What England not only desires but needs, and needs imperatively, is, first, the rest.i.tution to Belgium of her former status and whatever else can be restored of all that she has sacrificed. This is the indispensable preliminary to any form of settlement. The next essential is an adequate guarantee to France that she shall never experience such another invasion as we have seen in August, 1914; without a France which is prosperous, secure, and independent, European civilization would be irreparably maimed and stunted. The third essential, as essential as the other two, is the conservation of those other nations which can only exist on sufferance so long as _Realpolitik_ is practised with impunity.

To minor nationalities it should be clear that England is their friend, and cannot choose but stand their friend. Three times in her history she has made war upon a would-be despot of the Continent, treating the 'Balance of Power' as a principle for which no sacrifice could be too great. In these struggles she a.s.sisted the small Powers, less from altruism than because their interest was her own. She supported Holland against Philip II of Spain and against Louis XIV; against Napoleon she supported not Holland only, but also Portugal and, to the best of her power, Switzerland and Piedmont.

We do not argue--it would be absurd to argue--that England has always been free from reproach in her dealings with the smaller states. Holland may well remember the naval conflicts of the seventeenth century and the English Navigation Laws. But Holland should also remember that, in the seventeenth century, England was not yet a great Power; Holland and England fought as rivals and on equal terms, in a feud which subsequent alliances have healed, over a policy which England has long since renounced as mischievous and futile. On Denmark we inflicted a great wrong in 1807; it can only be extenuated by the fact, which Denmark knows now though she did not know it then, that Napoleon had conspired with Russia to seize the Danish fleet and use it against England.

Denmark, indeed, has better cause to complain that we gave her no a.s.sistance in 1864. That mistake--for it was a mistake of weakness, not deliberate treachery--has brought its own nemesis. We are still paying for that particular mistake, and we are not likely to forget the lesson.

The case of Schleswig-Holstein shows how the losses of such a state as Denmark may react on such a state as England.

England cannot afford that her weaker neighbours should become less prosperous or less independent than they are. So far as the long arm of naval power reaches, England is bound to give them whatever help she can. From motives of self-preservation, if on no other ground, she could not tolerate their subordination to such a power as Germany aspires to found. Her quarrel is not with the German people, but with the political system for which the German Empire, in its present temper, stands. That system England is bound to resist, no matter by what power it is adopted.

English sympathies and English traditions are here at one with English interests. England is proud to recollect how she befriended struggling nationalities in the nineteenth century. She did not support Greece and Italy for the sake of any help that they could give her. The goodwill of England to Holland, to Switzerland, to the Scandinavian states, is largely based upon their achievements in science and art and literature.

They have proved that they can serve the higher interests of humanity.

They have contributed to the growth of that common civilization which links together the small powers and the great with bonds more sacred and more durable than those of race, of government, of material interest. In this fraternity each nation has a duty to the rest. If we have harped on England's interest, it must not for a moment be supposed that we have forgotten England's duty. But England stands to-day in this fortunate position, that her duty and her interest combine to impel her in the same direction.

APPENDIX I

GERMANY'S REASONS

FOR

WAR WITH RUSSIA

How Russia and her Ruler betrayed Germany's confidence and thereby made the European War.

WITH THE ORIGINAL TELEGRAMS AND NOTES.

Druck und Verlag: Liebheit & Thiesen, Berlin.

Foreign Office, Berlin, August 1914.

On June 28th the Austro-Hungarian successor to the throne, Arch-Duke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, the d.u.c.h.ess of Hohenberg, were a.s.sa.s.sinated by a member of a band of servian conspirators. The investigation of the crime through the Austro-Hungarian authorities has yielded the fact that the conspiracy against the life of the Arch-Duke and successor to the throne was prepared and abetted in Belgrade with the cooperation of Servian officials, and executed with arms from the Servian State a.r.s.enal. This crime must have opened the eyes of the entire civilized world, not only in regard to the aims of the Servian policies directed against the conservation and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but also concerning the criminal means which the pan-Serb propaganda in Servia had no hesitation in employing for the achievement of these aims.

