The project was headed up by Amba.s.sador Rich Armitage; Congress approved $100 million for the initial effort.

Though the natural inclination of the military is to avoid getting tangled up in such projects, Generals Galvin and McCarthy jumped on the effort right away. It obviously fitted in with Galvin's long-standing inclinations. He saw the importance of supporting Provide Hope, yet it was far from clear how EUCOM would help.

Early in January, the decision was made to keep the Provide Comfort Crisis Action Team going, with a focus on Provide Hope; and a meeting was held at EUCOM headquarters to decide what else to do. Someone obviously had to link up with Amba.s.sador Armitage and find that out.

Tony Zinni got the call.

General McCarthy turned to Zinni: "We're not sure what this is all about, but it looks like a very good thing, and EUCOM needs to be a big part of it. Rich Armitage is in Bonn [on a trip to solicit European a.s.sistance]. Get up there and tell him you're there to support him. Figure out what he needs and go make that happen."

To Zinni, these are the a.s.signments he loves best-missions that n.o.body knows how to define or execute; and you go out with what are called mission-type orders: "Go get it done."

When Zinni arrived in Bonn, Armitage was holding a meeting with German and U.S. officials at the U.S. Emba.s.sy. During a break, he was ushered into the conference room to meet Armitage.

Armitage, a Naval Academy graduate and later a Navy SEAL, had had a long history in Vietnam both in combat and working for the State Department. In a long career in government, he had been an a.s.sistant Secretary in the Department of Defense, and then an amba.s.sador-at-large-a troubleshooter. In that capacity, he had brought acceptable settlements to a number of knotty negotiations, such as the Philippine bases contract. All the recent Republican administrations have used him as their frontline troubleshooter . . . the man who can handle the really tough jobs, get done what has to get done, no matter what it takes. He has had vast experience both at the Pentagon and in the State Department. (He became Deputy Secretary of State under Colin Powell.) Armitage is a big, powerfully built man, blunt, forceful, to the point, and easily intimidating to those susceptible to intimidation. He does not tolerate fools or people who waste his time, and he doesn't tolerate a lot of idle brainstorming. He knows where he wants to go; he wants to see what people can do, not what they can say. At the same time, he's a very smooth and savvy operator on the playing fields of Washington, with fine-tuned political instincts. He makes few wrong moves.

Zinni took an instant liking to him. All his instincts told him he and this hard-driving diplomat would work well together.

But Armitage was not thrilled when he was introduced to the Marine brigadier general from EUCOM. He was polite enough, but his expression said, "Who the h.e.l.l are you? And what do you want?"

"I'm on orders from EUCOM to report to you," Zinni said, "and get you any military support you need. I'm here to help you."

"I'm not sure I need your help," Armitage answered suspiciously, with an expression that was even less encouraging. His long familiarity with the military-always wary of nonmilitary missions like his-had made him skeptical of generals bearing gifts. It was more than likely that Zinni had been sent to keep an eye on him, and to make sure he didn't tap into military a.s.sets.

Armitage knew he did not need EUCOM, and he made that instantly clear (though without saying so directly). His mission was from the Secretary of State; that is, from a level several notches above EUCOM. And Colin Powell was one of his best friends (and remains so). As far as he was concerned, Zinni-and EUCOM-were probably obstructions rather than solutions. "Who needs EUCOM? I can blow EUCOM away and get whatever I need."

Zinni quietly pressed his case: "General Galvin is totally sincere. He did not send me to sabotage Provide Hope, but to offer you everything we have on a silver platter. We want to help you get this thing off the ground.

"Believe me," he a.s.sured Armitage, "I have both General Galvin's and General McCarthy's ear: You will get what you want."

After a time, Armitage softened into a "Well, we'll see" att.i.tude. That was enough for Zinni.

Back at EUCOM, General McCarthy set up a joint task force (under a special outfit in the Crisis Action Team) to carry out the airlift mission. The JTF was commanded by Brigadier General Jim Hobson, USAF, who had also worked with Zinni on Operation Provide Comfort, and it was composed of U.S. Air Force airlift units-a logistics component to move, stage, handle, and pack the supplies; a psychological operations unit to translate the instructions on how to properly use the relief supplies provided and convey our messages of cooperation; an information bureau to handle the public relations aspects; and the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA), which was tasked to provide advance contact and coordination at the delivery locations.

