The exportation of arms and ammunition was prohibited, and the importation of the same encouraged, by law. The president was also authorized to call out the militia to the number of eighty thousand, and to accept of the services of volunteers. A small naval force was also provided for, and means for extraordinary expenses incident to a state of war.

Washington had doubts of the success of the new mission. In a letter to Timothy Pickering, at the close of August, he said: "Candor is not a more conspicuous trait in the character of governments than it is of individuals. It is hardly to be expected, then, that the Directory of France will acknowledge its errors, and tread back its steps immediately. This would announce at once that there has been precipitancy and injustice in the measures they have pursued; or that they were incapable of judging, and had been deceived by false representations. Pride would be opposed to all these; and I can scarcely think the Directory will relinquish the hold it has upon those who more than probably have suggested and promoted the measures they have been pursuing. I rather suppose that they will lower their tone by degrees, and, as is usual, place the change to the credit of _French magnanimity_."

Yet Washington had no fears concerning a war with France. To Pickering he wrote: "I can say with truth that my mind has never been alarmed by any fears of a war with France. I always knew that this government had no desire to go to war with that or any other country; and I as firmly believed that no power, without a _semblance of justice_, would declare war against it. That France has stepped far beyond the line of rect.i.tude, can not be denied; that she has been encouraged to do so by a party among ourselves is, to my mind, equally certain; and when it is considered, moreover, that enriching themselves and injuring Great Britain were the expected consequences of their spoliation's, I could account, though not on honorable principles in them, for their going to a certain point; but I never did believe that they would declare an open war against us, or compel us, if they foresaw that would be the result, to declare it against them."

In the autumn of 1797, Washington received a letter dated "Warren, Albemarle county," and signed "John Langhorne," in which the writer condoled with him on the aspersions of his character by his political opponents, and suggested that he ought not to allow them to disturb his repose. This letter was a forgery, there being no such person as John Langhorne, and was evidently intended to draw from Washington some expressions that might be used to his injury, and serve a party purpose.

But Washington, ever guarded, let fall no word in his reply that could be so used. "For the divisions which have taken place among us, with respect to our political concerns," he said, "for the attacks which have been made upon those to whom the administration of the government has been intrusted by the people, and for the calumnies which are levelled at all those who are disposed to support the measures thereof, I feel, on public account, as much as any man can do, because in my opinion much evil and no good can result to this country from such conduct. So far as these attacks are aimed at me personally, it is, I can a.s.sure you, a misconception, if it be supposed I feel the venom of the darts."

This letter appears to have been written by a person whose name has never been given to the public. The fraud was discovered by a gentleman who lived near the residence of Mr. Jefferson. He was informed of a letter in the Charlottesville post-office, in the well-known handwriting of Washington, addressed to one whose name was unknown in that neighborhood; and he immediately apprized Washington, not only of that fact, but that his reply was sent for by a person whose political sentiments were averse to those of the late administration. Washington furnished his informant with a copy of the correspondence; and that gentleman, on investigation, expressed his opinion that the "plot"

originated with Jefferson. Washington appears to have considered that opinion of some weight, for, in a response to the letter of his informant, he said: "If the person whom you _suspect_, was really the author of the letter under the signature of _John Langhorne_, it is not at all surprising to me that the correspondence should have ended where it did; for the penetration of that man would have perceived, at the first glance, that nothing was to be drawn from that mode of attack. In what form the next invidious attempts may appear, remains to be discovered."

There is no evidence that Mr. Jefferson had any knowledge of the matter until the forgery was exposed, and his name had been connected with it by Washington's informant, whom he denominated his "malignant neighbor."

That neighbor was John Nicholas, commonly known as "Clerk John," who, Mr. Randall says, "was a weak-headed, absurd busybody, with that restless itching for notoriety which renders a man, dest.i.tute of ability, sense, or delicacy, almost indifferent as to the subject."[125]

Washington was naturally indignant at this attempt to ensnare him, and his feelings were much disturbed by the alleged secret attacks upon him and his public measures by Jefferson and his friends. As we have already observed, he lost confidence in the genuineness of Jefferson's professions of friendship; and, from this time, there was no correspondence between them.

