[Results as to 'villain regardant' and 'villain in gross.']

The case is interesting in many ways. It shows that the same man could be according to the point of view considered both as a villain in regard to a manor, and as a villain in gross. The relative character of the cla.s.sification is thus ill.u.s.trated as well as its importance for practical purposes. The transmission of a manor is taken to include the persons engaged in the cultivation of its soil, and even those whose ancestors have been engaged in such cultivation, and who have no special plea for severing the connexion.

As to the outcome of the whole inquiry, we may, it seems to me, safely establish the following points: 1. The terms 'regardant' and 'in gross'

have nothing to do with a legal distinction of status. 2. They come up in connexion with the modes of proof and pleading during the fourteenth century. 3. They may apply to the same person from different points of view. 4. 'Villain in gross' means a villain without further qualification; 'villain regardant to a manor' means villain by reference to a manor. 5. The connexion with a manor, though only a matter of fact and not binding the lord in any way, might yet be legally serviceable to him, as a means of establishing and proving his rights over the person he claimed.

[The astrier.]

I need hardly mention, after what has been said, that there is no such thing as this distinction in the thirteenth century law books. I must not omit, however, to refer to one expression which may be taken to stand in the place of the later 'villain regardant to a manor.' Britton (ii. 55) gives the formula of the special plea of villainage to the a.s.size of mort d'ancestor in the following words: 'Ou il poie dire qe il est soen vileyn et soen astrier et demourrant en son villenage.' There can be no doubt that residence on the lord's land is meant, and the term _astrier_ leads even further, it implies residence at a particular hearth or in a particular house. Fleta gives the a.s.size of novel disseisin to those who have been a long time away from their villain hearth[53] ('extra astrum suum villanum,' p. 217). If the term 'astrier'

were restricted to villains it would have proved a great deal more than the 'villain regardant' usually relied upon. But it is of very wide application. Britton uses it of free men ent.i.tled to rights of common by reason of tenements they hold in a township (i. 392). Bracton speaks of the case of a nephew coming into an inheritance in preference to the uncle because he had been living at the same hearth or in the same hall (in _atrio_ or _astro_) with the former owner[54], and in such or a similar sense the word appears to have been usually employed by lawyers[55]. On the other hand, if we look in Bracton's treatise for parallel pa.s.sages to those quoted from the Fleta and Britton about the villain astrier, we find only a reference to the fact that the person in question was a serf and holding in villainage and under the sway of a lord[56], and so there is nothing to denote special condition in the _astrier_. When the term occurs in connexion with villainage it serves to show that a person was not only a bondman born, but actually living in the power of his lord, and not in a state of liberty. The allusion to the hearth cannot possibly mean that the man sits in his own homestead, because only a few of the villains could have been holders of separate homesteads, and so it must mean that he was sitting in a homestead belonging to his lord, which is quite in keeping with the application of the term in the case of inheritance.

[The territorial hold of villainage.]

The facts we have been examining certainly suppose that in the villains we have chiefly to do with peasants tilling the earth and dependent on manorial organisation. They disclose the working of one element which is not to be simply deduced from the idea of personal dependence.

It may be called subjection to territorial power. The possession of a manor carries the possession of cultivators with it. It is always important to decide whether a bondman is in the seisin of his lord or not, and the chief means to show it is to trace his connexion with the territorial lordship. The interposition of the manor in the relation between master and man is, of course, a striking feature and it gives a very characteristic turn to medieval servitude. But if it is not consistent with the general theory laid down in the thirteenth century law books, it does not lead to anything like the Roman _colonatus_. The serf is not placed on a particular plot of land to do definite services under the protection of the State. He may be shifted from one plot within the jurisdiction of his lord to another, from one area of jurisdiction to another, from rural labour to industrial work or house work, from one set of customs and services to another. He is not protected by his predial connexion against his lord, and in fact such predial connexion is utilised to hold and bind him to his lord. We may say, that the unfree peasant of English feudalism was legally a personal dependant, but that his personal dependence was enforced through territorial lordship.

