challenge of integrating coalition and civilian components, make establishing the battle rhythm far more difficult.

In a cycle based on combat operations, you know when you're going to attack and shoot and when the attack aircraft are going to fly. There are always surprises and friction, but the preset procedures help you through them. Here we were throwing all kinds of noncombat factors into the scheduling and timing coordination evolution: We were there to feed people, who need food every day. So when do the convoys have to go out in order to make sure food is delivered every day to the distribution sites? How do we coordinate the security requirements for the convoys? Out of nowhere, an NGO might come up with a plan to set up twenty-three feeding stations. They want security for them. "When are you going to man them?" we ask. "When are they going to open? Where will we meet you for the security?" And then we had to ask ourselves and answer: "How will we fit these requirements into our own capabilities?"

These tasks become part of our operations cycle. Their relation to combat procedures is very slender.

The morning after we arrived, I gave quick guidance on handling these requirements and left the implementation in the capable hands of my staff.

THAT FIRST MORNING, General Johnston wanted us to get on the road right away to hook up with those running the political and humanitarian efforts. We set out in Humvees loaded with armed troops. General Johnston wanted us to get on the road right away to hook up with those running the political and humanitarian efforts. We set out in Humvees loaded with armed troops.

Our first meeting was with the President's recently appointed Special Envoy to Somalia, Amba.s.sador Bob Oakley, at the U.S. Liaison Office (USLO), located at a nearby villa. The drive there gave me my first on-the-ground look at the horrific conditions in the city. Buildings were either bullet-riddled or collapsed; hard-looking gunmen roamed the streets, glaring fiercely as we pa.s.sed; cl.u.s.ters of dazed and traumatized people wandered around poking listlessly in the rubble.

At the USLO compound, we banged on the huge metal gate; two Somalis pushed it back and let us in. A pair of Diplomatic Security guards were in the driveway-the only security I saw. I made a mental note to check on increasing it.

Oakley came out to greet us, a tall, slender, soft-spoken, and very savvy diplomat, with considerable experience in the third world as U. S. Amba.s.sador to Pakistan, Zaire, and Somalia. Earlier, he'd been an intelligence officer in the Navy, and knew and understood the military. He proved to be a brilliant, low-key negotiator, who commanded tremendous respect from the Somalis and the international representatives on the scene. General Johnston and I took to him right away.

What I've always liked about Bob Oakley is his "roll up your sleeves" att.i.tude. In Somalia, he worked the art of the doable, and not some unreachable idealistic dream. He developed every likely avenue, and we'd go down whichever looked most pa.s.sable. He also understood the necessary cooperation between humanitarian, political, and military efforts, and really went out of his way to make sure everything ran smoothly between them. Military officers were involved in all the serious political and humanitarian negotiations.

The first order of business was security for Oakley's small staff. We immediately agreed to put a Marine rifle squad at the compound.

Oakley then introduced us to John Hirsch, an old Africa hand and friend of his, who'd originally been sent by the State Department to be Bob Johnston's political adviser (POLAD). Later, Oakley asked if Hirsch could serve as both our POLAD and his deputy, and Johnston agreed instantly; this made great sense. It ensured the connection and coordination we all needed and proved an excellent decision.63 Oakley then laid out his immediate plans.

The first would soften our impact in the hinterland when we stretched out beyond the capital. Since we were an eight-hundred-pound gorilla, and a lot of suspicious armed men were out there, clashes were likely. His suggestion was to make advance arrangements with the local warlords and civil leaders. He would then move out ahead of us with a small Special Forces security detachment and symbolic food supplies. After the initial contact and food distribution, he'd explain our mission and intent, and then our forces would come in on his heels. His brave proposal worked to a tee. He would then move out ahead of us with a small Special Forces security detachment and symbolic food supplies. After the initial contact and food distribution, he'd explain our mission and intent, and then our forces would come in on his heels. His brave proposal worked to a tee.

