According to current notions the demesnes of the crown ought not to have been alienated at all. Although alienated by one king they were considered as liable to be resumed by his successors[201]. And as a matter of fact such resumptions were by no means unusual. Edward I gave an adequate expression to this doctrine when he ordered an inquisition into the state of the tenantry at Stoneleigh:--he did not wish any encroachment made on the old const.i.tution of the manor, for he had always in mind the possibility that his royal rights would be resumed by himself or by one of his successors[202].

[Services certain on Royal Manors.]

If we turn to the court rolls of a manor which is actually in the king's hand and compare them with those of a manor which he has granted to some convent or some private lord, we see hardly any difference between them.

The rolls of the manor of Havering at the Record Office, although comparatively late, afford a good insight into the const.i.tution of a manor retained in the king's own hand. They contain a good many writs of right, and though, naturally enough, the tenants do not bring actions against the king, we find an instance in which the king brings an action against his tenant, and pleads before a court which is held in his own name[203]. This is good proof that the condition of the tenants was by no means dependent on the arbitrary action of the manorial officers.

When King Henry II granted Stoneleigh to the Cistercians he displaced a number of 'rustics' from their holdings, and while doing this he recognised their right and enjoined the sheriff of Warwickshire to give them an equivalent for what they had lost in consequence of the grant[204]. The notion from which all inquiry consequent upon a 'Monstraverunt' starts is always this, that the tenants were holding by _certain_ (i.e. by fixed) services at the time when the manor was in the king's own hand. The certainty is not created by the fact that the manor pa.s.ses away from the king to some one else; it exists when the land is royal land and therefore cannot be destroyed on land that has been alienated. So true is this that Bracton and Britton give their often cited description of privileged villainage without alluding to the question whether or no the manor is still in the king's hand[205]; Britton even applies this description primarily to the king's own possessions by his way of stating the law as the direct utterance of the king's command. The well-known fact that the 'ferm' or rent of royal manors was not always fixed, that we constantly hear of an increased rental (_incrementum_) levied in addition to the old 'ferm' (_a.s.sisa_; _redditus antiquitus a.s.sisus_), can be easily reconciled with this doctrine[206]. The prosperity of the country was gradually rising; both in agricultural communities and in towns, new tenements and houses, new occupations and revenues were growing, and it was not the interest either of the communities or of the lord to compress this development within an unelastic bond. In principle the increased payments fell on this new growth on the demesne, although this may in some cases have been due to exactions against which the people could remonstrate only in the name of immemorial custom, and only by way of pet.i.tion since n.o.body could judge the king. In principle, too, certainty of condition was admitted as to the privileged villains on the king's demesnes[207].

[Trial of services in 'Monstraverunt'.]

This serves to explain the procedure followed by the court when a question of services was raised by a writ of 'Monstraverunt.' The first thing, of course, was to ascertain whether the manor was ancient demesne or not, and for this purpose nothing short of a direct mention in Domesday was held to be sufficient[208]. When this question had been solved in the affirmative, a jury had to decide what the customs and duties were, by which the ancestors of the plaintiffs held at the time when the crown was possessed of the manor. In principle it was always considered that such had been the services at the time of the Conquest[209], but practically, of course, there could be no attempt to examine into such ancient history. The men of King's Ripton actually pleaded back to the time of King c.n.u.t, and maintained that no prescription was available against their rights as no prescription could avail against the king[210]. The courts naturally declined to go higher than men could remember, but they laid down this limitation entirely as one of practice and not of principle[211]. Metingham demanded that the claimants should make good their contention even for a single day in Richard Coeur de Lion's time[212]. The men of Wycle combine both a.s.sertions in their contention against Mauger; they appeal to the age of the first Norman kings, but offer to prove the certainty of their services in the reigns of Richard and John[213].

[Nature of tenancy in ancient demesne.]