At about this time, Washington received the welcome news of the liberation of his friend Lafayette, and his expected speedy departure for America. Also a pamphlet on the "Military and Political Situation of France," by General Dumas, an officer who had served under Rochambeau at Yorktown. On the subject of his friend's release, he wrote to M. de La Colombe, who had been Lafayette's adjutant-general when the latter commanded the National Guard, and who was then in Philadelphia, saying: "I congratulate you on the happy event of the liberation of our mutual friend, whose reception in this country will be, I am sure, cordial from all descriptions of people; from none more than myself. The answer given by him to the minister is n.o.ble, and worthy of himself.[126] The only regret I should feel on his arrival in America, if it should happen soon, would be his disappointment at not finding his son here.

"I said all I could with decency, both to him and M. Frestel, to induce their awaiting direct accounts from the prisoners before their departure; but the eagerness of the former to embrace his parents in the first moments of their release from a cruel imprisonment, was not to be restrained."

These two great men and loving friends never met again on earth.

Circ.u.mstances caused Lafayette to remain in Europe, and his visit to America was deferred more than a quarter of a century, when he came as the Nation's Guest.

Dumas's pamphlet, to which we have just alluded, and the author's accompanying letter, awakened pleasant emotions in the bosom of Washington, for intelligence of an old companion-in-arms was conveyed.

"General Rochambeau," wrote Dumas, "is still at his country-seat near Vendome. He enjoys there tolerably good health, considering his great age, and reckons, as well as his military family, amongst his most dear and glorious remembrances, that of the time we had the honor to serve under your command."

This announcement gave Washington real pleasure, for he had heard from time to time vague rumors of the vicissitudes of Rochambeau--first as field-marshal, in command of the revolutionary army of the north; then as a thwarted and disappointed man, dwelling in retirement; and then as a victim prepared for the guillotine, but saved by a sudden change in public affairs. He was glad to know that the general was enjoying repose in his old age. Rochambeau survived all the tempests of the Revolution, was honored by Napoleon with the cross of grand officer of the Legion of Honor, and a marshal's pension, and died in 1807, at the age of eighty-two years.

FOOTNOTES:

[125] Life of Jefferson, ii. 371.

[126] The emperor of Austria communicated to Lafayette, through the marquis de Chasteler, his intention to liberate him from his confinement at Olmutz, on certain conditions, to which the marquis refused to accede. In his reply to De Chasteler, Lafayette said:--

"His majesty, the emperor and king, demands an a.s.surance that, immediately after my release, I will depart for America. This is an intention which I have often manifested; but since, in the actual state of things, an a.s.surance to this effect would seem to recognise a right to impose this condition upon me, I think it not proper to satisfy such a demand.

"His majesty, the emperor and king, has done me the honor to signify that, as the principles which I profess are incompatible with the security of the Austrian government, it is his wish that I should never again enter his dominions without his special permission. There are duties from which I can not release myself--duties which I owe to the United States, and above all to France; nor can I consent to any act which shall derogate from the rights of my country over my person.

"With these reservations, I can a.s.sure the marquis de Chasteler that it is my fixed determination never again to set my foot in any country which yields obedience to his imperial majesty the king of Bohemia and Hungary."--Sparks's Life of Washington, vol. xi., note ix. of the Appendix.

CHAPTER x.x.xIX.

AMERICAN ENVOYS IN PARIS--DIRECTORY SEEKING MONEY--TALLEYRAND AND HIS AGENTS--PROPOSITIONS FOR AN APOLOGY, LOAN, AND BRIBE--INDIGNANT REFUSAL--ATTEMPTS TO FRIGHTEN THE ENVOYS--TWO OF THEM ORDERED OUT OF FRANCE--THEY ALL LEAVE--EXCITEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES--CONGRESS PREPARES FOR WAR--PATRIOTIC ADDRESSES TO THE PRESIDENT--HAMILTON CALLS WASHINGTON TO THE RESCUE OF HIS COUNTRY--WASHINGTON'S RESPONSE--THE PRESIDENT PERPLEXED--HE TURNS TO WASHINGTON--APPEAL OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR--WASHINGTON'S REPLIES--IS APPOINTED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES--HAMILTON URGES HIM TO ACCEPT--THE PRESIDENT SENDS HIM A COMMISSION--SECRETARY OF WAR AT MOUNT VERNON--WASHINGTON ACCEPTS THE APPOINTMENT--HIS SELECTION OF OFFICERS.