More immediately, he had arranged a meeting later that morning at the USLO compound with Mohammed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed. Getting cooperation from them would secure our logistics base in Mogadishu and expedite our move out of the city . . . and advance a further agenda of Oakley's-a plan to anchor political stability by gaining an agreement among the fifteen faction leaders fighting for power in southern Somalia. He would press the two warlords to accept a seven-point agreement he was introducing. Once he had their okay, he would take it to the other twelve faction leaders.

The schedule called for a late-morning meeting with the warlords, then lunch, then one-on-one meetings as necessary, and then a press conference. If we had positive news at the press conference, our operation would get a good psychological kickoff.

AS WE waited for our guests, I walked around the compound to get a sense of the security requirements-and to give my legs a stretch. In the kitchen area to the rear of the compound, I had a chat with some of the cooks-my first direct contact with Somalis. Since many of them had worked at the U.S. Emba.s.sy before its evacuation, they spoke English. I learned later that older Somalis often spoke Italian, a legacy from the colonial period, so my own Italian background came in handy. waited for our guests, I walked around the compound to get a sense of the security requirements-and to give my legs a stretch. In the kitchen area to the rear of the compound, I had a chat with some of the cooks-my first direct contact with Somalis. Since many of them had worked at the U.S. Emba.s.sy before its evacuation, they spoke English. I learned later that older Somalis often spoke Italian, a legacy from the colonial period, so my own Italian background came in handy.

As I was leaving, I noticed a baby goat tied to a tree. When I stopped to pet the kid, all the Somalis smiled brightly.

"He's a friendly little guy," I said; and they nodded.

Then they added: "He's going to taste good at lunch."

ALI MAHDI'S convoy arrived first, accompanied by an armed escort we'd provided, as well as by his personal security. Since we were in south Mogadishu, Aideed's turf, Ali Mahdi had demanded extra protection. convoy arrived first, accompanied by an armed escort we'd provided, as well as by his personal security. Since we were in south Mogadishu, Aideed's turf, Ali Mahdi had demanded extra protection.

Aideed's compound was, in fact, directly across the dirt street from the USLO compound, but that did not speed up his arrival. Aideed had a well-tuned dramatic sense. He did not make haste to cross over to Oakley's compound, but kept everyone waiting for his grand entrance.

Ali Mahdi's people emerged anxiously from their vehicles. Once they'd satisfied themselves we weren't part of an Aideed trap, Ali Mahdi stepped nervously out of his vehicle and greeted us, sweating heavily. Inside, his conversation was fast and rambling; and prayer beads were in rapid motion in his hand.

Aideed continued to keep us waiting. "Is he coming at all?" everyone wondered.

And I wondered: "Might he make a move on Ali Mahdi, now that he has his enemy on his turf?"

I stepped outside to see if our troops were alert, then radioed our op center to make sure we had other troops moving around the area showing our strength.

When Aideed finally made his appearance, striding into our little company with a confident grin on his face, Ali Mahdi seemed close to paralysis from fear. But he quickly perked up when Aideed heartily embraced him like a long-lost friend.

After introductions and initial explanations from Bob Oakley, the two warlords made conciliatory speeches. Aideed emphasized the importance of the meeting after more than a year of separation and conflict, and made a couple of small, symbolic, starter proposals to help move the reconciliation along. He said: "We must end the division of the city by removing the green line"-the north-south line separating his turf from Ali Mahdi's-"and we must end our propaganda war against each other."

He closed with a hope that Somalia would again be a viable country.

This man was a formidable personality, I quickly realized-no penny-ante thug. He was articulate and statesmanlike, and obviously had no doubts that he was the natural leader of his country-he saw himself as nothing less than its George Washington-and that our purpose was to benefit his ambitions.

Ali Mahdi was not so impressive. His speech essentially confirmed and seconded Aideed's.

