While the elder Kim, as we have seen in chapter 7, increased tensions with the United States, his son set out to intensify the personality cult. Kim Jong-il, starting work with the party, was convinced of the need to defend Kim Il-sung's absolute authority and his revolutionary ideas "in order to tide over this difficult situation."7 It was during that period that the senior Kim made the transition from mere dictator to official deity.

"North Korean leaders claimed that they opposed China's Cultural Revolution, but in reality they imitated the Cultural Revolution on a smaller scale," former party ideology chief Hw.a.n.g Jang-yop observed later. "They created an even more intense personality cult for Kim Il-sung and launched an ultra-left campaign to rid society of all capitalistic elements." Since there was no "visible political force opposing Kim Il-sung," said Hw.a.n.g, "the campaign in Pyongyang "was a simple affair that accomplished its goal with the purging of a few intellectuals. But that simple affair was the turning point in the Kim Il-sung personality cult, which went from strength to strength.8 A complicating factor was a struggle between Kim Jong-il and his uncle, Kim Yong-ju, that began to develop after the younger man graduated from college and started work in the party. As we saw in chapter 10, Yong-ju seemingly was positioned to become Kim Il-sung's successor. He had backers in high places, including Kim Il-sung's wife Song-ae. Many people in leading roles in the party a.s.sumed he would be the successor.9 But Kim Jong-il went after the job. "The two men's rivalry was based on who could put Kim Il-sung on a higher pedestal," Hw.a.n.g Jang-yop recalled. "Thanks to this compet.i.tion, the Kim Il-sung personality cult went beyond the Soviet-style dictatorship" and became what Hw.a.n.g called "absolutism of the Great Leader." But Kim Jong-il went after the job. "The two men's rivalry was based on who could put Kim Il-sung on a higher pedestal," Hw.a.n.g Jang-yop recalled. "Thanks to this compet.i.tion, the Kim Il-sung personality cult went beyond the Soviet-style dictatorship" and became what Hw.a.n.g called "absolutism of the Great Leader."

Unofficial accounts agree with the official version that the junior Kim from very early in his working career focused his efforts on promoting loyalty toward the revolution and, especially its leader. Koreans traditionally value "purity." Both in Pyongyang and in Seoul, the ruling regime denigrated suspected agents of the other side as "impure elements." In a typically Korean Confucian behavior pattern that Karl Marx surely never envisioned as a component of communist rule, Kim Jong-il liked to ascribe merit to himself on account of his descent from the pure revolutionary line. And he insisted that others acknowledge his superiority in that regard. After all, Kim Il-sung had demonstrated his own purity by refusing to deviate even slightly from opposition to the j.a.panese colonialists.

According to one account, the young man displayed open contempt toward any Korean of his father's generation who had shown any weakness toward the enemy and thus failed to meet Kim Il-sung's high standard. "Comrade, how much did you devote yourself to the revolution at the time of the j.a.panese colonial rule?" he would ask one of his elders. "Did you ever commit anti-revolutionary acts?" (I encountered a similar att.i.tude in a great many South South Korean youngsters, of his and subsequent generations, who had little direct knowledge of the pressures and complexities of life under j.a.panese rule. They-were eager to reject and despise any authority figures-from parents right up to the late South Korean President Park Chung-hee, a former j.a.panese soldier-on the ground of insufficient patriotism.) Korean youngsters, of his and subsequent generations, who had little direct knowledge of the pressures and complexities of life under j.a.panese rule. They-were eager to reject and despise any authority figures-from parents right up to the late South Korean President Park Chung-hee, a former j.a.panese soldier-on the ground of insufficient patriotism.) One of Kim Jong-il's early targets for contempt was his uncle, Kim Yong-ju. As director of the Central Committee's Organization and Guidance Bureau, the uncle was officially the young graduate's first boss. But according to a South Korean account, he soon learned that the little prince was not easily bossed.

Over the years various reports appeared in South Korea to the effect that Kim Yong-ju had been captured by the j.a.panese in the late 1930s and had turned collaborator.10 It is not clear whether Kim Jong-il while working for his uncle got wind of such stories, true or false. Even if he did not, however, it would have been simple enough to punch holes in Kim Yong-ju's own war stories and show him up for an un-heroic sort at best whose pre-liberation experiences would not bear much scrutiny. Yong-ju made the preposterous claim, for example, that he had been a member of the political committee of the New Fourth Army of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. The actual members of that committee were such Chinese Communist luminaries as Liu Shao-qi and Chen Yi. It is not clear whether Kim Jong-il while working for his uncle got wind of such stories, true or false. Even if he did not, however, it would have been simple enough to punch holes in Kim Yong-ju's own war stories and show him up for an un-heroic sort at best whose pre-liberation experiences would not bear much scrutiny. Yong-ju made the preposterous claim, for example, that he had been a member of the political committee of the New Fourth Army of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. The actual members of that committee were such Chinese Communist luminaries as Liu Shao-qi and Chen Yi.11 The South Korean account says that clashes with the uncle led Kim Il-sung to transfer the young man from the party Central Committee to the party chapter in North Hamgyong Province. In the provincial party chapter, young Kim is reported to have worked under Kim Guk-tae, the boss of the local party's Organization Department. Although Kim Guk-tae was several years older and an army veteran, this was a more salubrious match-up as both men were second-generation communist n.o.bility. Both could boast "pure revolutionary" descent. A graduate of Mangyongdae School, Kim Guk-tae was the son of Kim Chaek. An anti-j.a.panese guerrilla general, the equal of Kim Il-sung in Manchuria, Kim Chaek had died during the Korean War after commanding the frontline troops of the People's Army. The two young men had known each other as boys.12 Around 1966 Kim is believed to have returned to Pyongyang to work in his father's military bodyguard organization. One account says he took the rank of major, and clashed frequently with the chief of the Bodyguard Bureau, O Baek-ryong, a former anti-j.a.panese guerrilla comrade of Kim Il-sung's. There is a report that O finally became so irritated by Kim Jong-il's presumption that he asked the younger man: "Am Iyour adjutant?"13 Young Kim as a bodyguard officer continued accompanying his father on guidance tours and giving some guidance of his own. Sometimes he seems to have given advice just to hear himself talk. At the workers' dormitory of a steel mill, for example, he barged unceremoniously into a room-to the surprise of the occupant, who was just getting off his shift and looking forward to his rest. Although the rooms were already so well equipped that the visiting mothers of workers had gushed over their comforts, he demanded that flat pillows be replaced with cylindrical, embroidered, traditionally Korean pillows, and pots of cold water with hot, freshly boiled water. The story does not mention his asking workers whether that was what they wanted, but it praises him for "taking into consideration those points which even their over-anxious mothers did not notice."