Though OSIA's mission was normally arms control verification, their capabilities (language, small-team deployability to remote sites, etc.) made them ideal for this task. Many airlift delivery locations were in places U.S. aircraft had never flown into-remote airfields where there was little or no information about fuel availability, field conditions, and navigational aids. The OSIA teams made their way to these locations a week in advance, made the contacts on the ground for handling the supplies, and pa.s.sed on all the necessary information by means of satellite communications.

The U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) supported the operation; EUCOM established a Special Projects Team in their command center to run it; and a Disaster a.s.sistance Response Team from the Office of Foreign Disaster a.s.sistance joined the effort.

The relief supplies themselves came from Cold War stocks, prepositioned in Italy, the Netherlands, and Germany-food, medicine, blankets, and medical supplies-much of it in storage since the 1950s. EUCOM units gathered these up and moved them in a ma.s.sive series of airlifts to places they had never seen before-Dushambe, Almaty, Tashkent, Kiev, Bishket, Baku, and other remote spots in the FSU.

Meanwhile, Armitage's team watched over the JTF, visited countries and organizations in NATO and the European Union (to gain partic.i.p.ation and support for the follow-on efforts), and traveled to the various republics of the FSU (to establish contact with local officials, coordinate future activities, and make a.s.sessments of needs). Secretary of State Baker chaired a multination donors' conference in Washington to solicit support and resources for the long-term effort.

Secretary Baker kicked off the operation in a ceremony at Rhine-Main on January 23, 1992.

EUCOM had put together a system that would deliver everything Armitage might want. Thus when he came to Zinni and asked, "Can we get a plane to deliver medicine to Kiev?" Or: "Can we move some supplies to Almaty?" Zinni got him the airplanes and set up the deliveries. had put together a system that would deliver everything Armitage might want. Thus when he came to Zinni and asked, "Can we get a plane to deliver medicine to Kiev?" Or: "Can we move some supplies to Almaty?" Zinni got him the airplanes and set up the deliveries.

Zinni made things happen-contributing to, demonstrating his loyalty to, and becoming part of Armitage's team; and that impressed Armitage. Loyalty and team playing are important to Armitage-probably a legacy from his military background.

Meanwhile, the two men were connecting on a more personal level. They liked each other's company, and they shared deep, bonding experiences-combat in Vietnam, weight lifting. It didn't take long for Zinni to become one of Armitage's right-hand men.

After a time, somebody asked Zinni, "Okay, so what are you now? What do they call you?"

Zinni gave the question a second's thought, and then made up his t.i.tle: "I'm the Military Coordinator for Armitage," he said. The t.i.tle stuck.

Zinni was provided an office with Armitage's team at the State Department in Washington, and he had another office at the Rhine-Main Air Base53 in Germany, where they were running the JTF. But he spent most of his time crisscrossing Europe with Armitage. They flew to Moscow and St. Petersburg, to Ankara, to Brussels. They dealt with NATO and the EU. They coordinated support, partic.i.p.ation, receipt, and distribution of the aid and the future larger-scale reconstruction effort. They worked with U.S. government a.s.sessment teams on the ground in the FSU and with local officials. They were all over the place. in Germany, where they were running the JTF. But he spent most of his time crisscrossing Europe with Armitage. They flew to Moscow and St. Petersburg, to Ankara, to Brussels. They dealt with NATO and the EU. They coordinated support, partic.i.p.ation, receipt, and distribution of the aid and the future larger-scale reconstruction effort. They worked with U.S. government a.s.sessment teams on the ground in the FSU and with local officials. They were all over the place.

The airlift operation ran until the end of February and delivered 2,100 tons of food and medical supplies to twenty-two locations.

Zinni spent three months on Provide Hope after the end of the airlift. During that time, Armitage worked tirelessly to transform into reality the vision he and the Secretary of State had put together.

As time pa.s.sed and the military requirements ended, Zinni's work for Armitage took him increasingly into the economic54 and political realm. Though Armitage wanted to keep Zinni around, it had grown obvious that the military aspects of Provide Hope had faded away. and political realm. Though Armitage wanted to keep Zinni around, it had grown obvious that the military aspects of Provide Hope had faded away.

"There's no point in your hanging around here anymore," Armitage told Zinni finally. "Why don't you go back to EUCOM? As things move on, we might get you back in, but there's no sense in your hanging out here."

