REINVENTING WAR.

More striking still was the post-Vietnam rehabilitation of the Pentagon's power-projection capabilities. Superficially, this was simply a matter of loosening constraints, persuading Americans (and American soldiers) that the risks entailed in sending U.S. forces into action in some far-off land were tolerable and the likelihood of a new "quagmire" remote. More fundamentally, the goal was to make war once again purposeful, refuting the lingering Vietnam-era impression that committing forces abroad almost inevitably yielded only meaningless slaughter.

Between 1981 and 2000, three presidents-Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and Bill Clinton-collaborated to lift the constraints that Vietnam had seemingly imposed. Each of the three vowed as commander in chief to take a vigorous, a.s.sertive approach to military intervention-no shilly-shallying. Each made good on that promise.

Over these two decades, the use of force by the United States became both notably more frequent and less controversial. Bit by bit, the concept of deterrence as a cornerstone of national security strategy lost its salience. In its place emerged a clear preference for putting U.S. forces to work rather than holding them in reserve. emerged a clear preference for putting U.S. forces to work rather than holding them in reserve.

At one end of this narrative stands the U.S. involvement in the El Salvadoran civil war, Ronald Reagan's 1981 decision to send a grand total of fifty-five U.S. military "trainers" to a.s.sist the Salvadoran army, evoking from panicky observers predictions that the United States was plunging headlong into another Vietnam. At the other end stand Bill Clinton's efforts to "contain" Saddam Hussein during the 1990s, which saw U.S. combat aircraft penetrating Iraqi airs.p.a.ce on a daily basis for years on end-tens of thousands of sorties flown, thousands of weapons expended in attacking Iraqi targets-with few Americans even bothering to take notice.4 In between were a slew of combat and quasi-combat missions that saw American troops going into action everywhere from Latin America to the Caribbean, the Balkans to the Persian Gulf, East Africa to Asia Minor. By the dawn of the twenty-first century, the War Powers Act of 1973, and therefore any congressional brake on decisions related to war, had become a dead letter. To a greater extent than any earlier period in U.S. history, Americans had come to accept the use of force as routine.

In the wake of 9/11, this trend found its ultimate expression in the Bush Doctrine of preventive war, which swept aside any lingering reticence about employing force. When acting in the role of commander in chief, the president now claimed-and exercised-essentially unlimited ent.i.tlements. Anything he and his advisers judged necessary to "keep America safe" became legitimate. In the midst of the Watergate scandal that ultimately proved his undoing, President Richard Nixon had advanced the argument that "if the president does it, that means it's not illegal." Nixon's removal from office had seemingly discredited this claim; after 9/11, this perverse Nixon Doctrine returned to favor. president does it, that means it's not illegal." Nixon's removal from office had seemingly discredited this claim; after 9/11, this perverse Nixon Doctrine returned to favor.

All of this happened in plain sight. If the American people did not actively endorse the ever greater militarization of foreign policy and the concentration of ever more power in the Oval Office, they pa.s.sively a.s.sented. White House advisers increasingly operated on the a.s.sumption that the benefits of using force outweighed the risks. At a minimum, dropping a few bombs all but guaranteed an uptick in a president's approval rating. Even when an operation went awry, as in the case of Bill Clinton's bungled war in Somalia, the negative fallout quickly pa.s.sed. Everyone knew this; hence the joke-or was it a joke?-that the best way for a president to get out of hot water at home was to conjure up a war abroad, an insight brilliantly captured in director Barry Levinson's cynical 1997 movie, Wag the Dog Wag the Dog.

A president could now-it seemed-take the nation to war without Americans being noticeably discomfited. War, after all, had become a spectacle, not a phenomenon that inflicted pain and suffering on citizens of the United States.

Behind the scenes, the reformulation of the American way of war involved sustained conflict, pitting an officer corps still bearing the scars of Vietnam against a new generation of civilian semiwarriors keen to prove Vietnam's irrelevance. Both camps were committed to restoring the utility of force. Each camp entertained its own specific vision of what that should entail. Yet note carefully: Although soldiers and semiwarriors disagreed on matters of technique, they were united in their commitment to restoring the credibility of America's armed forces as an instrument of global power projection. That the Department of Defense might define its purpose as defending the United States never received serious consideration. define its purpose as defending the United States never received serious consideration.

This process of reinventing war occurred in two stages. For a time, the officer corps had the upper hand. After 9/11, the semiwarriors gained the advantage. The defining events in this saga were Operation Desert Storm in 1991 and Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. The first was Gen. Colin Powell's war, its conduct reflecting precepts to which Powell and the officer corps as a whole had become deeply devoted. The second was Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's war, its conduct-in its early stages at least-reflecting the way that he and his fellow semiwarriors believed the United States ought to fight.

Operation Desert Storm represented the culmination of a reform project that had absorbed the energies of the officer corps ever since the Vietnam War ended. Its princ.i.p.al theme was the reconst.i.tution of conventional warfare-the clash of regular forces on non-nuclear battlefields uncluttered with civilians, directed by generals insulated from meddling politicians and intrusive media, and culminating in an operationally decisive outcome. From Vietnam, officers like Powell had drawn this lesson: Long wars spelled inst.i.tutional disaster and were to be avoided at all costs. The military's version of a new American way of war aimed to preclude protracted fighting and therefore all of the political and moral complications that had made Vietnam such a frustrating and agonizing experience.

Largely conceived by the officer corps itself at installations such as Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and Fort Monroe, Virginia, the reforms inst.i.tuted during the period leading up to Desert Storm looked to the past as much as the future. For inspiration, they drew upon World War II (emphasizing Europe over the Pacific) and to a lesser extent on the Israeli military experience (focusing on the ostensibly decisive Six-Day War of 1967). Military reformers consciously disregarded the U.S. experience of Vietnam altogether. Indeed, a central purpose of the reform project was to purge the armed forces of the effects of Vietnam and avert the recurrence of anything even remotely similar. Counterinsurgency, nation building, winning hearts and minds: Officers who had served in Vietnam invariably viewed these as anathema. military experience (focusing on the ostensibly decisive Six-Day War of 1967). Military reformers consciously disregarded the U.S. experience of Vietnam altogether. Indeed, a central purpose of the reform project was to purge the armed forces of the effects of Vietnam and avert the recurrence of anything even remotely similar. Counterinsurgency, nation building, winning hearts and minds: Officers who had served in Vietnam invariably viewed these as anathema.