CHAPTER II.

RIGHTS AND DISABILITIES OF THE VILLAIN.

Legal theory as we have seen endeavoured to bring the general conception of villainage under the principles of the Roman law of slavery, and important features in the practice of the common law went far to support it in so doing. On the other hand, even the general legal theory discloses the presence of an element quite foreign to the Roman conception. If we proceed from principles to their application in detail, we at once find, that in most cases the broad rules laid down on the subject do not fit all the particular aspects of villainage. These require quite different a.s.sumptions for their explanation, and the whole doctrine turns out to be very complex, and to have been put together out of elements which do not work well together.

[Villainage by birth.]

We meet discrepancies and confusion at the very threshold in the treatment of the modes in which the villain status has its origin. The most common way of becoming a villain was to be born to this estate, and it seems that we ought to find very definite rules as to this case. In truth, the doctrine was changing. Glanville (v. 6) tried in a way to conform to the Roman rule of the child following the condition of the mother, but it could not be made to work in England, and ever since Bracton, both common law and jurisprudence reject it. At the close of the Middle Ages it was held that if born in wedlock the child took after his father[57], and that a b.a.s.t.a.r.d was to be accepted as _filius nullius_ and presumed free[58]. Bracton is more intricate; the b.a.s.t.a.r.d follows the mother, the legitimate child follows the father; and there is one exception, in this way, that the legitimate child of a free man and a nief born in villainage takes after the mother[59]. It is not difficult to see why the Roman rule did not fit; it was too plain for a state of things which had to be considered from three different sides[60]. The Roman lawyer merely looked to the question of status and decided it on the ground of material demonstrability of origin[61], if such an expression may be used. The Medieval lawyer had the Christian sanctification of marriage to reckon with, and so the one old rule had to be broken up into two rules--one applicable to legitimate children, the other to b.a.s.t.a.r.ds. In case of _b.a.s.t.a.r.dy_ the tendency was decidedly in favour of retaining the Roman rule, equally suiting animals and slaves, and the later theory embodied in Littleton belongs already to the development of modern ideas in favour of liberty[62]. In case of _legitimacy_ the recognition of marriage led to the recognition of the family and indirectly to the closer connexion with the father as the head of the family. In addition to this a third element comes in, which may be called properly feudal. The action of the father-rule is modified by the influence of territorial subjection. The marriage of a free man with a nief may be considered from a special point of view, if, as the feudal phraseology goes, he enters to her into her villainage[63]. By this fact the free man puts his child under the sway of the lord, to whose villainage the mother belongs. It is not the character of the tenement itself which is important in this case, but the fact of subjection to a territorial lord, whose interest it is to retain a dependant's progeny in a state of dependency. The whole system is historically important, because it ill.u.s.trates the working of one of the chief ingredients of villainage, an ingredient entirely absent from ancient slavery; whereas medieval villainage depends primarily on subjection to the territorial power of the lord. Once more we are shown the practical importance of the manorial system in fashioning the state of the peasantry. Generally a villain must be claimed with reference to a manor, in connexion with an unfree hearth; he is born in a nest[64], which makes him a bondman. The strict legal notion has to be modified to meet the emergency, and villainage, instead of indicating complete personal subjection, comes to mean subjection to a territorial lord.

This same territorial element not only influences the status of the issue of a marriage, it also affects the status of the parties to a marriage, when those parties are of unequal condition. Most notable is the case of the free wife of a villain husband lapsing into servitude, when she enters the villain tenement of her consort; her servitude endures as long as her husband is in the lord's power, as long as he is alive and not enfranchised. The judicial practice of the thirteenth century gives a great number of cases where the tribunals refuse to vindicate the rights of women entangled in villainage by a mesalliance[65]. Such subjection is not absolute, however. The courts make a distinction between acquiring possession and retaining it. The same woman who will be refused a portion of her father's inheritance because she has married a serf, has the a.s.size of novel disseisin against any person trying to oust her from a tenement of which she had been seised before her marriage[66]. The conditional disabilities of the free woman are not directly determined by the holding which she has entered, but by her marital subordination to an unfree husband ('sub virga,' Bract. Note-book, pl. 1685). For this reason the position of a free husband towards the villainage of his wife a nief is not exactly parallel. He is only subject to the general rules as to free men holding in villainage[67]. In any case, however, the instances which we have been discussing afford good ill.u.s.trations of the fact, that villainage by no means flows from the simple source of personal subjection; it is largely influenced by the Christian organisation of the family and by the feudal mixture of rights of property and sovereignty embodied in the manorial system.