The three United States envoys--Pinckney, Gerry, and Marshall--met in Paris on the fourth of October, 1797, and were approached by the wily diplomat, M. de Talleyrand, minister for foreign affairs, in a spirit not at all pleasing either to their expectations or their desires. They had been sent upon a mission of peace, charged with honorable purposes, and were met with propositions insulting and disgraceful. On their arrival, the envoys sent a joint letter to Talleyrand, informing him of their presence and purposes, and requesting him to appoint a time for receiving copies of their letters of credence. He informed them that he was then engaged upon a report to the Directory on American affairs, and that, when it should be completed, he would inform them what was to be done. At the same time he sent them permits (cards of hospitality) to reside in Paris meanwhile.

The Directory had resolved to extort money from the envoys, if possible; and in the course of a few days after their first communication with Talleyrand, that minister, through secret agents, began to sound them.

One of these informed them that he had, as if by accident, learned through Talleyrand's private secretary that the Directory were very much exasperated at the tone of the president's speech at the opening of the special session of Congress. Another, a partner in a noted commercial house in Paris, volunteered to answer their drafts to any amount; a third called on them, and, in a private interview with Pinckney, said that he had a message from Talleyrand, suggesting a plan by which a reconciliation between the two governments might be brought about. That "plan" proposed that some of the most offensive pa.s.sages in the president's speech should be expunged or softened before the envoys should be received; a loan to be made to the republic; and a _douceur_ to the Directory of nearly two hundred and fifty thousand dollars. The envoys were astonished, but resolved to treat the matter in such a way that they might ascertain the real sentiments of the French government, without exciting suspicions.

Shortly afterward (October twentieth), Talleyrand's secret agent again appeared before the envoys, and introduced Mr. Bellamy, a citizen of Hamburg, who came as an intimate friend of the minister for foreign affairs, but without, as he said, any diplomatic authority. He a.s.sured the envoys that Talleyrand was well disposed toward the United States; that if the offensive portions of the president's speech should be expunged, the loan made, and the _douceur_ given, a new treaty would be made, and all would be well. "We want money," said Bellamy, speaking for his princ.i.p.als--"a great deal of money."

Another conference was held on the following day, when the secret agent and Bellamy breakfasted with the envoys. It was stated that the Directory insisted upon an apology, or its equivalent, for the offensive words of the president; but Bellamy gave it as his private opinion that the matter might be compromised with money. At that conference the amount of the loan was fixed at six millions four hundred thousand dollars, to be secured by Dutch "inscriptions," or obligations extorted from them by the French; and the _douceur_ to the Directory at two hundred and fifty thousand dollars.

"The proposition for a loan can not be met by any construction of our instructions," said the envoys. "One of us, however, will return home and consult our government on that point, provided the Directory will agree to suspend, in the interval, all further captures of American vessels, and all proceedings on captures already made." The agents of the Directory were quite surprised at this answer. Bellamy spoke of the resentment of that body, and said that, if money could not be had from the envoys, the apology would be expected. To his astonishment, he was informed that such a proceeding was wholly out of the question; that the president had exercised his const.i.tutional privilege in giving to Congress his ideas on national affairs, and that in doing so he had only stated facts in regard to French relations with which the American people were already familiar. The agents seemed greatly astonished at the audacity of the envoys, and withdrew, satisfied that they could accomplish nothing.

An interview between the envoys and Talleyrand was arranged for the twenty-seventh. The minister repeated, in substance, the proposition of his agents; but the representatives of America were firm. Finally, after more unofficial interviews with other agents of the Directory, who had endeavored to frighten the American ministers by menaces of the hostility of France; who had painted, in glowing colors, the immense power and resources of the French nation, and the dangers to be apprehended from its indignation; who claimed that in the friendship of France alone could America look for safety--the envoys told them plainly: "Gentlemen, we will not give you a dollar. Before coming here, we should not have thought it possible that such an offer would have been made to us. A transaction such as you propose, would be disgraceful to all parties concerned." And then it was that Pinckney made that terse and indignant remark which has become proverbial: "Millions for defence, but not one cent for tribute!"

Startled by the indignation and boldness of the envoys, the agent of the executive government intimated that if they would pay, for the private use of the Directory, the sum named, by way of _fees_, as they would pay a lawyer, they might remain in Paris until they should receive further orders from home respecting the loan required for the government. This base proposition to purchase the services of the Directory was rejected with disdain; and the French executive government, in the persons of its agents, withdrew abashed, and did not prosecute the disgraceful measures any further. Indeed, the envoys refused to have any further intercourse with them.

