Or will it remain so,

Until comes upon us the end of time?

Is it possible, I wonder, that for us too,

A star will emerge out of the firmament?

Let luck be on our side for once.

Afterword.

Two years after the ouster of Saddam Hussein, three years after my travels through the region, much in Kurdistan-the poverty, the dispossession, the repression-remains the same. Yet a number of important changes of enormous potential have occurred, and I remain cautiously optimistic regarding the future of the Kurds.

For the past year, Iraq has consistently dominated the front-page headlines, often with reports of horrific violence: suicide bombings, kidnappings, mob lynchings, beheadings. But with only few exceptions-most notably the February 2004 bombings of Kurdish party headquarters, which left 109 dead-almost all of this violence has occurred outside the Kurdish region. While the rest of Iraq has roiled and burned, Kurdistan has remained remarkably calm and has in fact flourished, due in large part to the effective Kurdish regional government and peshmerga. Foreign investment has been funneling in, exiled Iraqi Kurds have returned home, Kurdish culture has blossomed, and new schools, roads, water treatment plants, shopping centers, hotels, restaurants, cafes, and small businesses have opened up.

During the national elections of January 30, 2005-Iraq's first democratic elections in over fifty years-the Iraqi Kurds turned out by the hundreds of thousands. Virtually all voted for the Kurdistan Alliance List, a combined ticket of KDP and PUK candidates; the two parties had set aside their differences in order to win the largest possible bloc of seats in the 275-seat National a.s.sembly (75, in the end, putting them in second place behind the Shiites' United Iraqi Alliance, which won 140). The Kurds' large showing guaranteed them major positions in the new government and an influential role in the forging of the new const.i.tution.

In a jubilant post-election mood, many Kurds saw themselves at a historic turning point. "Indeed it was a great day in the history of Iraq . . ." one Kurdish friend wrote me in an e-mail. "For the Kurdish people it was their first chance in their life to vote for their future, for freedom, peace, and democracy." "Oh my G.o.d, for people in my age group and older this is unbelievable . . ." wrote another. "The new experience of free voting today for Iraqis was huge, just huge."

Other Iraqi Kurds were not as sanguine. The elections were problematic on the regional level. The joint KDP-PUK slate for the 111-seat regional Kurdish parliament-which also included candidates from Arab, Turcoman, and Christian parties-meant that the powers-that-be had already decided on the distribution of seats pre-election. As one Kurd put it, "Democracy is supposed to be about choice, but where was the choice here? It was like having George Bush and John Kerry on the same ticket." That complaint echoed other ongoing complaints about the parties' continuing nepotism, the near impossibility of obtaining jobs without party membership, and the parliament representatives receiving fat salaries for doing little. Far from diminishing post-Saddam, as many Iraqi Kurds had hoped, the parties' abuse of power appeared to be as fully entrenched in early 2005 as it was during my 2002 visit.

The question of an independent Iraqi Kurdistan remains a volatile issue. The vast majority of Iraqi Kurds want nothing to do with their Arab compatriots. In a February 2004 pet.i.tion delivered to the United Nations, 1.7 million Kurds-about half the Iraqi Kurdish population-voted for independence. An informal referendum held on Iraqi election day resulted in a similar statistic, with 1.9 million, or 95 percent of those polled, voting for independence. Nonetheless, most Kurdish politicians-no matter what they might hope for in their hearts-remain publicly committed to building a unified, federated Iraq. Given the many impediments to independence, theirs is the more realistic position, but it is creating a widening rift between the party leaders and their const.i.tuents.

Oil-rich Kirkuk remains at the heart of the debate about Iraqi Kurdish independence. Kurds, Arabs, and Turcomans all continue to claim the city as their own. Disturbingly little progress has been made regarding the property claims of Kurds ousted during Saddam's "Arabization" campaign, and animosity between the three ethnic groups is riding high. Some say civil war is right around the corner. After the January 2005 elections, Kurds claimed victory as well as a majority presence in Kirkuk, but those results were not conclusive. The election committee had allowed about 70,000 Kurdish refugees in the city to vote, leading the major Arab parties, fearing the "busing in" of ineligible Kurdish voters, to boycott the elections.