The need for Zinni to come back never materialized. By the end of spring, the mission was folding. The silence from the international community had been deafening. Other countries did not have the will or share the vision; they were simply not interested in partic.i.p.ating in a new Marshall Plan.

What kept them away?

The world of the early '90s was not the world of the late '40s. This wasn't a devastated Europe threatening to collapse into communism. It was a Europe of individual nations who were not only beginning to feel their own oats but had serious problems of their own to solve. The Germans, for instance, had to pay for German reunification.

No one was interested in working under a U.S.-led program . . . or in laying down the necessary resources.

It was nevertheless a badly missed opportunity; and much of the turmoil and instability that came afterward in Russia, the former Yugoslavia, and elsewhere could have been avoided if the nations of the free world and their organizations (like the UN and the EU) had been more farsighted.

ZINNI'S INVOLVEMENT in "Operations Other Than War"-like Provide Comfort, Provide Hope, Provide Promise, and others while at EUCOM-provided a wealth of experience that he later drew on constantly. These were fascinating, exciting missions . . . like military operations, even combat operations. On these missions, he got to do what he loved best-get out into action in the field, but with the added thrill that he was saving people's lives. in "Operations Other Than War"-like Provide Comfort, Provide Hope, Provide Promise, and others while at EUCOM-provided a wealth of experience that he later drew on constantly. These were fascinating, exciting missions . . . like military operations, even combat operations. On these missions, he got to do what he loved best-get out into action in the field, but with the added thrill that he was saving people's lives.

Later he partic.i.p.ated in several other Operations Other Than War-such as the one in Somalia-that have been seen as the most advanced models for military-civil operations, peacekeeping, and humanitarian missions. No one has had more experience in these kinds of operations than Zinni.

Chapter FIVE.

SOMALIA.

AFTER EUCOM , Tony Zinni returned to Quantico as the deputy commanding general of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC). Tony Zinni returned to Quantico as the deputy commanding general of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC).55 The MCCDC watches over the Marine Corps requirements and structure in doctrine, organization, material, training, education, and leadership development; and it manages the Corps' career schools for its officers and enlisted (all of which together make up the Marine Corps University).

It was an obvious a.s.signment for Zinni, yet he was not overjoyed to have it. As he saw it, his recent experience could have been better used in an operational a.s.signment. ("Every officer worth his salt always feels he is the best qualified operator in the Corps," he comments.) On the other hand, returning to Quantico brought him back into the doctrine, training, and education base with which he was familiar. There he'd be at the red-hot center of all the exciting, revolutionary changes that General Gray was creating, and there he himself would be provided with a forum for his own ideas for change. He knew he had a lot to contribute to Quantico. His tour at EUCOM had convinced him that U.S. military services would soon be forced to improve their performance significantly in joint operations and to develop programs for handling the messy new third world missions that were clearly on the horizon.

The Marine Corps, specifically, had to examine its organization, its doctrine, and the way it fought, taking a hard look at the tactics, techniques, and procedures needed for nontraditional missions such as peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. The new missions that he had tackled at EUCOM were not aberrations-the Kurdish relief effort, the NEOs, the engagement with former Warsaw Pact militaries. They were the face of the future. And Zinni was convinced that the Marine Corps, with its tradition of flexibility and resourcefulness, could more easily adapt to these missions than could other services, and pioneer the kind of post-Cold War force that was ideally suited to it.

Zinni was granted his wish to explore these new ideas . . . but not, as it happened, in the cla.s.srooms and on the fields of Quantico. Instead, he became a major player in the most trying and tangled U.S. military peacekeeping operation until the occupation of Iraq in 2003. It made the Kurdish relief in '91 seem like a walk in the park.

By November 1992, Zinni had been at Quantico for six months. Shortly, he would be in the zone for promotion to major general. The next summer would change his fate one way or another; he'd either be moving up to a new command or out into civilian life.

That month, while working to develop a new war game with the Navy, he learned that President Bush had decided to launch a joint task force to conduct a humanitarian operation in Somalia. Zinni was vaguely aware of the desperate and worsening situation in that country-civil war, famine, disease, anarchy, thousands of innocents dying. The news of the humanitarian operation, however, came out of the blue.

In a few days, it would be decided whether the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) or the Army's 18th Airborne Corps would lead the operation. Even though he was in the dark about the operation's actual nature, Zinni knew his EUCOM experiences in joint and humanitarian operations would come in very handy in the planning if I MEF got the call. He immediately went to his boss, Lieutenant General Chuck Krulak,56 to offer his services. to offer his services.