The American ministers remained several months in Paris, urging the objects of their mission at all proper times, but without success. The Directory refused to acknowledge them in their official character, and they were, from time to time, importuned for money by Talleyrand, in his unofficial visits to them. Finally, perceiving that their reception was out of the question, they prepared a full statement, in a letter addressed to Talleyrand, in which they made explanations, and gave proofs unequivocal of the friendliness of the government of the United States toward that of France. To this Talleyrand made an elaborate reply, and the envoys, in April, met it with a rejoinder.

Talleyrand's tactics were now changed, and he endeavored by various attempts to induce Pinckney and Marshall, who were federalists, voluntarily to relinquish their station, and leave negotiations with Gerry, who belonged to the republican party, and was supposed to sympathize with the French Directory. In this the wily diplomat did not succeed. Satisfied that nothing could seduce them from the path of rect.i.tude, the Directory ordered those two envoys to quit the territories of the French republic immediately; while, to aggravate the insult to the American government, Mr. Gerry, because he belonged to a party favorable to France, was permitted to remain. Gerry, frightened (as he afterward said, in excuse for his conduct) by Talleyrand's threat of an immediate declaration of war against the United States by France if he should leave, consented to remain. Yet he refused to sanction the expulsion of his colleagues. He would not treat independently of them; and, finally, the entire emba.s.sy returned home. Marshall left France at the middle of April, Gerry on the twenty-sixth of July, but Pinckney was detained until October, on account of the ill health of his daughter.

During the whole time of these attempts at negotiation, the French Directory allowed many gross insults to the United States government to be perpetrated. Open war was waged upon American commerce by French cruisers; and the American flag floating over a vessel was deemed a sufficient justification for the capture and condemnation of such vessel.

When the final despatches of the envoys reached the public eye and ear in the United States, there was an outburst of indignation over all the land, that proclaimed the dignity of true patriotism in the presence of mere party considerations. The nation felt insulted by the attempt to degrade the republic into a tributary dependant of France; and the indignities offered to the representatives of their government, and the injuries inflicted upon their commerce, were resented with great warmth.

The words of Pinckney were reported, and in every part of the continent was heard the cry--"Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute!"

And yet there were those slavish enough to justify France, by criminating the American government. The _Aurora_ was foremost in this labor; and, preparatory to such defense, it had published Talleyrand's reply to the statement of the envoys, which had been received by Bache before it reached the government of the United States.

It was argued that the intentions of France were not really hostile; that men under British influence, who wished for war, had misrepresented her conduct; that, admitting her position to be hostile, she only demanded those marks of friendship which, at a critical moment, she had herself afforded America; that the real interests of the United States required a compliance with the demands of the Directory for a loan and a bribe; that it would cost more money to resist than to comply; that resistance would be inevitably ineffectual; and that national honor was never secured by national defeat.

But such logic, degrading and unpatriotic in tendency, did not suit the temper of the American people at that time. A war-spirit was aroused not easily to be appeased, except by the ministrations of justice. In Congress, vigorous measures for defence and retaliation were adopted.

Means for administering chastis.e.m.e.nt for injuries received, and for repelling those which were threatened, were provided with willing alacrity. A regular army was authorized. A regiment of artillerists and engineers was added to the permanent establishment; and the president was authorized to raise twelve additional regiments of infantry and one regiment of cavalry, to serve during the continuance of existing difficulties with France, if not sooner discharged. He was also authorized to appoint officers for a provisional army, and to receive and organize volunteer corps, which should be exempt from ordinary militia duty.

These measures of Congress were fully approved by the great ma.s.s of the people. The president received addresses from all parts of the Union, whose spirit attested the patriotic sentiment of the nation; and the executive, in turn, warmed by like sentiments, made responses that sustained the ardor of the people.

Then arose spontaneously in every mind the question, "Who shall command our army in this crisis?" and in every mind was the same response. All hearts turned instinctively toward Washington as the only man in the nation fitted for that important trust. The loud, harsh voice of party spirit was hushed to a whisper; and men who had joined in the clamor of reproach against the late president because of his public measures, were among the first, in this hour of peril, to turn to him as the only leader in whom they might implicitly trust. Intimations of this nature reached Washington almost daily while Congress were busy in preparing for war; and finally, near the close of May, Hamilton, in a confidential and highly interesting letter, wrote to him, saying:--

"At the present dangerous crisis of public affairs, I make no apology for troubling you with a political letter. Your impressions of our situation, I am persuaded, are not different from mine.