IT WAS time for lunch. My little goat friend came out well cooked and cut into chunks on a platter. As this was pa.s.sed around, I noticed one huge piece-the leg, from shank to hoof-sitting in the middle of the pile. Since I was at the end of the table, the last piece left was this gigantic goat drum-stick. Everyone was delighted when I pulled it off and began to gnaw away clumsily. time for lunch. My little goat friend came out well cooked and cut into chunks on a platter. As this was pa.s.sed around, I noticed one huge piece-the leg, from shank to hoof-sitting in the middle of the pile. Since I was at the end of the table, the last piece left was this gigantic goat drum-stick. Everyone was delighted when I pulled it off and began to gnaw away clumsily.

The lunch turned out to be very friendly . . . and useful.

Aideed proved especially helpful. It was obvious that he wanted to be seen as part of our operation . . . and to co-opt it to his benefit, if he could. Yet, he agreed to cooperate on security measures in his areas of Mogadishu and the outlying regions; and his advice was sound. He confirmed, for example, Oakley's plan to enter new areas carefully. "If the militias and gangs know you are coming," he told us, "they will get out of the way and won't cause trouble.

"And make sure," he went on, "that the first troops in arrive with food and medicine to give directly to the people. In this way they won't see you as just another armed band to be feared, but will a.s.sociate you with good things."

We incorporated this advice into our planning.

A couple of "Oh, by the way" comments also emerged: one having to do with the formation of political committees, the other with the need for a national police force. I didn't pay much attention to either of them at the time; but they greatly affected me later.

Oakley then sprang his seven-point agreement and pressed for acceptance.

The key points were as follows: Immediate and total cessation of hostilities and restoration of unity of the USC; immediate and total cessation of negative propaganda; and the breaking of the artificial lines in the capital.

In Somalia, negotiation means endless talk with minimal conclusion, with any agreement reached today up for discussion again tomorrow. Aideed and Ali Mahdi were thus reluctant to reach any conclusions; they wanted a series of further meetings.

Oakley pushed back. "We have press outside waiting for signs of progress," he told them. "We need something positive and concrete to give a boost to our negotiations. We have to give the people something to hope for."

After hemming and hawing, they agreed to three of the points. (Oakley succeeded in gaining complete agreement within a few days.) Bob Johnston and I also insisted that technicals be taken off the roads of Mogadishu to prevent any problems with our forces; and both agreed.

We then left Aideed and Ali Mahdi to talk privately as we prepared for the press conference. Once that was over, Bob Johnston and I left, feeling confident that the first meeting with the warlords had gone exceptionally well, and that we had in Bob Oakley a great and politically astute partner. The security cooperation that came out of this meeting allowed us to reach our first phase objectives in seven days, rather than the antic.i.p.ated thirty, and hastened completion of the next and most crucial phase.

NEXT ON our schedule was a meeting back at the emba.s.sy compound with Phil Johnston, the immensely capable, creative, and energetic head of the Humanitarian Operation Center (HOC). Johnston, the president of CARE, was on loan to the UN. HOC's function was to coordinate the humanitarian effort in Somalia for that organization. our schedule was a meeting back at the emba.s.sy compound with Phil Johnston, the immensely capable, creative, and energetic head of the Humanitarian Operation Center (HOC). Johnston, the president of CARE, was on loan to the UN. HOC's function was to coordinate the humanitarian effort in Somalia for that organization.

Like Oakley, Johnston was an open, can-do guy who focused on the mission and not on prerogatives. Also like Oakley, he was familiar with the military, understood how to work with us, and did not have to be convinced about setting up a solid coordination mechanism. He instantly embraced our plan to set up a Civil Military Operations Center to coordinate our efforts with his HOC, the NGOs, and the relief agencies, adding a suggestion that we co-locate the CMOC with his HOC.

This was a great idea. It was not only logical, but it made life easier for the NGOs and relief agencies, many of whom did not want to be closely a.s.sociated with the military; and some, like the Red Cross, were actually forbidden a.s.sociation with the military by their charter.

One of our colonels, Kevin Kennedy, who was already involved in Operation Provide Relief and knew the humanitarian side of things extremely well, was designated as head of the CMOC. Two other superb officers, Colonel Bob MacPherson and Lieutenant Colonel Buddy Tillet, were added to the team, along with a handful of Civil Affairs personnel a.s.signed to our task force.

