Washington and the American Republic - Part 32
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Part 32

"The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success must often depend on secrecy; and, even when brought to a conclusion, a full disclosure of all the measures, demands, or eventual concessions, which may have been proposed or contemplated, would be extremely impolitic; for this might have a pernicious influence on future negotiations, or produce immediate inconveniences, perhaps danger and mischief, in relation to other powers. The necessity of such caution and secrecy was one cogent reason for vesting the power of making treaties in the president, with the advice and consent of the senate; the principle on which that body was formed confining it to a small number of members. To admit, then, a right in the house of representatives to demand, and to have, as a matter of course, all the papers respecting a negotiation with a foreign power, would be to establish a dangerous precedent.

"It does not occur that the inspection of the papers asked for can be relative to any purpose under the cognizance of the house of representatives, except that of an impeachment, which the resolution has not expressed. I repeat, that I have no disposition to withhold any information which the duty of my situation will permit, or the public good shall require, to be disclosed; and, in fact, all the papers affecting the negotiation with Great Britain were laid before the senate when the treaty itself was communicated for their consideration and advice.

"The course which the debate has taken on the resolution of the house, leads to some observations on the mode of making treaties under the const.i.tution of the United States.

"Having been a member of the general convention, and knowing the principles on which the const.i.tution was formed, I have ever entertained but one opinion on this subject; and, from the first establishment of the government to this moment, my conduct has exemplified that opinion--that the power of making treaties is exclusively vested in the president, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, provided two thirds of the senators present concur; and that every treaty, so made and promulgated, thenceforward became the law of the land. It is thus that the treaty-making power has been understood by foreign nations; and, in all the treaties made with them, we have declared, and they have believed, that when ratified by the president, with the advice and consent of the senate, they became obligatory. In this construction of the const.i.tution, every house of representatives has heretofore acquiesced; and, until the present time, not a doubt or suspicion has appeared, to my knowledge, that this construction was not the true one. Nay, they have more than acquiesced; for, till now, without controverting the obligations of such treaties, they have made all the requisite provisions for carrying them into effect.

"There is also reason to believe that this construction agrees with the opinions entertained by the state conventions, when they were deliberating on the const.i.tution; especially by those who objected to it because there was not required, in _commercial treaties_, the consent of two thirds of the whole number of the members of the senate, instead of two thirds of the senators present; and because, in treaties respecting territorial and certain other rights and claims, the concurrence of three fourths of the whole number of both houses respectively was not made necessary.

"It is a fact decided by the general convention, and universally understood, that the const.i.tution of the United States was the result of a spirit of amity and mutual concession.

"And it is well known that, under this influence, the smaller states were admitted to an equal representation in the senate with the larger states, and that this branch of the government was invested with great powers; for on the equal partic.i.p.ation of those powers the sovereignty and political safety of the smaller states were deemed essentially to depend.

"If other proofs than these, and the plain letter of the const.i.tution itself, be necessary to ascertain the point under consideration, they may be found in the journals of the general convention, which I have deposited in the office of the department of state. In those journals it will appear that a proposition was made, 'that no treaty should be binding on the United States which was not ratified by a law,' and that the proposition was explicitly rejected.

"As, therefore, it is perfectly clear to my understanding that the a.s.sent of the house of representatives is not necessary to the validity of a treaty; as the treaty with Great Britain exhibits, in itself, all the objects requiring legislative provision, and on these the papers called for can throw no light; and as it is essential to the due administration of the government that the boundaries fixed by the const.i.tution between the different departments should be preserved, a just regard to the const.i.tution and to the duty of my office, under all the circ.u.mstances of this case, forbids a compliance with your request. GEORGE WASHINGTON."

[94] Earnest pet.i.tions from these had been sent in to Congress, representing that the property of merchants of the United States, to the amount of five millions of dollars, had been taken from them by the subjects of Great Britain, for which they wanted rest.i.tution, and, for that purpose, prayed for measures to execute the provisions of the treaty.

[95] History of the United States, second series, i, 603.

[96] Letter to Mrs. Adams, April 30, 1796.

CHAPTER x.x.xIII.