Visiting a furnace at the steel mill and seeing a lot of dust, he behaved like a zealous American Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) inspector. Told that a dust extractor was being built, he insisted "in a low yet grave voice, which expressed his determination," that factory officials shut down the furnace immediately until the new anti-pollution equipment was ready for installation. They might have ignored another twenty-four-year-old bodyguard who gave such an order, but this was Kim Il-sung's son. They dutifully shut down the furnace.14 Officially disseminated stories go on and on telling of his tramping through woods and fields and across dangerous steel mill floors, rolling up his sleeves and getting dirty, sometimes actually joining in the work-and thereby deeply impressing his hosts. "Kim Jong-il was working in person!" an official biographer exclaims, relating an instance in which the young Kim husked some corn. An official who was on the scene "bo-wed in spite of himself before the n.o.ble and loyal heart of Kim Jong-il.15 It appears that the supposedly egalitarian North Koreans believed-and were not officially discouraged in that belief-that the ordinary requirements should not apply to the son of the country's ruler. That notion is rooted not in communist doctrine but in the determinedly anti-egalitarian Confucianism represented by the Yi Dynasty's royalty and It appears that the supposedly egalitarian North Koreans believed-and were not officially discouraged in that belief-that the ordinary requirements should not apply to the son of the country's ruler. That notion is rooted not in communist doctrine but in the determinedly anti-egalitarian Confucianism represented by the Yi Dynasty's royalty and yangban yangban n.o.bility. For them physical labor was unthinkable; idly reading poetry the most admired pursuit. n.o.bility. For them physical labor was unthinkable; idly reading poetry the most admired pursuit.

Bodyguard duty was the closest young Kim ever came to serving in the military. He had a uniform then, but photos generally show him in civilian garb. The regime had to scrounge to find a single, rather pathetic anecdote from that period indicating interest in military matters. In July of 1967, near the height of military tension with South Korea and the United States, he visited a coastal defense headquarters on the Sea of j.a.pan. Earlier that year a North Korean coastal battery had sunk a South Korean patrol escort craft in those waters. The following January would see the capture of the Pueblo. Pueblo.

The coastal defense unit, of course, specialized in big guns. But Kim Jong-il himself-was known as a crack shot with small arms-perhaps the result of many hunting trips with his father. Discussing the soldiers' training program, he complained that they had focused on artillery at the expense of rifle practice. After all, they might have to defend their positions with rifles if the big guns failed. He had the men demonstrate their shooting, but they were not very good. Then he "stepped down an emplacement and, giving an example of the right way to shoot, he taught them how to achieve first-rate marksmanship. Looking at Kim Jong-il, who was drenched in sweat, the commanders felt tremendously guilty about their neglect of small arms training." Or did one or two of them, perhaps, silently entertain dark thoughts about a privileged, twenty-five-year-old draft-dodger who had unerringly picked for discussion and demonstration the only skill in which he could show their men up?16 After his bodyguard duty Kim Jong-il went back to the party Central Committee, taking posts in the propaganda and agitation department.17 There he became such a bloodhound in rooting out disloyal elements that an official version reads like a history of the Spanish Inquisition: "Kim Jong-il, who had obtained concrete information on the internal conditions of the party in a short time, found that there was a serious problem in it." There he became such a bloodhound in rooting out disloyal elements that an official version reads like a history of the Spanish Inquisition: "Kim Jong-il, who had obtained concrete information on the internal conditions of the party in a short time, found that there was a serious problem in it."

[Kim] discovered a symptom of a dangerous plot by some impure elements. He found that some party officials were leading an unwholesome life as party members. They were not sincere in their party work, ignoring party rules and concealing each other's irregularities. ... It appeared to Kim Jong-il that there was something shady about their lives and so he made a close study of their defects and shortcomings in all fields of their activities. As a result, he discovered that an official holding a high post in the party was behind the irregularities. ... He discovered this when he read a certain book and when he noticed in it a pa.s.sage denying the purity of the revolutionary tradition of the party. Many people read the book, but there was none who pointed out this fact. Only he saw in it an attempt to slander party policy and deny the purity of its revolutionary tradition. He lost no time in examining publications related to that book. His concern proved right, as he found not a few books which advocated bourgeois ideas, revisionist and Confucian ideas and lifestyles. ... A handful of people, centered on a high-ranking party official, were spreading unwholesome ideas systematically and in an organized "way in the backstage, while pretending on the surface to support the ideas of the party18 No name is given for this wicked Korean version of China's Deng Xiaoping, but the high-ranking official whom the young loyalist zealot was pursuing appears to have been Kim To-man. Chosen in 1966 as party secretary in charge of propaganda and agitation, Kim To-man was the only one of the ten people given secretary rank at that time who could not boast of either experience as a partisan general or blood ties to partisan leaders.19 Kim Jong-il went after him and his followers, who had influence in "literary and artistic circles"-that is, party propaganda. The young inquisitor became particularly exercised over a play called Kim Jong-il went after him and his followers, who had influence in "literary and artistic circles"-that is, party propaganda. The young inquisitor became particularly exercised over a play called An Act of Sincerity. An Act of Sincerity. He argued that the play was intended to gloss over the flaws of people he believed or suspected had not fought the good fight against the j.a.panese. The play, says a biographer of Kim Jong-il, He argued that the play was intended to gloss over the flaws of people he believed or suspected had not fought the good fight against the j.a.panese. The play, says a biographer of Kim Jong-il, was written to enable schemers and ambitious people to utilize an "autobiography" to make themselves appear like "revolutionaries". ... However, when the revolution faced a difficult phase, those who could not endure it raised their heads as impure and vacillating elements. Many of them had unknown careers. Nevertheless the party and President Kim Il-sung took a careful and generous att.i.tude to them so as to allow them to hold responsible posts in the party and the state, expecting that when trusted and entrusted with heavy responsibilities, they would repay the generous treatment with sincere efforts. However, they betrayed the trust reposed in them, and as they were given leading posts and as their positions rose higher, they became arrogant, and later came to take an overbearing att.i.tude, bent on achieving their own personal purposes in the party.

