Tents are a great and important feature in any long campaign. I don't hesitate to say that the single canvas bell tent as supplied to the British Forces, should be at once converted into double canvas tents.

In the many long sweltering days when the Natal Field Force before Colenso, and later at Elandslaagte, were forced to lie doing nothing, the heat of the sun coming through the tent was very bad; one was always obliged to wear a helmet inside one's tent; and I think in the men's tents (ours with, say, ten in them, and the military who had, I am told, up to fifteen in one tent) the state of things was abominably unhealthy under the blazing South African sun, and I am persuaded that half the sickness among the forces was due to this insufficient protection from the sun. The double canvas bell tent with air s.p.a.ce in between the two parts does very well, in both keeping heat and cold off. The Indian tents, of khaki canvas, double and generally square-shaped, are much the best ones we saw on the Natal side and should be used generally in the Army; the extra expense would be saved in the end by prevention of fever and sunstroke.

My own experience (when I and three other officers lay in a field hospital outside Ladysmith just after the relief, in a single bell tent, and saw Tommies all around us crowded into these tents with fever and dysentery, whereby all our cases, I am sure, were made much worse by the torturing sun which poured in all day on our heads), makes me very glad that the "Hospital Commission" is now sitting, and I sincerely hope that such absurd mistakes will be noticed and corrected by them for the good of the whole British Forces.

Regarding the Mauser rifle, as compared with the Lee-Metford, I personally have little experience, but I can only say that the Mauser to hold and carry is much the better balanced of the two, and that the fine sighting is superior. Also some military officers seem to say it is a better shooter at long ranges, and its magazine action is far quicker and superior.[9] Revolvers, as far as I know, have had no test at all in this war. The cavalry carbine, I believe, is universally condemned by all cavalry officers out here, and is doomed to go I hope, being, if used against foes with modern weapons, only waste lumber.

[Footnote 9: Since writing this about the Mauser, Captain Cowper of the Queen's tells me that on the whole he considers the Lee-Metford superior, and that the Boers he has met have told him they hold it to be a harder shooter at long ranges.

However, it seems to me that the better balance and magazine of the Mauser counteract this and give it the preference.]

I believe that I am right in saying that pouches for carrying the rifle ammunition are universally condemned in favour of a bandolier, with flaps over every ten cartridges or so. In our Naval bandoliers the want of these flaps was especially noticeable, and the wastage of ammunition dropped out was, I am sure, excessive, besides leaving loose ammunition lying about for Boer or Kaffir to pick up, as they are reported to be doing. The web bandolier is lighter than the leather, and better, so I recommend it, if fitted with flaps, to the notice of the Naval authorities.

APPENDIX II

EXTRACTS FROM SOME OF THE DESPATCHES, REPORTS, AND TELEGRAMS, REGARDING OPERATIONS MENTIONED IN THIS JOURNAL

[_London Gazette_, January 26th, 1900.]

_From General Sir Redvers Buller, V.C., G.C.B._

Chieveley Camp, _December 17th, 1899._

[_Extract._]

I enclose a reconnaissance sketch of the Colenso position. All visible defences had been sh.e.l.led by eight naval guns on the 13th and 14th.

During all this time and throughout the day, the two 4.7 and four 12-pounder Naval guns of the Naval Brigade and Durban Naval Volunteers, under Captain E. P. Jones, R.N., were being admirably served, and succeeded in silencing every one of the enemy's guns they could locate.

[_London Gazette_, March 30th, 1900.]

_From Captain E. P. Jones, R.N., Commanding Naval Brigade._

Chieveley Camp, _December 16th, 1899._

[_Extract._]

The whole force under Sir Redvers Buller advanced at 4 a.m. yesterday, intending to take the positions of the enemy on the other side of the Tugela. The Brigade under my command was disposed as follows:--Two 4.7 guns and four 12-pounders which were on the outpost line in a position 10,000 yards from the main works of the enemy, from which place we had been sh.e.l.ling them on the previous day, advanced to a small rise about 5,000 yards from the entrenched hills across the Tugela. Six 12-pounders under Lieutenant Ogilvy with Lieutenant James of H.M.S.

_Tartar_ and Lieutenant Deas of _Philomel_ were attached to the Field Artillery under Colonel Long. Two 12-pounders under Lieutenant Burne held the kopje from which we advanced.

[_London Gazette_, March 12th, 1901.]

_From Captain Jones, R.N., Commanding Naval Brigade, Natal._

Naval Camp, Spearmans Hill, _February 8th, 1900._

[_Extract._]

As to Vaal Krantz, the Naval guns were disposed as follows: ... Two 12-pounders with Lieutenant Burne on the plateau between this hill and the river. At daylight on the 6th, Lieutenant Burne's two guns were moved to a position at the east of Zwartz Kop.

February 18th, 1900. Lieutenant Burne with two 12-pounder guns was left with General Warren at Spearmans and marched on the 10th to Springfield Bridge where he remains under Colonel Burn-Murdoch.

From General Sir R. Buller to Admiral Sir R. Harris, March 5th, 1900.

"I much appreciate your congratulations. I can hardly tell you how much of our successes are due to the Navy: their gunnery was admirable."

Report from Lieutenant Burne, R.N., February 16th, 1900, enclosed in letter of March 28th, 1900, from the Commander-in-Chief, Cape of Good Hope Station.