Although styled as bold and innovative, the spirit of this enterprise was deeply conservative. This becomes especially evident when considering how the military chose to spend its money during the bountiful years of the Reagan defense buildup. The signature weapons that had defined the services prior to Vietnam continued to define them afterward: For the army, this meant, above all, the tank; for the navy, the aircraft carrier; for the air force, the long-range bomber and manned supersonic fighter.

In virtually every case, weapons design reflected a commitment to incremental refinements. So, although the M1 Abrams tank fielded in the 1980s was a wonder to behold, it expressed a vision of land combat that dated back to World War I and had reached maturity in the 1940s. Much the same could be said of the navy's post-Vietnam Nimitz-cla.s.s carriers and of the air force's new B-1 bomber and F-15 and F-16 fighters. An officer from any of the services transported from the 1940s to the 1980s would have been impressed with the hardware available-everything was faster, bigger, and sleeker-but would have found the organization, operations, and inst.i.tutional culture that went with these weapons comfortably familiar.

The new generation of weapons did differ from their predecessors in one respect: They were exceedingly expensive. Even the generous budgets of the 1980s funded their purchase in only limited numbers. A similar limitation applied to the procurement of volunteers for the all-volunteer force: They cost a lot and were not easily replaced. So the post-Vietnam reforms also saw the services shift from a traditional reliance on sheer ma.s.s to destroy any adversary, as epitomized by the LeMay approach to strategic bombing, to a greater stress on quality. Among other things, this meant placing greater emphasis on training and retention. Those volunteering to serve became an increasingly valued commodity. Even the generous budgets of the 1980s funded their purchase in only limited numbers. A similar limitation applied to the procurement of volunteers for the all-volunteer force: They cost a lot and were not easily replaced. So the post-Vietnam reforms also saw the services shift from a traditional reliance on sheer ma.s.s to destroy any adversary, as epitomized by the LeMay approach to strategic bombing, to a greater stress on quality. Among other things, this meant placing greater emphasis on training and retention. Those volunteering to serve became an increasingly valued commodity.

This increased attention to quality fostered one exception to the Pentagon's otherwise consistent preoccupation with conventional warfare. In the wake of Vietnam, so-called special operations forces proliferated. Elite units-among them navy SEALs and the army's Rangers, Green Berets, Delta Force, and 160th Aviation Regiment-a.s.sumed responsibility for an array of unconventional tasks ranging from clandestine reconnaissance and counterterror missions to hostage rescue, psychological operations (PSYOPS), and support for friendly indigenous forces. In 1987, Congress acknowledged the growing importance of these activities by creating a new four-star Special Operations Command, signifying that the members of this "community" had achieved a status separate from but at least equal to the bulk of U.S. forces.

Americans quickly learned that most of what happens in the world of special operations lies beyond their purview. Capabilities, activities, and even budgets are all cla.s.sified. Public accountability is minimal. In effect, after Vietnam the Pentagon increased its presence in the "black world," encroaching upon and then moving well beyond the territory originally staked out by Allen Dulles and his colleagues. When it came to covert action, the CIA no longer enjoyed even the approximation of a monopoly. When it came to covert action, the CIA no longer enjoyed even the approximation of a monopoly.

From the perspective of the officer corps, the post-Vietnam reform project reached its apotheosis in the Persian Gulf War of 19901991. For the armed services, and especially for Powell, then serving as chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Operation Desert Storm came as validation and vindication. Victory over Iraq, generously credited by the Department of Defense with possessing "the fourth largest army in the world, an army hardened in long years of combat against Iran," vanquished the memory of defeat in Southeast Asia.5 By a.s.sembling a combat force of several hundred thousand soldiers in a harsh, unforgiving environment, Powell and his fellow Vietnam veterans had reaffirmed the unequaled ability of the United States to reposition ma.s.sive amounts of combat power just about anywhere on the planet. Powell had promised to destroy the Iraqi army-"First, we're going to cut it off, and then we're going to kill it"-and U.S. troops had seemingly made good on that promise.6 At first blush, Operation Desert Storm appeared a stupendous achievement, a victory without parallel in the annals of warfare. At first blush, Operation Desert Storm appeared a stupendous achievement, a victory without parallel in the annals of warfare.

It promptly vaulted Powell to the status of national hero. The general wasted no time in advertising the just-completed campaign as the approved template for all future American wars. This was the way it was supposed to be done: When (and only when) truly vital interests were at stake, the United States should employ what Powell called "overwhelming force" to make short work of any adversary. Now that U.S. forces had proven their ability to do just that, however, Powell was not eager to place the military's gains at risk by repeating the feat elsewhere. With the Iraqis kicked out of Kuwait, his priority, widely shared throughout the officer corps, was to consolidate the gains that the armed services had worked so hard to achieve since Vietnam. kicked out of Kuwait, his priority, widely shared throughout the officer corps, was to consolidate the gains that the armed services had worked so hard to achieve since Vietnam.

Within the military, the inevitable search for relevant lessons focused on identifying "what is important to protect and preserve in our military capability." According to the Pentagon, five key elements had contributed to victory in the Gulf: a decisive president who "not only gave the military the tools to do the job but ... provided it with clear objectives and the support to carry out its a.s.signed tasks" (that is, a president who avoided the errors charged to Lyndon Johnson); technological superiority, especially a new generation of precision weapons that "gave our forces the edge"; the professionalism and competence of U.S. troops and their commanders; the availability of forward-deployed units along with the bases that made their commitment to combat possible; and finally the acc.u.mulated benefit of intense preparation over the course of many years. "It takes a long time to build the high quality forces and systems that gave us success." Implicit in that concluding point was a warning: Abuse this force and you'll break it; once broken, recovery won't come easily.7 Looking ahead, the Pentagon identified two key priorities: first, "to retain our technological edge out into the future," and second, to "be ready for the next Desert Stormlike contingency that comes along."8 In sum, by 1991 the military establishment felt that it had achieved something approximating the summit of perfection. The last thing soldiers needed or wanted was for someone to start tinkering with a machine so painstakingly a.s.sembled. Powell's priority and the priority of the officer corps was to preserve what had been regained. In sum, by 1991 the military establishment felt that it had achieved something approximating the summit of perfection. The last thing soldiers needed or wanted was for someone to start tinkering with a machine so painstakingly a.s.sembled. Powell's priority and the priority of the officer corps was to preserve what had been regained.