This was a case in which Kim Il-sung was rooting out perceived rivals from within the partisan group and the military-perhaps on account of their criticism of his new, extreme policies20 rather than their views on literature- and his son enthusiastically piled on. In part the younger Kim was seeking to prove his loyalty to his father. But according to Hw.a.n.g Jang-yop, Kim Jong-il also had his own axe to grind: he hoped to push aside high-level supporters of his uncle within those then-powerful groups. rather than their views on literature- and his son enthusiastically piled on. In part the younger Kim was seeking to prove his loyalty to his father. But according to Hw.a.n.g Jang-yop, Kim Jong-il also had his own axe to grind: he hoped to push aside high-level supporters of his uncle within those then-powerful groups.21 "Already aware of their moves," the elder Kim called a party Central Committee plenary meeting for May of 1967 "to smash the schemes of the bourgeois and revisionist elements." Before that meeting was held, the Great Leader started an "ideological struggle." However, "at first, partic.i.p.ants in the struggle did not understand the seriousness of the situation." Kim Jong-il, coming to the rescue, "unveiled the nature of anti-party counter-revolutionary elements who had raised their heads whenever the party faced a trial."

That started the ball rolling, and soon others joined in, spying upon and denouncing the target elements. For example, a certain official discovered an impure "directive" issued by an anti-party element written down in his notebook, and with an awakened eye he saw that it could serve as evidence to expose the criminal act of the anti-party element, and unhesitatingly partic.i.p.ated in the struggle against the factionalists. Then many other party members exposed the criminal acts of anti-party elements by pointing out similar facts. The ideological struggle intensified. ... After the plenary meeting the schemers who wanted to spread anti-party counter-revolutionary ideas within the party were systematically liquidated.22 Kim To-man and several colleagues were purged at that meeting.23 More purges were yet to come. More purges were yet to come.

Hw.a.n.g Jang-yop has explained in plain language what much of the literary purge entailed. Earlier Kim Il-sung had permitted, even encouraged, his old partisan comrades to publish their own memoirs. The regime's ghost-writers made sure those volumes included plenty of flattering references to Kim. "But when Kim Jong-il entered the central party in the late 1960s, he called back all the memoirs," according to Hw.a.n.g. "Kim Jong-il was concerned that the memoirs detracted from the Kim Il-sung personality cult and created legends about partisans other than Kim Il-sung." By the late 1960s, North Korean textbooks were devoid of references to "many heroic figures. ..."24 Taking the witch hunt on the road, in July 1967 Kim Jong-il went to South Hamgyong Province and got involved in some rough local politics. He "worked hard there to eradicate the tendencies of factionalism, parochialism and nepotism which were still found in some party organizations." In that province and South Pyongan Province, say officially sanctioned biographers, he "worked energetically to carry through the party policy of eradicating the effect of unwholesome ideas and promoting economic and defense construction simultaneously"25 The latter was the euphemism for Kim Il-sung's policy of militarization. According to an unofficial North Korean spokesman in Tokyo, Kim Jong-il "struggled against local opponents who attempted to weaken the party leadership" and afterward "emerged as a leading theoretician. The latter was the euphemism for Kim Il-sung's policy of militarization. According to an unofficial North Korean spokesman in Tokyo, Kim Jong-il "struggled against local opponents who attempted to weaken the party leadership" and afterward "emerged as a leading theoretician.26 Hw.a.n.g Jang-yop, who worked from 1958 to 1965 as Kim's ideological secretary, seems to have found himself eclipsed in ideological work as the junior Kim's star ascended. While continuing to rank as one of the country's leading intellectuals, Hw.a.n.g was shifted to a number of often less important jobs before he defected, in 1997, to South Korea.

Hw.a.n.g was relatively fortunate in that he survived. After his defection he told of Baek Nam-woon, who, although "respected as the father of left--wing scholars, was purged by Kim Jong-il at the end of the 1960s. I heard Kim Byeong-ha, then Minister of National Security, boast that his men had taken Baek to the [concentration camp]. ... As a scholar, Baek had not partic.i.p.ated actively in the campaign against Kim Il-sung. He probably made a few comments that were picked up through wire-tapping and construed as complaints. Baek died in the concentration camp."27 More than is the case with the often fanciful-sounding accounts of his birth, childhood and youth, in my reading stories officially told about Kim Jong-il's deeds following his university graduation tend to have the feel of being based on actual incidents. It appears that his hagiographers went out in the late 1970s or early 1980s and interviewed people he had been in contact with earlier, asking them for accounts of the meetings. Perhaps the original tellers- and certainly the sycophantic retellers-made any necessary adjustments so that the accounts would conform to the formula established earlier, in which the young man invariably left his listeners scratching their heads at their own stupidity and carelessness but full of admiration for his genius and his great love for the people.

A gut reaction to such stories is that most of the people involved must have been at least normally intelligent folk. Some of them probably were smarter than he was. But it seems likely that either they felt at the time that they must play dumb in the actual meetings or, later, they allowed themselves to be portrayed as fools in order to flatter the leader's eldest son.

To someone raised on the United States' unceremonious, no-nonsense egalitarianism, it is numbing to read volume after volume of accounts such as one that describes Kim Jong-il's summoning of officials in charge of scientific and educational work. When they arrived at the meeting he let them know they were there to resolve theoretical questions, regarding which "opinions varied in the academic world at that time." He did the talking, of course. As the twenty-five-year-old rambled on, "the officials wrote down every one of Kim Jong-il's words in their notebooks." They "felt their mental horizons broadening." When he had finished, they felt confident that the academic controversies he had addressed "had come to an end." They believed that "they could open the eyes of anyone who was confused on the subject. ... When Kim Jong-il finished his explanation, all the officials rose to their feet. 'He's truly a genius of ideas, and genius of theory!'-This is what every one of them felt. Greatly moved, they expressed their infinite respect for Kim Jong-il."28 Indeed, according to Hw.a.n.g, Kim Jong-il "tends to dominate meetings and conferences and to lead all discussion to conclusions congruent with his own.29 My guess is that those poor officials whom the biographers describe really did abase themselves to some such depth of fawning servility, feeling they had no other choice. Eventually the official stories had been repeated so often inside the country that many younger North Koreans-never having heard him utter more than a phrase, and having no source of information about him except the regime's teachings-truly believed that Kim Jong-il was an exalted being, quite different from ordinary people. Thus, there might be less need for conscious dissembling and acting on their part. But again the question arises of-why if he possessed any sensitivity, the junior Kim not only permitted but almost certainly gave the order that such accounts be translated from the Korean for foreign readers-to many of-whom he himself-was inevitably made to appear the fatuous one. My guess is that those poor officials whom the biographers describe really did abase themselves to some such depth of fawning servility, feeling they had no other choice. Eventually the official stories had been repeated so often inside the country that many younger North Koreans-never having heard him utter more than a phrase, and having no source of information about him except the regime's teachings-truly believed that Kim Jong-il was an exalted being, quite different from ordinary people. Thus, there might be less need for conscious dissembling and acting on their part. But again the question arises of-why if he possessed any sensitivity, the junior Kim not only permitted but almost certainly gave the order that such accounts be translated from the Korean for foreign readers-to many of-whom he himself-was inevitably made to appear the fatuous one.