[Prescription.]

There are two other ways of becoming a villain besides being born to the condition; the acknowledgment of unfree status in a court of record, and prescription. We need not speak of the first, as it does not present any particulars of interest from a historical point of view. As to prescription, there is a very characteristic vacillation in our sources.

In pleadings of Edward III's time its possibility is admitted, and it is pointed out, that it is a good plea if the person claimed by prescription shows that his father and grandfather[68] were strangers.

There is a curious explanatory gloss, in a Cambridge MS. of Bracton, which seems to go back at least to the beginning of the fourteenth century, and it maintains that free stock doing villain service lapses into villainage in the fifth generation only[69]. On the other hand, Britton flatly denies the possibility of such a thing; according to him no length of time can render free men villains or make villains free men. Moreover he gives a supposed case (possibly based on an actual trial), in which a person claimed as a villain is made to go back to the sixth generation to establish his freedom.[70] It does not seem likely that people could often vindicate their freedom by such elaborate argument, but the legal a.s.sumption expounded in Britton deserves full attention. It is only a consequence of the general view, that neither the holding nor the services ought to have any influence on the status of a man, and in so far it seems legally correct. But it is easy to see how difficult it must have been to keep up these nice distinctions in practice, how difficult for those who for generations had been placed in the same material position with serfs to maintain personal freedom.[71]

For both views, though absolutely opposed to each other, are in a sense equally true: the one giving the logical development of a fundamental rule of the law, the other testifying to the facts. And so we have one more general observation to make as to the legal aspect of villainage.

Even in the definition of its fundamental principles we see notable discrepancies and vacillations, which are the result of the conflict between logical requirements and fluctuating facts.

[Criminal law in its relation to villainage.]

The original unity of purpose and firmness of distinction are even more broken up when we look at the criminal and the police law where they touch villainage. In the criminal law of the feudal epoch there is hardly any distinction between free men and villains. In point of amercements there is the well-known difference as to the 'contenement'

of a free landholder, a merchant and a villain, but this difference is prompted not by privilege but by the diversity of occupations. The Dialogus de Scaccario shows that villains being reputed English are in a lower position than free men as regards the presumption of Englishry and the payment of the murder-fine,[72] but this feature seems to have become obliterated in the thirteenth century. In some cases corporal punishment may have differed according to the rank of the culprit, and the formalities of ordeal were certainly different[73]. The main fact remains, that both villains and free men were alike able to prosecute anybody by way of 'appeal'[74] for injury to their life, honour, and even property[75], and equally liable to be punished and prosecuted for offences of any kind. Their equal right was completely recognized by the criminal law, and as a natural sequence of this, the pleas of the crown generally omit to take any notice of the status of parties connected with them. One may read through Mr. Maitland's collection of Pleas of the Crown edited for the Selden Society, or through his book of Gloucestershire pleas, without coming across any but exceptional and quite accidental mentions of villainage. In fact were we to form our view of the condition of England exclusively on the material afforded by such doc.u.ments, we might well believe that the whole cla.s.s was all but an extinct one. One glance at a.s.size Rolls or at Cartularies would teach us better. Still the silence of the Corona Rolls is most eloquent. It shows convincingly that the distinction hardly influenced criminal law at all.

[Police in relation to villainage.]