Somewhat to Zinni's surprise, Krulak was enthusiastic. "Hey, listen," he said, "I don't want the operational force to look at Quantico as a drain. I want them to see us as an organization that's there for them. We look out for them; we support them. So if we've got expertise, I want to offer it up."

Krulak called General Carl Mundy, who had replaced General Gray as commandant, and made the offer. General Mundy, in turn, called the commanding general of I MEF, Lieutenant General Bob Johnston. (Zinni had known Johnston for years, had served under him in Okinawa, and had great respect for him.) While these discussions were taking place, Zinni was on his way to Fort Leavenworth for a conference. When he arrived, he had a call from Krulak. "I MEF has been chosen for the mission," Krulak told him, "and General Johnston wants you to take part in it. Get back to Quantico as soon as you can, then call Bob Johnston for further instructions."

"The best possible news!" Zinni thought. The news soon got better.

Back at Quantico, he called Lieutenant General Johnston, still thinking that Johnston would want him primarily for the initial planning. What he heard then just about knocked him over: The commandant had recommended him for chief of staff of the Joint Task Force (JTF) that would be formed around the core of the I MEF staff.57 Since this meant he would be going to Somalia in a leading operational role, he was ecstatic. Since this meant he would be going to Somalia in a leading operational role, he was ecstatic.

But it turned out that Johnston had a better idea. He wanted Zinni to be the director of operations. Even though the chief of staff was the senior position, he felt strongly that this operation was going to be so challenging and complicated that he wanted someone with Zinni's wealth of operational experience, both in combat and in humanitarian missions, to run it. The practicalities of integrating all the pieces of this mission meant that the chief of staff was going to have to back up the chief of operations (in planning and logistics and the like). Operations was where all the action was going to take place.

To Zinni, this was great news. "I don't care about seniority," he told Johnston. "I want the operations job."

The next day he packed his bags, went up to Washington, and joined the CENTCOM58 CINC, General Joe h.o.a.r, for the flight to h.o.a.r's headquarters in Tampa. There they linked up with General Johnston and got a briefing on the operation. Afterward, Zinni was to accompany Johnston back to his headquarters at Camp Pendleton, California, for a week of planning. They were to deploy to Somalia on December 10. CINC, General Joe h.o.a.r, for the flight to h.o.a.r's headquarters in Tampa. There they linked up with General Johnston and got a briefing on the operation. Afterward, Zinni was to accompany Johnston back to his headquarters at Camp Pendleton, California, for a week of planning. They were to deploy to Somalia on December 10.

The plane ride from Washington to Tampa proved to be invaluable. Zinni had known Joe h.o.a.r from his first days in Vietnam (he had first met h.o.a.r in the Rung Sat), and the two had remained friends ever since. h.o.a.r was a savvy operator who had earned a tremendous reputation as the CENTCOM commander. For the duration of the three-hour flight, the two men went over the mission.

Zinni had recommendations based on his recent experiences: techniques, tactics, and organizations (like UNHCR) they'd need to employ if they were dealing with refugees or displaced persons; using Civil Affairs to set up a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) like the one created in Operation Provide Comfort to connect with the NGOs and the UN; using psychological operations (such as avoiding military terminology in order to better convey the humanitarian message).

h.o.a.r listened carefully to Zinni's ideas-most of them totally new to him: Refugees? The third world? NGOs? UN? . . . another universe another universe! After he'd taken them in, he put his arm around Zinni-he's a large, bearish man-and said: "I'm glad I found you. You're the guy we need out there. This is going to be great."

At CENTCOM headquarters, h.o.a.r, Johnston, Zinni, and the staff went over the situation in Somalia and the planning so far.

The Somali people occupy the actual "Horn" of Africa, and are the majorityin northern Kenya, Djibouti, and the now Ethiopian province of Ogaden. They are a clan-based society, with five major clans and numerous subclans, unified in language and ethnic ident.i.ty, separate in customs, lineage, and history. Somalia became a nation in 1960, following a period as an Italian and British colonial possession and a post-World War Two UN mandate. A weak, fractious postmandate government lasted for nine years, but collapsed in 1969 when the first President was a.s.sa.s.sinated and a military dictator, Siad Barre, took over. Barre's rule began well enough for the country, though his early alliance with the Soviets did not sit well with the West. It paid many of his bills, however, and brought in modern weapons.