In his new role as propagandist and "theoretician," Kim Jong-il sought to promote unthinking devotion to one-man rule. He arranged for the manufacture of plaster busts of Kim Il-sung, which he placed in study halls all over the country-changing the name from Study Hall of the History of the Workers' Party of Korea to Study Hall of Comrade Kim Il-sung's Revolutionary History. That made it clear that the leader now had primacy over even the party. The young Kim also ordered a new compilation of historical photographs to place in those study halls, "knowing that the existing pictorial records were not edited so as to center on the greatness of the President.30 Hagiographers exaggerated and fabricated to inflate Kim Il-sung's creditable achievements into a t.i.tanic image.31 In the 1960s, official Pyongyang biographer Baik Bong described Kim as "a legendary hero ... who is capable of commanding heavens and earth, an unrivalled brilliant commander who, as it were, can shrink a long range of steep mountains at a stroke and smash the swarming hordes of enemies with one blow." In the 1960s, official Pyongyang biographer Baik Bong described Kim as "a legendary hero ... who is capable of commanding heavens and earth, an unrivalled brilliant commander who, as it were, can shrink a long range of steep mountains at a stroke and smash the swarming hordes of enemies with one blow."32 Such a magical figure's spiritual origins naturally had to be matched with a heroic physical birth, so his hagiographers described Kim Il-sung as issuing from the bosom of a revolutionary holy family. Biographer Baik credited Kim's father, Kim Hyong-jik, with such colossal achievements as having founded, in 1917, the underground Korean National a.s.sociation, largest of the anti-j.a.panese organizations of the time.33 When the propagandists ran short on exaggerations and inventions, they stole. In people's homes were placed copies of a slogan attributed to Kim: "Fish cannot live out of water. The people cannot live without the People's Army.- Kim Il-sung." The real author of the phrase was, of course, Mao Zedong.34 Publishing a third edition of Kim Il-sung's Selected Works Selected Works along with volumes of commentary and biography, backing them up with audiovisual materials and developing revolutionary historical sites for ma.s.s tours, Kim Jong-il enforced systematic, daily study. The goal was to "make all party members think and act in unison according to the leader's intentions and teachings," to make people "have absolute trust in the President as their spiritual support." along with volumes of commentary and biography, backing them up with audiovisual materials and developing revolutionary historical sites for ma.s.s tours, Kim Jong-il enforced systematic, daily study. The goal was to "make all party members think and act in unison according to the leader's intentions and teachings," to make people "have absolute trust in the President as their spiritual support."

Kim Jong-il was tireless in his efforts "to lead people to the way of faithfulness." One of his acquaintances, for example, had a brother who got in a spot of trouble with the authorities. Kim Jong-il was able to have the brother's case reexamined. It turned out that some "vicious elements" were responsible for the transgression and had shifted the blame. Afterward, young Kim advised the grateful acquaintance, in effect, that his whole family should go and sin no more: "If a man is deprived of his political life, or the trust of the party, he is nothing. Therefore, it is necessary to do everything in your power to keep your political life, given by the great leader, and work hard to prove worthy of his trust. Not only yourself, but all your family members and relatives must be armed with the unitary idea of the party and be educated to be faithful to the leader. You must live according to the leader's teachings anywhere, anytime, whatever you do, and judge by his teachings as a yardstick, and fight unhesitatingly against anything deviating from his teachings."35 When a draft doc.u.ment for a party congress listed several top party officials, with Kim Il-sung's name at the top, his son ordered that it be retyped to leave a s.p.a.ce between the Great Leader's name and the rest of the list. His underlings did that, but a few days later he called an official in and asked him to print Kim Il-sung's name in larger type, as well. "Think. It's because the sun shines that the planets shed their light, isn't it?" he explained to the puzzled official. "As we could not draw the sun and the planets in the same size, so we would never write down the name of the leader and the names of his men in the same size." The official now understood what Kim Jong-il had in mind, and "bowed deeply to his n.o.ble loyalty." (The idea actually was lifted from Stalin's personality cult.)36 It was for that same party congress, in 1970, that Kim Jong-il personally designed the first lapel badges with his father's portrait and had them pa.s.sed out to delegates. It was for that same party congress, in 1970, that Kim Jong-il personally designed the first lapel badges with his father's portrait and had them pa.s.sed out to delegates.37 Kim Jong-il had been fascinated with movies from his childhood, brought up on viewing sessions in his father's mansion that leaned heavily toward Russian movies. As that fascination converged with his interest in women, the avid film buff had begun hanging around Pyongyang's film studios, dating actresses.38 According to an official account, he told his father as early as 1964-the year of his university graduation-that all was not well in North Korea's tin-seltown. Kim Il-sung thereupon called a party politburo meeting at the Korean Film Studio, with the studio staff in attendance. There the elder Kim gave a speech complaining that opportunists within the communist movement were kowtowing to a cultural offensive launched by the imperialists. He wanted a radical change. The industry must produce many high-quality movies, artistic yet ideologically compelling. Filmmakers must chart a straight path, repudiating two extremes: "the art-for-art's sake doctrine of the revisionists and the leftist tendency to stress only ideology while ignoring artistry." The themes of the films must fall into three categories: (1) Kim Il-sung's anti-j.a.panese struggle, (2) the Korean War and (3) inspiration for workers to make "great revolutionary advances in socialist construction."

After the speech, the audience "gave a standing ovation for a long time, looking up at President Kim Il-sung and Comrade Kim Jong-il. ... It was from that time onwards that Kim Jong-il's energetic guidance of cinematic development began."39 While still in his twenties Kim Jong-il rose in the party Central Committee hierarchy to become deputy director of the propaganda and agitation department (under his friend Kim Guk-tae again, according to some reports) and then department director. Working as a propagandist gave the Great Leader's son an official excuse to continue his interest in the cinema- which eventually would prove a virtual obsession. On one level, he simply wanted better quality from a young and struggling back-water movie industry that was far from meeting the technical standards of Moscow, much less Hollywood. On another level, he was determined to root out of the movie industry the counterrevolutionary, bourgeois, feudalistic, revisionist, flunkeyist influences that those wicked fellows purged in 1967 had planted in earlier years to distract the people from worshipping Kim Il-sung with the proper single-hearted, single-minded unity. This would be a flip-side version of the Hollywood blacklist.