The Iraqi Kurds face other worrisome issues as well: The majority Shiites might try to establish an Islamic state, Iran might try to unduly influence the Shiite politicians, Turkey might threaten the Iraqi Kurds' autonomy and ambitions. But the Kurds' strong showing in the Iraqi national election promises to help mitigate these and other potential problems. With the second-largest bloc in the National a.s.sembly, and a two-thirds vote needed to pa.s.s the new const.i.tution, the Kurds are in an excellent position to both limit the Shiites' power and to push through various demands of their own, including the continuation of their semi-autonomous zone. As long as Iraq holds together-a big "if," granted-the Kurds should be able to stand fast against their Arab compatriots and other threats.

This past year has brought change to Turkey. In December 2004, the European Union finally voted to allow Turkey to begin membership negotiations in October 2005. That vote was deemed an enormous victory for the republic, even though full-fledged membership is still at least a decade away, due to the mult.i.tude of conditions-including an improvement in minority rights-that the EU has placed upon the country.

Over the past year, Turkey's human rights record has continued to improve, but only slowly and fitfully, with two steps forward, one step back. Hopefully, the setting of an EU negotiations date will lead the republic to work harder to implement the many bold reforms it pa.s.sed over the last two years, but only time will tell.

On the plus side of Turkey's 2004 human rights record: In June, Turkish state radio and television started broadcasting limited weekly shows in Kurdish, and the new law abolishing the state security courts-often used to prosecute people for non-violent, antigovernment opinions-went into effect. Also in June, Leyla Zana, the Kurdish parliamentarian jailed in 1994 after speaking Kurdish during her swearing-in ceremony, was released from prison, along with her three colleagues jailed for the same offense. In October, Istanbul's first and Turkey's sixth private Kurdish language education center opened its doors. And throughout the year, there were fewer reported cases of torture and ill-treatment in Turkish prisons.

On the minus side: Although Zana and her colleagues were released, they were forced to stand retrial, starting in late February 2005; even if they are convicted, they are unlikely to go back to prison. Despite the abolition of the state security courts, several writers received prison sentences for non-violent expressions of opinion; one, Hakan Albayrak, was sentenced for fifteen months under the "Law on Crimes Against Atatrk" for writing that prayers were not said at Atatrk's funeral. Despite the fewer number of reported cases of torture and ill-treatment in prisons, incidents of beating, s.e.xual a.s.sault, and the use of electric shock and hosing with cold water continued. The Turkish government did nothing to help the hundreds of thousands of Kurds displaced during the civil war to return to their villages, and abuses by the village guards continued.

Complicating matters was the fact that KONGRA-GEL, as the PKK renamed itself, declared an end to its five-year unilateral ceasefire on June 1, 2004. The group resumed attacks in the southeast and was also blamed by the Turkish security forces for the bombing of two hotels in Istanbul in August, which left two dead and eleven injured. Predictably, the Turkish state responded to the rebels' attacks with a heavy hand, igniting Kurdish fears of renewed ant.i.terror operations. The resumed armed conflict resulted in about 220 dead and 125 wounded in 2004, according to the Diyarkabir Human Rights a.s.sociation.

Many of Turkey's Kurds are quietly questioning why KONGRA-GEL/ PKK is again resorting to violence at a time when human rights conditions are finally improving; the guerrillas' actions are putting the Kurds' recent gains at risk. A deeply ingrained distrust of Turkey's sincerity in reform is a large part of the answer. "We've come a long way," Sezgin Tanrikulu, the human rights lawyer I met in Diyarbakir, told The New York Times in October. "But no matter how harshly we condemn, the idea of violence continues to have a hold on the minds of young people. To expel it, there have to be much more courageous steps toward cultural rights and democratization."

About 5,000 KONGRA-GEL/PKK guerrillas continue to hide out in the mountains of northern Iraq. Turkey has repeatedly asked the Iraqis and the United States to take action against the rebels, but has thus far failed in its request, as the troops already have their hands full battling the Iraqi insurgents. Turkey has managed to convince Iran to cooperate, however. In July, Iran launched attacks on the far fewer number of KONGRA-GEL/PKK guerrillas hiding in its mountains-resulting in twelve deaths-and declared the group to be a terrorist organization.