Now all that has been said hitherto applied to 'the tenants in ancient demesne' indiscriminately, without regard to any diversity of cla.s.ses among them. Hitherto I have not noticed any such diversity, and in so doing I am warranted by the authorities. Those authorities commonly speak of 'men' or 'tenants in ancient demesne' without any further qualification[214]. Sometimes the expression 'condition of ancient demesne' also is used. But closer examination shows a variety of cla.s.ses on the privileged soil, and leads to a number of difficult and interesting problems.

To begin with, the nature of the tenancy in general has been much contested. As to the law of later times Mr. Elton puts the case in this way: 'There is great confusion in the law books respecting this tenure.

The copyholders of these manors are sometimes called tenants in ancient demesne, and land held in this tenure is said to pa.s.s by surrender and admittance. This appears to be inaccurate. It is only the freeholders who are tenants in ancient demesne, and their land pa.s.ses by common law conveyances without the instrumentality of the lord. Even Sir W.

Blackstone seems to have been misled upon this point. There are however, as a rule, in manors of ancient demesne, customary freeholders and sometimes copyholders at the will of the lord, as well as the true tenants in ancient demesne[215].' Now such a description seems strangely out of keeping with the history of the tenure. Blackstone speaks of privileged copyhold as descended from privileged villainage[216]; and as to the condition in the thirteenth century of those 'men' or 'tenants in ancient demesne' of whom we have been speaking, there can be no doubt.

Bracton and his followers lay down quite distinctly that their tenure is villainage though privileged villainage. The men of ancient demesne are men of free blood holding in villainage[217]. And to take up the special point mentioned by Mr. Elton--conveyance by surrender and admittance is a quite necessary feature of the tenure[218]: conveyance by charter makes the land freehold and destroys its ancient demesne condition[219]. But although this is so clear in the authorities of the thirteenth century, there is undoubtedly a great deal of confusion in later law books, and reasons are not wanting which may account for this fact and for the doctrine propounded by Mr. Elton in conformity with certain modern treatises and decisions.

[Cla.s.ses of tenantry.]

We may start with the observation, that privileged villains or villain socmen are not the only people to be found on the soil of the ancient demesne. There are free tenants there and pure villains too[220]. Free socage is often mentioned in these manors, and it is frequently pleaded in order to get a trial transferred to the Common Law Courts. When the question is raised whether a tenement is free or villain socage, the fact that it has been conveyed by feoffment and charter is treated, as has just been pointed out, as establishing its freehold character and subjecting it to the ordinary common law procedure[221]. On the other hand, registers and extents of ancient demesne manors sometimes treat separately of 'nativi' or 'villani' as distinguished from the regular customary tenants, and describe their services as being particularly base[222]. In trials it is quite a common thing for a lord, when accused of having altered the services, to plead that the plaintiffs were his villains to be treated at will. Attempts were made in such cases to take advantage of the general term 'men of ancient demesne,' and to argue that all the population on the crown manors must be of the same condition, the difference of rank applying only to the amount and the kind of services, but not to their certainty, which ought to be taken for granted[223]. But strictly and legally the lord's plea was undoubtedly good: the courts admitted it, and when it was put forward proceeded to examine the question of fact whether the lord had been actually seised of certain or of uncertain services[224]. It is of considerable importance to note that the difference between villains pure and villains privileged was sometimes connected with the distinction between the lord's demesne and the tenant's land in the manor[225]. The demesne proper was frank fee in the hands of the lord, and could be used by him at his pleasure. If he chose to grant it away to villains in pure villainage, the holdings thus formed could have no claim to rank as privileged land. It was a.s.sumed that some such holdings had been formed at the very beginning, as it were, that is at a time beyond memory of man, but tenements at will could be created at a later time on approved waste or on soil that had escheated to the lord and in this way pa.s.sed through his demesne[226]. One of the reasons of later confusion must be looked for in the fact that the pure villain holdings gradually got to be recognised at law as copyhold or base customary tenures. They were thus brought dangerously near to ancient demesne socage, which was originally nothing but base customary tenure. The very fact of copyhold thus gaining on villain socage may have pushed this last on towards freehold. Already the Old Natura Brevium does not know exactly how to make distinctions. It speaks of three species of socage--free, ancient demesne, and base. The line is soon drawn between the first two, but the third kind is said to be held by uncertain services, and sued by writ of 'Monstraverunt' instead of having the writs of right and 'Monstraverunt' of ancient demesne socage[227].

