Except for some quaint fetish about the necessity for maintaining the usual diplomatic forms, there is no necessity for delay in emergencies of this description. If an ordinarily intelligent Englishman, with a fair knowledge of English history and a grasp of the traditions and mentality of his countrymen, cannot carry on, how are people miles away, with no opportunity to visualise the actual situation, to instruct him?

Diplomatic methods and forms are all right for leisurely negotiations, but are useless in urgent and dangerous occasions. If my work fails, as even now it may, I shall be subject to severe criticism; but I shall get that even if it succeeds, so what does it matter so long as in my own mind I did the best in the circ.u.mstances?

My journey east was broken at Krasnoyarsk to enable me to interview the new commander, General Rosanoff, who had taken in hand the suppression of the revolt of the Lettish peasants north of the railway. South of the line all hostile elements had been dispersed. The line cut through the centre of the Bolshevik field of operations. The Czechs guarded the actual railway, and while they prevented large forces from moving across it, they took but little trouble to prevent miscreants from tampering with the rails, as was evidenced by the scores of derailed trains in all stages of destruction strewn along the track. This naturally involved great material loss and, what was still worse, a huge toll of innocent human life. One train, a fast pa.s.senger, accounted for two hundred women and children, besides uncounted men. Fairly large Russian forces were now placed at General Rosanoff's disposal, and by a wide turning movement from Krasnoyarsk in a north-easterly direction, and with a large cavalry force operating towards the north-west from Irkutsk, the whole gang would, it was hoped, be herded towards the centre, and a few weeks would probably liquidate the whole disturbance. The Krasnoyarsk and the Ussurie movements of the Bolsheviks were under the direction of able officers appointed by the Red Guard Headquarters at Moscow, with whom they were in constant communication.

Pa.s.sing Irkutsk, we again struck the Baikal--looking more glorious than before. The warm south-west winds had cleared the snow from the western hills and thawed the ice from that half of the sea. The other half was still ice-bound. In the morning sunshine the snow-covered mountains in the east pierced the heavens with the radiance of eternal day. The disappearance of the sun only adds to their beauty; they alone seem to know no night. As we travelled round under the shadow of these giants the temperature fell many degrees below zero, and the cold from the water penetrated the carriages, necessitating fires and warm furs, in spite of the June sunshine.

I had received intimation that it would be of service to the Omsk Government if I would call upon Colonel Semianoff and use my good offices and my newly-conferred honour as a Siberian Cossack Ataman to recall this erring son of Muscovy to the service of the State. I knew that British pressure had been applied to persuade the j.a.panese to cease their financial and moral support--both open and secret--to this redoubtable opponent of the Russian Government, and it was rumoured that British wishes had at last been complied with. It was common knowledge that the illegal floggings, murders, and robberies committed under the alleged authority of Colonel Semianoff would not have remained unpunished a day if he had not been under the protection of one of the most numerously represented Allied forces. Whatever faults may be alleged against Admiral Koltchak, cruelty or injustice cannot be included among them. I well remember his fury when it was reported to him that some eighty workmen had been illegally flogged by Semianoff's soldiers at Chita. His poor dilapidated reserves were ordered to move at once to their protection. Semianoff prepared his armoured trains and troops to receive them, but the same Allied Power which fed, clothed, and armed his troops kept at bay those who were ordered to avenge the wrongs of the Russian workmen.

On another occasion I remember Admiral Koltchak's almost hopeless despair when some truculent officers had used their weapons and badges of rank to secure the persons of some Bolshevik prisoners, and antic.i.p.ating the decision of the court about to try them, shot them in cold blood. He at once executed the officers and men who handed them over, as well as such of those who took part in the conspiracy, even though they claimed to be merely the avengers of their own murdered families. Stern, impartial justice is part and parcel of this remarkable man's character. It was this very trait which made Semianoff and the Supreme Governor natural enemies.

The day that I arrived at Chita it was officially announced that Semianoff had made his submission to the authority of Koltchak, and had accepted an appointment in the Russian Army. My task therefore changed its character; the proposed admonishment became a congratulation in a very frank and friendly half-hour's interview, the colonel returning the visit to my carriage later. Colonel Semianoff is one of the most striking personalities I have met in Russia; a man of medium height, with square broad shoulders, an enormous head, the size of which is greatly enhanced by the flat, Mongol face, from which gleam two clear, brilliant eyes that rather belong to an animal than a man. The whole pose of the man is at first suspicious, alert, determined, like a tiger ready to spring, to rend and tear, but in repose the change is remarkable, and with a quiet smile upon the brown face the body relaxes.

Colonel Semianoff is a very pleasant personality. His great physical strength has caused the j.a.panese to name him "Samurai," or "Brave Knight of the Field," and I think that is a good description of his character.

Relentless and brave, kindness nevertheless finds a part in his make-up.

The princes of Mongolia have asked him to become their emperor, and should he choose this path a whirlwind will pa.s.s over the neighbouring lands. Perhaps underneath he is, after all, a good Russian--time will tell. If his conversion is real he will add a tower of strength to the Russian fighting forces.

At Harbin I heard a full explanation of the reason for the Mongolians approaching Semianoff to become their emperor. Mongolia previous to the Revolution was considered as under a loose sort of Russian protection.

Since the break-up of the Russian Empire the j.a.panese have cast longing eyes upon this extensive country, which is supposed to belong to both Russia and China but in reality it belongs to neither. The j.a.panese have roamed all over the country during these last two years, and have spent time and money lavishly in propaganda. They first tried to orientate the Mongol mind towards a direct connection with themselves, but their avarice and conceit offend all the people with whom they come into contact. This direct method of getting control of Mongolia had therefore to be abandoned in favour of a round-about but more dangerous policy.

Colonel Semianoff is only half Russian, his mother being a Mongolian woman of high birth. He speaks Mongolian perfectly, and the Mongolians claim him for their own. Semianoff admitted to me personally that he had been subsidised all through by j.a.pan. It was the j.a.panese who called the Mongolian princes together and prevailed upon them to offer Semianoff the t.i.tle of Emperor of Mongolia. He had other fish to fry, however, but when his other schemes fail, as I think they must, he will be quite ready to play the j.a.panese game in Mongolia as faithfully as he did in Siberia. Semianoff will be the puppet, but j.a.pan will pull the strings; that at least is their hope and belief.

About thirty versts west of Manchuli our train was stopped by a red flag, and a railway workman informed us of a raid upon a homestead by the side of the railway, the robbers having decamped two hours before our arrival. The father had two bullets through his chest and one through the right side of his neck, and had crawled a distance of over a verst to give information. He was taken up on our train, and we went forward to the scene of the tragedy. In the small wooden house, covered with loose feathers, lay the dead body of the mother with her unborn baby, near by lay a girl of about ten with her head terribly wounded. In an outhouse was the body of their Chinese boy. My hospital orderly rendered what aid was possible to the girl, who was carried by Madame Frank to my carriage for conveyance to the hospital at Manchuli. A civilian doctor declared both cases hopeless, and the depositions of the man were taken. Briefly thus:

When the Bolsheviks first occupied Manchuli a railway workman of anarchist tendencies was appointed Soviet Commissar of the district.

Afterwards, when the Bolshevik power was destroyed and their forces were driven off the railway, the Bolshevik bands took to the forest, some engaging in running contraband over the Chinese frontier, others forming themselves into bands who not only robbed the isolated peasantry, but forced young men to join them, and afterwards levied toll upon large villages and small towns. About three in the morning this Bolshevik Commissar knocked at the cottage door and asked the father to let him come in, as he was very tired, having had a long journey with contraband. Believing him to be alone, the man opened the door. The room was immediately filled with armed men, who demanded his savings or his life. The commissar, from his knowledge of such matters, believing his savings to be in the feather pillow, ripped it open and found 4,600 roubles. Having collected all the other small articles of value in the house, these innocent children of the Revolution held consultation on the necessity of killing everybody who knew them to be Bolsheviks, so that the crime should be cast upon the Chinese robber gangs who occasionally raid Russian territory. This important point in the regeneration of Russia settled, they shot the man in the chest, the bullet coming out by the shoulder-blade. The wife, begging for the life of her husband, was bayoneted, and the aroused Chinese workman was dispatched with a rifle. Then these harmless idealists proceeded to depart. So far they had not touched the girl, but the father, on regaining consciousness, heard the closed door open again, saw the leader of the "comrades" re-enter and pick up a small axe near the fire, with which he proceeded to smash the head of the child. Nature in its terrible revolt gave the father the power to raise himself slightly from the floor in a vain effort to grapple with this representative of the new regime. The commissar shouted: "What, still alive!" and fired two more point-blank shots at the prostrate man.

It was entirely due to the tenacity of the father that the object of the killing was frustrated and the identification of the scoundrels with the Bolshevik commanders operating in this neighbourhood completed. I had no time to pick up the trail and punish the murderers. What sort of punishment the Tommies would have decided as necessary to fit the crime is better imagined than described!

It was June when we pa.s.sed over the Hinghan range, a series of sand mountains of great extent which form the breeding-ground for numerous herds of horses who spread themselves over the slopes and plains and sometimes endanger the safety of the railway. Snow was falling in clouds, and banked itself against the rails and telegraphs in a surprising manner considering the time of the year. The summer of this wild region lasts about two months--July and August--during which time the sand becomes hot, and travelling is not comfortable. After crossing the summit the plains fell gradually away, enabling the trains to move with great rapidity, and in less than two days we struck Harbin, and donned our topees and tropical clothes.

Harbin is the centre of Chinese and Russian political and financial intrigue. Other races take a fair hand in the business, but the predominance must be conceded to these two. There is some sort of national feeling amongst the worst type of Russian speculator, but none amongst the Chinese. The Harbin Chinaman is perfectly denationalised, and ought, therefore, according to some standards of political reckonings, to be the most ideal citizen in the world; but the world who knows him hopes that for ever he may be exclusively confined to Harbin.

I had a long conversation with General Ghondati, one of the most level-headed living statesmen of the old regime. All his hopes are centred on the success of Admiral Koltchak in his efforts to secure order to enable the National a.s.sembly to consider the question of a Const.i.tutional Monarchy on England's pattern to be established at Moscow. If this cannot be, he fears Russia's travail will last longer and may be fatal to her existence. He was not himself opposed to a Federal Republic, but was certain that without a head the undisciplined semi-oriental elements would never accept the abolition of absolutism as final. The Russian people have it in their bones to obey a leader; their warlike nature precludes the possibility of their continued loyalty to a junta, however able. A crown on top, with a parliament to control and direct, would be the happiest solution of Russia's present difficulties.

He summed his theory up in these words: "A properly elected parliament to make the law and rule, but there must be a monarch to issue its orders."

Though this is the expressed opinion of what the Bolshevik would term one of the "old regime," it is nevertheless the openly-expressed opinion of the sensible leaders of every cla.s.s of Russian society except two--the Bolsheviks at one end, and the Absolutists at the other. More than once already these two extremes have come close together to frustrate the possibility of a compromise on const.i.tutional lines. They openly declare that, unless power is given to either one or the other, they would prefer that the present anarchy should continue. It is not the first time in revolutionary history that the adherents of autocracy (Royalist and otherwise) have preferred the ruin of their country rather than lose their own personal power.

Ghondati is a clear-headed patriot, and I am surprised that his counsel has not been sought for in this supreme moment of his country's history.

His ideas relating to recognition by the Powers were rather remarkable.

He did not think that any country could give help to Russia without either asking for conditions or being suspected of doing so. The only exception was England. The reason England is not suspected is that her Empire is so vast and varied in character that she has all the raw material for her trade and all the s.p.a.ce she requires for her surplus population. Her help, unlike that of any other State so far, has been unselfish and unconditional. Ghondati quite saw that "this fact was producing a steady and permanent orientation of Russian opinion towards England, which, if cultivated by British statesmanship, would eventually give my country everything she required, while those whose help was always surrounded with conditions would have great difficulty to retain the advantages they secured only under the pressure of circ.u.mstances."

CHAPTER XXII

AMERICAN POLICY AND ITS RESULTS

At Nikolsk my train was stopped as the No. 4 Post train from Vladivostok had been wrecked by Bolsheviks, a startling situation considering that eleven months previously the whole power of Bolshevism had been destroyed in these maritime provinces. The station commandant was an old friend, who had given me his own private official carriage at the time when our little yellow brother had decided to lower the prestige of his white Ally in Eastern eyes by making British officers travel in cattle-trucks. He came into my car and began to explain how the cross-purposes of the American and j.a.panese forces were producing a state of uncertainty and disorder as bad, if not worse, than existed under the Bolshevik regime. Our conversation was cut short by the receipt of a telegram from the station-master at Kraevesk. It was to the effect that he was using his own line from his house, because a few minutes previously a detachment of the Red Guard had entered the station and, in the presence of the American soldiers who were guarding the railway, had placed himself and his staff under arrest and taken possession of the station; that the Reds had sent a message to Shmakovka ordering all Russian railway officials and staff to leave their posts, as the Bolshevik army, with the sanction of the American forces, was about to take over the line. The Red Guard officer in proof of his order stated "that fifteen American soldiers are now standing in the room from which I am sending this message." Having issued these orders in the presence of the Americans, they had removed the telegraph and telephone apparatus, and the station-master wished to know what he was to do and whether any help could be sent him. Imagine my utter astonishment at this message, containing, as it undoubtedly did, evidence of co-operation and understanding between the Bolshevik forces and one of our Allies.

In one of my numerous interviews with Admiral Koltchak at Omsk he had made some very serious statements regarding the American policy in the Far East, which he feared would result in reproducing the previous state of disorder. I a.s.sured him that the policy of the Allies was to resist disorder and support order, and that I could not believe America had come to Siberia to make his task more difficult, but to help him in every reasonable way. He agreed that such was the intention of the American people, but he feared that the American command was being used for quite other purposes. His officers had informed him that out of sixty liaison officers and translators with American Headquarters over fifty were Russian Jews or the relatives of Russian Jews; some had been exiled from Russia for political and other offences, and had returned as American citizens, capable of influencing American policy in a direction contrary to that desired by the American people. I a.s.sured him that this could not be, and that his people might themselves in this matter be under the influence of a near Eastern neighbour not friendly to American interference in Eastern affairs, and that under this influence they might greatly magnify the danger. My words seemed to ease the admiral's mind, but he regretfully replied that the reports were so voluminous and categorical in character that he thought I, as a representative of the people of England, as well as an officer of His Majesty's Army, ought to be made acquainted with the situation.

This matter had almost disappeared from my mind, but the message from the station-master at Kraevesk revived it with the vividness of a sudden blow. I at once determined to make myself acquainted as far as possible with the policy of the American commanders, and with this object in view I interviewed many American officers and soldiers. I found that both officers and men were most anxious to render all the help possible to maintain Koltchak's authority and crush disorder in the Far East, and, as they put it, "justify their presence in Siberia." Many felt that at the time they were only helping the Bolsheviks to recover their lost hold upon the people by providing neutral territory for Bolshevik propaganda; that when they arrived in the country in August, 1918, the English, Czechs, and j.a.panese, with the aid of such Russian units as then existed, had reduced the maritime provinces to order, but that their own efforts had produced a state of affairs similar to, if not worse than, those which existed during the actual Bolshevik occupation.

I learnt from these American troops that their officers and officials, from General Graves downwards, had been in actual correspondence with Red Guard officers, and that more than one understanding had been arrived at between them; that for a time the ordinary American soldiers thought the understanding between the two forces was so general and friendly in character that no further hostile acts were to be contemplated between them. It was true that this wrecking of trains and attacks on the line guarded by American soldiers made things look serious, but they felt sure that the confidence existing between the American and Red Guard Headquarters was so well established that these acts of brigandage could only be due to some misunderstanding. The Kraevesk affair appeared to be only a symptom of a much wider policy, and not the foolish act of a negligent subordinate officer.

Following up my inquiries there fell into my hands a letter, dated May 24, from the American officer (Captain ----) commanding the American forces at Svagena, addressed to the officer commanding the Red Guard operating in that district. The American officer addressed the Red Guard commandant as a recognised officer of equal military standing. The American officer complained that after a recent fraternisation of the two forces which had taken place in accordance with previous arrangements near the "wood mill," on the departure of the Red troops he received reports that the Red Guard officer had ordered the destruction of certain machinery at the mill, and had also torn up two sections of the line at points east and west of the station at Svagena. The American captain enumerated other accusations against the Red Guard, such as threats to bayonet certain orderly disposed people who would not join the Bolshevik army, and warned the Red Commissar that these acts were contrary to the _agreement_ entered into by the chiefs of the American and Red forces, and if such acts were repeated he would take steps to punish those who committed such breaches of _their joint understanding_.

I think this letter from the American officer at Svagena is positive proof of some local or general understanding between the American authorities and the Red army operating in the maritime provinces, and further, that this understanding had existed for many months; that it was this understanding which prevented the American forces joining in the combined Allied expedition to relieve the besieged Russian garrison in the Suchan district; that under this American-Bolshevik agreement the small scattered Red Guard bands who were dispersed by the Allies at the battle of Dukoveskoie in August, have collected together and formed definite military units. In other words, that the American policy, unconsciously or otherwise, has produced a state of indecision amongst the Allies, and unrest and anarchy amongst the population of the Transbaikal and Ussurie Provinces, which may prove disastrous to the rapid establishment of order in Russia.

There are other indications that the presence of the American forces in Siberia has been used by somebody for purposes not purely American. The business of the American command is to secure order in those districts which have been placed under its control by the Council of Allied Commanders. There is another self-evident and obvious duty, namely, to shape their conduct in such manner as to create friendly relations with such elements of Russian authority and order as are gradually appearing here and there, under the influence of the Supreme Governor, and also provide as little s.p.a.ce and opportunity as possible for the collection and reorganisation of the elements of disorder. The policy of the American command, quite unintentionally perhaps, has been quite the reverse. Their policy has resulted in turning every Russian authority against them, or, where this has not happened, they have themselves turned against Russian authority. They have prepared plans and created opportunities for the reorganisation of the forces of disorder which, if it does not actually create a serious situation for themselves, will do so for those Allies who are trying to bring order out of chaos. The reduction of the whole country to order, to enable it to decide its own future form of Government, is as much an American as a British object.

That some sinister underground influence has deflected American policy from this straight and honest course is quite obvious.

Contrary to general Allied opinion, the American command declared a neutral zone in the Suchan district. Armed operations by Russian, i.e.

Admiral Koltchak's or Red Guard forces, were prohibited within this zone. Lenin and Trotsky's officers jumped at this order and at once began to collect their scattered forces together. Within three weeks they raised their Bolshevik flag on their own headquarters, under the protection of the flag of the United States. From this neutral American zone the Bolsheviks organised their forces for attacking the j.a.panese on the Amur, for destroying British and other supply trains on the Ussurie Railway, and finally exchanged shots with the Russian sentries near Vladivostok itself, always bolting back to the American zone when attacked by the forces of the Supreme Governor.

The other Allies and the Russians having got the measure of this neutral zone business, naturally took steps to protect their men and property, and for a time the operations of this very energetic Lenin officer were confined to robbing and destroying a few isolated villages in the maritime provinces; but the utter absurdity of American policy was at last brought home to the Americans themselves. The Red Guard commandant, chafing under the restrictions imposed upon him by the Russian and j.a.panese forces (in which the British also joined when Captain Edwards could get near with his good ship _Kent_), decided to attack the unsuspecting Americans themselves. The Red Guard were very clever in their operations. The American troops were guarding the Vladivostok-Suchan Railway; the neutral zone was situated at the extreme end of the line. If the Red Guard had attacked the end near the zone their tactics would have been discovered at once. They therefore usually marched out from the American zone, made a detour through villages and forest, and struck the railway at a point as far distant as possible.

Destroying a bit of line--perhaps, if they had good luck, burning a bridge--they usually exchanged a few shots with the American troops, and if pressed, marched back to the zone under the protection of a section of the very forces they had been raiding. The American command naturally became more vigilant on the distant sections of the line, and this forced the Bolsheviks to operate nearer and nearer the protected zone; but in the meantime they managed to kill several Russian soldiers, wound a few Americans, and destroy five different sections of the railway.

Then they operated too near the zone, and the American troops pressed them straight into their own zone, where, to add insult to injury, they claimed that in accordance with the American proclamation they could not be molested as military operations were prohibited within the zone!

Instead of proceeding to root out this nest of pirates, someone suggested that a more comprehensive and binding arrangement was necessary between the American and Red Guard forces, to prevent such regrettable occurrences in future. It was common talk that a conference between the Red Guard commander and General Graves, the American G.O.C., was actually arranged, but was dropped when the Supreme Governor's representative in the Far East declared to General Graves personally that his proposed conference with the enemies of the Russian Government would be considered as a hostile act. The breaking off of these negotiations caused great annoyance to the Soviet Government at Moscow, and they ordered their commissars in Ussurie to use the forces which had been organised under American protection to attack their protectors, which they at once proceeded to do. This doubtless altered the relationship of these two parties, though the chances are that the powerful influence which forced the American commanders into this ill-fated policy will be powerful enough to prevent an open American declaration against the Reds in the Far East.

It is well at this stage to estimate the effect this American muddle has had, and will continue to exert, upon the effort of the Allies to secure some sort of order in the Russian Empire, and upon the position of the Americans themselves in their future relations with the Russian people.

The American troops were spread over the whole province from Vladivostok to Nevsniudinsk, a point just east of the Sea of Baikal. They were almost entirely confined to the railway, but in this country the railway is the centre and heart of all things. American policy at Vladivostok applied to the whole of this area, which is really the Transbaikal provinces, or all Siberia east of Baikal. In the early days of September, 1918, when I pa.s.sed with my battalion towards Omsk, this immense area had been reduced to order by the efforts of the Allies, at the head of which I place the gallant Czechs. The American forces arrived too late to take part in the military operations, but began to settle down to the work of administration with energy and ability. The French moved forward after myself, and the Italian unit followed later, leaving the American and j.a.panese, with such isolated local Russian forces as had called themselves into being, in absolute possession of Transbaikal Siberia. There was not a single band of Red Guards one thousand strong in the whole territory. After nine months of Allied occupation the Reds organised, largely under American protection, two divisions (so called) of from 5,000 to 7,000 men, and numerous subsidiary units of a few hundred, who murdered and robbed in every direction, and destroyed every semblance of order which the Supreme Governor and the Allies had with so much labour attempted to set up.

Thus this huge province in a short time descended from comparative order to sporadic disorder, simply because America had no Russian policy of her own, and rejected that of her friends.

It was a major mistake of England and France to leave America and j.a.pan cheek by jowl without a moderating influence, to wreck the good work they had accomplished in the Far East. The rivalries of these two Powers in this part of the world were well known and should have been provided for. It was too much to expect that they would forget their concession and trade rivalries in a disinterested effort to help Russia. States are not usually philanthropic organisations, these two least of all. The work has therefore to be largely done over again, either by us or by the Supreme Governor, Admiral Koltchak. Or the Allies, finding the task too great, may retire and allow this huge province, probably the wealthiest part of the world, to recede back to the barbarism of the Bolshevik.

CHAPTER XXIII

j.a.pANESE POLICY AND ITS RESULTS

The lack of Allied cohesion produced by the defection of American policy from that of the European Powers may change completely the status and future of American enterprise in Siberia. America has transformed a friendly population into at least a suspicious, if not a hostile, one.

j.a.pan, on the other hand, has steadily pursued her special interests and taken full advantage of every American mistake, until she is now looked upon as the more important of the two.

The att.i.tude of j.a.pan to the Russian problem made a complete somersault in the course of the year August, 1918, to August, 1919. When j.a.pan sent her 12th Division, under General Oie, to the Ussurie in 1918, she did so with a definite policy. Her ambitions were entirely territorial in character; they doubtless remain so. The line of her advance has, however, completely changed. In 1918 she had made up her mind that Germany was bound to win the war; that Russia was a conquered country; that any day she might be called upon to repudiate her English alliance and her Entente engagements, and a.s.sist Germany and her Bolshevik Allies in driving the Entente Powers from the eastern end of the Tsar's dominions. Provided Germany defeated the Allies on the Western front, as she confidently antic.i.p.ated, this task was well within her power. So insignificant was the task a.s.signed to her in this eventuality that she confidently expected the immediate surrender of such scattered Allied and American forces as would find themselves marooned in this back end of the world. Believing this to be the position, she acted accordingly, treating the Russians and the other Allied forces in the stupidly arrogant manner I have already described. With the _navete_ of a young Eastern prodigy she not only made demands upon her Allies, but at the same time made definite proposals to such Russian authorities as retained a precarious control over the territory she had already a.s.signed to herself. On landing her troops at Vladivostok she presented, through her proper diplomatic agents, to the commander of that province a set of proposals which would have placed her in control of the Russian maritime provinces. The Russian commander asked that these demands should be put in writing, and the j.a.panese agent, after some demur, agreed, on the understanding that the first demands should not be considered as final but only as an instalment of others to come. The first proposal was that j.a.pan should advance the commander 150,000,000 roubles (old value) and the commander should sign an agreement giving j.a.pan possession of the foresh.o.r.e and fishing rights up to Kamchatka, a perpetual lease of the Engilsky mines, and the whole of the iron (less that belonging to the Allies) to be found in Vladivostok.

The Town Commander appears to have been quite honest about the business, for in correspondence he pointed out that he was not the Government of Russia, neither could he sign the property or rights of Russia away in the manner suggested. The j.a.panese reply was simple and to the point: "Take our money and sign the agreement, and we will take the risks about the validity." The old Directorate, with Avkzentieff, Bolderoff & Co. standing sponsors for the Russian Convention, were supposed to control Russian affairs at this time. Directly the commandant refused to agree to the j.a.panese demands they transferred their claims to the old Directorate. The Directorate sent Evanoff Renoff to "Vlady" to conduct the negotiations, and I suppose to collect the money. When I was at "Vlady," in June, 1919, huge stores of iron were being collected, and some of it had already been shipped to j.a.pan.

Avkzentieff was exiled and Bolderoff was living in comfort and safety in j.a.pan. These were the things that were above and could be seen; what happened to the other part of the first instalment of j.a.panese proposals for "helping" Russia will doubtless be known later.

At the end of August, 1918, it was decided that until some sort of central authority to act as the organ of Government was set up, it was futile to hope for the return of orderly government. For this purpose the British went forward to Omsk and asked the j.a.panese to do likewise.

The j.a.panese would not move, first because they wished to consolidate their power in the provinces nearest j.a.pan, and secondly secure as many concessions as possible before America arrived on the scene. When America did arrive she still tarried to watch American operations. The British moved off into the unknown with a 5,000-mile line of unguarded communications; the j.a.panese, true to type, opened negotiations with the Directorate for the absolute possession of the railway to the Urals, and also asked what concessions she could expect to receive, territorial and mineral, as compensation for the use of her army for the Directorate's protection. A convention had just been signed, or was on the point of signature, between the j.a.panese and the Directorate, placing the entire railway under j.a.panese hands, when the Directorate fell. The first act of the Supreme Governor, Admiral Koltchak, was to inform the j.a.panese that the change in the Government involved a change in policy with regard to the advance of j.a.panese troops and the occupation of the railway. The j.a.panese protested, but the admiral stood firm.

This att.i.tude of the Supreme Governor was a serious setback to j.a.panese policy, and they became alarmed for their position in the Far East should his authority extend in that direction; but it is not difficult as a rule to find tools for any kind of work in Russia. Ataman Semianoff had for some time been kept by the j.a.panese in reserve for such an occasion. His forces were ranged around Chita, and his influence and authority extended from the Manchurian border to Lake Baikal. On receiving intimation of the change in policy from Admiral Koltchak, the j.a.panese ordered Semianoff to repudiate the Supreme Governor's authority; they gave the same instructions to Kalmakoff, who occupied a similar position on the Ussurie Railway and so placed an effective barrier between themselves, their Eastern concessions, and the Supreme Governor. The Supreme Governor ordered his Staff to clear these two mutineers off the line, but the j.a.panese Staff informed the Supreme Governor that these two Russian patriots and their forces were under the protection of j.a.pan, and if necessary they would move the j.a.panese Army forward to their succour.

The successful resistance of s.e.m.e.noff and Kalmakoff to the Omsk Government, backed up by the armed forces of one of the Allies, had a disastrous effect upon the situation throughout Siberia. If Semianoff and Kalmakoff could, with Allied help and encouragement, openly deride the Omsk Government's orders, then it was clear to the uninitiated that the Allies were hostile to the supreme Russian authority. If Semianoff and Kalmakoff can wage successful hired resistance to orderly government at the bidding of a foreign Power, why cannot we do so, to retain the land and property we have stolen and prevent the proper administration of justice for the crimes we have committed? It was intended as a deliberate attack upon authority and an incentive to the disorderly elements to continue the prevailing anarchy. A united, well organised Russia is not the kind of Russia j.a.pan wishes to see established. If j.a.pan is to succeed in her territorial ambitions in the Far East, Russia must be kept in a state of mental disorder and physical paralysis.

Germany used the Russian love of conspiracy and intrigue to create disorder and destroy the Muscovite power; j.a.pan intends, if possible, to continue that disorder for her own political reasons.