There was an alternative view, however, according to which the results achieved against Iraq fell well short of being decisive. After all, Saddam had survived. So, too, had the most capable parts of his large, if not especially competent, army. To deal with this continuing "threat," U.S. forces remained in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the region, a decision consistent with the principle that the presence of American forces abroad contributed to security and stability yet one provoking deep resentment throughout much of the Islamic world. In the end, a brief campaign touted as a great victory had settled little, while creating new complications; the historic feat of arms over which Colin Powell had presided turned out to be something of a bust politically and strategically.

Proponents of this view-for the most part civilians ensconced in universities like Harvard and Chicago, in security-oriented think tanks, and in an obscure but influential Pentagon directorate called the Office of Net a.s.sessment-saw Operation Desert Storm not as a great victory but as a missed opportunity, not as the culmination of a process of reform but as a harbinger of better things to come. In the campaign to expel the Iraqi army from Kuwait, they glimpsed stupendous possibilities. America's armed services stood on the cusp of what they called a Revolution in Military Affairs or RMA. Properly exploited, they believed, this revolution promised to invest force with unprecedented effectiveness and utility.

Considered from this perspective, Operation Desert Storm signaled not the perfection of industrial-age warfare but its death knell. According to RMA enthusiasts a new era of Information Age warfare was dawning. Primacy in the cyberworld held the promise of primacy in the real world: This was their conviction.

During most of the twentieth century, machines had dominated the battlefield. As the twenty-first century beckoned, information networks were emerging as key determinants of victory. A nation's capacity to manufacture armor plate had once figured as a measure of its military potential; what mattered now was the ability of a nation's military forces to access and manage bandwidth. Machines remained, of course, but ensuring their effectiveness now centered on making them "smart." As the fate of the Iraqi army in Kuwait suggested, the machine that was not smart became simply a target.

This RMA implied a new aesthetic of war. Past conflicts had tended to be confusing brawls; in the digital age, military operations were to become carefully ch.o.r.eographed performances. Information would lift the millennia-old fog of war; things that had been hidden would become visible; tasks that had seemed dauntingly difficult would become routine. No matter the conditions on the ground, the advent of the Information Age promised to unshackle armies, transforming war much as it was said to be transforming business, journalism, and ma.s.s culture. Agility, precision, synchronization, and speed: In the realm of military affairs, these were now emerging as the attributes defining operational excellence.9 The RMA's semiwarriors believed that the United States was uniquely placed to exploit the opportunities offered by this revolution. If the Pentagon acted promptly, they felt certain that something approaching permanent military dominion would all but fall into the country's lap. The mere contemplation of this prospect generated a sense of excitement verging on the erotic.

The implications of supremacy extended far beyond matters of tactics, of course. The appeal of the RMA lay not in the promise of winning battles but of changing the world, while making the global Pax Americana all but permanent. What the new semiwarriors glimpsed was the possibility of removing war from the realm of chance and uncertainty. in the promise of winning battles but of changing the world, while making the global Pax Americana all but permanent. What the new semiwarriors glimpsed was the possibility of removing war from the realm of chance and uncertainty.

For the United States, armed conflict henceforth promised to become a low-risk enterprise. All but a.s.sured that future wars would be limited affairs ending in success, Americans would no longer hesitate before pulling the trigger. Policy makers could contemplate the prospect of intervention abroad, confident that any ensuing conflict would be brief and economical, that they would be able to antic.i.p.ate and control its course, and that (in contrast to Desert Storm) the result would be politically decisive. As never before, force would provide the essential instrument for cutting through the vagaries of history, paving the way for peace, security, and the further spread of American values.

And that was not all: Once fully demonstrated to a shocked-and-awed world, these capabilities, uniquely possessed by U.S. forces, promised to reduce the necessity of actually pulling that trigger. In most cases, the mere prospect of the United States flexing its military muscles was likely to dissuade anyone from challenging the existing order or violating American norms. If, as Dean Acheson once remarked, "influence is the shadow of power," the RMA promised to endow the United States with a level of influence surpa.s.sing anything the world had ever seen. Possession of unrivaled military capabilities would make the Washington rules una.s.sailable. Washington's rule would be complete. Washington itself, the seat of American power, would affirm its standing as the New Rome.

As an added bonus, the project would likely pay for itself. In 1991, the governments of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Germany, and j.a.pan had reimbursed the Pentagon for costs incurred in conducting Operation Desert Storm. If U.S. forces demonstrated the ability to maintain international peace and security to the general benefit of all, was it unreasonable to expect other nations-rich but debellicized-to underwrite the expenses involved? With military service voluntary and with other nations footing the bill, the yoke borne by the American people promised to be so light as to be unnoticeable. Germany, and j.a.pan had reimbursed the Pentagon for costs incurred in conducting Operation Desert Storm. If U.S. forces demonstrated the ability to maintain international peace and security to the general benefit of all, was it unreasonable to expect other nations-rich but debellicized-to underwrite the expenses involved? With military service voluntary and with other nations footing the bill, the yoke borne by the American people promised to be so light as to be unnoticeable.

So now was not the time for the Pentagon to rest on its laurels as Powell and his military contemporaries preferred. To wait pa.s.sively for the next Desert Storm to come along-years might pa.s.s!-could mean forfeiting the initiative. Standing pat might allow would-be compet.i.tors (China seemed the most likely candidate) to catch up. Rather than consolidation, aggressive exploitation of the new revolutionary age of warfare defined the order of the day.

The expectations generated by RMA theorists-forces optimized for "network centric" warfare providing the foundation for lasting American primacy-grew out of a specific context in which postCold War triumphalism blended with a rising faith in the transformative power of technology married to the forces of globalization. In a fast, flat, and wide-open world, this new way of war offered an enticing blueprint for extracting the maximum benefit from the arena in which the United States enjoyed unquestioned superiority. Unlike LeMay's SAC, instruments of violence designed to fit RMA precepts wouldn't risk blowing up the world. Unlike Dulles's CIA with its limited repertoire of dirty tricks, those forces would possess broad utility. Best of all, for the moment at least, the United States owned the RMA franchise.

Yet strip away the cyberjargon and the RMA bore more than a pa.s.sing resemblance to flexible response. The new generation of semiwarriors-Democrats like Madeleine Albright eager to succor the afflicted; Republicans like Donald Rumsfeld, pursuing more overtly imperial ambitions-were, in fact, the heirs of Taylor, McNamara, and Bundy. In the RMA they saw the possibility of fulfilling the promise of flexible response, dashed by Vietnam: Here once again was the prospect of devising a broader array of power projection options; here once again was the seductive vision of force employed in a controlled and limited manner, with costs contained and risks minimized. than a pa.s.sing resemblance to flexible response. The new generation of semiwarriors-Democrats like Madeleine Albright eager to succor the afflicted; Republicans like Donald Rumsfeld, pursuing more overtly imperial ambitions-were, in fact, the heirs of Taylor, McNamara, and Bundy. In the RMA they saw the possibility of fulfilling the promise of flexible response, dashed by Vietnam: Here once again was the prospect of devising a broader array of power projection options; here once again was the seductive vision of force employed in a controlled and limited manner, with costs contained and risks minimized.