It is curious that, as regards police, villains are grouped under an inst.i.tution which, even by its name, according to the then accepted etymology, was essentially a free inst.i.tution. The system of frank pledge (_plegium liberale_), which should have included every one 'worthy of his _were_ and his _wite_,' is, as a matter of fact, a system which all through the feudal period is chiefly composed of villains[76].

Free men possessed of land are not obliged to join the t.i.thing because they are amenable to law which has a direct hold on their land[77], and so the great ma.s.s of free men appear to be outside these arrangements, for the police representation of the free, or, putting it the other way, feudal serfs actually seem to represent the bulk of free society. The thirteenth-century arrangements do not afford a clue to such paradoxes, and one has to look for explanation to the _history_ of the cla.s.ses.

The frankpledge system is a most conspicuous link between both sections of society in this way also, that it directly connects the subjugated population with the hundred court, which is the starting-point of free judicial organisation. Twice a year the whole of this population, with very few exceptions, has to meet in the hundred in order to verify the working of the t.i.things. Besides this, the cla.s.s of villains must appear by representatives in the ordinary tribunals of the hundred and the shire: the reeve and the four men, mostly unfree men[78], with their important duties in the administration of justice, serve as a counterpoise to the exclusive employment of 'liberi et legales homines'

on juries.

[Civil disability of a villain as to his lord.]

And now I come to the most intricate and important part of the subject--to the civil rights and disabilities of the villain. After what has been said of the villain in other respects, one may be prepared to find that his disabilities were by no means so complete as the strict operation of general rules would have required. The villain was able in many cases to do valid civil acts, to acquire property and to defend it in his own name. It is true that, both in theory and in practice, it was held that whatever was acquired by the bondman was acquired by the lord.

The bondman could not buy anything but with his lord's money, as he had no money or chattels of his own[79]. But the working of these rules was limited by the medieval doctrine of possession. Land or goods acquired by the serf do not _eo ipso_ lapse into his lord's possession, but only if the latter has taken them into his hand[80]. If the lord has not done so for any reason, for want of time, or carelessness, or because he did not choose to do so, the bondman is as good as the owner in respect of third persons. He can give away[81] or otherwise alienate land or chattels, he has the a.s.size of novel disseisin to defend the land, and leaves the a.s.size of mort d'ancestor to his heirs. In this case it would be no good plea to object that the plaintiff is a villain. In fact this objection can be raised by a third person only with the addition that, as villain, the plaintiff does not hold in his own name, but in the name of his lord[82]. A third person cannot except against a plaintiff merely on the ground of his personal status. As to third persons, a villain is said to be free and capable to sue all actions[83]. This of course does not mean that he has any action for recovering or defending his possession of the tenements which he holds _in villainage_, but this disability is no consequence of his servile blood, for he shares it with the free man who holds in villainage; it is a consequence of the doctrine that the possession of the tenant in villainage is in law the possession of him who has the freehold. It may be convenient for a villain as defendant to shelter himself behind the authority of his lord[84], and it was difficult to prevent him from doing so, although some attempts were made by the courts even in this case to distinguish whether a person had been in possession as a dependant or not. But there was absolutely nothing to prevent a villain from acting in every respect like a free man if he was so minded and was not interrupted by his lord.

There was no need of any accessory action to make his acts complete and legal[85]. Again we come to an anomaly: the slave is free against everybody but his lord.

[Convention with the lord.]