Meanwhile, the situation for Iranian Kurds remains largely unchanged. Over the past year, several Kurdish publications daring to address political issues have been shut down, and Kurdish dissidents continue to languish in prisons.

Syria erupted into interethnic Kurdish-Arab violence in March during a football match between a Syrian Kurdish team and one supported by the country's Baathists. Some members of the audience began shouting "Death to the Kurds, long live Saddam, long live Fallujah," and shot at least three Kurds dead. Those deaths led to Kurdish rioting and a huge demonstration in Qamishli, during which another 25 to 40 people were killed. The Syrian authorities then arrested more than 2,000 Kurds. Among them were at least 20 children age 14 to 17, who were tortured and held incommunicado for over three months.

Where exactly does all this leave the Kurds? That question remains as difficult to answer today as it was a year ago. The regional tides could still flow in many different directions. Iraq could collapse into civil war, the Iraqi Kurds could insist on full independence, Turkey could backslide into deeper repression, KONGRA-GEL/PKK could reignite a civil war, and Iran and Syria could crack down harder than ever on their Kurdish populations.

Nonetheless, it does seem to me that progress is slowly being made overall. The Kurds of Iraq and Turkey are in a significantly better position now than they were ten years ago and in a somewhat better position now than they were one year ago. The Kurds of Syria and Iran continue to suffer under considerable repression but are holding their own. All Kurdish eyes are trained on Iraq and Turkey; whatever happens there could affect the Kurds of all nations.

New York City

February 15, 2005

Notes.

For background information, I am especially indebted to the works of two foremost scholars of Kurdish studies, David McDowall and Martin van Bruinessen. After Such Knowledge, What Forgiveness? by Jonathan Randal and "When Worlds Collide: The Kurdish Diaspora from the Inside Out," a Ph.D. dissertation by Diane E. King also inform much of the Iraq section, while Atatrk's Children: Turkey and the Kurds by Jonathan Rugman and Roger Hutchings, and Turkey's Kurdish Question by Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller inform much in the Turkey chapters. The Kurds: State and Minority in Turkey, Iraq and Iran by James Ciment, The Kurds: A Concise Handbook by Mehrdad E. Izady, Michael M. Gunter's works on Iraq and Turkey, Human Rights Watch publications, and the listserv articles of the Washington Kurdish Inst.i.tute were also especially helpful.

CHAPTER ONE: Through the Back Door.

810: population figures: based on estimates in David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, pp. 34 and 466; Jonathan Randal, After Such Knowledge, What Forgiveness?, p. 16; and Diane E. King, "When Worlds Collide: The Kurdish Diaspora from the Inside Out," Ph.D. dissertation, p. 19.

10: growing national consciousness of Kurds: Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, Turkey's Kurdish Question, pp. 14; McDowall, A Modern History, pp. 45560; and Martin van Bruinessen in Susan Meiselas, Kurdistan: In the Shadow of History, p. 374.

10: Xenophon quote: cited in Randal, After Such Knowledge, p. 21, from Anabasis, IX, 13.

10: Kurds' first loyalty to tribal leaders: McDowall, A Modern History, p. 21.

10: "golden age": Mehrdad Izady, The Kurds: A Concise Handbook, p. 41.

11: tension between Muslim and Kurdish ident.i.ties: King, "When Worlds Collide," pp. 25355.

12: successful balance of power in Ottoman-Safavid era: McDowall, A Modern History, p. 25 and following.

13: "a thousand sighs": cited in Randal, After Such Knowledge, p. 12, from Rene Mauries, Le Kurdistan ou la mort, 1967, p. 1; and Thomas Bois, The Kurds, p. 136.

14: Prometheus in the Caucasus: Yo'av Karny, Highlanders: A Journey to the Caucasus, p. xv.

14: bilad es-siba', "refreshed and in motion": Carleton S. c.o.o.n, Caravan: The Story of the Middle East, p. 295.