Kim Jong-il started by abolishing an annual January convention of filmmakers from all over the country to evaluate the previous year's film output from the standpoint of artistry. Kim decried the esthetic review for its failure to stick strictly to pushing the ideology of one-man rule. He called it a "platform which was utilized by the babblers in order to demonstrate their intelligence." Anti-party counterrevolutionaries in charge of cinema development for the party had dreamed up the session in a plot to "restore outdated self-indulgence, so as to liberalize' cinematic creation." Instead of studying Kim Il-sung's thoughts on art and literature, speakers at the meeting had dwelled on theories from outside. They had even gone to the length of "suggesting the introduction of so-and-so's system of direction and so-and-so's system of acting from Europe."

Officials hearing his complaints were "bewildered," never having seen any harm in the get-togethers. But, now that he mentioned it, they "felt as if their vision was opening up." Kim Jong-il then opened their vision a little wider, decreeing that "from now on you must not use the words 'esthetic review.' Instead we must hold a meeting for the study of the great leader's artistic and literary thoughts." Now they got the picture, and "the officials and artists left the room, bitterly reflecting on their inability to distinguish right from wrong."

Some days later Kim Jong-il presided over the first meeting for the study of the Great Leader's thought on juche-oriented on juche-oriented art and literature, convened in a movie studio. He humiliated the first speaker who took the floor, attacking the man's use of foreign words such as the "moral" of a story and "suspense" when there were perfectly good words in Korean to get the meaning across. Bidding the "bewildered" speaker to sit down, he expressed disgust that "the flunkeyist and dogmatic habit is even repeated in this place where we are studying the Great Leader's art and literature, convened in a movie studio. He humiliated the first speaker who took the floor, attacking the man's use of foreign words such as the "moral" of a story and "suspense" when there were perfectly good words in Korean to get the meaning across. Bidding the "bewildered" speaker to sit down, he expressed disgust that "the flunkeyist and dogmatic habit is even repeated in this place where we are studying the Great Leader's juche-oriented juche-oriented art and literary thoughts. It is appalling." Without discarding that habit of "parroting" others, the filmmakers would "never be able to make films which will genuinely do a great deal for the Korean revolution, films which will be loved by the Korean people." art and literary thoughts. It is appalling." Without discarding that habit of "parroting" others, the filmmakers would "never be able to make films which will genuinely do a great deal for the Korean revolution, films which will be loved by the Korean people."

In order to make a clean sweep of past errors, "Kim Jong-il sternly ordered that all the files on the 'art review' meetings be burned. All those present at the meeting were struck by the intelligent leadership of Kim Jong-il." After the meeting, all the papers and reports presented at previous "esthetic reviews" were indeed burned, so that a new start could be made based on the theories of Kim Il-sung.40 Although Kim Il-sung had staged skits and plays and disseminated tracts during his anti-j.a.panese struggle, he had not made movies. Thus, the pickings were slim for filmmakers looking for guidance from the Great Leader's holy writ. Kim Jong-il was happy to step into the breach and propound his own theories, always describing them as developments of his father's ideas.

At the first meeting for the study of the Great Leader's thought on juche- on juche-oriented art and literature, according to official accounts, and on other occasions as well, the junior Kim laid out his chongja chongja or "seed" theory. He had "discovered for the first time in history the seed of the work of art, its nucleus. or "seed" theory. He had "discovered for the first time in history the seed of the work of art, its nucleus.41 In fact his demand that writers and directors "grasp the seed" of a work was another way of directing them to choose a theme that could be expressed in just a few words and stick to it. To that extent, of course, Kim Jong-il's idea was by no means new. But the principle of focusing tightly on a clear theme probably is the one that writers-professionals included- most often forget. (I, myself, while reading his thoughts on the "seed," realized that parts of my ma.n.u.script lacked focus and needed re-writing. Thanks, Dear Leader, for the useful reminder.) Kim's dwelling on the principle could only be a positive influence on North Korean screen-writing and film direction and editing, from the technical standpoint. In fact his demand that writers and directors "grasp the seed" of a work was another way of directing them to choose a theme that could be expressed in just a few words and stick to it. To that extent, of course, Kim Jong-il's idea was by no means new. But the principle of focusing tightly on a clear theme probably is the one that writers-professionals included- most often forget. (I, myself, while reading his thoughts on the "seed," realized that parts of my ma.n.u.script lacked focus and needed re-writing. Thanks, Dear Leader, for the useful reminder.) Kim's dwelling on the principle could only be a positive influence on North Korean screen-writing and film direction and editing, from the technical standpoint.

Content was a different matter. Kim Jong-il wanted artistic people to grasp seeds that would promote the regime's ideology, especially one-man rule. Talking to the makers of the film Five Guerrilla Brothers Five Guerrilla Brothers in 1968, he complained that they had killed off a character, making him the victim of an enemy plot to poison the guerrillas' salt supply. That went against what was or should have been the seed of the work: "that the Korean People's Revolutionary Army would be ever-victorious as long as the headquarters of the revolution existed." in 1968, he complained that they had killed off a character, making him the victim of an enemy plot to poison the guerrillas' salt supply. That went against what was or should have been the seed of the work: "that the Korean People's Revolutionary Army would be ever-victorious as long as the headquarters of the revolution existed."

Kim Jong-il also complained that the real prototype of the character the filmmakers had killed off did not in fact die in the salt incident. And he insisted that "our literature and arts must portray historical facts strictly in accordance with the principles of maintaining party loyalty and of being historically accurate." (Note that party loyalty was to take precedence over historical accuracy.) "You must not fake, in a careless manner, what is not found in life, and present scenes that vary from the truth, simply for the sake of the arts. In dealing with historical facts, you must discard, as a matter of course, what is of no substance; but you must not discard-what is of essential significance, interpret it as you please or invent something."

That is good advice. I think it was taken to heart, to some extent, in the factual basis apparent in many of the stories told about Kim senior and junior in books the regime published from the 1980s on, at least until Kim Il-sung's death in 1994.

But Kim Jong-il only selectively followed his own advice. The "headquarters of the revolution" to which he referred in his critique of Five Guerrilla Brothers Five Guerrilla Brothers was meant to be understood as the seat of Gen. Kim Il-sung, that lofty being destined to become North Korea's Great Leader. In historical fact, Kim Il-sung's headquarters was no more the headquarters of was meant to be understood as the seat of Gen. Kim Il-sung, that lofty being destined to become North Korea's Great Leader. In historical fact, Kim Il-sung's headquarters was no more the headquarters of the the revolution than were the headquarters of any of a number of other guerrilla fighters and political leaders, based in other parts of Manchuria, in China proper, in Korea itself or elsewhere, who were Kim's revolutionary equals or betters. revolution than were the headquarters of any of a number of other guerrilla fighters and political leaders, based in other parts of Manchuria, in China proper, in Korea itself or elsewhere, who were Kim's revolutionary equals or betters.