_Report from Lieutenant Burne, R.N._

Springfield Camp, _February 16th, 1900._

I have the honour to report as follows:--

Since being detached from Lieutenant Ogilvy's command I moved back across the Tugela river from the advanced kopjes on February 1st. On Sunday, February 4th, I learnt that I was attached to Sir Charles Warren's Division, and received my orders from him personally on that day on Gun Plateau, regarding the next day's operations; I also interviewed yourself on that day in reply to signal received. On Monday, 5th, my guns were sh.e.l.ling the enemy incessantly all day in conjunction with the feint on the left, and in reply to a Boer 3"

Creusot and two Maxim Vickers 1-1/4 lbs. I received many directions from both General Warren and General Talbot-c.o.ke, as to points they wished sh.e.l.led, and at the end of the day had expended 250 common and shrapnel sh.e.l.l. At 8 p.m. I received orders from General Warren to march at daybreak on Tuesday, and join the Commander-in-Chief at the fort of Zwartz Kop; this I did, and though delayed on the hill by wagons and by the 7th Battery R.F.A. coming up, and later, by streams of ambulance in the narrow road close to Zwartz Kop, I arrived and reported my guns to General Buller about 8 a.m., at the foot of the kopje. He told me to bring my guns into action, and help to silence the Boer 6" Creusot, and, if possible, the 3" Creusot, which were firing from Spion Kop (position 2) at our field batteries.

As I came into action, and was aiming my right gun at the Boer 6", a sh.e.l.l from it struck twenty yards in front, and covering us with dirt, jumped over our heads without exploding; the sh.e.l.l was plainly visible in the air to me on coming down, and I saw it strike on its side and the fuse break off. The sh.e.l.l was picked up intact at my wagons which were just coming up, by Edward House, A.B., and we have it now. I concentrated my fire on the 6" gun at 6,400 yards, and in an hour it was silenced for the rest of the day; this, of course, was effected in conjunction with the fire from the 5" guns just in front of me, and from one 4.7 on Signal Hill.

During the day my guns also drove back at least two Boer field guns at 6,500 yards, which had been brought down into Vaal Krantz, and which tried to find our range but just fell short; they shifted position, but were finally driven over the sky-line. There was also a 1-1/4 lb.

Pom-pom in a donga in the valley, which we silenced many times, and at the end of the day had fired some 230 rounds.

On Wednesday, February 7th, we commenced again at daylight; the 6"

opened a heavy fire on one pontoon (No. 3), and on the field batteries in front of us, which had been pushed forward there before daybreak.

My fire was directed solely at the big gun; my No. 2 standing by and firing directly he saw it appear. During the day my ammunition supply was kept up by direct communication by orderly with the column under Major Findlay. In the forenoon the Boer field guns were brought down again in the valley, and sh.e.l.led the pontoon, Krantz Kop, and us; they were driven off in an hour or so, but recommenced again later.

In the afternoon, more field guns and Pom-poms on the burnt kopjes to the left of us opened a heavy fire on Krantz Kop, but were driven off by our guns, the howitzer battery (100 yards in our rear), and by the Naval guns on Zwartz Kop.

About 5 p.m. the fire from the Boer 100-pounder was very heavy, and came all round us, the Staff, and Infantry in reserve, and twice my crews only escaped by lying down. Just at that moment I got the order from Colonel Parsons, R.A., to withdraw my guns by moonlight, and cover our retirement on Gun Plateau. This was done, but the steep hill being jammed with traffic, I did not get up to my old position on Gun Plateau till next morning, when I reported to General Warren.

Between February 8th and 9th, I a.s.sisted to cover the retirement of our troops over the Tugela, and on the 9th was withdrawn at 11 a.m., and arrived at Springfield Bridge at 3 p.m.

On February 10th, by order of Colonel Burn-Murdoch (1st Dragoons) and the Camp Commandant, I placed my guns in the entrenched camp half a mile beyond the bridge, and up to 14th was employed in making gun epaulements and pits, and finding the ranges.

On February 13th, the Boers appearing in force on the kopjes to our left at 9,000 yards, I rode out with Colonel Burn-Murdoch and other Commanding Officers, to reconnoitre, and find gun positions. They sniped at us at 1,600 to 2,000 yards, and at the advanced Cavalry pickets all night, but next morning, the 14th, after "A" Battery Royal Horse Artillery and my guns had been pushed forward, they were found to have retreated altogether, and we surmised them to be a commando of Free State Boers returning to the Free State.

To-day, the 16th, we received news of General French's relief of Kimberley. All quiet in this neighbourhood.

At present I have 500 rounds of ammunition with me, and 300, in reserve, in charge of the officer of the ammunition column here.

I will conclude by saying that I have nothing but praise for the conduct and hard work performed by my men during the last ten days, especially when under fire; their spirit is now excellent. I should specially mention my captains of guns, T. Mitch.e.l.l, 1st cla.s.s P.O., and J. Mullis, 1st cla.s.s P.O., for their hard work, the latter the best and quickest shot of the two. I must recommend E. A. Harvey, P.O., 2nd cla.s.s, and leading shipwright, as rendering me most useful and clever work on the gun mountings, etc., and for further designs.

Of the rest P. Treherne, A.B.; D. Shepherd, A.B., S.G.T.; Henry House, A.B.; W. Jones, A.B., S.G.T.; Fred Tuck, O.S.; C. Patton, signalman; and W. Dunetal, stoker, deserve special mention. Mr. White, midshipman, has rendered me useful a.s.sistance. Mr. Freeman, conductor, has done very well; and the white drivers, McPheeson and Blewitt, excellently. I find the gun teams of eight oxen under the two latter are very useful.