Our meeting with Phil Johnston bore immediate fruit. The next day, we were able to successfully get off the first protected relief convoy. The first relief ships full of supplies landed and off-loaded in the port of Mogadishu the day after. These initial steps marked the actual start of our Phase II.64

FOR MANY reasons our relationships with NGOs and relief agencies proved to be mixed-and sometimes tense. reasons our relationships with NGOs and relief agencies proved to be mixed-and sometimes tense.

Coordinating these disparate organizations is often like herding cats. Their culture is sharply different from ours in the military-and often infused with a built-in dislike for us . . . rising more often than not out of the part they are called on to play in healing the devastation of armed conflict. Because they can easily be overwhelmed by the vast capability of the military, they fight fiercely to protect their ident.i.ty and their own distinct contribution to the larger effort. And because they vary greatly in size, areas of expertise, charter, and sponsorship (religious, private, governmental, international, etc.), they often have a particular orientation about how or where they will function that may not be compatible with the kind of broadly coordinated plan the military likes to produce. More practically, their people do not respond to rigid direction and organizational structure, while their organizations often compete for resources and support. There is little natural tendency or interest to cooperate.

More than sixty relief agencies were operating in Somalia. Of these, several came out of the UN; the U.S. government's Office of Foreign Disaster a.s.sistance (OFDA) had on-the-ground presence in the form of its Disaster a.s.sistance Response Team (DART); there was agency representation from several other countries; and there were many NGOs-all of them working under Phil Johnston's able coordination mechanism. But coordination was at best still a difficult task.

To begin with, there was resentment of the military intervention. Many agencies feared the military would get credit for any success, even though they themselves had been working in Somalia long before the military. And some agencies opposed military partic.i.p.ation at all in humanitarian relief, on the grounds that we did not understand how to do it and would screw up their efforts. agencies feared the military would get credit for any success, even though they themselves had been working in Somalia long before the military. And some agencies opposed military partic.i.p.ation at all in humanitarian relief, on the grounds that we did not understand how to do it and would screw up their efforts.

Relief workers also tended to develop views about who were the bad guys and who were the good . . . views as often as not based on partial, local experience and friendships, and not on the big picture. In a culture of blood feuds, it's easy to take sides based on proximity. Armed with such biases, relief workers would strongly urge us to get rid of "their" particular enemies, and fight our efforts to bring everyone to the table. It was our view that Somalis themselves had to decide the who and the how of their governance. Many agencies thought they knew a better way . . . without realizing that in so doing they were treating the Somalis like children.

We had our biggest dispute with the agencies over the security mission. The agencies tended to expect us not only to improve general security for everybody, but to actually replace their hired guns and provide them with both full-time mission security for their organizations and full-time personal security. We could not possibly do that. Certainly not without major-and unacceptable-changes on their part.

For starters, there were well over five hundred facilities and residences in Mogadishu alone. Consolidating these would have made security feasible; but NGO culture put such consolidation out of the realm of discussion. The agencies also liked to maintain a "youthful" lifestyle, with a lot of free and easy movement around town at night for parties or other social events. In New York, L.A., London, or Paris, this kind of travel is perfectly safe. In Mogadishu, you'd be crazy to do that without armed protection; and they expected us to provide it. They refused to change their lifestyle, and we refused to provide individual protection. Tempers ran high.

At one point the UN threw an amazing costume party. They were disappointed when we did not accept their invitation to attend.

IF FARMERS and cowboys can be friends, so can relief workers and military. The great majority of relief workers are fine people who bravely do G.o.d's work; yet their culture remains far apart from ours; they tend to see the world from another, though equally valid, perspective. and cowboys can be friends, so can relief workers and military. The great majority of relief workers are fine people who bravely do G.o.d's work; yet their culture remains far apart from ours; they tend to see the world from another, though equally valid, perspective.