The unspoken rule seems to have been that writers should avoid lies about small, easily ascertainable facts and stick to Big Lies-such as Kim Il-sung's purported leadership of the entire "revolution" from the 1930s on and South Korea's invasion of the North to start the Korean War. Kim Jong-il did not in so many words, for publication, address the importance of the Big Lie for the regime. However, he did endorse fictionalizing historical facts: "The arts, even though based on actual situations, must not reproduce facts and instances automatically; they must identify those which are of essential significance and generalize them," he said, in the same talk in which he had emphasized fidelity to the facts. Unfortunately, he said, the unimaginative moviemakers he was addressing were "unable to make full use of this wonderful creative capacity"42 What his seemingly conflicting advice may have boiled down to is: Stick to the facts if fabrication would be easily detected-but if a lie would serve the maintenance of the regime, then tell the lie and overcome people's disbelief through dramatic force and constant repet.i.tion.

To get the filmmakers headed in the right direction, Kim Jong-il decided to lead them in making films based on some works-plays or skits-from the period of the anti-j.a.panese struggle in Manchuria. In each case those were works whose original authorship was ascribed to Kim Il-sung. The first of those was Sea of Blood, Sea of Blood, which is which is the story of an ordinary mother in a farm village, who is widowed in the sea of blood resulting from a slaughter carried out by j.a.panese imperialism. The story gives a vivid account of how the mother, realizing the truth of struggle through ordeals, rises in a revolutionary struggle. With her three children to feed, the heroine has a hard time of it under the oppressive rule of j.a.panese imperialism. The elder son Won-nam joins the Anti-j.a.panese Guerrilla Army in his early years, and the only daughter Gap-sun and the younger son Ul-nam are gradually awakened to the cause of revolution. The mother learns the truth of revolution, first under the influence of her husband and children and then educated by an anti-j.a.panese guerrilla political worker.One day, the younger son Ul-nam is cruelly murdered by the enemy while trying to save the political worker being pursued by a j.a.panese garrison troop. Firming up her will to resist in the depth of despair, the heroine indignantly rises, organizes a women's a.s.sociation, goes among workers and gets explosives. After remarkable activities, she leads a popular uprising in support of an attack on the county seat by the Guerrilla Army and joins it. On the joyful day of liberation of the county seat, the heroine, speaking to the ma.s.ses of the truth she has learned, makes an enthusiastic appeal to them to rise for the revolution.

Kim Jong-il's creative staff spent a year developing a screenplay based on a novelized version of the original play43 Young Kim quickly demonstrated his preference for late-night work regardless of the sleeping schedules of underlings, whom he expected to adjust to his hours. Staying in "a house beside a lake"-perhaps one of his villas-he worked with the creative staff on the screenplay. One night, Young Kim quickly demonstrated his preference for late-night work regardless of the sleeping schedules of underlings, whom he expected to adjust to his hours. Staying in "a house beside a lake"-perhaps one of his villas-he worked with the creative staff on the screenplay. One night, the scriptwriters, who worked until late at night, were just going to bed when Kim Jong-il called them and handed back their ma.n.u.scripts which he had been looking through. He asked them to bring him any other ma.n.u.scripts which they might have. It was already 2:30 A.M., so they hesitated. One of them suggested that he should sleep."Never mind, give me ma.n.u.scripts you've written, if you have any. ... You know, the President wrote this celebrated work, sitting up all night for several nights, taking time off in the intervals of the grim, b.l.o.o.d.y struggle against the j.a.panese. In that case, how can we allow ourselves to write the screen version of that masterpiece, taking as much rest and sleep as we want, satisfied with our comfortable conditions? I prefer to work in the peaceful, small hours. Give me ma.n.u.scripts you've written, please."His eyes were glittering with eagerness. The writers were swept by rising emotion and gave him their ma.n.u.scripts. Taking the papers, Kim Jong-il again plunged into his work of revision. The night pa.s.sed and the moonlight which played on the rippling water of the lake was fading in the grey dawn. The writers, too, sat at their desks a little longer. Soon they were overcome by weariness and started to doze.How much time pa.s.sed no one knew. ... One of them was awakened by the trickling of-water somewhere. The sound undoubtedly came from the washroom. The hands of the clock-were pointing to 4 A.M. He p.r.i.c.ked up his ears to make sure where the sound was coming from, and there again came the sound of running water which was now mingled with noise of splashing. The writer stood up. He went to the washroom and was surprised to see Kim Jong-il washing his face in cold water. A lump suddenly rose in his throat. "He's overcoming the fatigue caused by overwork." The writer stood spellbound for some time, staring in reverence at the dear leader who was so devoted to his work of making the screen version an enduring piece to be handed down to posterity.

Kim Jong-il also personally supervised the shooting of Sea of Blood. Sea of Blood. In September 1969, filming a scene depicting the burning of a hamlet, he ran hither and yon through the smoke making sure all the pieces fit together. He told off an actor playing a j.a.panese soldier who "ran about brandishing his sword, although he had just been slain by a peasant with an axe." At another point, "he urged the cavalry to charge towards Ul-nam's mother, who was frantically searching for her children, but they did not hear him. Immediately he rushed into the suffocating smoke and led the hors.e.m.e.n to where they should be. In September 1969, filming a scene depicting the burning of a hamlet, he ran hither and yon through the smoke making sure all the pieces fit together. He told off an actor playing a j.a.panese soldier who "ran about brandishing his sword, although he had just been slain by a peasant with an axe." At another point, "he urged the cavalry to charge towards Ul-nam's mother, who was frantically searching for her children, but they did not hear him. Immediately he rushed into the suffocating smoke and led the hors.e.m.e.n to where they should be.44 Sea of Blood premiered later in 1969, followed in the next few years by other screen versions of Kim Il-sung's "revolutionary masterpieces." In 1970 came premiered later in 1969, followed in the next few years by other screen versions of Kim Il-sung's "revolutionary masterpieces." In 1970 came The Fate of a Self-defense Corps Man, The Fate of a Self-defense Corps Man, whose main character is first pressed into betraying his nation through service in the j.a.panese imperialists' self-defense corps. He soon finds the corps to be "a living h.e.l.l of racial discrimination, insult and whipping." A friend who tries to desert is executed. Mean-while, the j.a.panese drive the hero's father like a beast, as he labors to help build a gun emplacement, and then they shoot him to death. The young man, previously without cla.s.s-consciousness, then changes course, taking "the path of revolution to wipe out the aggressors." The writers at first had trouble deciding on the central theme. Kim Jong-il settled it. The seed of the work, he said, was the inevitability of death, whether or not the young men joined the self-defense corps. whose main character is first pressed into betraying his nation through service in the j.a.panese imperialists' self-defense corps. He soon finds the corps to be "a living h.e.l.l of racial discrimination, insult and whipping." A friend who tries to desert is executed. Mean-while, the j.a.panese drive the hero's father like a beast, as he labors to help build a gun emplacement, and then they shoot him to death. The young man, previously without cla.s.s-consciousness, then changes course, taking "the path of revolution to wipe out the aggressors." The writers at first had trouble deciding on the central theme. Kim Jong-il settled it. The seed of the work, he said, was the inevitability of death, whether or not the young men joined the self-defense corps.45 Note that the film offers a view of life complex enough to allow for a negative character to turn positive. One who has started as a traitor can become a shining revolutionary. That sort of twist would become a hallmark of the Kim Jong-il era in cinema, as compared with simplistic "revolutionary morality plays" that the North Korean studios had churned out earlier.46 This fact strikes a note of seeming irony: From what we are told about This fact strikes a note of seeming irony: From what we are told about An Act of Sincerity An Act of Sincerity-the play Kim Jong-il had denounced earlier as representing a treacherous maneuver by Kim To-man's henchmen-the approach appears to have been similar.