The good times ended in 1977 when Barre attacked Ethiopia to regain Ogaden. This was a tragic miscalculation-not least because Ethiopia was itself a Soviet client state. The Soviets, forced to choose, tilted toward Ethiopia; and the disastrous war and defeat (in 1978) that followed pitched Somalia into a steep decline.

Barre switched sides from the Soviets to the West, and a period of apparent progress followed-only to be eaten up by corruption, and by the increasing repression of clans other than Siad Barre's own Marehan. As the repression grew to violent a.s.sault and terror, the Siad Barre government rotted from within. The clans fought back, and the nation drifted into civil war. (The conflict started in 1988, but only became general in 1990.) Civil war devastated the country. It was a nation awash in Soviet and Western weapons. Most were ultimately used to kill Somalis. Hundreds of thousands of refugees left the country; hundreds of thousands more were killed in the fighting, or died of starvation and disease. By 1992, half the children born since 1987, and twenty-five percent of the country's children overall, had perished. Inst.i.tutions of government had vanished. Factional feuding among clans only added to the misery.

Millions were still at serious risk.

Siad Barre was driven from power in 1990, but kept fighting in southern Somalia near the border with Kenya, in what was called "the Triangle of Death"-the area between the towns of Baidoa and Bardera, in the interior, and Kismayo, on the coast. Faction leaders controlling the various regions fell to fighting each other. The strongest of these was General Mohammed Farrah Aideed59 of the Hawiye clan . . . but there were many others. of the Hawiye clan . . . but there were many others.

In January 1991, Mogadishu, the capital, was divided between Aideed and the businessman, politician, and local warlord Ali Mahdi Mohamed (previously allies against Siad Barre), after Ali Mahdi turned against Aideed. This was a not totally surprising turnaround. Both were members of the Hawiye clan (yet from different subclans: Aideed was a Habr Gidr and Ali Mahdi was an Abgal; significant differences in Somalia's fractious clan system), and both were also leaders of the same political faction, the United Somali Congress (USC)-but in Somalia, betrayal is the mother's milk of politics.

That same month, the U.S. Emba.s.sy in Mogadishu was evacuated in a last-minute, dramatic rescue by Marine helicopters launched from amphibious ships partic.i.p.ating in Operation Desert Shield.

For several months, the two sides faced off against each other, Aideed in the southern parts of the city and Ali Mahdi in his base in the city's north. Aideed, who was the more experienced and effective military commander and had the benefit of better and heavier weapons (taken from Siad Barre's warehouses), held the stronger position; but fighting between the two warlords was only sporadic. Law and order completely broke down in the city; armed gangs roamed everywhere. No one could control them. Serious fighting finally broke out in September 1991 and raged for several months, leaving little of value intact in Mogadishu.

In May 1992, Aideed finally defeated Barre, who escaped to Kenya, and later found exile in Nigeria. Aideed had proved to be a formidable commander, with powerful credentials to lead his country. He had-as he saw it-liberated Somalia from the dictator Siad Barre, a triumph that ent.i.tledhim to take Barre's place as the national leader. Other faction leaders saw things very differently; and fighting continued. This worsened the famine and destruction throughout the southern part of the country, especially in the Triangle of Death. (The northern provinces, at the actual Horn of Africa, were relatively unaffected and in effect have operated as a more or less independent state.) In 1992, the UN started a humanitarian operation called UNOSOM (UN Operations Somalia), which proved to be powerless and ineffective-too weak to put down the violence . . . or even to provide security for the relief workers. Looting prevented most UN and NGO food and relief supplies from reaching the intended beneficiaries.

In late August of that year, the U.S. also started a humanitarian operation, called "Provide Relief," that airlifted food and medical supplies from Kenya to remote sites in Somalia. Provide Relief aircraft flew nearly 2,500 missions and delivered more than 28,000 metric tons to airfields in southern Somalia. The operation saved lives, but an airlift could not carry nearly enough food and medicine to seriously ease the famine and disease.60 By the fall of 1992, Somalia was a lawless, devastated land ruled by fifteen warlords with their militias and by roving gangs of armed bandits. These traveled around in "technicals," pickup trucks with crew-served weapons mounted on their beds. (They got their name from the relief agencies who had hired out the gangs for protection and charged it off to "technical a.s.sistance.") The relief agencies and NGOs were subject to extortion, pillage, threats, and even murder, sometimes by the very guards they hired.