The debate over the new American way of war, pitting those who saw Desert Storm as perfection against those who saw it as portent, extended throughout the 1990s and did not come to a head until after 9/11. By that time, Rumsfeld, a self-described conservative who, on matters related to the future of war, entertained genuinely radical views, had become secretary of defense. His agenda upon taking command of the Pentagon reduced to a single word: transformation.

Rumsfeld was intent on breaking military resistance to the RMA and then remolding the services according to its dictates. During the first eight months of his tenure he made frustratingly little progress. The attacks of September 11, 2001, changed all that. The global war on terror promptly declared by the Bush administration presented a made-to-order opportunity to shatter that resistance once and for all. Rumsfeld grasped the opportunity with alacrity.

SPEED KILLS.

America's crusade to extirpate terrorism-in size, scope, and significance comparable to the world wars of the last century, according to some observers-opened on a seemingly promising note. century, according to some observers-opened on a seemingly promising note.10 In the fall of 2001, U.S. forces launched Operation Enduring Freedom, toppling the Taliban regime that had provided Osama bin Laden sanctuary and putting Al Qaeda to flight. Dazzled by this apparent success, the Bush administration almost immediately began shifting its attention to Iraq, identifying the overthrow of Saddam Hussein as its main objective. Although top U.S. officials did not expect the global war on terror to end with Saddam's removal, they felt certain that removing the Iraqi dictator would yield large strategic gains. Once Washington had removed Saddam, further successes would come easily. In the fall of 2001, U.S. forces launched Operation Enduring Freedom, toppling the Taliban regime that had provided Osama bin Laden sanctuary and putting Al Qaeda to flight. Dazzled by this apparent success, the Bush administration almost immediately began shifting its attention to Iraq, identifying the overthrow of Saddam Hussein as its main objective. Although top U.S. officials did not expect the global war on terror to end with Saddam's removal, they felt certain that removing the Iraqi dictator would yield large strategic gains. Once Washington had removed Saddam, further successes would come easily.

As with the campaign in Afghanistan, Operation Iraqi Freedom began on a promising note. Within a matter of weeks, U.S. forces had shattered the Iraqi army and captured Baghdad. Speaking on the deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln Abraham Lincoln against the backdrop of a banner reading against the backdrop of a banner reading MISSION ACCOMPLISHED MISSION ACCOMPLISHED, a giddy President Bush announced on May 1, 2003, that major combat operations in Iraq had ended.

The president spoke prematurely, however. Saddam's ouster had decided nothing. Things became not easier, but more difficult.

Intended to solve problems, Saddam's elimination instead confronted Washington with fresh complications. In Baghdad, regime change unleashed forces-a civil war combined with an anti-Western insurgency and rampant criminality-to which U.S. occupation authorities in Iraq responded clumsily and ineffectually. As the Bush administration preoccupied itself with trying to prevent Iraq from imploding, the larger global war on terror stalled. Expectations that a concerted exercise of American power would eliminate the conditions giving rise to violent jihadism and affirm Washington's claim to global dominion lost all coherence and credibility. affirm Washington's claim to global dominion lost all coherence and credibility.

No sooner had U.S. forces managed to impose some faint semblance of order on Iraq in 2008, than deteriorating conditions in Afghanistan revealed that earlier claims of victory there had likewise been overstated. The Taliban were once again on the march and the United States found itself back at square one. By the time Barack Obama succeeded George W. Bush as president in January 2009, the phrase global war on terror global war on terror had become an epithet, redolent with deception, stupidity, and monumental waste. Soon thereafter it faded from the lexicon of American politics. had become an epithet, redolent with deception, stupidity, and monumental waste. Soon thereafter it faded from the lexicon of American politics.

Donald Rumsfeld's transformation initiative followed a similar trajectory and suffered a similar fate. What seemed ever so briefly to be evidence of creative genius-Rumsfeld prodding, cajoling, and lashing hidebound generals into doing things his way with spectacular results-turned out to be illusory, and the RMA's much-hyped formula for military supremacy ersatz.

Campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq intended to showcase an unprecedented mastery of war demonstrated the folly of imagining that war could be mastered. When he finally left the Pentagon in late 2006, Rumsfeld found himself running neck and neck with Robert McNamara for the t.i.tle of worst defense secretary in U.S. history. The concept of transformation had become a symbol of the overweening arrogance and hucksterism that had characterized his entire tenure in office. Yet Rumsfeld's failure-the bungled wars that discredited his military reform project-deserves careful examination for one specific reason: Out of that failure came yet another misguided effort to refashion the sacred trinity, namely the new era of counterinsurgency in which the United States finds itself today.

President Bush and his chief advisers intended the global war on terror to serve several purposes, not least among them to sh.o.r.e up the basic approach to national security that had prevailed since World War II. For Rumsfeld and others in the administration, transformation and the conflict initiated in response to 9/11 were component parts of a even larger enterprise. Their overarching goal was to affirm and even deepen the Washington consensus, while removing any remaining constraints on the use of American military power.

Forged during the early Cold War, the Washington rules once underpinned a strategy of containment: Washington's declared aim had been to avert a domino effect, the loss of any one country to communism presumably leading to the loss of many others. As reconfigured in the wake of 9/11, the Washington rules provided the basis for the United States to promote its own domino effect, the forceful "liberation" of one or two countries in the Islamic world expected to unleash a wave of change eventually rippling across the entire Greater Middle East.

Yet implementing this new domino theory required the United States to shed any lingering reticence when it came to the actual use of force. Here lay the inspiration for the Bush Doctrine of preventive war: It offered the means to advance Bush's Freedom Agenda. Rather than merely containing threats to national security, the United States would antic.i.p.ate, confront, and eliminate threats before they actually posed a danger. By embracing preventive war, the Bush administration added a codicil to the Washington consensus, with ma.s.sive (although largely unexamined) moral, political, and strategic implications. What made this doctrine of preventive war appear plausible-even alluring, in the eyes of some-was the Revolution in Military Affairs. Selling the American people on the global war on terror meant selling them on the new American way of war it implied. American people on the global war on terror meant selling them on the new American way of war it implied.