JEFFERSON'S APPREHENSIONS CONCERNING JAY'S TREATY--HIS OPINION OF GALLATIN--OF THE TREATY-MAKING POWER--HIS LETTER TO MAZZEI--ITS EFFECTS--DISCLOSURE OF A CONFIDENTIAL PAPER--JEFFERSON DISCLAIMS ANY PARTIc.i.p.aTION IN THE ACT--HIS LETTER TO WASHINGTON, AND THE REPLY--UNGENEROUS ATTACKS ON WASHINGTON'S CHARACTER--PROVISION FOR CARRYING THE TREATY INTO EFFECT--DIPLOMATIC CHANGES--WASHINGTON AT MOUNT VERNON--EFFORTS TO PROCURE THE LIBERATION OF LAFAYETTE--WASHINGTON'S LETTER TO THE EMPEROR OF GERMANY--WASHINGTON'S FAREWELL ADDRESS--ITS AUTHORSHIP.

According to the prediction of Vice-President Adams, the British treaty, after having been "mauled and abused," was "acquiesced in."

"The treaty will go into operation, and be supported by a great majority of the people," wrote Jay on the first of May; "a majority comprising the greater part of the men most distinguished by talents, worth, and weight."[97]

But there were many honest men--men who loved their country, were jealous of its honor, and ready to make personal sacrifices, if necessary, for the commonwealth--who regarded the triumph of the government party, on this occasion, as a public calamity. Among these was Mr. Jefferson, who, from his retirement at Monticello, sent forth, now and then, the thunderbolts of his wrath against political opponents and their measures. He had watched the progress of the treaty in every stage of the ordeal to which it was subjected in Congress, and occasionally gave his views to his friends. He was deeply enamored of Gallatin, and with acute perception, as time demonstrated, he foresaw the value of the young Genevese to his adopted country. "If Mr.

Gallatin," he said, in a letter to Madison on the sixth of March, concerning the operations of the treasury, "would undertake to reduce this chaos to order, present us with a clear view of our finances, and put them into a form as simple as they will admit, he will merit immortal honor."

After Gallatin's speech on the treaty, Mr. Jefferson again wrote to Madison, saying, "It is worthy to be printed at the end of the Federalist, as the only rational commentary on the part of the const.i.tution to which it relates." In reference to the power of the house of representatives, in the matter of treaties, Mr. Jefferson remarked in the same letter, "I see no harm in rendering their sanction necessary, and not much harm in annihilating the whole treaty-making power, except as to making peace. If you decide in favor of your right to refuse your co-operation in any case of treaty, I wonder on what occasion it is to be used, if not in one where the rights, the interest, the honor, and faith of our nation are so grossly sacrificed; when a faction has entered into a conspiracy with the enemies of their country, to chain down the legislature at the feet of both; when the whole ma.s.s of your const.i.tuents have condemned this work in the most unequivocal manner, and are looking to you as their last hope to save them from the effects of the avarice and corruption of the first agent, the revolutionary machinations of others, and the incomprehensible acquiescence of the only honest man [the president] who has a.s.sented to it. I wish that his honesty and his political errors may not furnish a second occasion to exclaim--'curse on his virtues, they have undone his country.'"[98]

On the twenty-fourth of April, in a letter to his friend, Philip Mazzei,[99] then in Florence--a letter which afterward drew down upon the author the most severe comments--he said, "The aspect of our politics has wonderfully changed since you left us. In place of that n.o.ble love of liberty and republican government which carried us triumphantly through the war, an Anglican monarchical and aristocratical party has sprung up, whose avowed object is, to draw over us the substance, as they have already done the form, of the British government. The main body of our citizens, however, remain true to their republican principles; the whole landed interest is republican, and so is a great ma.s.s of talent. Against us are the executive; the judiciary; two out of three branches of the legislature; all the officers of the government; all who want to be officers; all timid men who prefer the calm of despotism to the boisterous sea of liberty; British merchants, and Americans trading on British capital; speculators and holders in the banks and public funds, a contrivance invented for the purposes of corruption, and for a.s.similating us in all things to the rotten as well as the sound parts of the British model. It would give you a fever were I to name to you the apostates who have gone over to these heresies; men who were Samsons in the field and Solomons in the council, but who have had their heads shorn by the harlot England. In short, we are likely to preserve the liberty we have obtained, only by unremitting labors and perils. But we shall preserve it; and our ma.s.s of weight and wealth on the good side is so great, as to leave no danger that force will ever be attempted against us. We have only to awake and snap the Lilliputian cords with which they have been entangling us during the first sleep which succeeded our labors."[100]