By November, the chaos and violence in Somalia had made some kind of international action inevitable. After much discussion within the Bush administration and the UN, it was decided that a large military force was needed (modeled after the recent Desert Shield/Desert Storm coalition against Iraq), consisting of at least two American divisions, supplemented by other U.S. and foreign forces. This force would operate with UN approval (under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, authorizing peace enforcementusing "all necessary means" including deadly force), but it would not be a UN-commanded operation. The operation was called "Restore Hope."

The American concept for Restore Hope foresaw the quick establishment of security on the ground, allowing the relief agencies and NGOs to operate freely, followed by a rapid transition to a UN-led peacekeeping operation (though the U.S. expected to continue to supply logistics and support services and a quick reaction force). But there was to be no attempt to disarm the warlords or seriously alter the political landscape.

However, the UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, had different expectations. In his view, Restore Hope's limited time frame and scope would not provide enough security, disarmament, or political change to allow the UN to take responsibility for nation building in Somalia. He wanted the U.S. to embark on a full-scale nationwide disarmament program before there could be any transition to UN peacekeepers.

This ambiguity between the U.S. and the UN understanding of what had to be done came to haunt both the U.S. Restore Hope operation and its UN successor, which came to be called UNOSOM II.

THE FORCE designed to bring initial order to Somalia's chaos was General Johnston's JTF: designed to bring initial order to Somalia's chaos was General Johnston's JTF: The Marine piece would consist of a Marine Air Ground Task Force, centering on the 1st Marine Division, with logistics and air components. The Army had designated the 10th Mountain Division as their part. The Navy was going to bring in maritime preposition ships and a carrier; and naval P-3 aircraft, flying out of Djibouti, would also be available. The Air Force brought in C-130s and a number of other aircraft to augment Marine Corps air. There were also special operations components.

General h.o.a.r was additionally looking at a coalition involvement that would include partic.i.p.ation from African, Gulf region, and Western countries. (He called this "a 3-3-1 Strategy.") Because Somalia was both an African and an Islamic country, it was politically important for CENTCOM to be seen in Africa and in the Islamic world as encouraging their involvement. He also wanted one other Western force as a leavening factor; and the Canadians had already committed to sending a brigade. (Later, the numbers of other partic.i.p.ating countries exploded. By the end of the operation, there were twenty-six of them.) Once the various pieces of the force had arrived in Somalia, they had to be fused together. The CENTCOM and I MEF staffs had already put in much work on that, as well as the more obvious issues of deployment, logistics support, and bases (General h.o.a.r wanted to use regional bases in Kenya and Djibouti as support bases, for example). Sequencing in a large force into the Horn of Africa's slender infrastructure was not going to be easy.

The biggest problem faced by the planners, however, was that they didn't yet understand exactly what had to be done once the forces were on the ground. This was an unusual mission, and few of them really understood its nature. Like General h.o.a.r, they'd had no experience dealing with NGOs and the UN, much less bringing order to a failed third world nation . . . and saving lives there. Though shooting, killing, and destruction were seen as inevitable, this was in no way a typical combat mission. They were groping badly trying to comprehend it.

Here Zinni brought his greatest contribution.

After a day at CENTCOM headquarters, Zinni and the rest of the I MEF staff left for Camp Pendleton. By then, he had a basic understanding of the situation in Somalia and the mission they'd be mounting to deal with it. Yet, at the same time, the situation on the ground was breaking fast, and there was no clear picture of what was actually happening there or what had to be done.

The following week was spent on round-the-clock frantic planning and coordination.

Zinni, Johnston, and key members of their team took off on a C-141 for Somalia on the ninth of December. A Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) had meanwhile been positioned off Mogadishu in amphibious ships and would land to secure the port, airfield, and U.S. Emba.s.sy that day. The command team's C-141 landed on the tenth.

MOGADISHU.

Tony Zinni:

A few hours out of the Mogadishu airport, we received a call that the French government had decided to partic.i.p.ate in the operation and had dispatched a general to Mogadishu from Djibouti, where there was a French base; but the French government had insisted that their general be the first on the ground. Bob Johnston's reply was, "Bulls.h.i.t"; and, as the coalition commander, he ordered the French to stand off as we landed. They complied.

