I beg to call your attention to another editorial in the Springfield _Republican_, ent.i.tled "Why Germany Must Surrender," hereto attached.

Speaking of Germany's promises, I mention still another editorial from the Springfield _Republican_ which concludes by saying, "Even Mr.

Wilson is not so simple-minded as the Kaiser may once have thought him to be."

It is the hand of Prussianism which offers this peace to America. As long ago as last June you exposed the hollowness of peace offered under such conditions as are now set forth by the German Chancellor.

Referring to the German Government, you said: "It wishes to close its bargain before it is too late and it has little left to offer for the pound of flesh it will demand."

In your speech of September 27th, you said:

"We are all agreed that there can be no peace obtained by any kind of bargain or compromise with the governments of the Central Empires, because we have dealt with them already and have seen them deal with other governments that were parties to this struggle, at Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest. They have convinced us that they were without honour and do not intend justice. They observe no covenants, accept no principle but force and their own interest We cannot 'come to terms'

with them. They have made it impossible. The German people must by this time be fully aware that we cannot accept the word of those who forced this war upon us. We do not think the same thoughts or speak the same language of agreement." Certainly, the German people are not speaking through the German Chancellor. It is the Kaiser himself. He foresees the end and will not admit it. He is still able to dictate conditions, for, in the statement which appeared in the papers yesterday, he said: "It will only be an honourable peace for which we extend our hand."

The other day you said: "We cannot accept the word of those who forced this war upon us." If this were true then, how can we accept this offer now? Certainly nothing has happened since that speech that has changed the character of those in authority in Germany. Defeat has not chastened Germany in the least. The tale of their retreat is still a tale of savagery, for they have devastated the country and carried off the inhabitants; burned churches, looted homes, wreaking upon the advancing Allies every form of vengeance that cruelty can suggest.

In my opinion, your acceptance of this offer will be disastrous, for the Central Powers have made its acceptance impossible by their faithlessness.

TUMULTY.

While the President was conferring with Secretaries Lansing, Daniels, Baker, and Colonel House, I addressed the following letter to President Wilson and a practically identic letter to Colonel House:

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

7 October, 1918.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

Since I returned, every bit of information that comes to me is along one line and that is, that an agreement in which the Kaiser is to play the smallest part will be looked upon with grave suspicion and I believe its results will be disastrous. In my opinion, it will result in the election of a Republican House and the weakening, if not impairing of your influence throughout the world. I am not on the inside and so I do not know, but I am certain that Lloyd George and Clemenceau will take full advantage of this opportunity in declaring that, so far as they are concerned, they are not going to sit down at the Council Table with William the Second, and you may be put in a position before the world, by your acceptance of these conditions, of seeming to be sympathetic with the Kaiser and his brood.

May not Germany be succeeding in splitting the Allies by this offer, just as Talleyrand succeeded, at the Congress of Vienna, in splitting the allies who had been victorious over Napoleon? You cannot blot out the record you have made in your speeches, which in every word and line showed a distrust of this particular autocracy, with which you are now asked to deal. Have you considered the possibility that as soon as Germany read your New York speech of September 27th, knowing, as they did, that it was neither palatable to the Allies nor in accordance with that which they had hitherto stood for, promptly accepted your att.i.tude as a means of dividing the Entente at a critical moment and robbing her of the benefits of the military triumph? Did not Talleyrand do the very same thing to them, as the representative of defeated France, when he sided with Russia and Prussia as against England and thus made possible the return of Napoleon?

I realize the great responsibility that rests upon the President. In any other matter, not so vital as this, you could be wrong and time would correct it, but in a thing like this, when you are dealing with a question which goes to the very depths of international action and world progress, you are at the parting of the ways. If you wish to erect a great structure of peace, you must be sure and certain that every brick in it, that every ounce of cement that goes in it is solid and lasting, and above all, you must preserve your prestige for the bigger moments to come.

Sincerely, TUMULTY

Upon the conclusion of the conference, I had a talk with Colonel House and Secretaries Daniels, Lansing, and Baker, and again urged the necessity of a refusal on the part of the President to accept the German peace terms.

Secretary Lansing informed me that the President had read my letter to the conference and then said: "We will all be satisfied with the action the President takes in this matter."