There is certainly great probability that we may have to enter into a very serious struggle with France; and it is more and more evident that the powerful faction which has for years opposed the government is determined to go every length with France. I am sincere in declaring my full conviction, as the result of a long course of observation, that they are ready to _new model_ our const.i.tution, under the _influence_ or _coercion_ of France; to form with her a perpetual alliance, _offensive_ and _defensive_; and to give her a monopoly of our trade, by _peculiar_ and _exclusive_ privileges. This would be in substance, whatever it might be in name, to make this country a province of France.

Neither do I doubt that her standard, displayed in this country, would be directly or indirectly seconded by them, in pursuance of the project I have mentioned.

"It is painful and alarming to remark that the opposition faction a.s.sumes so much a geographical complexion. As yet, from the south of Maryland, nothing has been heard but accounts of disapprobation of our government, and approbation of our apology for France. This is a most portentous symptom, and demands every human effort to change it.

"In such a state of public affairs, it is impossible not to look up to you, and to wish that your influence could in some proper mode be brought into direct action." Hamilton then suggested the propriety of Washington's taking a tour southward, which would call out the people in public demonstrations, and would give him an opportunity of expressing sentiments which would throw the weight of his character into the scale of the government, and revive an enthusiasm for his person that might be turned into a right channel. He concluded by saying: "You ought to be aware, my dear sir, that in the event of an open rupture with France, the public voice will again call you to command the armies of your country; and, though all who are attached to you will, from attachment, as well as public considerations, deplore an occasion which should once more tear you from that repose to which you have so good a right, yet it is the opinion of all those with whom I converse that you will be compelled to make the sacrifice. All your past labor may demand, to give it efficacy, this further--this great sacrifice."

Notwithstanding these alarm-bell notes from Hamilton, in whose political sagacity Washington had unbounded confidence, he could not bring himself to believe that actual war between the two countries would ensue. "You may be a.s.sured," he replied, "that my mind is deeply impressed with the present situation of our public affairs, and not a little agitated by the outrageous conduct of France toward the United States, and at the unparalleled conduct of its partisans, who aid and abet their measures. You may believe further, from a.s.surances equally sincere, that, if there was anything in my power, which could be done with consistency, to avert or lessen the danger of the crisis, it should be rendered with hand and heart.

"But, my dear sir, dark as matters appear at present, and expedient as it is to be prepared at all points for the worst that can happen--and no one is more disposed to this measure than I am--I can not make up my mind yet for the expectation of _open war_, or, in other words, for a formidable invasion by France. I can not believe, although I think them capable of anything bad, that they will attempt to do more than they have done; or that, when they perceive the spirit and policy of this country rising into resistance, and that they have falsely calculated upon support from a large part of the _people_ thereof to promote their views and influence in it, they will not desist even from these practices, unless unexpected events in Europe, and their possession of Louisiana and the Floridas, should induce them to continue the measure.

And I believe further, that, although the _leaders_ of their party in this country will not change their sentiments, they will be obliged, nevertheless, to change their plan, or the mode of carrying it on, from the effervescence which is appearing in all quarters, and from the desertion of their followers, which must frown them into silence, at least for awhile.

"If I did not view things in this light, my mind would be infinitely more disquieted than it is; for, if a crisis should arrive when a sense of duty or a call from my country should become so imperious as to leave me no choice, I should prepare for the relinquishment, and go with as much reluctance from my present peaceful abode, as I should do to the tomb of my ancestors.

"To say at this time, determinately, what I should do under such circ.u.mstances, might be improper, having once before departed from a similar resolution; but I may declare _to you_, that, as there is no conviction in my breast that I could serve my country with more efficiency in the command of the armies it might levy than many others, an expression of its wish that I should do so must, somehow or other, be unequivocally known, to satisfy my mind, that, notwithstanding the respect in which I may be held on account of former services, a preference might not be given to a man more in his prime; and it might well be supposed, too, that I should like precisely to know who would be my coadjutors, and whether you would be disposed to take an active part, if arms are to be resorted to."[127]