A little later, when the government had triumphed in the matter of the treaty, and the public acquiesced, Mr. Jefferson wrote to Monroe, in Paris; "You will have seen, by their proceedings, the truth of what I have always observed to you, that one man outweighs them all in influence over the people, who have supported his judgment against their own, and that of their representatives. Republicanism must lie on its oars, resign the vessel to its pilot, and themselves to the course he thinks best for them." In this manner the professedly retired statesman, deceived by demagogues, taking Bache's abusive and unscrupulous "Aurora"

as his compa.s.s in current politics, and with his judgment sadly warped by his prejudices, he threw out, in various directions, ungenerous insinuations against Washington, who, at that moment, was confiding implicitly in Jefferson's integrity, justice, sincerity, and personal friendship. He would not allow himself to be even suspicious of any duplicity or dishonor on the part of his late secretary, even when that gentleman himself supposed Washington had reason to suspect him.

In Bache's "Aurora," on the ninth of June, were disclosed, by an anonymous writer, a series of questions submitted by Washington, in strict confidence, to the cabinet in 1793, concerning the reception of Genet, and the force of the treaty with France. These were published with the evident design to prejudice the executive in the public mind.

This startled Jefferson, and he thought it necessary to put in an immediate disclaimer of all partic.i.p.ation in the matter. He wrote to Washington on the nineteenth of June, saying, in reference to the doc.u.ment, "It having been confided to but few hands, makes it truly wonderful how it should have got there. I can not be satisfied as to my own part, till I relieve my mind by declaring--and I attest everything sacred and honorable to the declaration--that it has got them, neither through me nor the paper confided to me. This has never been from under my own lock and key, or out of my own hands. No mortal ever knew from me that these questions had been proposed." Mr. Jefferson then expressed his belief, that one who had been their mutual friend "thought it worth while to sow tares" between the president and himself, and denounced him as an "intriguer, dirtily employed in sifting the conversations of his table, where, alone, he could hear him."[101] The person here alluded to was General Henry Lee, of Virginia, who had lately become attached to the federal party, and incurred the political enmity of Jefferson.

This letter drew from Washington a most n.o.ble reply. On the sixth of July he wrote: "If I had entertained any suspicions before, that the queries, which have been published in Bache's paper, proceeded from you, the a.s.surances you have given of the contrary would have removed them; but the truth is, I harbored none. I am at no loss to conjecture from what source they flowed, through what channel they were conveyed, and for what purpose they and similar publications appear. They were known to be in the hands of Mr. Parker in the early part of the last session of Congress. They were shown about by Mr. Giles during the session, and they made their public exhibition about the close of it.

"Perceiving and, probably, hearing, that no abuse in the gazettes would induce me to take notice of anonymous publications against me, those who were disposed to do me _such friendly offices_, have embraced, without restraint, every opportunity to weaken the confidence of the people; and, by having the whole game in their hands, they have not scrupled to publish things that do not, as well as those which do exist, and to mutilate the latter, so as to make them subserve the purposes which they have in view.

"As you have mentioned the subject yourself, it would not be frank, candid, or friendly, to conceal, that your conduct has been represented as derogating from that opinion I had conceived you entertained of me; that, to your particular friends and connections you have described, and they have denounced, me as a person under a dangerous influence; and that, if I would listen more to some other opinions, all would be well. My answer invariably has been, that I had never discovered anything in the conduct of Mr. Jefferson to raise suspicion in my mind of his insincerity; that, if he would retrace my public conduct while he was in the administration, abundant proofs would occur to him, that truth and right decisions were the sole objects of my pursuit; that there were as many instances, within his own knowledge, of my having decided _against_, as in _favor_, of the opinions of the persons evidently alluded to; and, moreover, that I was no believer in the infallibility of the politics or measures of any man living. In short, that I was no party man myself, and the first wish of my heart was, if parties did exist, to reconcile them."