In the military, we often have little patience for "save the whales" types-especially when they seem timid and poorly organized. Yet neither do we normally have sufficient understanding of their special expertise, or of how actions that seem logical to us can be counterproductive to their efforts. I had already learned from past experience, and would learn again in Somalia, that we both had to work much harder to understand each other and coordinate our efforts better. The good news: In Somalia, our day-to-day experiences taught both the relief agencies and the military how to do exactly that-such functions as sending out convoys under security, manning and securing feeding stations, constructing facilities, vetting local hired security, and many others were accomplished through the selfless efforts of both sides.

AT THE END of the first day on the ground, General Johnston and I sat down to a.s.sess the situation before he made a report to the CINC. Both of us were encouraged. The meetings with Bob Oakley and Phil Johnston had gone extremely well. ("The Johnston and Oakley team is a definite winner," I said to myself.) The general's guidance was to stay close to both of them, making sure I coordinated the security, political, and humanitarian efforts directly with them. This was fine with me. It made perfect sense. He also asked me to communicate directly not only with his own staff but with the CENTCOM staff; and General h.o.a.r later instructed me to extend my direct communications to the Joint Staff as well. All of this also made perfect sense, though it was highly unusual to grant such access to someone at my level, and meant they had significant trust in me. I was determined to use the access wisely and keep everyone involved well informed. In fact, it allowed us to avoid many potential misunderstandings. of the first day on the ground, General Johnston and I sat down to a.s.sess the situation before he made a report to the CINC. Both of us were encouraged. The meetings with Bob Oakley and Phil Johnston had gone extremely well. ("The Johnston and Oakley team is a definite winner," I said to myself.) The general's guidance was to stay close to both of them, making sure I coordinated the security, political, and humanitarian efforts directly with them. This was fine with me. It made perfect sense. He also asked me to communicate directly not only with his own staff but with the CENTCOM staff; and General h.o.a.r later instructed me to extend my direct communications to the Joint Staff as well. All of this also made perfect sense, though it was highly unusual to grant such access to someone at my level, and meant they had significant trust in me. I was determined to use the access wisely and keep everyone involved well informed. In fact, it allowed us to avoid many potential misunderstandings.

After this wrap-up meeting, I got an update from my guys in the op center: They were making terrific progress setting up our command and control facilities. But reports from our units moving out into the tense streets of Mogadishu were giving me serious concern. There were too many heavily armed men out there. Our guys did see encouraging signs, however. Many people waved and smiled when they saw U.S. Marines.

THE NEXT DAY turned out to be less positive. turned out to be less positive.

To start things off, the bad guys decided to test us quickly, to see if we were made of sterner stuff than the UN troops, whose rules of engagement had made strong response to provocation close to impossible.

We had put up both fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters over the city and its immediate surroundings as a show of force and to provide a source of intelligence, reconnaissance, and cover as we began reaching out beyond the city. That morning, two of these helicopters were fired on by technicals. Though the helos immediately destroyed them, we were not happy that the bad guys were willing to take us on. That was of course a big mistake on their part. The quick and decisive response of the helos demonstrated that we meant business and would not tolerate attacks.

We were not the UN.

This event sparked a widely quoted statement to the press: "Things have changed in Mogadishu," I told them. "Wyatt Earp is in town."

The key meeting that day was with the special representative of the UN Secretary-General, Ismat Kittani, a veteran Iraqi diplomat and senior member of the UN Secretariat, and the military commander of the UN forces in UNOSOM, Pakistani General Mohamed Shaheen. Bob Oakley accompanied us to the UN headquarters, located in a villa in the center of the city that was decidedly more comfortable than our own gutted emba.s.sy. The meeting went badly.

Inside the headquarters, the air was thick with resentment. Kittani, confrontational from the start, was clearly infuriated that the U.S. military had been called to pick up after UNOSOM's failure. And if we then managed to achieve positive results, UNOSOM's failure would seem that much greater. Up until that moment, I'd imagined that the enormous size of the job ahead would make taking credit for success easy for everybody. There was, after all, plenty of work for everybody, including UNOSOM. And if we all together succeeded in making life better for the people who were actually suffering, then we could all go home happy. But for the first time I began to realize how far apart we were from the UN's concept of what had to be done.