While at luncheon that afternoon, the President sent for me to come to the White House. I found him in conference with Secretary Lansing, Colonel House, and Mr. Polk. The German reply was discussed and I was happy when I found that it was a refusal on the part of the President to accept the German proposal.

The gist of the President's reply was a demand from him of evidence of a true conversion on the part of Germany, and an inquiry on the part of the President in these words:

"Does the Imperial Chancellor mean that the German Government accepts the Fourteen Points?" "Do the military men of Germany agree to withdraw all their armies from occupied territories?", and finally: "The President wishes to know whether the Chancellor speaks for the old group who have conducted the war, or does he speak for the liberated peoples of Germany?"

Commenting upon the receipt of the President's reply to the Germans, Andre Tardieu says:

It is a brief reply which throws the recipients into consternation they cannot conceal. No conversation is possible, declares the President, either on peace or on an armistice until preliminary guarantees shall have been furnished. These are the acceptation pure and simple of the bases of peace laid down on January 8, 1918, and in the President's subsequent addresses; the certainty that the Chancellor does not speak only in the names of the const.i.tuted authorities who so far have been responsible for the conduct of the war; the evacuation of all invaded territories. The President will transmit no communication to his a.s.sociates before having received full satisfaction on these three points.

What must be the thought of those partisans in America who were crying out against the preliminary course of the President in dealing with Germany, who read this paragraph from Tardieu's book as to the impressions made in France and Germany by the notes which the President from week to week addressed to the Germans with reference to the Armistice?

Again Tardieu says:

Then comes the thunderbolt. President Wilson refuses to fall into the trap and, crossing swords in earnest, presses his attack to the utmost in the note of October 14. A mixed commission for evacuation? No!

These are matters which like the Armistice itself "must be left to the judgment and advice of the military advisers of the Allied and a.s.sociated Governments." Besides no armistice is possible if it does not furnish "absolutely satisfactory safeguards and guarantees of the maintenance of the present military supremacy of the armies of the United States and of its allies." Besides, no armistice "so long as the armed forces of Germany continue the illegal and inhuman practices which they still persist in." Finally, no armistice so long as the German nation shall be in the hands of military power which has disturbed the peace of the world. As to Austria-Hungary, Germany has no interest therein and the President will reply directly. In a single page the whole poor scaffolding of the German Great General Staff is overthrown. The Armistice and peace are not to be the means of delaying a disaster and of preparing revenge. On the main question itself the reply must be Yes or No!

In the books of Ludendorff and Hindenburg we see the shattering effect of the President's answer upon the German military mind. Whatever misunderstanding and misrepresentation of the President's position there might be in his own country, whatever false rumours spread by party malice to the effect that he had entered into negotiations with Germany without the knowledge of the Allies and was imposing "soft" terms on Germany to prevent a march to Berlin, the German commanders were under no illusions.

They knew that the President meant capitulation and that in his demand he had the sanction of his European a.s.sociates.

Says Ludendorff:

This time he made it quite clear that the Armistice conditions must be such as to make it impossible for Germany to resume hostilities and to give the powers allied against her unlimited power to settle themselves the details of the peace accepted by Germany. In my view, there could no longer be doubt in any mind that we must continue the fight.

Said Hindenburg in an order "for the information of all troops," an order never promulgated:

He [Wilson] will negotiate with Germany for peace only if she concedes all the demands of America's allies as to the internal const.i.tutional arrangements of Germany.... Wilson's answer is a demand for unconditional surrender. It is thus unacceptable to us soldiers.

In Andre Tardieu's book we read that from October 5th, the day when Germany first asked for an armistice, President Wilson remained in daily contact with the European governments, and that the American Government was in favour of writing into the Armistice harsher terms than the Allies thought it wise to propose to the Germans. It will be recalled that the popular cry at the time was "On to Berlin!" and an urgent demand upon the part of the enemies of the President on Capitol Hill that he should stand pat for an unconditional surrender from Germany; that there should be no soft peace or compromise with Germany, and that we should send our soldiers to Berlin. At the time we discussed this att.i.tude of mind of certain men on the Hill, the President said: "How utterly foolish this is!