This portion of Washington's letter must have been felt by Mr. Jefferson as a severe rebuke of his real insincerity, in throwing out precisely such insinuations as Washington here alludes to. Washington continued:--

"To this I may say, and very truly, that, until within the last year or two, I had no conception that parties would, or even could, go the length I have been witness to; nor did I really believe, until lately, that it was within the bounds of probability, hardly within those of possibility, that, while I was using my utmost exertions to establish a national character of our own, independent, as far as our obligations and justice would permit, of every nation of the earth, and wished, by steering a steady course, to preserve this country from the horrors of a desolating war, I should be accused of being the enemy of one nation, and subject to the influence of another; and, to prove it, that every act of my administration would be tortured, and the grossest and most insidious misrepresentations of these be made, by giving one side only of a subject, and that, too, in such exaggerated and indecent terms as could scarcely be applied to a Nero, a notorious defaulter, or even to a common pickpocket. But enough of this, I have already gone further in the expression of my feelings than I intended."[102]

When Congress had disposed of the treaty by voting appropriations for the purpose of executing it, nothing remained to complete the business but the appointment of the several officers to carry out its provisions.

These were immediately made. David Howell, of Rhode Island, was made commissioner for ascertaining the true river St. Croix; Messrs.

Fitzsimons and Innes (the latter soon succeeded by Mr. Sitgreaves) were appointed commissioners on the subject of British debts; and Messrs.

Gore and Pinckney commissioners for settling claims for British spoliations.

Some diplomatic changes were made at about this time; Rufus King was appointed minister to England, in place of Thomas Pinckney, who wished to return home; Colonel Humphreys was appointed minister to Spain, in place of Mr. Carmichael, deceased; John Quincy Adams, son of the vice-president, left the Hague, to which he had been accredited, and succeeded Humphreys at Lisbon; and Mr. Murray took Adam's place in Holland. The president was authorized to appoint two or more agents, one to reside in Great Britain, the others at such points as the executive might choose, to investigate and report concerning all impressments of American seamen by British cruisers.

The interesting session of Congress during which Jay's treaty had been the chief topic of debate, was now drawing to a close, and Washington looked to the brief period of repose from public duties, at Mount Vernon, that would succeed the legislative turmoil, with the greatest pleasure. That moment of release came on the first day of June, when the Congress adjourned.

The president's thoughts now turned toward his long-tried friends, and the sweet enjoyments of private life toward which he was hastening.

Among the former, the Marquis de Lafayette held a prominent place in his heart. He was yet a prisoner in a far-off dungeon, and his family in exile. Feeble was the arm of any man to give him liberty, especially one stretched toward him from the new republic beyond the sea. Yet Washington left no means untried to liberate his friend. Compelled by circ.u.mstances and state policy to be cautious, he was, nevertheless, persevering in his efforts. He well knew that his formal interposition in behalf of the ill.u.s.trious captive would be unavailing. But he employed the American ministers at European courts in expressing, on every convenient opportunity, unofficially, the interest which the president took in the fate of his friend, and to use every fair means in their power to obtain his release.

While Lafayette was in the hands of the Prussian authorities, James Marshall was sent to Berlin as a special and confidential agent to solicit his discharge. Before Marshall's arrival, Lafayette had been delivered by the king of Prussia into the hands of the emperor of Germany. Mr. Pinckney, the United States minister in London, was then instructed to indicate the wishes of the president concerning the prisoner, to the Austrian minister in England, and to solicit the powerful mediation of the British cabinet. These efforts failed, and Washington, disdaining to make further application to the deputies of sovereignty, whose petty tyranny was proverbial, determined to go to the fountain-head of power in the dominion where his friend was suffering, and, on the fifteenth of May, he wrote as follows to the emperor of Germany:--

"It will readily occur to your majesty, that occasions may sometimes exist, on which official considerations would constrain the chief of a nation to be silent and pa.s.sive in relation even to objects which affect his sensibility, and claim his interposition as a man. Finding myself precisely in this situation at present, I take the liberty of writing this private letter to your majesty, being persuaded that my motives will also be my apology for it.

"In common with the people of this country, I retain a strong and cordial sense of the services rendered to them by the Marquis de Lafayette; and my friendship for him has been constant and sincere.

It is natural, therefore, that I should sympathize with him and his family in their misfortunes, and endeavor to mitigate the calamities which they experience; among which, his present confinement is not the least distressing.

"I forbear to enlarge on this delicate subject. Permit me only to submit to your majesty's consideration, whether his long imprisonment, and the confiscation of his estates, and the indigence and dispersion of his family, and the painful anxieties incident to all these circ.u.mstances, do not form an a.s.semblage of sufferings which recommend him to the mediation of humanity? Allow me, sir, on this occasion to be its organ, and to entreat that he may be permitted to come to this country, on such conditions, and under such restrictions, as your majesty may think it expedient to prescribe.