In congressional testimony presented barely three weeks after September 11, Paul Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld's influential deputy, explained the connection between the war just begun and the national security practices to which the United States had adhered for decades. Although "terrorist movements and totalitarian regimes of the world have a variety of motives and goals," Wolfowitz explained, in a broader sense they shared a single unifying purpose: "a desire to see America driven into retreat and isolation."

Usama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, Kim Jong Il and other such tyrants all want to see America out of critical regions of the world, constrained from coming to the aid of friends and allies, and unable to project power in the defense of our interests and ideals.

By holding our people hostage to terror and fear, their intention is for America to be intimidated into withdrawal and inaction-leaving them free to impose their will on their peoples and neighbors unmolested by America's military might.

All of these capabilities serve their common objective of keeping America out of their regions and unable to project force in the defense of freedom. To meet the challenges over the horizon, we must transform our Armed Forces more rapidly, more creatively, and even more radically than we had previously planned. ...

It is a fact of life that countries frequently prepare to fight the last war. We spent much of the 1990s planning to re-fight the Gulf War.... [To wage the wars of the future,] we will need forces and capabilities that give the President an even wider range of military options. that give the President an even wider range of military options.

The goal of [military] transformation is to maintain a substantial advantage over any potential adversaries.... If we can do this, we can reduce our own chances of being surprised, and increase our ability to create our own surprises, if we choose.11 Wolfowitz's glib allusion to the historical dyad was standard fare: a.s.sertive leadership as prescribed by the American credo versus retreat and isolationism. As always for defenders of the Washington consensus, these defined the sole alternatives. More imaginative was Wolfowitz's depiction of how a motley collection of B-list foes had banded together to lay siege to the national security triad. Rolling back the U.S. military presence abroad, neutralizing the Pentagon's capacity for power projection, intimidating Americans into pa.s.sivity: This defined the common agenda to which such disparate figures as Al Qaeda's radical jihadist leader, Iraq's secular authoritarian, and North Korea's erratic dictator all ostensibly subscribed.

According to Wolfowitz, "transformation" offered the essential means of thwarting this nefarious partnership. Radically reforming the Pentagon consistent with the principles of the RMA promised to provide Washington-that is, people like Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz-with inviting new opportunities to act. Rather than being surprised as on 9/11, the United States would spring surprises on bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, Kim Jong Il, and anyone else said to pose a threat.

Within days after Wolfowitz spoke, the invasion of Afghanistan provided a preliminary demonstration of what he and Rumsfeld had in mind. Small numbers of special operations troops (a.s.sisted by CIA paramilitaries) linked to an impressive array of firepower-mostly sophisticated aircraft delivering precision munitions-and local allies on the ground made short work of the Taliban. Operation Enduring Freedom began on October 7, 2001. By November 14, the Afghan capital, Kabul, had fallen. operations troops (a.s.sisted by CIA paramilitaries) linked to an impressive array of firepower-mostly sophisticated aircraft delivering precision munitions-and local allies on the ground made short work of the Taliban. Operation Enduring Freedom began on October 7, 2001. By November 14, the Afghan capital, Kabul, had fallen.

President Bush wasted no time in explaining what it all meant. Afghanistan had provided "a proving ground" for a new American approach to war, he announced to the a.s.sembled cadets at the Citadel in Charleston, South Carolina. Yet this was a work in progress: More remained to be done. "This revolution in our military is only beginning," Bush continued, "and it promises to change the face of battle."

These past two months have shown that an innovative doctrine and high-tech weaponry can shape and then dominate an unconventional conflict. The brave men and women of our military are rewriting the rules of war.... Our commanders are gaining a real-time picture of the entire battlefield and are able to get targeting information from sensor to shooter almost instantly.... We're striking with greater effectiveness, at greater range, with fewer civilian casualties. More and more, our weapons can hit moving targets. When all of our military can continuously locate and track moving targets with surveillance from air and s.p.a.ce, warfare will be truly revolutionized.12 The march on Baghdad served to highlight these capabilities on an even larger scale. Operation Iraqi Freedom began on March 20, 2003. By April 9, U.S. forces had taken the Iraqi capital, Saddam Hussein was in hiding, and his army had all but ceased to exist. capital, Saddam Hussein was in hiding, and his army had all but ceased to exist.

Administration officials immediately set out to interpret the military significance of what had occurred. The deed was done. The Pentagon had, in fact, consummated a revolution. History had rounded a corner and was entering the home stretch.

During his presentation on the deck of the Abraham Lincoln Abraham Lincoln that May 1, a c.o.c.ky President Bush, already referring to Operation Iraqi Freedom in the past tense, elaborated on the significance of the campaign now (apparently) concluding. The invasion of Iraq, he rhapsodized, "was carried out with a combination of precision and speed and boldness the enemy did not expect and the world had not seen before. In the images of falling statues," the president continued, that May 1, a c.o.c.ky President Bush, already referring to Operation Iraqi Freedom in the past tense, elaborated on the significance of the campaign now (apparently) concluding. The invasion of Iraq, he rhapsodized, "was carried out with a combination of precision and speed and boldness the enemy did not expect and the world had not seen before. In the images of falling statues," the president continued, we have witnessed the arrival of a new era. For a hundred years of war, culminating in the nuclear age, military technology was designed and deployed to inflict casualties on an ever-growing scale.... Military power was used to end a regime by breaking a nation. Today, we have the greater power to free a nation by breaking a dangerous and aggressive regime. With new tactics and precision weapons, we can achieve military objectives without directing violence against civilians. No device of man can remove the tragedy from war; yet it is a great moral advance when the guilty have far more to fear from war than the innocent.13 In an appearance at a conservative Washington think tank that same day, Vice President d.i.c.k Cheney seconded his boss, declaring that "Iraqi Freedom has been one of the most extraordinary military campaigns ever conducted." Victory in Iraq offered "proof positive of the success of our efforts to transform our military to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century." Transformation had "allowed us to integrate joint operations much more effectively than ever before, thereby enabling commanders to make decisions more rapidly, to target strikes more precisely, to minimize human casualties, civilian casualties, and to accomplish the missions more successfully." boss, declaring that "Iraqi Freedom has been one of the most extraordinary military campaigns ever conducted." Victory in Iraq offered "proof positive of the success of our efforts to transform our military to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century." Transformation had "allowed us to integrate joint operations much more effectively than ever before, thereby enabling commanders to make decisions more rapidly, to target strikes more precisely, to minimize human casualties, civilian casualties, and to accomplish the missions more successfully."14 In testimony before the House Government Reform Committee on May 6, Wolfowitz went even further: Our unparalleled ability to conduct night operations has allowed us to virtually own the night, and the close integration of our forces has resulted in an order of magnitude change in how precise we are in finding and hitting targets from just a decade ago. ...