15: number of villages destroyed: the often-cited figure of four thousand refers to the total number destroyed while the Baath Party was in power. Carole A. O'Leary, "The Kurds of Iraq: Recent History, Future Prospects," p. 2.

CHAPTER TWO: Arrival.

20: Mulla Mustafa's revolt continuing to present day: Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds of Iraq: Tragedy and Hope, p. 19.

21: "inability of the feudalist": cited in McDowall, A Modern History, p. 343, from a PUK publication, Revolution in Kurdistan.

22: elections deemed mostly free and fair: "Elections in Iraqi Kurdistan (May 19, 1992): An Experiment in Democracy," a report from international election observers, sponsored by the European Human Rights Foundation, London/Brussels.

25: comparison of KDP and PUK: James Ciment, The Kurds: State and Minority in Turkey, Iraq and Iran, pp. 1920; and International Crisis Group, "War in Iraq: What's Next for the Kurds," p. 2.

25: populations: 2003 estimates from World Food Program, United Nations.

26: double-edged sword of Ottoman arrangements: McDowall, A Modern History, p. 31.

31: "fear and dread": Ely Bannister Soane, To Mesopotamia and Kurdistan in Disguise, p. 367.

CHAPTER THREE: The Little Engine That Could.

4041: Algiers Accord overview: Randal, After Such Knowledge, pp. 14582, and Ismet Sheriff Vanly in Gerard Chaliand, A People Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan, pp. 16777. Pike Report quote as cited in Chaliand, p. 170. Kissinger quote as cited in Randal, p. 166.

41: "I trust America": cited in Randal, After Such Knowledge, p. 156, from Barzani interview by Jim Hoagland, The Washington Post, 1973.

53: Hussein as the perpetrator of all evil: King, "When Worlds Collide," p. 10.

CHAPTER FOUR: After al-Anfal.

5556: Anfal overview: Human Rights Watch/Middle East, Iraq's Crime of Genocide: The Anfal Campaign, pp. 122; Randal, After Such Knowledge, pp. 21035; McDowall, A Modern History, pp. 25763.

55: numbers killed in Anfal: Human Rights Watch estimates 100,000. The Kurds, using figures compiled by the PUK, estimate 182,000.

56: total number killed during Baath regime: O'Leary, "The Kurds of Iraq," p. 2.

56: " 'a final solution' ": Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, The Anfal Campaign in Iraqi Kurdistan: Destruction of Koreme, p. 7.

57: "I will kill them all": from 1988 audiotape of meeting of Iraqi officials. Available from www.hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanfal/APPENDIXA.htm.

CHAPTER SIX : Balancing Acts.

88: "covered their heads with a veil": Claudius James Rich, Narrative of a Residence in Koordistan, pp. 15355; King, "When Worlds Collide," pp. 4041.

89: "the place was a desert": A. H. Layard, Nineveh and Its Remains, p. 142.

96: decline in Muslim-Christian relations and Layard's reaction: Martin van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State, pp. 23031. "cause of much jealousy": Layard, Nineveh, p. 156.

98: losses during Kurdish-Turkish conflict: official government figures are 37,000 people killed, 3,165 villages destroyed, and 378,335 rendered homeless. Human rights groups estimate the number of homeless to be at least 1 million. Kurdish Human Rights Project estimates 3 million; Human Rights Watch, between 1 and 2.5 million.

99: PKK-Iraqi Kurd relations: Barkey and Fuller, Turkey's Kurdish Question, pp. 4853, 16061; Michael Gunter in Robert Olson, The Kurdish National Movement in the 1990s: Its Impact on Turkey and the Middle East, pp. 5062; and McDowall, A Modern History, pp. 38391.

99: "combat the PKK": cited by Gunter in Olson, Kurdish National Movement, p. 52, from Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Western Europe, Dec. 18, 1991, p. 55.

99: "calan is the enemy": Ibid., p. 58, from FBIS-WEU, Sept. 5, 1995, p. 30.

100: "Kurdistani" ident.i.ty: O'Leary, "The Kurds of Iraq," p. 7.