Even against his lord the bondman had some standing ground for a civil action. It has rightly been maintained, that he could implead his master in consequence of an agreement with him. The a.s.sertion is not quite easy to prove however, and has been put forward too sweepingly[86]. At first sight it seems even that the old law books, i.e. those of Bracton and his followers, teach the opposite doctrine. They deal almost exclusively with the case of a feoffment made by the lord to a villain and his heirs, and give the feoffee an action only on the ground of implied manumission. The feoffor enfranchises his serf indirectly, even if he does not say so in as many words, because he has spoken of the feoffee's heirs, and the villain has no other heirs besides the lord[87]. The action eventually proceeds in this case, because it is brought not by a serf but by a freed man. One difficult pa.s.sage in Bracton points another way; it is printed in a foot-note[88]. There can be no doubt, that in it Bracton is speaking of a covenant made by the lord not with a free man or a freed man, but with a villain. This comes out strongly when it is said, that the lord, and not the villain, has the a.s.size against intruders, and when the author puts the main question--is the feoffor bound to hold the covenant or not? The whole drift of the quotation can be understood only on the fundamental a.s.sumption that we have lord and villain before us. But there are four words which militate against this obvious explanation; the words '_sibi et heredibus suis_.' We know what their meaning is--they imply enfranchis.e.m.e.nt and a freehold estate of inheritance. They involve a hopeless contradiction to the doctrine previously stated, a doctrine which might be further supported by references to Britton, Fleta and Bracton himself[89]. In short, if we accept them, we can hardly get out of confusion. Were our text of Bracton much more definitely and satisfactorily settled than it is[90], one would still feel tempted to strike them out; as it is we have a text studded with interpolations and errors, and it seems quite certain that 'sibi et heredibus suis' has got into it simply because the compositor of Tottell's edition repeated it from the conclusion of the sentence immediately preceding, and so mixed up two cases, which were to be distinguished by this very qualification. The four words are missing in all the MSS. of the British Museum, the Bodleian and the Cambridge University Library[91]. I have no doubt that further verification will only confirm my opinion. On my a.s.sumption Bracton clearly distinguishes between two possibilities. In one case the deed simply binds the lord as to a particular person, in the other it binds him in perpetuity; and in this latter case, as there ought not to be any heirs of a bondman but the lord, bondage is annihilated by the deed. It is not annihilated when one person is granted a certain privilege as to a particular piece of land, and in every other respect the grantee and all his descendants remain unfree[92]:--he has no freehold, but he has a special covenant to fall back upon. This seems to lie at the root of what Bracton calls privileged villainage by covenant as distinguished from villain socage[93].

[Legal practice as to conventions.]

The reader may well ask whether there are any traces of such an inst.i.tution in practice, as it is not likely that Bracton would have indulged in mere theoretical disquisitions on such an important point.

Now it would be difficult to find very many instances in point; the line between covenant and enfranchis.e.m.e.nt was so easily pa.s.sed, and an incautious step would have such unpleasant consequences for landlords, that they kept as clear as possible of any deeds which might indirectly destroy their claims as to the persons of their villains[94]. On the other hand, even privileged serfs would have a great difficulty in vindicating their rights on the basis of covenant if they remained at the same time under the sway of the lord in general. The difficulties on both sides explain why Fleta and Britton endorse only the chief point of Bracton's doctrine, namely, the implied manumission, and do not put the alternative as to a covenant when heirs are not mentioned. Still I have come across some traces in legal practice[95] of contracts in the shape of the one discussed. A very interesting case occurred in Norfolk in 1227, before Martin Pateshull himself. A certain Roger of Sufford gave a piece of land to one of his villains, William Tailor, to hold freely by free services, and when Roger died, his son and heir William of Sufford confirmed the lease. When it pleased the lord afterwards to eject the tenant, this latter actually brought an a.s.size of novel disseisin and recovered possession. Bracton's marginal note to the case runs thus: 'Note, that the son of a villain recovered by an a.s.size of novel disseisin a piece of land which his father had held in villainage, because the lord of the villain by his charter gave it to the son [i.e.

to the plaintiff], even without manumission[96].' The court went in this case even further than Bracton's treatise would have warranted: the villain was considered as having the freehold, and an a.s.size of novel disseisin was granted; but although such a treatment of the case was perhaps not altogether sound, the chief point on which the contention rested is brought out clearly enough. There was a covenant, and in consequence an action, although there was no manumission; and it is to this point that the marginal note draws special attention[97].

[Waynage.]