As we have seen so vividly in recent days, lives depend, not just on technology, but on a culture that fosters leadership, flexibility, agility and adaptability. The American people need and deserve a transformed Defense Department.15 Out of this cascade of self-congratulation, one word pulled away from the pack to emerge as the signature for the new American way of war: speed speed. U.S. forces possessed the ability to dictate the tempo of events. They acted; the enemy reacted, belatedly and ineffectively. The United States "owned the clock," a priceless a.s.set.16 In a hastily prepared history of the Iraq invasion, retired Maj. Gen. Robert Scales cut to the essence: In war, speed kills, especially if military forces move fast enough to disrupt the enemy's ability to make decisions. [U.S. commanders in Iraq] maintained the speed of movement by making the tip of the spear as supple, mobile, and flexible as possible. They had clearly learned the lesson of the Gulf War [of 1991] that a fundamental law of Newtonian physics applies also to military maneuver: one can achieve overwhelming force by subst.i.tuting velocity for ma.s.s.17 Rumsfeld himself returned repeatedly to this point. In the invasion of Iraq, "speed was more important than ma.s.s," he emphasized during a television interview on April 13.18 Speed facilitated the good and precluded the unwanted. At a meeting with Pentagon employees soon after Baghdad fell, Rumsfeld expanded on this theme: "What's happened is amazing for the speed with which it was executed, but also for all the things that did not happen, all the bad things that could have happened [but didn't] because of that speed." Speed cleansed war of undesired collateral effects that traditionally compromised its utility. Thanks to the speed and precision of U.S. operations, he continued, Speed facilitated the good and precluded the unwanted. At a meeting with Pentagon employees soon after Baghdad fell, Rumsfeld expanded on this theme: "What's happened is amazing for the speed with which it was executed, but also for all the things that did not happen, all the bad things that could have happened [but didn't] because of that speed." Speed cleansed war of undesired collateral effects that traditionally compromised its utility. Thanks to the speed and precision of U.S. operations, he continued, There are no large ma.s.ses of refugees fleeing across borders into the neighboring countries. And humanitarian relief is flowing in through ports and rail and roads to a.s.sist the Iraqi people. There has not been large-scale collateral damage. The infrastructure of the country is largely intact. Bridges were not blown, for the most part, and rail lines were protected. The dams were not broken and floods did not occur. And there have not been ma.s.sive civilian casualties because the coalition forces took such enormous care to protect the lives of innocent civilians.19 Rumsfeld had shaped the design of Operation Iraqi Freedom to validate his concept of transformation. He now declared his test a success. Together, Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom had seemingly buried the putative lessons that Colin Powell had drawn from Desert Storm. Numerically large armies with their "big footprint" were now problematic. Small contingents of highly trained, high-tech ground forces moving like quicksilver: Here was the template for all future U.S. military operations. Deliberate planning, ma.s.sed formations, top-down control, operations unfolding according to a ponderous, predetermined sequence: All of these had become as obsolete as close-order drill. Swift, precise, flexible, agile, adaptable: These qualities had now become the hallmarks of U.S. military operations.

As Afghanistan and Iraq seemed to indicate, to commit U.S. forces to battle was to achieve a.s.sured victory. Washington need no longer view force as a last resort. Among the instruments available to policy makers, force now ranked as the preferred option.

Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz may not have hankered for war, something with which they had no direct personal experience. What they and other semiwarriors craved was not slaughter but submission-unquestioned political dominance as an expected by-product of unquestioned military dominion. Writing not long after the fall of Baghdad, one enthusiast put it this way: [T]he strategic imperative of patrolling the perimeter of the Pax Americana is transforming the U.S. military ... into the cavalry of a global, liberal international order. Like the cavalry of the Old West, their job is one part warrior and one part policeman-both of which are entirely within the tradition of the American military. of which are entirely within the tradition of the American military.

Even as the military remains ready to wage a full-scale war focused against a specific aggressor nation, the realignment of our network of overseas bases into a system of frontier stockades is necessary to win a long-term struggle against an amorphous enemy across the arc of instability.... Although countless questions about transformation remain unanswered, one lesson is already clear: American power is on the move.20 This defined the brand of militarism to which Washington now fell prey.

WAIST DEEP IN THE EUPHRATES.

During the run-up to, and execution of, Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, Rumsfeld had broached no opposition from within the officer corps. Confronted with contrary views, he moved quickly to crush them, Gen. Eric Shinseki, the army chief of staff who told Congress that occupying Iraq might pose considerable challenges, being his most famous victim. (A paradox of Rumsfeld's tenure in office: Intolerant of generals within the Pentagon who disagreed with him, the defense secretary evinced remarkable patience for senior commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq who performed ineptly.) With the fall of Baghdad, Rumsfeld succeeded in silencing RMA skeptics. Senior officers-at least those wishing to remain in the defense secretary's good graces-now dutifully parroted the language of transformation. Here, for example, is army Lt. Gen. Robert Wagner riffing on the future of warfare, less than a year into Operation Iraqi Freedom: future of warfare, less than a year into Operation Iraqi Freedom: We envision the future from an information age perspective where operations are conducted in a battles.p.a.ce, not a battlefield.... We are now able to create decision superiority that is enabled by networked systems, new sensors and command and control capabilities that are producing near real-time situational awareness.... [O]ur operations in Afghanistan and Iraq [have demonstrated the] operational attributes that an adaptive joint force must possess in the modern Battles.p.a.ce. To dominate this battles.p.a.ce, the joint force must be "knowledge centric," "coherently joint," "fully networked and collaborative" interdependent in organization and employment and uniquely designed for "Effects-Based Operations." Certainly any future joint force must be capable of conducting rapid, decisive combat operations. But we have found that a future joint force must also apply these operational attributes synergistically across the entire range of military operations. We must be decisive in every operation, not just the high-end portion of war but across the full range of military operations.... The advent of reliable and secure digital communications, a new level of battles.p.a.ce awareness borne from joint and combined interoperability, and precision weapons have created the potential for a new type of force.21 Some readers may flinch from wading through this gaseous pa.s.sage. Yet it deserves careful consideration. Take a moment to read it a second time. Savor the vocabulary: seamless, digital, networked, effects-based, coherently joint, along with the reference to precision and, of course, speed, all of it redolent of a pitch marketing an info-tech start-up rather than an activity involving death and destruction, risk and uncertainty (all of which go unmentioned). Note the references to synergism, interoperability, and situational awareness, which suggest the absence of fog and friction. Ponder Wagner's jaw-dropping a.s.surance that forces organized consistent with such principles will "be decisive in every operation," apparently without exception. along with the reference to precision and, of course, speed, all of it redolent of a pitch marketing an info-tech start-up rather than an activity involving death and destruction, risk and uncertainty (all of which go unmentioned). Note the references to synergism, interoperability, and situational awareness, which suggest the absence of fog and friction. Ponder Wagner's jaw-dropping a.s.surance that forces organized consistent with such principles will "be decisive in every operation," apparently without exception.