While filming The Fate of a Self-defense Corps Man, The Fate of a Self-defense Corps Man, the cast and crew worked on location at Pochonbo in the mountainous northern part of the country. The weather was cold. Kim Jong-il "sent them a variety of foodstuffs and high-quality medicines, in addition to blankets, fur coats, fur caps and fur shoes for each member of the crew. He even sent them a letter. On receiving these gifts, the crew were choked with emotion." Pulling strings to procure special favors on such a munificent scale for people involved in his pet projects-or for people in unfortunate circ.u.mstances, whose particular needs came to his attention and moved him--was to become his pattern. The impulse to generosity seems to have been genuine enough, but in altruism and philanthropy his style was neither modest nor discreet. It appears his propagandists made sure he would get full public credit for every kindness. the cast and crew worked on location at Pochonbo in the mountainous northern part of the country. The weather was cold. Kim Jong-il "sent them a variety of foodstuffs and high-quality medicines, in addition to blankets, fur coats, fur caps and fur shoes for each member of the crew. He even sent them a letter. On receiving these gifts, the crew were choked with emotion." Pulling strings to procure special favors on such a munificent scale for people involved in his pet projects-or for people in unfortunate circ.u.mstances, whose particular needs came to his attention and moved him--was to become his pattern. The impulse to generosity seems to have been genuine enough, but in altruism and philanthropy his style was neither modest nor discreet. It appears his propagandists made sure he would get full public credit for every kindness.

At that time Kim was promoting a "speed campaign" to step up output in the film industry paralleling similar campaigns elsewhere in the economy. He telephoned the Pochonbo location every day around midnight or in the early morning to check on progress, urging "that the shooting be done at lightning speed." The daily shooting quota-was 80 meters of film, but "thanks to Kim Jong-il's solicitude and trust" the crew averaged 250 meters a day- even though the cameramen "had to work while breathing on the lenses to warm them." A film that normally would have taken a year to complete was shot in forty days. "The beacon of the speed campaign, which was raised by Kim Jong-il, spread like wildfire to all units of the film industry and astonishing feats were performed, one after another. In 1970 alone, the cinema workers produced several dozen first-rate films"-an achievement that gave the lie to the evil counterrevolutionaries' claim that "higher speed results in lower quality."47 Kim by all accounts was genuinely tireless in his pursuit of the revolution in filmmaking. He chose the themes of films such as The Flourishing Village The Flourishing Village and and A Worker's Family, A Worker's Family, both of-which won the country's People's Prize. In the latter case he looked over film already shot and determined that the creative staff had not grasped the seed. "The stress must be put on the fact that a worker must never forget his origin and that even though he knows his origin, he would degenerate if he did not unceasingly revolutionize himself," he told them. "The seed of the film should be derived from this idea." They re-worked the characters and the sequences accordingly. That, says an official account, is how the film "became a work of great social impact, with people crying about the need for revolutionizing society." both of-which won the country's People's Prize. In the latter case he looked over film already shot and determined that the creative staff had not grasped the seed. "The stress must be put on the fact that a worker must never forget his origin and that even though he knows his origin, he would degenerate if he did not unceasingly revolutionize himself," he told them. "The seed of the film should be derived from this idea." They re-worked the characters and the sequences accordingly. That, says an official account, is how the film "became a work of great social impact, with people crying about the need for revolutionizing society."

Not satisfied with merely telling the staff-what to do, Kim "would also work, scissors in hand, throughout the night in a narrow editing booth or in a darkroom." The story is told of an inexperienced director who himself worked late into the night before he finished inserting a scene according to Kim's instruction, then went to bed. Later the man was awakened and summoned back to the studio, where he found Kim Jong-il reediting the film with scissors. Kim had gone through nine reels and had been at it for some four hours. "The film has been developed well," he told the "utterly perplexed" director, explaining that he had "cut out some sc.r.a.ps of the scenes which might be dull. I am not sure you will be happy with what I have done. ..."

"Dear Leader!" mumbled the director, who was "deeply moved."

Finally, Kim Jong-il put the scissors down and walked out, saying to the director, "Comrade director, look through it again carefully."

Then he left the studio. The car carrying Kim Jong-il glided out of the studio gate and disappeared into the darkness, which soon melted into grey light.The director returned to the room and, as he looked through the film which had just been reedited by Kim Jong-il, he was overcome by another surge of emotion. Scenes which were similar and redundant had been cut out and the recording of boisterous orchestral music and a long chorus in the finale had been removed. Because this had been done the emotional development now had pace and force and it left one in a thoughtful mood. The director felt as if he was watching another film altogether. He blushed in spite of himself. In order to accentuate the emotion in the finale, he had intertwined similar, meaningless scenes and backed them up by prolonged orchestral music and a chorus. Now the director realized that he had simply followed the conventional canon of editing. There suddenly rang in his ears the words which Kim Jong-il had so modestly said when bidding him fare-well-"Look through it again carefully."

Thus Kim, although still a very young man himself, played the big daddy role, with his filmmakers cast as children. "In keeping with the proverb, 'Spare the rod and spoil the child,' Kim Jong-il was extremely exacting while being infinitely kind to them as well. With such fatherly attention, Kim Jong-il helped them in their work."48 The role of the movie-going ma.s.ses he envisioned as even more childish: to watch his films and, through watching, fully internalize devout reverence toward his own father as the father of them all, in accordance with the "monolithic ideology." His efforts paid off, in terms of both propaganda and art. Audiences definitely noticed an improvement. Some of the films produced under his supervision drew favorable reviews not only from the captive North Korean audience but from outsiders, as well.