The goal of these policies was the gradual revolutionizing and final separation of the south-easterly districts from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and their union with Servia. This direction of Servias policy has not been altered in the least in spite of the repeated and solemn declarations of Servia in which it vouchsafed a change in these policies toward Austria-Hungary as well as the cultivation of good and neighborly relations.

In this manner for the third time in the course of the last 6 years Servia has led Europe to the brink of a world-war.

It could only do this because it believed itself supported in its intentions by Russia.

Russia soon after the events brought about by the Turkish revolution of 1908, endeavored to found a union of the Balcan states under Russian patronage and directed against the existence of Turkey. This union which succeeded in 1911 in driving out Turkey from a greater part of her European possessions, collapsed over the question of the distribution of spoils. The Russian policies were not dismayed over this failure.

According to the idea of the Russian statesmen a new Balcan union under Russian patronage should be called into existence, headed no longer against Turkey, now dislodged from the Balcan, but against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. It was the idea that Servia should cede to Bulgaria those parts of Macedonia which it had received during the last Balcan war, in exchange for Bosnia and the Herzegovina which were to be taken from Austria. To oblige Bulgaria to fall in with this plan it was to be isolated, Roumania attached to Russia with the aid of French propaganda, and Servia promised Bosnia and the Herzegovina.

Under these circ.u.mstances it was clear to Austria that it was not compatible with the dignity and the spirit of self-preservation of the monarchy to view idly any longer this agitation across the border. The Imperial and Royal Government appraised Germany of this conception and asked for our opinion. With all our heart we were able to agree with our allys estimate of the situation, and a.s.sure him that any action considered necessary to end the movement in Servia directed against the conservation of the monarchy would meet with our approval.

We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike att.i.tude of Austria-Hungary against Servia might bring Russia upon the field, and that it might therefore involve us in a war, in accordance with our duty as allies. We could not, however, in these vital interests of Austria-Hungary, which were at stake, advise our ally to take a yielding att.i.tude not compatible with his dignity, nor deny him our a.s.sistance in these trying days. We could do this all the less as our own interests were menaced through the continued Serb agitation. If the Serbs continued with the aid of Russia and France to menace the existence of Austria-Hungary, the gradual collapse of Austria and the subjection of all the Slavs under one Russian sceptre would be the consequence, thus making untenable the position of the Teutonic race in Central Europe. A morally weakened Austria under the pressure of Russian pan-slavism would be no longer an ally on whom we could count and in whom we could have confidence, as we must be able to have, in view of the ever more menacing att.i.tude of our easterly and westerly neighbors. We, therefore, permitted Austria a completely free hand in her action towards Servia but have not partic.i.p.ated in her preparations.

Austria chose the method of presenting to the Servian Government a note, in which the direct connection between the murder at Sarajevo and the pan-Serb movement, as not only countenanced but actively supported by the Servian Government, was explained, and in which a complete cessation of this agitation, as well as a punishment of the guilty, was requested.

At the same time Austria-Hungary demanded as necessary guarantee for the accomplishment of her desire the partic.i.p.ation of some Austrian officials in the preliminary examination on Servian territory and the final dissolution of the pan-Serb societies agitating against Austria-Hungary. The Imperial and Royal Government gave a period of 48 hours for the unconditional acceptance of its demands.

The Servian Government started the mobilization of its army one day after the transmission of the Austro-Hungarian note.

As after the stipulated date the Servian Government rendered a reply which, though complying in some points with the conditions of Austria-Hungary, yet showed in all essentials the endeavor through procrastination and new negotiations to escape from the just demands of the monarchy, the latter discontinued her diplomatic relations with Servia without indulging in further negotiations or accepting further Servian a.s.surances, whose value, to its loss, she had sufficiently experienced.

From this moment Austria was in fact in a state of war with Servia, which it proclaimed officially on the 28th of July by declaring war.