This little show of hauteur had nothing to do with the French military, who were superb troops (and often suffered for their government's arrogance). I knew from operations like Provide Comfort that they were worth their weight in gold on the ground and we welcomed their partic.i.p.ation, despite the initial flap. They did not let us down.

It was hot when we landed (Mogadishu is not far from the equator); and the airport was a wreck, with old Soviet MiGs and other wreckage trashed and in piles off to the side, but Marines from the MEU were already in positions to defend it. We were met by the MEU commander, Greg Newbold,61 who gave us a quick brief on the situation: who gave us a quick brief on the situation: During the night before the MEU's landing, he reported, he had sent in SEALs to recon; somebody had somehow got wind of it and reported this to the Western press who were hanging out in Mogadishu. They came running down to the beach with their klieg lights and cameras for a brilliant media welcome to the SEALs as they swam in. It was a very confused-and later very notorious-moment. (It further convinced me we needed to get a better handle on what was going on here.) Though Aideed had promised that the Marines would have no trouble during their landing (the airport and port were in southern Mogadishu-Aideed territory), Newbold took no chances.62 He immediately seized the port and air- He immediately seized the port and air- field and put out security, pushing out looters and vagrants, then flew up to the abandoned U.S. Emba.s.sy compound and seized it. field and put out security, pushing out looters and vagrants, then flew up to the abandoned U.S. Emba.s.sy compound and seized it.

We came in right behind them, and we immediately began the inflow of forces. Troops would soon be flying into the airfield, marrying up with prepositioned equipment, now being off-loaded. Other units would quickly follow. The Canadian ships were on the way. We expected to spend our next days setting up the command post, receiving troops to rapidly begin operations, and coordinating with the other efforts on the ground.

After the brief from Newbold, we moved to helicopters to fly the short distance to the U.S. Emba.s.sy compound. The sights from the helo as we flew over the city were overwhelming. The place was devastated . . . like Stalingrad after the battle. The people we could see seemed to be mostly combing through the ruins, searching for food or anything else of value.

As we touched down at the emba.s.sy compound, the devastation became more immediate. The effects of the destruction and wanton looting of the buildings and grounds were everywhere. For now, the Marines had set up a hasty security perimeter around the compound, and were in the process of clearing out dead bodies and debris. A few refugees who had taken up residence were also being removed. The emba.s.sy itself was completely gutted. The rooms were blackened from fires and full of trash and human waste. Even the electrical wiring and granite floor tiles had been torn out; every window was broken. Though our troops were hard at work clearing the mess, we knew it would be a long, hard task to get this place ready for operations.

We actually had other alternatives. The UN headquarters, for instance, was in a posh, intact housing compound; and one like it had been offered to Bob Johnston, but he had declined. It was our emba.s.sy-and a symbol of U.S. determination to reclaim its property.

He also did not believe in special frills or comforts for the command element; we ate MREs like the troops and were the last to receive service facilities such as shower units.

As I curled up the first night on the concrete floor of the room where I was sleeping, I wondered how this country could have fallen into such chaos and self-destruction. We faced a daunting task. The infrastructure was either destroyed or else practically unusable. It would take a major engineering effort to improve the roads, airfields, ports, and storage areas-not to mention electrical and water systems. The crude hospitals in Mogadishu were treating forty-five to fifty gunshot wounds on average per day; but these numbers sometimes reached one hundred fifty.

Outside Mogadishu, food and other critical supplies could not get through to the needy. One convoy of twenty-five trucks had started out from Mogadishu the week before we arrived to deliver food to starving Somalis in Baidoa in the Triangle of Death. In order to get out of the city in the first place, the convoy had had to give up three trucks to pay off extortionists; it had lost twelve trucks to hijackers on the roads; and eight trucks were looted as they arrived. Only four trucks made it back to Mogadishu. None of the starving received the food the trucks had carried.

OPERATION Restore Hope The mission of Combined Task Force Restore Hope was to secure the major air and sea facilities, key installations, and major relief distribution sites; provide open and free pa.s.sage for humanitarian relief supplies; provide security for relief convoys and relief organizations; and a.s.sist in providing humanitarian relief under UN auspices. Our only role (as I understood it) was to provide an overwhelming security environment so that much-needed relief supplies could flow freely. This was seen as a short-term operation that would jump-start the stalled humanitarian efforts and give UNOSOM a chance to make adjustments and pick up the mission from us. (I learned later that the UN had a different view of our mission.) We had built our plan in four phases.