Probably what is meant is a species of copyhold which is not socage, and the writ of 'Monstraverunt' attributed to it may perhaps be the plaint or pet.i.tion which is the initial move in a suit for the protection of copyhold in the manorial court.

[Villain socage.]

In the time of Henry III and of the Edwards the nature of ancient demesne tenure was better understood. At the close of the thirteenth century the lawyers distinguish three kinds of men--free, villains, and socmen[228]. In order to be quite accurate people spoke of _villain socmen_ or _little socage_[229] in opposition to free. But even at that time there were several confusing features about the case. The certainty of condition made the tenure of the villain socmen so like a freehold that it was often treated as such in the manorial doc.u.ments. In the Stoneleigh Register the peculiar nature of socage in ancient demesne is described fully and clearly. It is distinguished in so many words from tenancy at will, and a detailed description of conveyance by surrender in contrast with conveyance by charter seems to give the necessary material for the distinction between it and freehold[230]. But still the fundamental notion of free men holding in villainage gets lost sight of. Only some of the cottiers are said to hold in villainage. The more important tenants, the socmen holding virgates and half-virgates, are not only currently described as freeholders in the Register, but they are entered as such on the Warwickshire Hundred Roll[231]. The term 'parva sokemanria' is applied in the Stoneleigh Register only to a few subordinate holdings which are undoubtedly above the level of pure villainage, but cannot be definitely distinguished from the other kinds of socage in the Register. This may serve as an indication of the tendency of manorial communities to consider privileged villainage as a free tenure, but legal pleadings and decisions were also creating confusion for another reason, because they tended, as has been said, to consider the whole body of men on the ancient demesne in one lump as it were. The courts very often applied as the one test of tenure and service the question whether a person was a descendant by blood of men of ancient demesne or a stranger[232]. In connexion with this the court rolls testify to the particular care taken to control any intrusion of strangers into the boundaries of a privileged manor[233]. This was done primarily in the interests of the lord, but the tenantry also seem to have sometimes been jealous of their prerogatives[234], and it is only in the course of the fourteenth century that they begin to open their gates to strangers, 'adventicii[235].' However this may be, the practice of drawing the line between native stock and strangers undoubtedly countenanced the idea that all the tenants of native stock were alike, and in this way tended to confuse the distinction between freeholders, pure villains, and villain socmen.

The courts made several attempts to insist on a firm cla.s.sification, but some of these were conceived in such an unhappy spirit that they actually embroiled matters. The conduct of the king's judges was especially misdirected in one famous case which came up several times before the courts during the thirteenth century. The tenants of Tavistock in Devonshire were seeking protection against their lords, and appealing to the right of ancient demesne. The case was debated two or three times during Henry III's reign, and in 1279 judgment was given against the plaintiffs by an imposing quorum, as many as eight judges with the Chief Justice Ralph Hengham at their head. It was conceded that Tavistock was ancient demesne, but the claimants were held to be villains and not villain socmen, and this on the ground that the Domesday description did not mention socmen, but only villains[236]. It seems strange to dispute a decision given with such solemnity by men who were much better placed to know about these things than we are, but there does not seem to be any possible doubt that Hengham and his companions were entirely wrong. Their decision is in contradiction with almost all the recorded cases; it was always a.s.sumed that the stiff Domesday terminology was quite insufficient to show whether a man was a pure villain or a free man holding in villainage, which last would be the villain socman in ancient demesne. If Hengham's doctrine had been taken as a basis for decision in these cases, no ancient demesne tenancy would have been recognised at all out of the Danelaw counties, that is in far the greater part of England, as Domesday never mentions socmen there at all. In the Danelaw counties, on the other hand, the privilege would have been of no use, as those who were called socmen there were freeholders protected without any reference to ancient demesne.