Several points of contention emerged.

In general: If the U.S. wanted to take on the job of fixing Somalia, fine. As far as the UN was concerned, let the U.S. do the whole thing.

Specifically: The UN did not intend to take over the mission from us anytime soon; neither did UNOSOM intend to work with us beyond a minimal coordination effort to de-conflict our forces; and they were very reluctant to honor any agreements we made or programs we put in place. We proposed setting up a Somali-led and -manned police force, for example. But UNOSOM was opposed-for all practical purposes-to Somalis leading anything important. They made it equally clear that our agreements with the factions would in no way be binding on UNOSOM.

As a final indignity, Kittani demanded an operational name change. For some reason known only to him, and perhaps to the trackless depths of the UN bureaucracy, our operational name at that point-"Combined Task Force," the standard military t.i.tle given to coalition commands-was unacceptable to the UN; and we would have to change it to "Unified Task Force" (UNITAF).

Such a name change is in fact no big deal . . . such things have little practical importance. But in demanding it, Kittani's arrogance stuck in our craw, and did not help relations that were already starting to get frayed. Still, we did not want to do anything to give the UN an excuse for accusing us of not cooperating, nor did we want to harm efforts to eventually hand the mission back to them; so we accepted the change.

Kittani never let up his hostility, and never lost an opportunity to obstruct our work-even when his obstructions harmed Somalis.

Some time later, Bob Oakley and I worked out a plan with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, for resettling in Somalia the 350,000 Somali refugees then in Kenya. To the immense chagrin of Madame Ogata (whose job was to try to resettle the almost one million refugees scattered around the region and the half-million displaced persons in the country), the UN rejected our plan-without subst.i.tuting another; they simply stonewalled. This kind of thing happened all too often.

In time, I began to learn some of the reasons behind the UN obstruction policy . . . though I still believe they were wrong not to try to work more closely with us. Cooperation and coordination would have helped all of us-not least the Somalis. But I now see that their hesitations were based on genuine fears. Primarily, they were afraid they'd be left holding the bag if chaos and anarchy returned after the eight-hundred-pound gorilla left town. A good point: Chaos and anarchy returned after we left.

As one UN official explained to me: "Boutros-Ghali is afraid you'll hand him a poisoned apple. He won't take the mission from you until he has wrangled as much as he can from the U.S."

What they seemed to want from us, then, was to clean up the country and leave it in a condition that would greatly lessen the ability of the warlords to wage factional war. A worthy goal. But hardly possible without total war.

The big demand from Kittani and Boutros-Ghali was total disarmament of all the Somalis.

Thanks a lot!

There was simply no way we-or anyone-could disarm the Somalis except at the cost of enormous bloodshed. Weapons were everywhere, and most were portable and easily hidden.

This issue became a major bone of contention between the U.S. and UN leadership.

Our thought had been to establish a secure environment, while the UN simultaneously did the things they did best-working on peace agreements, setting up voluntary disarmament programs, reinst.i.tuting a national police force, resettling refugees and displaced persons, and eventually a.s.suming the security mission. But it was evident from this first meeting that they would do nothing beyond sitting there without a new mandate and Security Council resolution.

Up to this point, everybody had made it clear that we were all working together. "Hey, we're all one team" was the constant message. "We have one objective. Let's figure out how to work together." Suddenly, we'd hit a wall. The idea that this would be a kick-start operation of short duration was fading fast. It now looked like we had inherited the whole problem.

After the meeting, I would have been blind to miss General Johnston's and Amba.s.sador Oakley's frustration. Theirs mirrored mine.

More bad news came that day: French troops in Mogadishu had shot up an unarmed bus, killing two Somalis and seriously wounding seven others, after an evidently confused bus driver had run a French roadblock. An angry Somali mob had gathered around the French positions, and we had to move in, negotiate some kind of peace with the warlords, and calm things down.

Later, other complaints about French troops in Mogadishu eventually led us to move them out to an area near the Ethiopian border, where they did great work. This location was no less difficult than Mogadishu, but it was politically less sensitive.