Kim Jong-il's takeover of North Korean opera in the late 1960s was as blunt and, for those in the industry, as initially humiliating as his earlier move to abolish the filmmakers' "esthetic review" sessions. He attended the opening of a new opera. While he watched the performance, "his face clouded." When the curtain came down, he gathered the writers and asked them "whether they would follow the old manner they had adopted. Faced by such an abrupt question, they were unable to say a word. Turning to the bewildered artists, he explained the defects of opera one by one and said that the time had come for them to put aside operas of this kind-in which the content is shackled to the form and which do not appeal to contemporary esthetic sense."

Korea had its own cla.s.sic opera form. However, due at least partly to Soviet influence, the traditional form had declined in favor of European-style opera. Viewing European opera as an aristocratic form, Kim Jong-il like-wise was not interested in bringing back the traditional, decidedly un-revolutionary Korean opera. Rather, he was determined to create a new type of opera, starting with operatic versions of Sea of Blood Sea of Blood and the other "revolutionary masterpieces" that he had made into movies. He would replace the Western-style arias and recitatives with and the other "revolutionary masterpieces" that he had made into movies. He would replace the Western-style arias and recitatives with juche juche elements, including songs sung in verses or stanzas, as in Korean folk ballads. elements, including songs sung in verses or stanzas, as in Korean folk ballads. Another juche Another juche element would be element would be pangchang, pangchang, offstage solos, duets and choruses that narrate, or project an inner voice, and set the mood. offstage solos, duets and choruses that narrate, or project an inner voice, and set the mood. Pangchang Pangchang is described as "unique in opera. is described as "unique in opera.49 In reality there is offstage singing in European opera. Take Il Trovatore, Il Trovatore, for example. But it would be a mistake simply to dismiss the North Korean claim by saying that Verdi and others were ahead of Kim Jong-il there. When I had a chance to experience it in person, attending a performance of for example. But it would be a mistake simply to dismiss the North Korean claim by saying that Verdi and others were ahead of Kim Jong-il there. When I had a chance to experience it in person, attending a performance of The Flower Girl The Flower Girl in 1989 (I'll say more about that performance in chapter 20), I found in 1989 (I'll say more about that performance in chapter 20), I found pangchang pangchang peculiarly affecting-differing subtly but significantly from the usual offstage singing in Western grand opera and in stage musicals of the Broad-way type. peculiarly affecting-differing subtly but significantly from the usual offstage singing in Western grand opera and in stage musicals of the Broad-way type.

Kim put himself into the development of Sea of Blood Sea of Blood as an opera just as he had done with the earlier movie version. Says an official biography: "The unremitting application which he brought to his task can be shown by the following figures: he listened to over fifty songs on nine occasions before selecting the song of the village youths in Act 1; as many as ninety songs on seven occasions before selecting one for a duet in Act 2; and over one hundred songs on six occasions for the duet between the mothers of Bok-dol and Chil-song in Act 3." as an opera just as he had done with the earlier movie version. Says an official biography: "The unremitting application which he brought to his task can be shown by the following figures: he listened to over fifty songs on nine occasions before selecting the song of the village youths in Act 1; as many as ninety songs on seven occasions before selecting one for a duet in Act 2; and over one hundred songs on six occasions for the duet between the mothers of Bok-dol and Chil-song in Act 3."

The creative staff did not quite understand how to use pangchang, pangchang, so young Kim "specified where so young Kim "specified where pangchang pangchang should be used and what its content should be." For example, in a scene in which the illiterate heroine's son, Ul-nam, is teaching her how to write, the composers wrote separate songs for the two of them to sing. "But Kim Jong-il, when he saw the scene, claimed that it had no general appeal and that the deep feelings of mother and son should be brought into relief, not through their songs, but by the use of should be used and what its content should be." For example, in a scene in which the illiterate heroine's son, Ul-nam, is teaching her how to write, the composers wrote separate songs for the two of them to sing. "But Kim Jong-il, when he saw the scene, claimed that it had no general appeal and that the deep feelings of mother and son should be brought into relief, not through their songs, but by the use of pangchang." pangchang." In the resulting re-written scene, the two study silently-while the offstage In the resulting re-written scene, the two study silently-while the offstage pangchang pangchang chorus "conjures up the spiritual world of the mother and son in a way which neither songs nor gestures could bring out:" chorus "conjures up the spiritual world of the mother and son in a way which neither songs nor gestures could bring out:"50 The mother's voice echoes through the dark sky; A flood of stars lights the sleepless night.

Nourishing the flower bud in her heart, She pictures a new and joyful world.

The mother who has known such a bitter life Learns one, then another letter this night.51 By all accounts, when Sea of Blood Sea of Blood premiered at the Pyongyang Grand Theater July 17, 1971, in the presence of the Great Leader himself, it astonished the theatergoers with its power. "Everyone in the audience became deeply moved and stood to applaud Kim Jong-il," said a former member of the elite who defected to South Korea. The production made Kim Jong-il's name and helped to solidify his status as the most likely successor to his father. premiered at the Pyongyang Grand Theater July 17, 1971, in the presence of the Great Leader himself, it astonished the theatergoers with its power. "Everyone in the audience became deeply moved and stood to applaud Kim Jong-il," said a former member of the elite who defected to South Korea. The production made Kim Jong-il's name and helped to solidify his status as the most likely successor to his father.52 The afterglow lasted for some time. A caption attached to a photo of Kim Jong-il taken on April 6, 1973, 1973, describes him as expounding "the principles of creating the describes him as expounding "the principles of creating the Sea of Blood Sea of Bloodtype revolutionary operas." It is one of the most appealing photos of him. Standing in what looks to be his office, smiling and gesturing as he addresses note-taking journalists, the thirty-one-year-old cultural czar appears confident and enthusiastic. Now he is no mere privileged kid, relying solely on his father's authority to lord it over his elders, but a mature young master of a field in which young people typically can shine, one who not only knows but loves his subject.53 In his work with the cinema and opera, Kim Jong-il seems to have achieved-for once in his life-the delicate combination of toughness and solicitude needed to call forth his subordinates' best work. It may be that he had been studying his father's leadership techniques closely, and learning from them.

The propaganda goal toward which Kim Jong-il directed the new type of opera and all the other arts (he also gave his attention to improving dance, orchestral music, stage drama and novels, among other forms) was, of