Altogether the attempt to make Domesday serve the purpose of establishing the mode of tenure for the thirteenth century must be called a misdirected one. It was quite singular, as the courts generally went back upon Domesday only with the object of finding out whether a particular manor had been vested in the crown at the time of the Conquest or not. It should be noted that Bracton considered the case from a very different point of view, as one may judge by the note he jotted down on the margin of his Note-book against a trial of 1237-8. He says: 'Nota de villanis Henrici de Tracy de Tawystoke qui nunquam fuerunt in manu Domini Regis nec antecessorum suorum et loquebantur de tempore Regis Edwardi coram W. de Wiltona[237].' Wilton's decision must have been grounded on the a.s.sumption that the ancestors of the claimants were strangers to the manor, or else that the manor had never formed part of the ancient demesne. This would, of course, be in direct contradiction to the opinion that the Tavistock tenants were descended from the king's born villains.

I cannot help thinking that Hengham's decision may have been prompted either by partiality towards the lord of the manor or by an ill-considered wish to compress the right of ancient demesne within the narrowest bounds possible. In any case this trial deserves attention by reason of the eminent authorities engaged in drawing up the judgment, and as ill.u.s.trating the difficulties which surround the points at issue and lead to confusion both in the decisions and in the treatment of them by law writers. In order to gain firm ground we must certainly go back again to the fundamental propositions laid down with great clearness by Bracton. It was not all the tenants on ancient demesne soil that had a right to appeal to its peculiar privileges--some had protection at Common Law and some had no protection at all. But the great majority of the tenants enjoyed special rights, and these men of ancient demesne were considered to be free by blood and holding in villainage. If the books had not noticed their personal freedom in so many words, it would have been proved by the fact that they were always capable of leaving their tenements and going away at pleasure.

[Bracton's historical explanation.]

Bracton does not restrict himself to this statement of the case; he adds a few lines to give a historical explanation of it. 'At the time of the Conquest,' says he, 'there were free men holding their lands freely, and by free services or free customs. When they were ejected by stronger people, they came back and received the same lands to be held in villainage and by villain services, which were specified and certain[238].'

The pa.s.sage is a most interesting one, but it calls for some comment.

How is it that the special case of ancient demesne gets widened into a general description of the perturbations consequent upon the Conquest?

For a general description it is; by the 'stronger folk,' the 'potentiores,' are certainly not meant the king and his officers only.

On the other hand, how can it be said of any but the ancient demesne tenants that they resumed their holdings by certain though base services? The wording is undoubtedly and unfortunately rather careless in this most important pa.s.sage, still the main positions which Bracton intended to convey are not affected by his rather clumsy way of stating them. Ancient demesne tenure, notwithstanding its peculiarities, is one species of a mode of holding which was largely represented everywhere, namely of the status of free men holding in villainage; this condition had been strongly affected if not actually produced by the Conquest. It is interesting to compare the description of the Conquest, as given at greater length but in a looser way, in the Dialogus de Scaccario. It is stated there that those who had actually fought against the Conqueror were deprived of their lands for ever after. Those who for some reason had not actually joined in the contest were suffered to hold their lands under Norman lords, but with no claim to hereditary succession. Their occupation being uncertain, their lords very often deprived them of their lands and they had no means to procure rest.i.tution. Their complaints gave rise to a discussion of the matter before the king, and it was held that nothing could be claimed by these people by way of succession from the time preceding the Conquest, and that actionable rights could originate only in deeds granted by the Norman lords[239].

The Dialogus as compared with Bracton lays most stress on the opposite side of the picture; the disabilities of persons holding at will are set forth not only as a consequence of the state of things following conquest _de facto_, but as the result of a legal reconsideration of the facts. As a cla.s.sification of tenures the pa.s.sage would not be complete, of course, since neither the important species of free socage recognised by Domesday nor the ancient demesne tenure appears. It is only the contrast between villainage and holding by charter that comes out strongly. But in one way the Dialogus reinforces Bracton, if I may be allowed to use the expression: for it traces back the formation of a very important kind of villainage to the Conquest, and connects the attempts of persons entangled into it to obtain protection with their original rights before the Conquest.