Again, we find in the beginning of Bracton's treatise a remark[98] which is quite out of keeping with the doctrine that the villain had no property to vindicate against his lord; it is contradicted by other pa.s.sages in the same book, and deserves to be considered the more carefully on that account. Our author is enumerating the cases in which the serf has an action against his lord. He follows Azo closely, and mentions injury to life or to limb as one cause. Azo goes on to say that a plaint may be originated by _intollerabilis injuria_, in the sense of corporeal injury. Bracton takes the expression in a very different sense; he thinks that economic ruin is meant, and adds, 'Should the lord go so far as to take away the villain's very _waynage_, i.e. plough and plough-team, the villain has an action.' It is true that Bracton's text, as printed in existing editions, contains a qualification of this remark; it is said that only serfs on ancient demesne land are possessed of such a right. But the qualification is meaningless; the right of ancient demesne tenants was quite different, as we shall see by-and-by.

The qualifying clause turns out to be inserted only in later MSS. of the treatise, is wanting in the better MSS., and altogether presents all the characters of a bad gloss[99]. When the gloss is removed, we come in sight of the fact that Bracton in the beginning of his treatise admits a distinct case of civil action on the part of a villain against his lord.

The remark is in contradiction with the Roman as well as with the established English doctrine, it is not supported by legal practice in the thirteenth century, it is omitted by Bracton when he comes to speak again of the 'persona standi in judicio contra dominum[100].' But there it is, and it cannot be explained otherwise than as a survival of a time when some part of the peasantry at least had not been surrendered to the lord's discretion, but was possessed of civil rights and of the power to vindicate them. The notion that the peasant ought to be specially protected in the possession of instruments of agricultural labour comes out, singularly enough, in the pa.s.sage commented upon, but it is not a singular notion in itself. It occurs, as every one knows, in the clause of the Great Charter, which says that the villain who falls into the king's mercy is to be amerced 'saving his waynage.' We come across it often enough in Plea Rolls in cases against guardians accused of having wasted their ward's property. One of the special points in such cases often is, that a guardian or his steward has been ruining the villains in the ward's manors by destroying their waynage[101]. Of course, the protection of the peasant's prosperity, guaranteed by the courts in such trials, is wholly due to a consideration of the interests of the ward; and the care taken of villains is exactly parallel to the attention bestowed upon oaks and elms. Still, the notion of waynage is in itself a peculiar and an important one, and whatever its ultimate origin may be, it points to a civil condition which does not quite fall within the lines of feudal law.

[Villains not to be devised.]

Another anomaly is supplied by Britton. After putting the case as strongly as possible against serfs, after treating them as mere chattels to be given and sold, he adds, 'But as bondmen are annexed to the freehold of the lord, they are not devisable by testament, and therefore Holy Church can take no cognisance of them in Court Christian, although devised in testament.' (I. 197.) The exclusion of villains is not peculiar to them; they share it with the greater part of landed possessions. 'As all the courts of civil jurisdiction had been prohibited from holding jurisdiction as to testamentary matters, and the Ecclesiastical Courts were not permitted to exercise jurisdiction as to any question relating to freehold, there was no court which could properly take cognisance of a testamentary gift of land as such[102].'

The point to be noted is, that villains are held to be annexed to the freehold, although in theory they ought to be treated as chattels. The contradiction gives us another instance of the peculiar modification of personal servitude by the territorial element. The serf is not a colonus, he is not bound up with any particular homestead or plot of land, but he is considered primarily as a cultivator under manorial organisation, and for this reason there is a limitation on the lord's power of alienating him. Let it be understood, however, that the limitation in this case does not come before us as a remnant of independent rights of the peasant. It is imposed by those interests of the feudal suzerain and of the kin which precluded the possibility of alienating land by devise[103].

[Villain tenure and villain service.]