"As it is a maxim with me not to ask what, under similar circ.u.mstances, I would not grant, your majesty will do me the justice to believe, that this request appears to me to correspond with those great principles of magnanimity and wisdom which form the basis of sound policy and durable glory.

"May the Almighty and Merciful Sovereign of the universe keep your majesty under his protection and guidance."

This letter was transmitted to Mr. Pinckney, and by him sent to the emperor, through his minister in Great Britain. "How far it operated,"

says Marshall, "in mitigating immediately the rigor of Lafayette's confinement, or in obtaining his liberation, remains unascertained."

Washington left Philadelphia for Mount Vernon on the thirteenth of June, accompanied by his family, and remained there about two months. During that retirement he made his final arrangements for leaving public life for ever at the close of his term of office, which would occur in March following. We have observed his great reluctance to consent to a second nomination for the chief-magistracy of the republic. The best interests of the commonwealth seemed to require the sacrifice on his part, and it was given, but with a full determination not to yield again, unless there appeared greater danger hovering over his beloved country, which his instrumentality might avert. To this determination he had adhered; and it was always with inexpressible satisfaction that he looked forward to the day when his public labors should cease. But, for cogent reasons, he never made this declaration publicly, until within the last few months of his second administration. His confidential friends well knew his determination, however, and the people generally suspected it.

"Those who dreaded a change of system," says Marshall, "in changing the person of the chief-magistrate, manifested an earnest desire to avoid this hazard, by being permitted once more to offer to the public choice a person, who, amidst all the fierce conflicts of party, still remained the object of public veneration." But his resolution was fixed. The safety of the nation did not, at that time, seem to require him to remain at its head, notwithstanding there were many and great perils besetting it; and while he was at Mount Vernon he completed the final draft of a "Farewell Address to the people of the United States," to be published in time for them to choose his successor at the appointed season.

That address had been the subject of deep and anxious thought; and, at the special request of the president, Madison, Jefferson, Hamilton, Jay, and perhaps others, had given him suggestions in writing, topical and verbal. These he took with him to Mount Vernon, and in the quiet of his library he arranged the address in proper form, using the suggestions of Madison and Hamilton very freely. In the form in which it finally appeared, it remains the n.o.blest production of Washington's mind and heart; and has been p.r.o.nounced by Alison, the eminent British historian, unequalled by any composition of uninspired wisdom. It is a political legacy which not only the countrymen of Washington, but the inhabitants of the civilized world ought to value as one of the most precious gifts ever bestowed by man upon his race. It is permeated with the immortal spirit of a true MAN, a true PATRIOT, and a true CHRISTIAN.[103]

FOOTNOTES:

[97] Letter to Lord Grenville.

[98] Jefferson's Memoirs and Correspondence, iii., 330.

[99] Mazzei was an Italian, who came to Virginia just before the War for Independence commenced, bringing with him about a dozen experienced grape culturists of his own country, for the purpose of attempting that business in America, and the manufacture of wine. He formed a stock company, of whom Mr. Jefferson was one, and a considerable sum was raised for the undertaking. An estate adjoining Mr. Jefferson's was purchased for the experiment, but the scheme failed. Mazzei went to Europe as an agent of some kind for the state of Virginia, leaving his family in America, and did not return. His wife died, and Mazzei wrote to Mr. Jefferson for legal evidence of her death, and other important information. In his reply, the strong language concerning political affairs in America, which we have quoted, was incidentally used in the conclusion. Mazzei was an ardent republican. He translated that portion of the letter into Italian, and without asking Jefferson's permission to do so, published it in a Florentine journal. It was republished in the French journals, translated into English, and, about a year after it was written, it appeared in the American federal newspapers, with, it was alleged, many errors and interpolations. It placed Jefferson in an unpleasant dilemma, yet he had such faith in Washington's confidence in him, that he conceived that that great and good man would not construe any portion of his remarks as aimed at the president, and, by the advice of his friends, he kept silent, neither avowing or disavowing the letter as his. It became the subject of fierce attacks for a long time, even through the canva.s.s in 1800, which resulted in the election of Mr.