[Saxon origin of ancient demesne tenure.]

Reverting now to the question of ancient demesne, we shall have to consider what light these statements throw on the origin of the tenure.

I have noticed several times that ancient demesne socage was connected in principle with the condition of things in Saxon times, immediately before the Conquest. The courts had to impose limitations in order to control evidence; the whole inst.i.tution was in a way created by limitation, because it restricted itself to the T.R.E. of Domesday as the only acceptable test of Saxon condition. But, notwithstanding all these features imposed by the requirements of procedure, ancient demesne drew its origin distinctly from pre-Conquest conditions. The manors forming it are taken as the manors of St. Edward[240]; the tenants, whenever they want to make a solemn claim, set forth their rights from the time of St. Edward[241], or even c.n.u.t[242]. But does this mean that the actual privileges of the tenure were extant in Saxon times? Surely not. Such things as freedom from common taxation, exemption from toll, separate jurisdiction, certainly existed in behalf of the king's demesnes before the Conquest, but there is no intimation whatever that the king's tenants enjoyed any peculiar right or protection as to their holdings and services. The 'little writ of right' and the 'Monstraverunt' are as Norman, in a wide sense of the word, as the freedom from serving on a.s.sizes or sending representatives to parliament. But although there is no doubt that this tenure grew up and developed several of its peculiarities after the Conquest, it had to fall back on Saxon times for its substance[243], which may be described in few words--legal protection of the peasantry. The influence of Norman lawyers was exercised in shaping out certain actionable rights, the effect of conquest was to narrow to a particular cla.s.s a protection originally conferred broadly, and the action of Saxon tradition was to supply a general stock of freedom and independent right, from which the privileged condition of Norman times could draw its nourishment, if I may put it in that way. It would be idle now to discuss in what proportion the Saxon influence on the side of freedom has to be explained by the influx of men who had been originally owners of their lands, and what may be a.s.signed to the contractual character of Saxon tenant-right. This subject must be left till we come to examine the evidence supplied by Saxon sources of information. My present point is that the ancient demesne tenure of the Conquest is a remnant of the condition of things before the Conquest[244].

It may well be asked why the destructive effects of Norman victory were arrested on ancient demesne soil? Was not the king as likely to exercise his discretion in respect of the peasantry as any feudal lord, and is it likely that he would have let himself be fettered by considerations and obligations which did not bind his subjects? In view of such questions one is tempted to treat the protection of the tenants on the ancient demesne merely as a peculiar boon granted to the people whom the king had to give away. I need not say that such an interpretation would be entirely wrong. I hope I have been able to make out convincingly that legal protection given against private lords on manors which had been alienated was only an outgrowth from that certainty of condition which was allowed on the king's own lands. I will just add now that one very striking fact ought to be noticed in this connexion; certainty of tenure and service is limited to one particular cla.s.s in the manor, although that cla.s.s is the most numerous one. If this privilege came into being merely by the fixation of status at the time when a manor pa.s.sed from the crown, the state of the villain pure would have got fixed in the same way as that of the villain socman. But it did not, and so one cannot shirk the difficult question, What gave rise to the peculiar protection against the lord when the lord happened to be king?