General Wagner's testimony recalls H. L. Mencken's famous a.s.sessment of President Warren G. Harding's oratory: It is so bad that a sort of grandeur creeps into it. It drags itself out of a dark abysm of pish, and crawls insanely up the topmost pinnacle of posh. It is rumble and b.u.mble, it is flap and doodle. It is balder and dash.

The bloviating of hack politicians offers a suitable subject for comedy and satire. Balderdash that presumes to express the truth about war does not: The stakes are too high. The views expressed by General Wagner, a Vietnam veteran to boot, ill.u.s.trate the extent to which, midway through the Age of Rumsfeld, the officer corps, its ranks normally filled with sober empiricists, had become unhinged. A soldier transported from the 1940s-or even the 1990s-would have found General Wagner's incantations all but incomprehensible.

Not only were such views divorced from the historical experience of warfare, they were also radically at odds with ongoing events. Wagner spoke in late February 2004. That month, 19 American soldiers lost their lives in Iraq with another 150 wounded. The following month the totals would rise to 52 killed and 323 wounded, and in April to 136 killed and 1,214 wounded. another 150 wounded. The following month the totals would rise to 52 killed and 323 wounded, and in April to 136 killed and 1,214 wounded.22 In the "battles.p.a.ce" where this was occurring, the Revolution in Military Affairs provided U.S. forces with no discernible advantage. The Americans certainly did not "own the clock." Despite all the technological paraphernalia in their possession, U.S. forces were effectively fighting blind. Lacking adequate intelligence, they conducted ma.s.sive nighttime "sweeps" in which they knocked down doors, terrorized Iraqi women and children, and detained large numbers of military-age men. They threw innocent and guilty alike into overcrowded detention camps that then served as incubators of anti-American resistance.

The result was not to suppress but further inflame an insurgency that was destabilizing Iraq. As U.S. troops moved about Baghdad and other cities, they found themselves continually ambushed. Relying increasingly on roadside bombs and other explosive devices, insurgents called the tune; the Americans danced. Meanwhile, the Abu Ghraib scandal was in full flower, with photographs of GIs s.a.d.i.s.tically abusing Iraqi detainees demolishing Washington's pretensions to moral superiority.

As things went from bad to worse, Rumsfeld's knowledge-centric, coherently joint, fully networked concept of military transformation offered little of value. The RMA ostensibly provided a surefire formula for making wars short and decisive. In Iraq, the formula failed, abysmally. The Bush administration's official narrative of a brief encounter ending neatly in "mission accomplished" disintegrated. The war became incoherent. Fighting simply went on and on, with U.S. forces groping ineffectually to regain control. Caught in the middle were Iraqi civilians who suffered and died or simply fled their homes or the country in alarming numbers, giving the lie to claims that the United States had discovered a more discriminating and humane approach to waging war. suffered and died or simply fled their homes or the country in alarming numbers, giving the lie to claims that the United States had discovered a more discriminating and humane approach to waging war.

During the opening stages of the Iraq War, Western observers had had great fun at the expense of Muhammad Saeed al-Sahhaf, the Iraqi information minister. Mockingly known as Baghdad Bob, al-Sahhaf had periodically provided Western reporters in Baghdad with the Iraqi government's version of events. As late as April 8, 2003, with U.S. armored columns already cruising through the Iraqi capital, he was still predicting that coalition forces were "going to surrender or be burned in their tanks." Victory over the invaders, he insisted, was just around the corner. Baghdad Bob's a.s.sessments evoked gales of laughter: Only a knave or a fool could express views so obviously at odds with reality.

By the spring and summer of 2004, those presenting the official U.S. interpretation of events in Iraq were sounding more than a little like Baghdad Bob. President Bush, for example, clung to the delusion that the restoration of Iraqi sovereignty, scheduled for June 30, held the key to restoring peace and harmony across that nation. Speaking at a press conference on April 13, the president was once again ready to declare the mission accomplished.

The nation of Iraq is moving toward self-rule, and Iraqis and Americans will see evidence in the months to come. On June 30th, when the flag of free Iraq is raised, Iraqi officials will a.s.sume full responsibility for the ministries of Government. On that day, the transitional administrative law, including a bill of rights that is unprecedented in the Arab world, will take full effect.23 Donald Rumsfeld shared this upbeat a.s.sessment of Iraq's prospects. "They've got the schools open," he told a television interviewer on April 29. "They've got the hospitals open. They've got the clinics open. There was not a humanitarian crisis. Food is there and available to the people. The people are able to form a part of an Olympic team. They've got a symphony that's started."24 Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith corroborated these findings. In a speech at a conservative think tank on May 4, he reported that over the course of the previous twelve months, "Iraq has been transformed." The economy was booming. Everywhere there were signs of progress. The restoration of sovereignty on June 30 would seal the deal. Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith corroborated these findings. In a speech at a conservative think tank on May 4, he reported that over the course of the previous twelve months, "Iraq has been transformed." The economy was booming. Everywhere there were signs of progress. The restoration of sovereignty on June 30 would seal the deal.25 On May 10, 2004, Bush was still justifying the ongoing war as central to American efforts to encourage "the spread of freedom throughout the world." U.S. forces were "steadily defeating" the enemy, he reported. American troops were "on the offensive, conducting hundreds of patrols and raids every day ... responding with precision and discipline and restraint, [while] taking every precaution to avoid hurting the innocent as we deliver justice to the guilty." The president expressed confidence that things were well in hand. "We're fielding the most technologically advanced military forces ever a.s.sembled, forces that are agile and flexible, able to strike in darkness and in light."26 All of this was fantasy. June 30 came and went, with the restoration of Iraqi sovereignty largely a fiction. Little of substance changed. The violence worsened. Tens of thousands of foreign troops continued to occupy Iraq and operate as their commanders saw fit. The war continued.