[Sidenote: see exhibits 1 & 2.]

From the beginning of the conflict we a.s.sumed the position that there were here concerned the affairs of Austria alone, which it would have to settle with Servia. We therefore directed our efforts toward the localizing of the war, and toward convincing the other powers that Austria-Hungary had to appeal to arms in justifiable self-defence, forced upon her by the conditions. We emphatically took the position that no civilized country possessed the right to stay the arm of Austria in this struggle with barbarism and political crime, and to shield the Servians against their just punishment. In this sense we instructed our representatives with the foreign powers.

[Sidenote: see exhibit 3.]

Simultaneously the Austro-Hungarian Government communicated to the Russian Government that the step undertaken against Servia implied merely a defensive measure against the Serb agitation, but that Austria-Hungary must of necessity demand guarantees for a continued friendly behavior of Servia towards the monarchy. Austria-Hungary had no intention whatsoever to shift the balance of power in the Balcan.

In answer to our declaration that the German Government desired, and aimed at, a localization of the conflict, both the French and the English Governments promised an action in the same direction. But these endeavors did not succeed in preventing the interposition of Russia in the Austro-Servian disagreement.

[Sidenote: see exhibits 4 & 5.]

The Russian Government submitted an official communique on July 24th, according to which Russia could not possibly remain indifferent in the Servio-Austrian conflict. The same was declared by the Russian Secretary of Foreign Affairs, M. Sasonow, to the German Amba.s.sador, Count Pourtales, in the afternoon of July 26th. The German Government declared again, through its Amba.s.sador at St. Petersburg, that Austria-Hungary had no desire for conquest and only wished peace at her frontiers. After the official explanation by Austria-Hungary to Russia that it did not claim territorial gain in Servia, the decision concerning the peace of the world rested exclusively with St. Petersburg.

[Sidenote: see exhibits 6, 7, 8, 9.]

The same day the first news of Russian mobilization reached Berlin in the evening.

[Sidenote: see exhibits 10, 10a, 10b.]

The German Amba.s.sadors at London, Paris, and St. Petersburg were instructed to energetically point out the danger of this Russian mobilization. The Imperial Amba.s.sador at St. Petersburg was also directed to make the following declaration to the Russian Government:

"Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to counter-measures which must consist in mobilizing the army.

"But mobilization means war.

"As we know the obligations of France towards Russia, this mobilization would be directed against both Russia and France. We cannot a.s.sume that Russia desires to unchain such a European war.

Since Austria-Hungary will not touch the existence of the Servian kingdom, we are of the opinion that Russia can afford to a.s.sume an att.i.tude of waiting. We can all the more support the desire of Russia to protect the integrity of Servia as Austria-Hungary does not intend to question the latter. It will be easy in the further development of the affair to find a basis for an understanding."

[Sidenote: see exhibit 11.]

On July 27th the Russian Secretary of War, M. Ssuchomlinow, gave the German military attache his word of honor that no order to mobilize had been issued, merely preparations were being made, but not a horse mustered, nor reserves called in. If Austria-Hungary crossed the Servian frontier, the military districts directed towards Austria, i.e. Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, would be mobilized, under no circ.u.mstances those situated on the German frontier, i.e. St. Petersburg, Vilna, and Warsaw.

Upon inquiry into the object of the mobilization against Austria-Hungary, the Russian Minister of War replied by shrugging his shoulders and referring to the diplomats. The military attache then pointed to these mobilization measures against Austria-Hungary as extremely menacing also for Germany.

In the succeeding days news concerning Russian mobilization came at a rapid rate. Among it was also news about preparations on the German-Russian frontier, as for instance the announcement of the state of war in Kovno, the departure of the Warsaw garrison, and the strengthening of the Alexandrovo garrison.

On July 27th, the first information was received concerning preparatory measures taken by France: the 14th Corps discontinued the manoeuvres and returned to its garrison.

In the meantime we had endeavored to localize the conflict by most emphatic steps.