I think that three considerations open the way out of the difficulty. To begin with, the king was decidedly considered as the one great safeguard of Saxon tradition and the one defender against Norman encroachments. He had constantly to hear the cry about 'the laws of Edward the Confessor,'

and although the claim may be considered as a very vague one in general matters, it became substantiated in this case of tenure and services by the Domesday record. Then again, the proportion of free owners who had lapsed into territorial dependence must have been much greater on the king's land than anywhere else; it was quite usual to describe an allodial owner from the feudal point of view as holding under the king in a particular way, and villain socage was only one of several kinds of socage after all. Last, but not least, the protection against exactions was in reality directed not against the king personally but against his officers, and the king personally was quite likely to benefit by it almost as much as his men. It amounted after all only to a recognition of definite customs in general, to a special judicial organisation of the manor which made it less dependent upon the steward, and to the facilities afforded for complaint and revision of judgments. As to this last it must be noted that the king's men were naturally enough in a better position than the rest of the English peasantry; the curse of villainage was that manorial courts were independent of superior organisation as far as the lower tenants were concerned. But courts in royal manors were the king's courts after all, and as such they could hardly be severed from the higher tribunals held in the king's name.

I may be allowed to sum up the conclusions of this chapter under the following heads:--

1. The law of ancient demesne is primarily developed in regard to the manors in the king's own hand.

2. The special protection granted to villain socmen in ancient demesne is a consequence of a certainty of condition as much recognised in manors which the king still holds as in those which he has alienated.

3. This certainty of condition is derived from the Conquest as the connecting link between the Norman and the Saxon periods.

CHAPTER IV.

LEGAL ASPECT OF VILLAINAGE. CONCLUSIONS.

[Method of investigation.]

I have been trying to make out what the theories of the lawyers were with regard to villainage in its divers ramifications. Were we to consider this legal part of the subject merely as a sort of crust superposed artificially over the reality of social facts, we should have to break through the crust in order to get at the reality. But, of course, the law regulating social conditions is not merely an external superstructure, but as to social facts is both an influence and a consequence. In one sense it is a most valuable product of the forces at play in the history of society, most valuable just by reason of the requirements of its formalism and of those theoretical tendencies which give a very definite even if a somewhat distorted shape to the social processes which come within its sphere of action.

The formal character of legal theory is not only important because it puts things into order and shape; it suggests a peculiar and efficient method of treating the historical questions connected with law. The legal intellect is by its calling and nature always engaged in a.n.a.lysing complex cases into const.i.tutive elements, and bringing these elements under the direction of principles. It is constantly struggling with the confusing variety of life, and from the historian's point of view it is most interesting when it succ.u.mbs in the struggle. There is no law, however subtle and comprehensive, which does not exhibit on its logical surface seams and scars, testifying to the incomplete fusing together of doctrines that cannot be brought under the cover of one principle. And so a dialectic examination of legal forms which makes manifest the contradictions and confused notions they contain actually helps us to an insight into the historical stratification of ideas and facts, a stratification which cannot be abolished however much lawyers may crave for unity and logic.

[Uncertainty and contradictions of legal theory.]

In the particular case under discussion medieval law is especially rich in such historical clues. The law writers are trying hard to give a construction of villainage on the basis of the Roman doctrine of slavery, but their fabric gives way at every point. It would be hardly a fair description to say that we find many survivals of an older state of things and many indications of a new development. Everything seems in a state of vacillation and fermentation during the thirteenth century. As to the origin of the servile status the law of b.a.s.t.a.r.ds gets inverted; in the case of matrimony the father-rule is driving the mother-rule from the ground; the influence of prescription is admitted by some lawyers and rejected by others. As to the means whereby persons may issue out of that condition, the views of Glanville and Bracton are diametrically opposed, and there are still traces in practice of the notion that a villain cannot buy his freedom and that he cannot be manumitted by the lord himself in regard to third persons. In their treatment of services in their reference to status the courts apply the two different tests of certainty and of kind. In their treatment of tenure they still hesitate between a complete denial of protection to villainage and the recognition of it as a mode of holding which is protected by legal remedies. And even when the chief lines are definitely drawn they only disclose fundamental contradictions in all their crudeness.