An inquiry into the condition of villains would be altogether incomplete, if it did not touch on the questions of villain tenure and villain services. Both are intimately connected with personal status, as may be seen from the very names, and both have to be very carefully distinguished from it. I have had to speak of prescription as a source of villainage. Opinions were very uncertain in this respect, and yet, from the mere legal point of view, there ought not to have been any difficulty about the matter. Bracton takes his stand firmly on the fundamental difference between status and tenure in order to distinguish clearly between serfs and free men in a servile position[104]. The villain is a man belonging to his lord personally; a villain holding (_villenagium_) is land held at the will of the lord, without any certainty as to t.i.tle or term of enjoyment, as to kind or amount of services[105]. Serfs are mostly, though not necessarily, found on villain land; it does not follow that all those seated on villain land are serfs. Free men are constantly seen taking up a _villenagium_; they do not lose by it in personal condition; they have no protection against the lord, if he choose to alter their services or oust them from the holding, but, on the other hand, they are free to go when they please.

There is still less reason to treat as serfs such free peasants as are subjected to base services, i.e. to the same kind of services and payments as the villains, but on certain conditions, not more and not less. Whatever the customs may be, if they are certain, not only the person holding by them but the plot he is using are free, and the tenure may be defended at law[106].

Such are the fundamental positions in Bracton's treatise, and there can be no doubt that they are borne out in a general way by legal practice.

But if from the general we turn to the particular, if we a.n.a.lyse the thirteenth-century decisions which are at the bottom of Bracton's teaching, we shall find in many cases notions cropping up, which do not at all coincide with the received views on the subject. In fact we come across many apparent contradictions which can be attributed only to a state of fermentation and transition in the law of the thirteenth century.

[Martin of Bestenover's case.]

Martin of Bestenover's case is used by Bracton in his treatise as ill.u.s.trating the view that tenure has no influence on status[107]. It was a long litigation, or rather a series of litigations. Already in the first year of King John's reign we hear of a final concord between John of Montacute and Martin of Bestenover as to a hundred acres held by the latter[108]. The tenant is ejected however, and brings an a.s.size of mort d'ancestor against Beatrice of Montacute, who, as holding in dower, vouches her son John to warranty. The latter excepts against Martin as a villain. A jury by consent of the parties is called in, and we have their verdict reported three times in different records[109]. They say that Martin's father Ailfric held of John Montacute's father a hundred acres of land and fifty sheep besides, for which he had to pay 20_s._ a year, to be tallaged reasonably, when the lord tallaged his subjects, and that he was not allowed to give his daughter away in marriage before making a fine to the lord according to agreement. We do not know the decision of the judges in John's time, but both from the tenor of the verdict and from what followed, we may conclude that Martin succeeded in vindicating his right to the land. Proceedings break out again at the beginning of Henry III's reign.

In 1219 John of Montacute is again maintaining that Martin is his villain, in answer as it seems to an action _de libertate probanda_ which Martin has brought against him. The court goes back to the verdict of the jury in John's time, and finds that by this verdict the land is proved to be of base tenure, and the person to be free. The whole is repeated again[110] on a roll of 1220; whether we have two decisions, one of 1219 and the other of 1220, or merely two records of the same decision, is not very clear, nor is it very important. But there are several interesting points about this case. The decision in 1220 is undoubtedly very strong on the distinction between status and tenure: 'nullum erat placitum in curia domini Regis de villenagio corporis ipsius Martini nisi tantum de villenagio et consuetudinibus terre,' etc.

As to tenure, the court delivers an opinion which is ent.i.tled to special consideration, and has been specially noticed by Bracton both in his Note-book and in his treatise. 'If Martin,' say the judges on the roll of 1219, 'wishes to hold the land, let him perform the services which his father has been performing; if not, the lord may take the land into his hands[111].' The same thing is repeated almost literally on the roll of 1220. Bracton draws two inferences from these decisions. One is suggested by the beginning of the sentence; 'If Martin wishes to hold the land.' Both in the Note-book and in the treatise Bracton deduces from it, that holding and remaining on the land depended on the wish of Martin, who as a free man was ent.i.tled to go away when he pleased[112].

The judgment does not exactly say this, but as to the right of a free person to leave the land there can be no doubt.