Of course, some of our so-called military leaders, for propaganda purposes only, are saying that it would be more advantageous for us to decline the offer of Germany and to go to Berlin. They do not, however, give our people any estimate of the cost in blood and money to consummate this enterprise."

The story was also industriously circulated that Marshal Foch was demurring to any proposition for a settlement with Germany.

It appears now that in the negotiations for the Armistice Colonel House, representing the President's point of view in this vital matter, asked this fundamental question of Foch: "Will you tell us, Marshal, purely from a military point of view and without regard to any other condition, whether you would prefer the Germans to reject or sign the Armistice as outlined here?" Marshal Foch replied: "The only aim of war is to obtain results. If the Germans sign an armistice now upon the general lines we have just determined, we shall have obtained the results we asked. Our aims being accomplished, no one has the right to shed another drop of blood."

It was said at the time that the President was forcing settlement upon the military leaders of the Allies. General Foch disposed of this by saying, in answer to a question by Colonel House and Lloyd George: "The conditions laid down by your military leaders are the very conditions which we ought to and could impose after the success of our further operations, so that if the Germans accept them now, it is useless to go on fighting."

It was all over, and the protagonist of the grand climax of the huge drama was Woodrow Wilson, the accepted spokesman of the Allies, the Nemesis of the Central Powers, who by first isolating them through his moral appeal to the neutral world was now standing before them as the stern monitor, demanding that they settle not on their terms, but on his terms, which the Allies had accepted as their terms.

I shall never forget how happy he looked on the night of the Armistice when the throngs surged through Pennsylvania Avenue, in Washington, and he, unable to remain indoors, had come to the White House gates to look on, in his face a glow of satisfaction of one who realizes that he has fought for a principle and won. In his countenance there was an expression not so much of triumph as of vindication.

As a light ending to a heavy matter, I may say here that when the Armistice terms were finally accepted, the President said: "Well, Tumulty, the war's over, and I feel like the Confederate soldier General John B.

Gordon used to tell of, soliloquizing on a long, hard march, during the Civil War: 'I love my country and I am fightin' for my country, but if this war ever ends, I'll be dad-burned if I ever love another country.'"

CHAPTER x.x.xV

APPEAL FOR A DEMOCRATIC CONGRESS

The President's appeal to the country of October 24, 1918, asking for the election of a Democratic Congress, brought down upon him a storm of criticism and ridicule. Many leading Democrats who had strongly urged an appeal by the President as a necessary and proper thing in the usual war situation which confronted him, as the criticism directed toward it grew more bitter, turned away from it and criticized what they said was the inept.i.tude and lack of tact of the President in issuing it. As a matter of fact, opinion in the Democratic ranks as to the wisdom and necessity of a general appeal was unanimous prior to the issuance of the statement. What the President was seeking to do when he asked the support of the country through the election of a Democratic Congress was to prevent divided leadership at a moment when the President's undisputed control was a necessity because of the effect a repudiation of his administration would work upon the Central Powers. He realized that the defeat of his administration in the midst of the World War would give aid and comfort to the Central Powers, and that the Allied governments would themselves interpret it as a weakening of our war power and while the enemy would be strengthened, our a.s.sociates would be distressed and disheartened.

He looked upon it, therefore, not as a partisan matter but as a matter involving the good faith of America.

At previous elections the White House had been inundated with requests from particular senators and congressmen, urging the President to write letters in their behalf, and this had resulted in so much embarra.s.sment to the Chief Executive that as the critical days of the November elections of 1918 approached, the President was forced to consider a more general and, if possible, a more diplomatic method of handling this difficult situation. The gentlemen who criticized the appeal as outrageously partisan evidently forgot that for months Will Hays, chairman of the Republican National Committee, had been busily engaged in visiting various parts of the country and, with his coadjutors in the Republican National Committee, openly and blatantly demanding an emphatic repudiation of the Administration from the country.

The President and I discussed the situation in June, 1918, and I was asked by him to consider and work out what might be thought a tactful, effective plan by which the President, without arousing party rancour or bitterness, might make an appeal to the country, asking for its support. I considered the matter, and under date of June 18, 1918, I wrote him a letter, part of which was given over to a discussion of the way the matter might discreetly be handled:

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON