Germany has not only threatened Slav life in South-Eastern Europe: she has irritated Slav feeling on her own Eastern frontier. The vitality and the increase of the Slavs in Eastern Germany has excited deep German alarm. The German Government has therefore of late years pursued a policy of repression towards its own Slav subjects, the Poles, forbidding the use of the Polish language, and expropriating Polish landowners in order to plant a German garrison in the East. Teutonism is really alarmed at the superior birth-rate and physical vigour of the Slavs; but Russia has not loved Teutonic policy, and there has been an extensive boycott of German goods in Russian Poland. The promise made by the Tsar, since the beginning of the war, that he would re-create the old Poland, and give it autonomy, shows how far Russia has travelled from the days, not so far distant in point of time, when it was her policy to repress the Poles in conjunction with Germany; and it has made the breach between Germany and Russia final and irreparable.

It is thus obvious that Germany is vitally opposed to the great Slav Empire in South-Eastern Europe and on her own eastern borders. But why, it may be asked, should Russian policy be linked with English? Is there any bond of union except the negative bond of common opposition to Germany? There is. For one thing England and Russia have sought to pursue a common cause--that of international arbitration and of disarmament. If neither has succeeded, it has been something of a bond between the two that both have attempted to succeed. But there are other and more vital factors. England, which in 1854-6 opposed and fought Russia for the sake of the integrity of Turkey, has no wish to fight Russia for the sake of a Germanized Turkey. On the contrary, the interest of England in maintaining independence in the South-East of Europe now coincides with that of Russia. Above all, the new const.i.tutional Russia of the Duma is Anglophil.

'The political ideals both of Cadets and Octobrists were learnt chiefly from England, the study of whose const.i.tutional history had aroused in Russia an enthusiasm hardly intelligible to a present-day Englishman. All three Dumas ... were remarkably friendly to England, and England supplied the staple of the precedents and parallels for quotation.'[24]

In a word, the beginnings of Russian const.i.tutionalism not only coincided in time with the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, but owed much to the inspiration of England.

Notes:

[Footnote 22: Count Aehrenthal, foreign minister of Austria (1906-1912), started the scheme of the Novi Bazar railway to connect the railways of Bosnia with the (then) Turkish line to Salonica. See also _Correspondence_, No. 19, Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 25: 'There is reliable information that Austria intends to seize the Salonica railway.']

[Footnote 23: For a summary of so-called proofs, see Appendix IV, _infra_.]

[Footnote 24: _Camb. Mod. Hist_. xii. 379.]

CHAPTER IV

CHRONOLOGICAL SKETCH OF THE CRISIS

The following sketch of events from June 28 to August 4, 1914, is merely intended as an introduction to the a.n.a.lytical and far more detailed account of the negotiations and declarations of those days which the reader will find below (Chap. V). Here we confine the narrative to a plain statement of the successive stages in the crisis, neither discussing the motives of the several Powers involved, nor distinguishing the fine shades of difference in the various proposals which were made by would-be mediators.

The crisis of 1914 began with an unforeseen development in the old quarrel of Austria-Hungary and Russia over the Servian question. On June 28 the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir-apparent of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and his wife, the d.u.c.h.ess of Hohenberg, paid a visit of ceremony to the town of Serajevo, in Bosnia, the administrative centre of the Austrian provinces of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. In entering the town, the Archduke and the d.u.c.h.ess narrowly escaped being killed by a bomb which was thrown at their carriage. Later in the day they were shot by a.s.sa.s.sins armed with Browning pistols. The crime was apparently planned by political conspirators who resented the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina (_supra_, p. 54), and who desired that these provinces should be united to Servia.

The Austrian Government, having inst.i.tuted an inquiry, came to the conclusion that the bombs of the conspirators had been obtained from a Servian a.r.s.enal; that the crime had been planned in Belgrade, the Servian capital, with the help of a Servian staff-officer who provided the pistols; that the criminals and their weapons had been conveyed from Servia into Bosnia by officers of Servian frontier-posts and by Servian customs-officials. At the moment the Austrian Government published no proof of these conclusions,[25] but, on July 23, forwarded them to the Servian Government in a formal note containing certain demands which, it was intimated, must be satisfactorily answered by Servia within forty-eight hours.[26] This ultimatum included a form of apology to be published on a specified date by the Servian Government, and ten engagements which the Servian Government were to give the Austro-Hungarian Government. The extraordinary nature of some of these engagements is explained in the next chapter (pp. 103-7).

On July 24 this note was communicated by Austria-Hungary to the other Powers of Europe,[27] and on July 25 it was published in a German paper, the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_. It was therefore intended to be a public warning to Servia. On July 24 the German Government told the Powers that it approved the Austrian note, as being necessitated by the 'Great-Servian' propaganda, which aimed at the incorporation in the Servian monarchy of the southern Slav provinces belonging to Austria-Hungary; that Austria, if she wished to remain a Great Power, could not avoid pressing the demands contained in the note, even, if necessary, by military measures; and that the question was one which concerned no Powers except Austria-Hungary and Servia.[28]

Russia did not agree that the Austrian note was directed against Servia alone. On July 24 the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs told the British Amba.s.sador at St. Petersburg that Austria's conduct was provocative and immoral; that some of her demands were impossible of acceptance; that Austria would never have taken such action unless Germany had first been consulted; that if Austria began military measures against Servia, Russia would probably mobilize. The Russian Minister hoped that England would proclaim its solidarity with France and Russia on the subject of the Austrian note; doubtless Servia could accept some of the Austrian demands.[29] To the Austro-Hungarian Government the Russian Minister sent a message, on the same day, July 24, that the time-limit allowed to Servia for her reply was quite insufficient, if the Powers were to help in smoothing the situation; and he urged that Austria-Hungary should publish the proofs of the charges against Servia.[30] On July 25 Russia told England[31] that Servia would punish those proved to be guilty, but would not accept all the demands of Austria; that no independent state could do so. If Servia appealed to arbitration, as seemed possible, Russia was, she said, prepared to leave the arbitration in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy--the four Powers whom Sir Edward Grey had suggested as possible mediators.

On the day on which Russia made this suggestion, July 25, the Servian Government replied to the Austrian note, conceding part of the Austrian demands, and announcing its readiness to accept, on the other points, the arbitration of the Hague Tribunal or of the Great Powers. The Austrian Government found the Servian note unsatisfactory, and criticized its details in an official memorandum.[32] The Austro-Hungarian Minister left Belgrade on July 25; on July 26 a part of the Austro-Hungarian army was mobilized; and on July 28 Austria-Hungary declared war on Servia.

Sir Edward Grey had from the first declined to 'announce England's solidarity' with Russia and France on the Servian question. On and after July 26 he was taking active steps to bring about the mediation, between Austria-Hungary and Servia, of four Powers (Italy, Germany, France, England). To this mediation Russia had already agreed, July 25; and Italy and France were ready to co-operate with England.[33] Germany, however, made difficulties on the ground that anything like formal intervention would be impracticable, unless both Austria and Russia consented to it.[34] Russia had already (July 25) prepared the ukase ordering mobilization,[35] but had not yet issued it; on July 27 the Russian Foreign Minister announced his readiness to make the Servian question the subject of direct conversations with Vienna.[36] This offer was at first declined by the Austro-Hungarian Government, but subsequently accepted; and conversations were actually in progress between the representatives of the two Powers as late as August 1.[37]

No doubt the hesitation of Austria was due to the fact that, on July 28, the Russian Government warned Germany of the mobilization of the southern military districts of Russia, to be publicly proclaimed on July 29.[38] Austria replied to this intimation by offering a.s.surances that she would respect the integrity and independence of Servia;[39] these a.s.surances, considered inadequate by the Russian Government, seem to have been the subject of the last conversations between Russia and Austria-Hungary.

Russia persisted that Germany was the real obstacle to a friendly settlement; and this conviction was not affected by the appeals for peace which the Kaiser telegraphed to the Tsar on July 28, July 29, and July 31.[40] On July 29 Germany told England that the Russian mobilization was alarming, and that France was also making military preparations;[41] at the same time Germany threatened to proclaim 'imminent state of war' (_drohende Kriegsgefahr_) as a counter measure to the French preparations;[42] German military preparations, by July 30, had in fact gone far beyond the preliminary stage which she thus indicated.[43] Germany had already warned England, France, and Russia that, if Russia mobilized, this would mean German mobilization against both France and Russia.[44] But on July 27, Russia had explained that her mobilization would in no sense be directed against Germany, and would only take place if Austrian forces crossed the Servian frontier.[45] On July 29, the day on which Russia actually mobilized the southern districts, Russia once more asked Germany to partic.i.p.ate in the 'quadruple conference' now proposed by England, for the purpose of mediating between Austria and Servia. This proposal was declined by the German Amba.s.sador at St. Petersburg.[46] Germany in fact believed, or professed to believe, that the Russian mobilization, though not proclaimed, was already far advanced.[47]

On July 30 Austria, although her conversations with Russia were still in progress, began the bombardment of Belgrade. The next day, July 31, Russia ordered general mobilization; on August 1 France and Germany each took the like step; Germany presented an ultimatum to Russia, demanding that Russian mobilization should cease, and another ultimatum to France asking what course she would take in the event of war between Germany and Russia.

Before these decisive steps of July 30-August 1, and while Sir Edward Grey was still engaged in efforts of mediation, Germany made overtures to England, with the object of securing England's neutrality in the event of a war between Germany and France. On July 29 Germany offered, as the price of English neutrality, to give a.s.surances that, if victorious, she would make no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France; but refused to give a similar a.s.surance respecting French colonies, or to promise to respect Belgian neutrality.[48] These proposals were refused by England on July 30.[49] On August 1 the German Amba.s.sador unofficially asked England to remain neutral on condition that Germany would not violate Belgian neutrality. Sir Edward Grey replied that England's hands were still free, and that he could not promise neutrality on that condition alone.[50]

Meanwhile, on July 30, Sir Edward Grey was told by France that she would not remain neutral in a war between Germany and Russia.[51] On July 31 the English Cabinet, being asked by France to declare definitely on her side, replied that England could give no pledge at present.[52] On the same day England asked France and Germany to engage to respect Belgian neutrality. France a.s.sented, Germany evaded giving a reply.[53] But, on August 2, German forces entered the neutral state of Luxemburg; and England promised to defend the French coasts and shipping if attacked by the German fleet in the Channel, or through the North Sea.[54] On August 4 the King of the Belgians telegraphed to King George announcing that Germany had demanded pa.s.sage for her troops through Belgian territory, and appealing to England for help.[55] On the same day, August 4, England sent an ultimatum to Germany asking for a.s.surance, before midnight, that Germany would respect Belgian neutrality.[56] This demand was taken at Berlin as equivalent to a declaration of war by England against Germany.

DIARY OF THE EVENTS LEADING TO THE WAR

June 28. a.s.sa.s.sination at Sarajevo of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the d.u.c.h.ess of Hohenberg.

July 6. The Kaiser leaves Kiel for a cruise in Northern waters.

July 9. Results of Austro-Hungarian investigation into the Servian crime laid before the Emperor.

July 13, 14. Serious disclosures about condition of French army.

July 13, 14, 15, 16. Heavy selling of Canadian Pacific Railway Shares, especially by Berlin operators.

July 16. Count Tisza, the Hungarian Premier, speaking in the Hungarian Chamber, describes war as a sad _ultima ratio_, 'but every state and nation must be able and willing to make war if it wishes to exist as a state and a nation.'

The _Times_ leading article 'Austria-Hungary and Servia' is commented on in Berlin as an 'English warning to Servia.'

July 19. The King summons a conference to discuss the Home-Rule problem.

July 21. The _Frankfurter Zeitung_ warns Austria-Hungary of the folly of its campaign against Servia.

July 23. Thursday. Austria presents her Note to Servia giving her 48 hours in which to accept.

July 24. Friday. Russian Cabinet Council held. The Austro-Hungarian demands considered as an indirect challenge to Russia.--Strike at St.

Petersburg.

Failure of the conference on Home Rule.

July 25. Sat.u.r.day. Servian reply; considered unsatisfactory by Austria-Hungary, whose Minister and Legation-staff leave Belgrade.

Russian Amba.s.sador at Vienna instructed to request extension of time-limit allowed to Servia.

Sir E. Grey suggests that the four other Powers should mediate at Vienna and St. Petersburg.--Serious riot in Dublin.

July 26. Sunday. Sir E. Grey proposes that the French, Italian, and German Amba.s.sadors should meet him in conference immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications.

Partial mobilization of Austro-Hungarian army ordered.

Russian Foreign Minister warns German Amba.s.sador that Russia cannot remain indifferent to the fate of Servia.

Sir E. Goschen says the Kaiser is returning to-night.

July 27. Monday. France and Italy accept proposal of a conference.

German Secretary of State refuses the proposal of a 'conference.'

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs proposes direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

British Fleet kept a.s.sembled after manoeuvres.

Sir E. Grey in the House of Commons makes a statement concerning the att.i.tude of Great Britain.

The _Times_ Berlin correspondent reports that the Kaiser returned this afternoon from Kiel to Potsdam.