Rather than liberating Iraq en route to liberating the remainder of the Greater Middle East, the Bush administration had blundered into an immense cul-de-sac, from which it could not extricate itself. The campaign intended to highlight American military capabilities without precedent became instead an open sore-the very war that Colin Powell, while a serving officer, had vowed to avoid. it could not extricate itself. The campaign intended to highlight American military capabilities without precedent became instead an open sore-the very war that Colin Powell, while a serving officer, had vowed to avoid.

In November 2001, with U.S. intervention in Afghanistan just under way, Paul Wolfowitz had touted the Pentagon's plans for reforming the military even as it waged the global war on terror. "We are getting it right," he declared. "I guarantee you."27 Wolfowitz's promise reflected the confidence then pervading the ranks of the semiwarriors. Like so much else undertaken by the Bush administration, the guarantee proved worthless. Rumsfeld's attempt to use the global war on terror as a device to validate his transformation agenda proved to be a ma.s.sive miscalculation. Marrying the two together resulted in the undoing of both.

5.

COUNTERFEIT COIN.

President Bush had embarked upon successive wars in Afghanistan and Iraq expecting each to end quickly and decisively. Yet in each theater-with Iraq attracting the lion's share of attention-fighting dragged on, increased in intensity, turned ugly, and consumed prodigious amounts of blood and treasure. The global war on terror morphed into what the Pentagon began styling the Long War, a conflict defined not by purpose, adversary, or location but by duration, which was indeterminate. For members of the U.S. military, war-not a cold war, but engagement in actual hostilities-was establishing itself as the new normalcy.

This new normalcy imparted a radical twist to the Washington rules. Not even the most hawkish proponent of American global leadership-not Allen Dulles or Curtis LeMay, not Maxwell Taylor or McGeorge Bundy-had ever proposed committing the United States to a policy of war without foreseeable end. Yet over the course of George W. Bush's presidency, open-ended war became accepted policy, hardly more controversial than the practice of stationing U.S. troops abroad. Speaking in 2006, Brig. Gen. Mark O. Schissler, a senior Pentagon planner, bluntly put into words what had already emerged as a prevailing a.s.sumption: "We're in a generational war." He himself expected that conflict to last another fifty or one hundred years. hardly more controversial than the practice of stationing U.S. troops abroad. Speaking in 2006, Brig. Gen. Mark O. Schissler, a senior Pentagon planner, bluntly put into words what had already emerged as a prevailing a.s.sumption: "We're in a generational war." He himself expected that conflict to last another fifty or one hundred years.1 More extraordinary still was the extent to which the country's military leaders, and the American people more generally, accommodated themselves to this prospect. Even as the course of events (especially in Iraq) evoked widespread consternation, questions about the origins of the predicament in which the United States found itself remained unasked. It was a cla.s.sic example of a symptom masking the disease. Even as a growing chorus of critics raged against President Bush's "mismanagement" of the Long War, the national security consensus that provided the real, if unacknowledged, foundation for the enterprise attracted little or no critical attention.

Yet as the bills piled up and the toll in casualties mounted (and as memories of 9/11 faded), the American people grew restive. Both Bush and the wars he had begun became increasingly unpopular. Someone had obviously screwed up. An angry season of finger-pointing ensued with the president and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, along with a few hapless generals, the favored targets.

The administration acknowledged the challenges it was facing, but remained determined. Rumsfeld famously described the road to victory in Iraq and Afghanistan as "a long, hard slog." Yet the defense secretary did not waver in his conviction that "the coalition can win ... in one way or another."2 Loyalists committed to the Long War did not conceal their disappointment, but insisted on the need to stay the course. They combed reports from the battlefield in search of good news. They hailed the arrival of successive "turning points" that, in practice, never quite panned out. Max Boot, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, was typical of those counseling patience. Writing five years after 9/11 when the situation in Iraq appeared particularly grim, Boot rejected the charge that "the Bush doctrine is a bust," insisting that "it is far too soon to judge the results of the President's grand strategy of transforming the Middle East." Persistence was sure to pay off. "The Muslim ma.s.ses just need to be shown that it's possible to set themselves free." Although there might be some b.u.mps along the way, "vigorous American leadership can lower the body count and hasten freedom's triumph," which Boot characterized as "virtually foreordained." course. They combed reports from the battlefield in search of good news. They hailed the arrival of successive "turning points" that, in practice, never quite panned out. Max Boot, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, was typical of those counseling patience. Writing five years after 9/11 when the situation in Iraq appeared particularly grim, Boot rejected the charge that "the Bush doctrine is a bust," insisting that "it is far too soon to judge the results of the President's grand strategy of transforming the Middle East." Persistence was sure to pay off. "The Muslim ma.s.ses just need to be shown that it's possible to set themselves free." Although there might be some b.u.mps along the way, "vigorous American leadership can lower the body count and hasten freedom's triumph," which Boot characterized as "virtually foreordained."3 For the Democratic Party, the Iraq War served as a rallying point, notwithstanding the fact that party leaders like Senators John Kerry of Ma.s.sachusetts and Hillary Clinton of New York had voted in favor of the resolution giving a congressional stamp of approval to the 2003 invasion. Calculation rather than conviction shaped the party's behavior: Iraq offered a perfect opportunity to make hay at Republican expense. Democrats denounced Bush's war policies not because they were reevaluating the fundamentals of national security strategy, but because they found fault with the implementation of that strategy in Iraq. Having tendered their ritual denunciations, they then routinely voted the money needed to ensure the war's continuation, tacitly signaling their continuing fealty to the Washington consensus.

Unwilling to take a principled stand against a conflict key members denounced as an unmitigated disaster, the Democratic Party made itself complicit in the war's perpetuation. Claiming to oppose the war while supporting the troops, most Democrats staked out a position designed to maximize partisan advantage while minimizing political risk. troops, most Democrats staked out a position designed to maximize partisan advantage while minimizing political risk.

These maneuvers paid off handsomely in the 2006 midterm elections, which Democrats cast as a referendum on Iraq, promising that, if given control of Congress, they would act promptly to shut down the war. Invited to render a verdict, voters handed Bush and his party a crushing setback. In the House of Representatives, the Republicans lo