In civil law, villains are disabled against their lords but evenly matched against strangers; even against a lord legal protection is lingering in the form of an action upon covenant and in the notion that the villain's wainage should be secure. In criminal and in police law villains are treated substantially as free persons: they have even a share, although a subordinate one, in the organisation of justice. The procedure in questions of status is characterised by outrageous privileges given to the lord against a man in 'a villain nest,' and by distinct favour shown to those out of the immediate range of action of the lord. The law is quite as much against giving facilities to prove a man's servitude as it is against granting that man any rights when once his servitude has been established. The reconciliation of all these contradictions and anomalies cannot be attempted on dogmatic grounds.

The law of villainage must not be constructed either on the a.s.sumption of slavery, or on that of liberty, or on that of _colonatus_ or ascription. It contains elements from each of these three conditions, and it must be explained historically.

[Influence of lawyers.]

The material hitherto collected and discussed enables us to distinguish different layers in its formation. To begin with, the influence of lawyers must be taken into account. This is at once to be seen in the treatment of distinctions and divisions. The Common Law, as it was forming itself in the King's Court, certainly went far to smoothe down the peculiarities of local custom. Even when such peculiarities were legally recognised, as in the case of ancient demesne, the control and still more the example of the Common Law Courts was making for simplification and reducing them more or less to a generally accepted standard. The influence of the lawyers was exactly similar in regard to subdivisions on the vertical plane (if I may use the expression): for these varieties of dependence get fused into general servitude, and in this way cla.s.ses widely different in their historical development are brought together under the same name. The other side of this process of simplification is shown where legal theory hardens and deepens the divisions it acknowledges. In this way the chasm between liberty and servitude increases as the notion of servitude gets broader. In order to get sharp boundaries and clear definitions to go by, the lawyers are actually driven to drop such traits of legal relations as are difficult to manage with precision, however great their material importance, and to give their whole attention to facts capable of being treated clearly.

This tendency may account for the ultimate victory of the quant.i.tative test of servitude over the qualitative one, or to put it more plainly, of the test of certainty of services over the discussion of kind of services. Altogether the tendency towards an artificial crystallisation of the law cannot be overlooked.

[Roman law, Norman law, and royal jurisdiction.]

In the work of simplifying conditions artificially the lawyers had several strong reagents at their disposal. The mighty influence of Roman law has been often noticed, and there can be no doubt that it was brought to bear on our subject to the prejudice of the peasantry and to the extinction of their independent rights. It would not have been so strong if many features of the vernacular law had not been brought half way to meet it. Norman rules, it is well known, exercised a very potent action on the forms of procedure[245]; but the substantive law of status was treated very differently in Normandy and in England, and it is not the influx of Norman notions which is important in our case, but the impetus given by them to the development of the King's Courts. This development, though connected with the practice of the Duchy, cannot be described simply or primarily as Norman. Once the leaven had been communicated, English lawyers did their own work with great independence as well as ingenuity of thought, and the decision of the King's Court was certainly a great force. I need not point out again to what extent the law was fashioned by the writ procedure, but I would here recall to attention the main fact, that the opposition between 'free' and 'unfree'

rested chiefly on the point of being protected or not being protected by the jurisdiction of the King's Court.

[Social bias of legal theories.]

If we examine the action of lawyers as a whole, in order to trace out, as it were, its social bias, we must come to the conclusion that it was exercised first in one direction and then in the opposite one. The refusal of jurisdiction may stand as the central fact in the movement in favour of servitude, although that movement may be ill.u.s.trated almost in every department, even if one omits to take into account what may be mere instances of bad temper or gross partiality. But the wave begins to rise high in favour of liberty even in the thirteenth century. It does not need great perspicuity to notice that, apart from any progress in morals or ideas, apart from any growth of humanitarian notions, the law was carried in this direction by that development of the State which lays a claim to and upon its citizens, and by that development of social intercourse which subst.i.tutes agreement for bondage. Is it strange that the social evolution, as observed in this particular curve, does not appear as a continuous _crescendo_, but as a wavy motion? I do not think it can be strange, if one reflects that the period under discussion embraces both the growth and the decay of feudalism, embraces, that is, the growth of the principle of territorial power on the ruins of the tribal system and also the disappearance of that principle before the growing influence of the State.

[Influence of conquest.]